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4Abstract
This  thesis  associates  the  cultural  elevation  of  discourse  articulating 
physiologically-centred conceptions of self in mid-nineteenth-century Britain with 
a  shift  in  power  relations.  I  contend that  the proliferation  of  zoologically-  and 
neurologically-oriented  texts,  themselves  embodying  politics  of  natural  truth, 
constituted a condition of  possibility  for  the emergence of  what  I  portray as  a  
'technicalization' of power. The articulation  of  organically determined notions of 
subjectivity are associated with the constitution of a technical ideal of knowledge 
production. Further, technical assemblages upon which physiological conceptions 
of self relied are shown to have helped constitute modes of resistance to discourse 
concerned  with  the  organic  determination  of  mind  and  life.  Technical  entities 
played  an  active  role  in  the  constitution  of  organic  subjectivities,  and  organic 
subjectivities in turn participated in the constitution of technical modes of being.
The historical narrative represents the formation of two related disciplines, 
zoology and psychology, as contingent upon the relative status of different kinds of 
epistemic  equipment.  In  a  natural  philosophic  context  pervaded  by  uncertainty 
regarding  the  relation  of  matter  to  spirit,  claims  that  could  be  made  regarding 
nature  were  circumscribed  by  what  'gentlemanly'  equals  could  agree  to  have 
'witnessed.'  Gentlemen  appealed  to  differing  forms  of  epistemic  equipment  in 
attempts to constitute zoology and psychology as disciplines.  The relative success 
of such appeals was determined not only by the political valency of the claims 
themselves, but also by the conditions constituted by the types of equipment used 
to make them.
The  thesis  then  goes  on  to  highlight  ways  in  which  the  disciplined 
consideration  of  body  and  mind  as  entities  determined  by  nature  constituted 
conditions  of  possibility  for  the  articulation  of  tool-  and  technique-centred 
subjectivities. The epistemic tools and representational claims appealed to as proof 
that  the  self  is  inherently  organic  (have)  paradoxically  participate(d)  in  the 
constitution of modes of being that extend the self into the realm of the technical.  
By  the  late  nineteenth  century,  the  capacities  of  cognition  and  replication  are 
beginning to be attributed to the combination of technical and organic entities.
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Introduction
The problem of bio-technical subjectivity
Like many others born into our capitalist, secular world, I was encouraged 
from a  young age  to  believe  that  our  subjective  experience  is  determined and 
delimited by our organic bodies. That is, through reading and discussing (in my 
case  especially  with  my  father)  such  texts  as  Richard  Dawkins'  The  Blind 
Watchmaker (1986) and Daniel Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), I, like 
many others, found myself convinced that the state of our living bodies determines 
all of out perceptions of and actions in the world. It seemed to me that humanity is, 
above all else, 'organic'.1
Despite this inculcated conviction, however, doubt has begun to encroach 
on my prior certainties over the past five or so years. In their stead, I have come to 
believe - along with a wide range of other writers, artists, engineers, scientists and 
performers before me - that non-biological, technical entities are key participants in 
our thoughts and experiences. Whether I consider the integration of our lives with 
the tools  we use in  day-to-day situations,  or  that  our  bodies  are  constantly re-
defined in relation to the built aspects of our environments, I can’t help but think 
that I am not only an organic being: I am also, at heart, technical.
There now exists a considerable body of literature that asserts that 'we' are 
(or, alternately, 'everything' is), in some sense, 'technical'.  For example, it is no  
longer considered eccentric to assert that we are ontologically 'cybernetic' and/or 
subjectively 'cyborg' (on which see below).2 The question remains, however: what 
1 'Organicism' in this thesis refers to the dual contention that our bodies are constituted by 
a force or set of conditions defined by a force or set of conditions defined by an extra-
human 'nature', and that our experiences are entirely dependent on our bodily states. 
See Dawkins, R. The Extended Phenotype: the gene as the unit of selection (Oxford, 
1982); Dawkins, R. The Blind Watchmaker (Harlow, 1986); Dennet, D. Darwin's  
Dangerous Idea: evolution and the meanings of life (London, 1995).
2 The body of literature addressing 'the cyborg' is now extensive. See especially Haraway, 
D. 'A Cyborg Manifesto: science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth 
century', in Haraway, D. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: the reinvention of nature (New 
York, 1991), pp. 149-181; Channell, D.F. The Vital Machine: a study of technology and 
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are we to  make of such an ontology? And what do such notions of subjectivity 
imply for our approaches to organization and our strategies of survival, sustenance 
and replication/reproduction? What is at stake in the identification of ourselves as 
engineered, ‘posthuman’3 or technical beings?
This thesis is concerned with what I perceive to be an at times dangerously 
de-emphasised element of our technically-constituted present; that of the 'organism' 
element of the cyb-org. It is motivated by what I believe to be a pressing need to 
re-affirm  and  reconcile  our  technical  selves  to  the  'biological'  aspects  of  our 
techno-biologies. Portraying the constitution of an exclusively organic subjectivity 
as a key condition of possibility for the emergence of cybernetic subjectivities, it 
seeks  (following  the  recent  publications  of  Donna  Haraway)  to  privilege  an 
integration  of  bodies  and  machines  that  remains  sensitive  to  the  needs  of  the 
living.4 There seem to be many different ways of becoming technical.5 I here insist 
organic life (New York and Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1991); Gray, C.H. (ed.) The 
Cyborg Handbook (New York and London, 1995); Hutchins, E. Cognition in the Wild 
(Cambridge, MA and London; MIT Press, 1995); Balsamo, A. Technologies of the 
Gendered Body: reading cyborg women (Durham and London; Duke University Press, 
1996); Haraway, D. Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_  
OncoMouse (New York and London, 1997); Hayles, N.K. How We Became Posthuman: 
virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature, and informatics (Chicago and London; University 
of Chicago Press, 1999); Clark, A. Natural Born Cyborgs: why minds and technologies 
are made to merge (New York; Oxford University Press, 2003); Hayles, N.K. My Mother  
Was a Computer: digital subjects and literary texts (Chicago and London; University of 
Chicago Press, 2005); Pickering, A. The Cybernetic Brain: sketches of another future 
(Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 2010).
3 On the notion of the posthuman see Pickering, A. The Mangle of Practice: time, agency,  
and science (Chicago and London, Chicago University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 25-26 and 
229-234;   Hayles, How We Became Posthuman); Wolfe, C. What is Posthumanism? 
(London and Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 2010). On relations between 
science and technology studies and the posthuman see also Roosth, S. and Silbey, S. 
‘Science and Technology Studies: from controversies to posthumanist social theory’, in 
Turner, B.S. The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory (Oxford, 2009), pp. 451-
473.
4 Haraway, D. A Companion Species Manifesto: dogs, people, and significant otherness 
(Chicago, 2003). See also Haraway, D. When Species Meet (Minneapolis and London; 
University of Minneapolis Press, 2008). My concern with the conditions of possibility of 
becoming technical is posed in a somewhat different (though I believe complementary) 
manner by Adrian Mackenzie, for example. See Mackenzie, A. Transductions: bodies 
and machines at speed (New York and London, 2002), on p. 2.
5 For example, Chris Gray et. al. identify cybernetic subjectivity with literary imagination, 
technoscientific practice, space exploration, film, and psychology, amongst other 
categories. See Gray, C.H., Mentor, S. and Figuera-Sarriera, H.J. 'Cyborgology: 
constructing the knowledge of cybernetic organisms', in Gray, The Cyborg Handbook, 
pp. 1-14.  As noted below, I address the rather protean 'nature' of 'the cybernetic' here 
by emphasising its embodiment in the fusing of tools and living bodies at particular times 
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on  the  necessity  of  attending  more  closely  to  one  specific  one:  that  of 
(simultaneously) becoming 'organic.' To counterpoint N. Katherine Hayles' recent 
title, My Mother Was a Computer (2005); 'my father is an organism.'
What do we understand by the cybernetic or cyborg? In their introduction 
to  The Cyborg Handbook (1995),  Chris Gray and his co-authors emphasise the 
diversity of ways in which the cybernetic can be figured and produced.6 In contrast, 
I want to adopt a fairly specific (if nevertheless wide-ranging) definition of such a 
figure; a cybernetic entity (for the purposes of this thesis) is an integrated system 
whose operation is enabled by the co-participation of natural and manufactured 
parts. In opposition to those who represent the cyborg as an identity characterised 
by the organic body's 'extension' via 'technology' (see below),  as well as those that 
consider  cybernetics  to  be  an  analogical  science  concerned  merely  with  the  
comparison of organism and machine,7 I thereby adhere to a figure of the cyborg as 
simultaneously a material, embodied and constructed entity, characterised by its  
combination of organic and technical elements.8
Having highlighted the importance of the organic in the constitution of the 
technical,  it  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  the  technical  is  indispensable  in 
consideration of the organic. 'Life' (or indeed 'existence')9 can no longer be isolated 
from the tools and techniques by which it is studied, re-created and manipulated.  
The narrative to be deployed here indicates not only that an organic subjectivity 
has been critical to the constitution of the technical, but also that the technical is  
critical  to  -  and  thereby  constitutive  of  -  the  organic.  The  two  categories  are 
and in specific places.
6 Gray, et. al. 'Cyborgology'.
7 Hayles, My Mother was a Computer offers a critical analysis of both the tendency of 
technically-enthusiastic claims to efface the living body, and the anti-technicalism that 
underlies much recourse to analogy. For an example of the former, see Clark, Natural  
Born Cyborgs. Regarding the latter, Muri, A. The Enlightenment Cyborg: a history of  
communications and control in the human machine, 1660-1830 (Toronto, Buffalo and 
London; University of Toronto Press, 2007) tends to conflate the analogical relation of 
machines and bodies with the constitution of organo-technical hybrids. See also Morus, 
I.R. (ed.) Bodies/Machines (Oxford and New York, 2002).
8 Similar definitions/declarations can be found in Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto'; 
Channell, The Vital Machine, on pp. 109-110, and Cordeschi, R. The Discovery of the 
Artificial: behaviour, mind and machines before and beyond cybernetics (Dordrecht, 
Boston and London, 2002), on p. xi.
9 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, pp. 246-252.
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enfolded within broader, 'cybernetic' entities, discourses and practices.
Finally, I wish to insist, along with two other recent publications,10 on the 
historicity (though not necessarily the originality)11 of the notion of the self as a 
technical-organic hybrid. In articulating - as I do here - a specifically historical 
account of technical subjectivity, am not concerned with portraying an eternally 
valid  'reality'  or  'nature'  of  its  constitution.  Rather,  I  am  concerned  with  the 
elucidation of one particular conception of it; a conception in which the concerns 
of the present can begin to be thought as both temporally specific and temporally 
specifying; as constituted by a past, but also as constitutive of a past. I am thereby 
committed,  along with Kay Anderson,  to  an inscribing of  the organic within a  
specifically posthuman history, in which the notion of human subjectivity becomes 
a  matter  of  historical  concern  rather  than  a  mode  of  historical  explanation.12 
Following  Michel  Foucault  and  others,  I  move  toward  the  construction  of  a 
genealogical13 account of the organic that does not seek to deploy 'the archive' as 
an authorizing technique.14 Rather, I affirm that narratives and texts such as the one 
10 Muri, The Enlightenment Cyborg; Ketabgian, T. The Lives of Machines: the industrial  
imaginary in Victorian literature and culture (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 
2011).
11 Haraway's 'A Cyborg Manifesto' insists on the need for cyborgs to refuse 'origin stories'. 
This refusal should not be taken as a refusal of the cyborg's historicity, however. Though 
much conventional historical analysis remains committed to the recounting of origins and 
ends (what Haraway refers to as 'salvation history'), this does not indicate that the 
(re)figuration of 'the past' is irrelevant to the present (or indeed the future). See Haraway, 
Modest_Witness, pp. 8-11 and 23-39.
12 See Anderson, K. Race and the Crisis of Humanism (Abingdon, London and New York; 
UCL Press, 2006) and Anderson, K and Perrin, C. 'Thinking with the Head; race, 
craniometry, humanism', Journal of Cultural Economy 2 (2009), pp. 83-98.
13 Foucault, M. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Bouchard, D.F. (ed.) Language,  
Counter-Memory, Practice: selected essays and interviews (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1977) pp.139-164. See esp. the comments on the body in genealogical analysis 
(on pp. 148, 153-154 and 155). To appropriate a passage of Judith Butler's: genealogy 
refuses to search for the origins of life, the inner truth of the nature of the organism, the 
'true' biology of the human body that repression has kept from view; rather, genealogy 
investigates the political stakes in designating as origin and cause those identity 
categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple 
and diffuse points of origin. The task of this enquiry is to center on - and decenter - such 
defining institutions. The original quote concerns gender rather than the organic. See 
Butler, J. 'Preface', in Butler, J. Gender Trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity 
(London, 2006 [1990]), p. xxxi.
14 On archives as constructs see Waterton, C. 'Experimenting with the Archive: STS-ers as 
analysts and co-constructors of databases and other archival forms', Science,  
Technology, and Human Values 35 (2010), pp. 645-676. Bowker, G.C. Memory 
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I am presenting here are independent, bio-technical processes constituted through 
interactions of bodily organisms and technical bodies.15 The implications of such 
an affirmation will be returned to in the conclusion of this thesis. What is important 
to  note  is  that  the  conception  of  self  and  world  as  inherently  ‘technical’  is  in  
contention, and that I am committed to affirming that such conceptions are  (and 
should be) historically situated.
The question of the technical
The critical role that the above terminology relating to 'the technical' plays 
in this thesis warrants further explication at this stage. As will become clearer as  
the narrative progresses,  I  have adopted a specific  and perhaps to  some rather 
idiosyncratic approach to terms relating to this category.
Most notably, I avoid all reference to 'technology' as referring to the built  
aspects of environments. The principal rationale for this has its roots in a long-
standing (though not universally acknowledged) disjuncture between uses of this 
term  in  anglophone,  and  continental  European,  intellectual  traditions.  Nathan 
Schlanger highlights this difference as one between an anglophone 'instrumental' 
conception of  the term,  and the continental  notion that  'technology'  refers  to  a 
specific mode of being as much as it does a set of entities in the world. 16 Broadly 
speaking, English-language authors conceive of 'technologies' as entities that have 
been constructed with the performance of specific tasks,  or  the achievement of 
specific ends, in mind: hammers, as 'technologies', might be understood as a class 
of  entities  constructed  for  the  striking  of  objects,  for  example.17 In  contrast, 
Practices in the Sciences (London and Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 2005); Derrida, J. 
(trans. Prenowitz, E.) Archive Fever: a Freudian impression (Chicago and London; 
Chicago University Press, 1995).
15 Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer. See also Foucault, M. 'What is an Author?', in 
Rabinow, P. (ed.) The Foucault Reader (New York, 1984), pp. 117-120.
16 Schlanger, N. 'Introduction', in Schlanger, N. (ed.) Marcel Mauss: techniques,  
technology and civilization (New York and Oxford, 2006), pp. 1-29. On pp. 2-4.
17 See eg. Mitcham, C. Thinking Through Technology: the path between engineering and 
philosophy (University of Chicago Press; Chicago and London, 1994).
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following the  work  of  Martin  Heidegger,  continental  philosophers  and a  small 
minority of anglophone thinkers have begun to articulate a conception of the world 
which emphasises the 'logos' element of 'techno-logy':18  'technology' is for these 
authors  not  a  set  of  entities  on  the  world  'out  there'  (eg.  a  hammer),  but  a 
historically specific mode of being or becoming (the total set of entities, actions 
and effects associated with hammering).
The  question  of  the  definition  of  'technology'  constitutes  a  choice  - 
between the consideration of the technical as an expanding, progressive process of 
'rationalization' that we as 'subjects' that produce and deploy, and can choose either  
to adopt or contest, and an acknowledgement that it is precisely in the realm of the 
technical that cognition – and thereby the subject - is constituted and created. It is  
this latter,  to me much richer conception of the term, that motivates its general 
absence  in  this  thesis:  in  considering  the  place  of  'the  technical'  at  specific 
historical and geographical sites,  I  hope to further the notion that our historical 
situation is, in an important sense, also a technological one.
Rather than referring to 'technology' as a catch-all category for elements of 
our world that  are not  conventionally associated with (the equally problematic) 
'nature',  then,  I  here  deploy  the  terms  'tool',  'technique',  and  'technical'  when 
referring to entities and activities related to non-organic elements of cognitive life. 
This of course begs the question of what I mean by these terms.
A  number  of  authors  have  sought  to  address  what  we  mean  by  a 
'technique'. One of the earliest advocates of 'technology' as an academic discipline, 
Marcel Mauss,19 articulated  an instrumental notion of technique that has become 
particularly prevalent in the anglophone tradition: 'We call 'technique' an ensemble 
of  movements  or  actions,  in  general  and  for  the  most  part  manual,  which  are 
organized and traditional, and which work together towards the achievement of a 
goal known be physical, chemical or organic.'20 Techniques are the human actions 
18 Thus Bernard Steigler and Adrian Mackenzie, for example, separately emphasise that 
technology as a notion is always-already 'technical' (ie. the technical is itself a condition 
of possibility for the conceptualization of something called 'technology'). See Steigler, B. 
Technics and Time 1: the fault of Epimethius (Stanford; University Press, 1998); Steigler, 
B. Technics and Time 2: disorientation (Stanford; University Press, 2009); Steigler, B. 
Technics and Time 3: cinematic time and the question of malaise (Stanford; University 
Press, 2011). Mackenzie, Transductions.
19 Schlanger, 'Introduction'.
20 Mauss, M. (trans. Redding, J.R. )'Techniques and Technology', in Schlanger, Marcel  
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requisite to achieve a certain set of technical goals. This conception of technique is  
accompanied in his texts by an equally instrumental  schema whereby technical  
entities are constituted as the expression of specific social goals - as the effects of 
certain ideals that are not themselves influenced by the world of the technical.
In contrast to Mauss, Bruno Latour articulates a conception of technique as 
constituted by technical entities themselves, as much as by the bodies that appear 
to  perform  them.  For  Latour,  'techniques  imply  not  [human]  society...  but  a 
semisocial organization that brings together humans and non-humans from very 
different seasons, places, and materials... Techniques are what happen to tools and 
non-human actants when they are processed through an organization that extracts, 
recombines, and socializes them.'21 It is this latter notion of technique that I wish to 
emphasise here. Techniques, this thesis highlights, are not simply actions intended 
for  the  achievement  of  goals  that  have been  articulated by  humans  – they are 
actions  (or,  following Andrew Pickering,  kinds of performance),  that  appear  in 
situations that can be described as co-constituted by both tools and organic bodies.
The  question  of  the  definition  of  'tools'  present  an  equally  intractable 
difference between instrumental and technological considerations of the nature of 
being. Though one of the most lauded advocates of philosophically technological 
considerations  in  the  English  language,  in  this  instance,  Latour  offers  a  more 
instrumental  definition  of  the  term:  a  tool  is  'the  extension  of  social  skills  to  
nonhumans.'  They 'represent  the  extension  of  a  skill  rehearsed in  the realm of 
social interactions' to a non-human context.22 The difficulty of this position for the 
consideration of technology as a mode of being should be clear:  following the 
general  tendency  of  the  continental  study  of  technique  towards  refusing  any 
absolute  differentiation  between  social  (ie.  human)  and  technical  elements  of 
existence,23 it is equally be possible to state that tools are extensions of 'non-human' 
skills to societies (ie. that tools do not have an exclusively 'social' origin). Latour  
does not follow through with his above-noted insistence on the inseparability of the 
Mauss, p. 149.
21 Latour, B. 'A Collective of Humans and Nonhumans', in Hanks, C. Technology and 
Values: essential readings (Malden, MA, Oxford, and Chichester, 2010), p. 56.
22 Latour, 'A Collective',  p. 57.
23 Steigler, Technics and Time, Vols. 1-3.
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social/psychological and the technical.24
Considered  here,  tools  (following  Steigler,  Heidegger,  et  al),  are 
understood  as  simultaneously  instantiations  and  constituents  of  psycho-social 
existence.  In  addition,  they  are  not  considered  to  be  differentiable  from  the 
technical  endeavours  that  they  (along  with  techniques)  constitute,  except  in 
retrospect. As Heidegger's famous observations relating to hammering highlight, 
tools often only become recognisable as such when they appear as 'broken', or no 
longer effective.25 They are elements of the technical that are neither significant 
enough to be upheld as ends in themselves, nor dispensable enough to be neglected 
in  the constitution of those ends.  Rather,  they act  as  catalysts -  participants in  
technical endeavour that do not undergo significant changes as a result of such 
participation.  Tools,  considered  here,  are  (in  contrast  to  temporally  more 
ephemeral  techniques  that  they  are  generally  accompanied  by)  the  memorial 
detritus left behind by technical endeavour at large. As such, they constitute the  
broad objects of this study – the elements around which considerations of relations 
between the organic and the technical have been formed over time.
These comments, whilst they defer the problem of defining the technical, 
do so inadequately. It should by now be evident that a consideration of 'tool' or  
'technique' is part of the same endeavour that requires a definition of 'technology'. 
There is no room in this study for defining this collection of terms adequately,  
except to note that they are all both related, and open to contestation. The most  
definite statement that can be made regarding them is that this study -  in that it  
aspires to the denotion 'techno-logy' - inscribes the psychological (ie. the category 
that denotes beliefs relating to cognition) as both constitutive of and constituted by 
the technical (ie. the category that denotes the bringing-forth of the world via the 
combination of tools and techniques). Because of this contention (that thinking, as 
an aspect of existing more generally, is an inherently technical endeavour), it is  
unable to contemplate the technical as a definite object of analysis, but rather seeks 
to bring it into question (in this case in relation to the history of psychology). As  
Steigler  notes,  it  was  during  'the  nineteenth  century,  as  stability  became 
24 Pickering, A. 'The Politics of Theory: producing another world, with some thoughts on 
Latour', Journal of Cultural Economy 2 (2009), pp. 197-212.
25 Mitcham, Thinking Through Technology, pp. 49 and 254-258.
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increasingly uncertain and change the rule, [that] it began to appear to be possible 
that technology, emerging from the technics associated with science, might prove 
to be incompatible with being.'26 Such a comment brings us back to the principle 
concern of this thesis - that of the relation between technical entities and those 
organic  beings  that  are  more  conventionally  considered  constitutive  of 
psychological existence.
Situating the organic as a matter of concern
As an object,  this  thesis is oriented  towards the organic as a 'matter  of 
concern.'  In  a  recent  article  questioning  why  the  twentieth-century  project  of  
'critique'  (which  sought  to  escape  or  move  away from  the  'matters  of  fact'  it 
analysed)  has  'run  out  of  steam',  Latour  emphasises  the  need  for  a  positive 
engagement with the materials and themes that animate intellectual discussion.27 
He  develops  the  concept  of  a  'matter  of  concern,'  through  the  use  of  which 
intellectuals might begin to blur any absolute distinctions between the objects of 
their  analysis  and  the  standpoint  they  adopt  to  analyse  (and  thereby  avoid 
positioning themselves as objective, external ‘critics’ of their subject matter).
As a matter of concern, the organic comes to appear not as a self-sustaining 
entity  that  follows  its  own intrinsic  laws  of  development,  but  as  a  discursive-
technical construct that requires the mobilization of a specific set of resources and 
commitments  for  its  continued  survival.  The  organic  is  thought  here  as  an 
assemblage; an amalgamation of a whole range of entities ranging from tools, texts  
and institutions to bodies, practices and beliefs.28 Much recent interest in scientific 
or 'natural philosophic' (as studies relating to nature were referred to as prior to the  
nineteenth century) notions of humans and human social groups has centred around 
the question of whether or not 'science' is something which can be reduced to its  
26 Steigler,  Technics and Time 3, p. 203.
27 Latour, B. 'Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From matters of fact to matters of 
concern', Critical Enquiry 30 (2004), pp. 225-248.
28 On assemblages see Latour, B. Reassembling the Social: an introduction to actor 
network theory (Oxford; University Press, 2005).
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social context, or whether the perception of a certain, 'objective' account of non-
human  nature  might  be  attainable.29 What  is  not  generally  addressed  by  such 
accounts is whether or not non-human (including technical) entities or actors can 
be said to participate in the constitution and construction of belief. Although the 
construal of science or natural philosophy as a pre-eminently ‘human’, 'subjective'  
activity has been helpful to historians in the past,30 we now find ourselves in a 
position in which it  has become possible -  indeed necessary -  to recognise the 
autonomous contributions  of  technical  equipment  and non-human organisms to 
such endeavour.
My preoccupation with the active participation of animals and tools in the 
process of apprehending ‘nature’ coincides with the interests of a number of studies 
that  seek to characterise  the scientific activity as  above all  a 'practice'-oriented 
activity. The study of science and technology has, over the last four decades, been 
marked in by a range of historical and ethnographic inquiries seeking to delineate 
the nature of laboratory-based investigation. Broadly, these studies have begun to 
turn  away  from  questions  relating  to  the  extent  to  which  science  might  be 
considered inherently 'social'  (most  famously contended in Stephen Shapin and 
Simon  Schaffer's  Leviathan  and  the  Air  Pump (1985)).31 Laboratory  science, 
according to the texts of Latour, Ian Hacking, Karin Knorr Cetina and Andrew 
Pickering, is marked by a specific set of relations by which human scientists and 
the objects of their investigation interact and intermingle in what Pickering terms a 
'dance of agency.'32 Haraway has  similarly positioned her  studies in  relation to 
29Young, R.M. ‘Science is Social Relations’ Radical Science Journal  5 (1977), pp. 65-129 
[available at http://human-nature.com/rmyoung/ accessed 05/04/2011]. For recent 
debate surrounding the objective or inherently contingent status of ‘the social’ in 
historical narrative see Zammito, J.H. A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: post-
positivism and the study of science from Quine to Latour (Chicago and London; Chicago 
University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 151-182; Cooter, R. ‘”Framing” the end of the social 
history of medicine’,  in Huisman, F. and Warner, J.H. (eds.) Locating Medical History:  
the stories and their meanings (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 
309-337 and Hayward, R. ‘’Much Exaggerated’: the end of the history of medicine’, 
Journal of Contemporary History 40 (2005), pp. 167-178.
30 Young, ‘Science is Social Relations’.
31Shapin, S and Schaffer, S. Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
experimental life (Princeton, NJ; University Press, 1985). On alternative readings of 
Shapin and Schaffer see Zammito, J.H. A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: post-
positivism in the study of science from Quine to Latour (Chicago and London: Chicago 
University Press, 2004), pp. 168-180.
32Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, esp. pp. 21-24.  Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. 
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laboratory  hybrids  in  her  more  avowedly  political  accounts  of  contemporary 
technoscientific experience.33 Taken together, these studies indicate that the highly-
technical  environment  of  the  experimental  laboratory  constitutes  a  key  site  in 
which living bodies and machines become or are made into techno-organic wholes.
Though  they  offer  powerful  conceptual  tools  that  undermine  such 
simplistic notions as the absolute 'objectivity' of science or, conversely, its inherent 
'relativism',  what  these  studies  have  not  interrogated  quite  so  closely  are  the 
conditions of possibility that  have enabled laboratory practices to enjoy such a 
prominent status in the first place. Such questions were understood as central to the 
history  of  science  during  the  1970s  and  1980s.  They  have  since  become  less 
fashionable.34 Existing accounts of the institutionalization of laboratory science (an 
occurrence  universally  acknowledged  to  have  occurred  during  the  nineteenth 
century) tend to privilege one or another of two categories; that of the state, or that  
of  individual  scientists.35 In  this  thesis,  I  re-visit  the  concerns  of  historians 
Laboratory Life: the social construction of scientific facts (Beverly Hills, 1979); Hacking, I. 
Representing and Intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science 
(Cambridge; University Press, 1983); Latour, B. Science in Action: how to follow 
scientists and engineers through society (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 
1987); Cetina, K.K. Epistemic Cultures: how the sciences make knowledge (Cambridge, 
MA and London; Harvard University Press, 1999). For an analysis of laboratory-centred 
'science studies' in relation to philosophy, see Zammito, A Nice Derangement, esp. pp. 
151-182.
33Haraway, Modest_Witness.
34 Gooday, G. 'Placing or Replacing the Laboratory in the History of Science?', Isis 99 
(2008), pp. 783-795; Kohler, R.E. 'Lab History: Reflections', idem, p. 761-786; Latour, B. 
'The Costly Ghastly Kitchen', in Cunningham, A. and Williams, P. (eds.) The Laboratory 
Revolution in Medicine (Cambridge; University Press, 1992), pp. 295-303. Though see 
also Lenoir, T. Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines 
(Stamford, CA; University Press, 1997).
35 For examples of work emphasising the former, see: Lenoir, T. 'Science for the Clinic: 
The Institutional Revolution in German Physics', in Coleman, W. and Holmes, F.L. The 
Investigative Enterprise: experimental physiology in nineteenth-century medicine 
(Berkeley, 1988), pp. 139-178; Lenoir, T. 'Laboratories, Medicine and Public Life in 
Germany 1830-1849: Ideological Roots of the Institutional Revolution', in Cunningham 
and Williams, The Laboratory Revolution in Medicine, pp. 14-71; Cooter, R and Sturdy, 
S. ‘Science, Scientific Management, and the Transformation of Medicine in Britain c. 
1870-1950’, History of Science 36 (1998), pp. 421-466. Literature emphasising the latter 
includes: Geison, G. Michael Foster and the Cambridge School of Physiology: The 
Scientific Enterprise in Late Victorian Society (Princeton, NJ; University Press, 1978); 
Coleman, W. 'Prussian Pedagogy: Purkyně at Breslau, 1823-1839’, in Coleman, W. and 
Holmes, F.L. The Investigative Enterprise, pp. 15-64; Kremer, R.L. 'Building Institutes 
For Physiology in Prussia, 1836-1846: Contexts, Interests, Rhetoric', in Cunningham and 
Williams, The Laboratory Revolution in Medicine, pp. 72-109.
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concerned  with  the  institutionalization  of  laboratories,  but  offer  a  somewhat 
different  account of  the conditions  upon which they were able  to gain cultural 
traction. Instead of appealing either to an unproblematized 'human' agency, or the  
'technical'  logic  of  a  bureaucratizing  state,  I  suggest,  the  establishment  of  
experimental  practices  as  critical  to  the  institutional  production  of  knowing 
subjects  can  be  understood  as  concomitant  with  the  assertion  of  a  specific,  
'organicist'  conception  of  subjectivity.  In  other  words,  I  offer  here  a  re-
interpretation  of  the  nineteenth-century  instantiation  of  experiment  as  an 
academically-respectable practice as dependent not only on a range of bureaucratic 
conditions  and  ‘individual’  efforts,  but  also  on  the  specific,  embodied, 
zoologically-informed conception of self that came to the fore at this time.
So as well as asserting that the organic, as a 'matter of concern', is in some 
sense  inherently  'technical',  this  thesis  makes  a  second,  critical  claim;  that  in 
establishing the organic as an authoritative mode of subjectivity, those actors or 
entities that help constitute such modes also establish the very conditions by which 
the organic begins to be re-cast as part of a broader, techno-organic whole. In other  
words, this thesis contends that a paradox can be said to lie at the heart of some of 
the more strident claims relating to the study of life: privileging the organic as a  
means by which questions relating to all kinds of experience might be explained 
has, historically, been irretrievably intertwined with the bringing-into-existence of 
the very technical  entities  that  have subsequently become emblematic  of  'post-
organic' (and posthuman) modes of subjectivity. A comment by Judith Butler, one 
of the most provocative and controversial  theorists  of embodied conceptions of 
subjectivity in recent times, encapsulates this line of argument succinctly: technical 
subjectivity,  I  contend,  'has  its  own… temporality  in which it  remains enabled 
precisely by the contexts from which it breaks... within political discourse, the very 
terms of resistance and insurgency are spawned in part by the powers that they 
oppose.'36 The concept of a matter of concern implies that the notion of the self as 
inherently  ‘technical’  is  dependent  upon  the  very  organo-centric  intellectual 
conditions out of which it has been able to emerge since the middle decades of the  
nineteenth century.
The organic is thereby portrayed as a matter of concern that is not only 
36 Butler, J. Excitable Speech: a politics of the performative (New York and London, 1997), 
p. 40.
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assembled, but which participates in the assembly of subjects and objects. Hence a 
primary purpose of this text is to begin to re-cast the organic as a key contributor to  
a broader process by which bio-technical entities and representations have come to 
proliferate, diversify and diffuse throughout technoscientific culture. Its concern is 
not to evaluate or compare different notions of life with a view to privileging one 
above the other. Nor is it to contest the legitimacy of organicist modes of thought 
in  any  absolute  sense.  Rather,  it  follows  Butler  in  asserting  the  potential  for 
subversion that the repetition or 'citation' of modes of expression that lie outside of  
one's own set of beliefs can have. Butler notes that ‘the resignification of norms 
is... a function of their inefficacy, and so the question of subversion, of working the  
weakness  in  the  norm,  becomes  a  matter  of  inhabiting  the  practices  of  its 
rearticulation.’37 To  the  extent  that  it  constitutes  a  rearticulation  of  a  set  of 
convictions and beliefs relating to 'life', this thesis highlights ways in which the 
organic participates in the constitution of modes of being that to it remain outside 
the domain of the enunciable. In announcing themselves as authoritative, organic 
modes of subjectivity, it claims, have participated in the construction of alternative 
modes of being that refuse the very possibility of apprehending a 'nature' that is not 
always already 'cultural' and/or 'technical'.38 It thereby identifies the assertion that 
the self is inherently organic as a participant in what Butler refers to as the 'turning 
of  power  against  itself  to  produce  alternative  modalities  of  power.'39 To  be 
concerned about any particular matter is to care about its fate.40 As partly technical 
beings, we should not seek to disarticulate ourselves absolutely from the organic 
matter that concerns us.
37Butler, J. Bodies that Matter: on the discursive limits of "sex" (London, 1993), p. 237.
38 On relations between these terms, see Michael, M. Reconnecting Culture, Technology,  
and Nature: from society to heterogeneity (London. 2000).
39Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 241. See also Butler, Excitable Speech, pp. 141-159.
40 Latour, 'Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?', p. 232; de la Bellacasa, M.P. 'Matters of 
Care in Technoscience: assembling neglected things', Social Studies of Science 41 
(2011), pp. 85-106.
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Locating the organic in the British nineteenth century
So far, I have referred to 'the cultural', 'the organic' and 'the technical' in a  
general and somewhat imprecise manner. Whilst this thesis does in some respects 
aspire to representing organicism as a phenomenon that embodies a certain set of 
power relations in general, it does not attempt to offer a universal history of ideas  
relating to 'life’. Instead, it presents an analysis of a specific time (the nineteenth 
century), a specific place (Britain) and a specific academic discipline (zoology) as 
a temporal, spatial and intellectual field through the analysis of which we might 
begin to construct a more general conception of the ways in which 'the' organic has 
participated in the constitution of technical  modes of subjectivity through time.  
This thesis thereby represents the nineteenth century as a critical period for the  
formation of technicalization of power in the West.
Others have pointed to the emergence of new forms of self-identification 
during the nineteenth century.41 To take one persuasive example, Friedrich Kittler, 
in his analysis of German discursive formations (Discourse Networks 1800/1900 
(1990)), has identified the period as marked by a critical shift in subjective modes. 
Kittler contrasts an early-nineteenth-century notion of individuality, integrity and 
‘authorship’  with  turn-of-the  twentieth  century  conceptions  of  representative 
practice as a dissolving of unified, authorial beliefs regarding the self. He thereby 
positions the nineteenth century as constituting a set of conditions that enabled a 
fundamental re-alignment of the place of humanity in intellectual and figurative 
practice. In Kittler’s 1800, authorship or the ‘fixing’ of text constitutes the human 
writer as ‘childlike’ male outside of feminine ‘nature’, who seeks to ‘interpret’ and 
thereby inculcate into (other male) readers a sense of a simultaneously spiritual, 
feminine, ‘natural’ source of truth. By Kittler’s 1900, in contrast, a world has been 
constituted in which the (no-longer so markedly gendered) ‘act’ of authorship is  
characterised by the interaction of certain kinds of mechanical and living bodies 
(most  notably  gramophones,  typewriters,  and  film  equipment,  along with  their 
designers and operators) that bring the possibility of representing anything apart  
from immediate, subjective experience into question.42 By 1900, for Kittler, the self 
41 Eg. Foucault, M. A History of Sexuality [Vol.I] (Harmonsworth, 1981); Kittler, F.A. (trans. 
Metteer, M.) Discourse Networks 1800/1900 (Stanford; University Press, 1990).
42 Kittler, Discourse Networks.
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has become something that can no longer be thought as constituted in relation to an 
autonomous, non-human ‘nature’, because it is being recognised that human bodies 
are being integrated ever-more closely into a world defined by certain types of  
machinery.
As well as pointing to the nineteenth century as a time of radical change in 
subjective modes, Kittler's work presents the period via a form of narration that 
does not rely on a temporally linear progress from beginning to end. Drawing on 
tools  and  techniques  developed  by  post-structuralist  authors  such  as  Jacques 
Derrida,  Jacques  Lacan and Michel  Foucault,  Discourse Networks  articulates  a 
conception of history as marked by a series of absolute epistemic breaks in modes 
of mediation.43 What is enunciable at any given time, for Kittler, is constituted in 
relation  to  the  technical  conditions  within  which  enunciation  takes  place: 
subjective modes centred around print and notions of self-'cultivation' in 1800 are 
represented as absolutely distinct from those that developed in conjunction with 
gramophones, films and typewriters around 1900. Whilst Kittler's linking of modes 
of discourse with the technical means by which such discourse took place is highly 
suggestive, there is little room in this account for forms of agency that are not 
either  technical  or  human.  The  human is  taken  out  of  its  animal,  evolutionary 
context and placed in conjunction with a range of tools and devices that constitute 
radical  differences  in  ways  of  thinking  of  the  (always-already-human)  self.  
Subjectivity  is  invariably  mediated  'technically',  but  not  necessarily  done  so 
‘developmentally’ or 'organically'.
In that I seek to refigure nineteenth-century texts relating to animality and 
embodiment into a comprehensible commentary on the place of the organic in a 
technically-defined world, I adopt a narrative strategy that owes somewhat more to 
nineteenth-century commitments to evolutionary gradualism. Geoffroy Bowker's 
recent Memory Practices in the Sciences (2005) points to the nineteenth century as 
a critical period for the emergence of what we now understand as conventionally 
'historical' modes of narration. Through a consideration of the geological science of 
the British natural philosopher Charles Lyell, Bowker shows how the notion of a 
perceptible ‘past’ that has its own, not-necessarily human agency informed much 
nineteenth-century scientific practice. Bowker shows that by thinking of the earth 
43 Wellbery, D.E. ‘Foreword’, in Kittler, Discourse Networks, pp. vii-xxxiii.
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as an (imperfect)  archivist,  Lyell helped consolidate a notion of the disciplined 
observer as a subject who’s duties included the imposition of ‘natural’ order: it was 
the author’s duty to ‘interpret’ or create order out of the uneven records left to the  
present by an abstract, impersonal ‘past’.44 In my own use of archives and textual 
records,  I  similarly draw together  archival  materials  to  form my own sense of 
order:  one  informed  by  the  concerns  regarding  organic-technical  interaction 
highlighted above. 
All  of  which  is  not  to  say  that  I  relate  nineteenth-century  texts  as 
authoritative means of conceiving of our present selves. As already noted, this text 
is  a bringing-together or ‘refiguring’ of materials relating to organic nature that 
were produced during the nineteenth century. It is inevitably partial, selective and 
informed  by  my own specific  concerns.45 Bowker  notes  that  many nineteenth-
century authors represented themselves as able to pronounce on the ordered nature 
of  things  because  of  their  (self-)positioning  as  technically-constituted  beings 
outside of ‘nature’.46 Here, I privilege nineteenth-century texts that, by insisting on 
the embodiment of mind in the nervous system, as well as the ‘animality’ of man, 
called this contention into question. I do so not because I believe that these well-
studied  nineteenth-century  considerations  of  selfhood  and  human  ‘nature’  are 
inherently  interesting  or  especially  plausible  (I  don’t),  but  rather  because  they 
present  a  particularly  vehement  example  of  the  assertion  that  we  are  first  and 
foremost ‘organic’ beings.
The  nineteenth  century  saw  the  coming-to-pre-eminence  in  Britain  of 
notions  of  humanity  as  an  inherently  'zoological'  entity.  Historians  have  long 
pointed  to  the  establishment  of  'evolutionary'  modes  of  thinking  at  this  time, 
especially  in  relation  the  so-called  'Darwinian  Revolution'.47 In  recent  years, 
44 Bowker, Memory Practices, pp. 35-73.
45 See Haraway, D. 'Situated Knowledges: the science question in feminism and the 
privilege of partial perspective', Feminist Studies 14 (1988), pp. 575-599.
46 Bowker, Memory Practices, pp. 35-73.
47 I do not directly address ‘Darwinism’ as a movement in this thesis for two major reasons. 
Firstly, Darwin studies have shown that the conception of Darwinism as a ‘revolutionary’ 
event that first showed how man was inextricably connected to the rest of organic nature 
is largely a twentieth-century myth (see the recent special issue of Isis: Isis 100 (2009), 
pp. 537-614.). Secondly, those that did adhere to the ‘Darwinian’ label during the 
nineteenth century, such as Thomas Henry Huxley, frequently remained highly 
ambivalent regarding the embodiment of mind in the nervous system (see e.g. White, P. 
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narratives  describing  the  establishment  of  'life'  sciences  such  as  zoology  and 
botany as respectable academic disciplines have been related in terms of the re-
organization of knowledge as a whole during the period.48 Differences between 
nineteenth-century  notions  of  'science'  or  'natural  philosophy'  have  been 
understood as disputes relating to questions of political organization, as well as the 
desirability  (or  otherwise)  of  certain forms of  human conduct.49 It  is  now well 
recognised that, in an important sense, the nineteenth century can be understood as 
one in which experience first became 'scientific' for a broad range of the British 
population.
The British nineteenth century has thereby constituted the focus of many 
histories of science concerned with examining the specific and contrasting means  
by which knowledge concerned with the definition of organic subjectivity has been 
produced and constructed over time. Such texts have characterised the period as 
one in which a wide variety of practices - including such diverse categories as 
literary  narration,  museological  collection  and  display,  experimentation,  and 
natural philosophic journeying - contributed to the formation of a discourse that 
sought to encapsulate the nature of life.50
Thomas Huxley: making the "man of science" (Cambridge; University Press, 2003)). 
Major studies of and collections regarding Darwinism include: Beer, G. Darwin’s Plots:  
evolutionary narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and nineteenth-century fiction [2nd ed.] 
(Cambridge and New York; Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1983]); Kohn, D. (ed.) 
The Darwinian Heritage (Princetion; University Press, 1985); Young, R.M. Darwin's  
Metaphor: nature's place in Victorian culture (Cambridge; University Press, 1985); 
Desmond, A. and Moore, J. Darwin (London, 1991); Browne, J. Charles Darwin [Vols. I: 
voyaging and II: the power of place] (London, 1995-2002).
48 Pickstone, J.V. Ways of Knowing: a new history of science, technology and medicine 
(Manchester; University Press, 2000). Bowker, Memory Practices, pp. 35-73; Hopwood, 
N., Schaffer, S. and Secord, J. ‘Seriality and Scientific Objects in the Nineteenth 
Century’, History of Science 48 (2010), pp. 251-285.
49On nineteenth-century organic science in Britain as inherently 'political', see especially 
Young, R.M. Darwin's Metaphor and Desmond, A. The Politics of Evolution: morphology,  
medicine and reform in radical London (Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 
1989) . On the relevance of 'science' to ideals of human conduct more generally, see 
especially Poovey, M. Making a Social Body: British cultural formation 1830-1864 
(Chicago and London, Chicago University Press, 1995); Cooter, R. The Cultural  
Meaning of Popular Science: phrenology and the organization of consent in nineteenth-
century Britain (Cambridge and New York; Cambridge University Press, 1984); Winter, 
A. Mesmerized: powers of mind in Victorian Britain (Chicago and London; Chicago 
University Press, 1998); Musselman, E.G. Nervous Conditions: science and the body 
politic in early industrial Britain (Albany; State University of New York Press, 2006).
50Major studies and collections include: Coleman, W. Biology in the Nineteenth Century:  
problems of form, function and transformation (Cambridge and New York; Cambridge 
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Britain  has  also  long  been  considered  a  context  in  which  industrial 
practices  proliferated  relatively  early.  A  range  of  histories  highlight  how  the 
factories  that  had  remained  very  much  outside  of  every-day  life  during  the 
eighteenth  century  became  ever-more  definitive  of  British  identity  during  the 
nineteenth. The nineteenth century was marked by a rapid process of urbanization, 
industrialization and bureaucratization that fundamentally altered both the structure 
of the British state and the beliefs and experiences of those living within it.51
Yet  these  two  trends  -  the  elevation  of  conceptions  of  self  explicitly 
committed to conceiving of man as an exclusively organic being, and the coming-
to-pre-eminence of technical modes of production and self government – have only 
recently begun to be thought in relation to each other. With a small number of  
significant  exceptions,52 the  technical  emphases  of  ‘industrialization’,  and  the 
coming-to-pre-eminence  of  ‘organicism’,  have  been  treated  as  categorically 
separate  (if  nevertheless  complimentary)  historical  movements.  The  British 
nineteenth century, then, presents a rich set of possibilities for thinking through 
ways in which technical and organic entities have come to constitute different parts 
of the same systemic whole in specific, historically-contingent ways. 
The organization of this thesis
Along with many texts that address the emergence of ‘science’ as a set of 
ideals that emerged during this period, my initial concern in this thesis is with the 
University Press, 1977); Beer, Darwin’s Plots; Rehbock, P.F. The Philosophic  
Naturalists: themes in early-nineteenth-century British Biology (Madison; University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983); Ritvo, H. The Animal Estate: the English and other creatures in 
the Victorian age (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1987); Desmond, The 
Politics of Evolution;  Rupke, N. Richard Owen: biology without Darwin [revised ed.] 
(Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press, 2009 [1994]); Secord, J.A. Victorian 
Sensation: the extraordinary publication, reception, and secret authorship of Vestiges of 
the Natural History of Creation (Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 1996)
51 Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines; Berg, M. The Machinery Question and the Making of  
Political Economy 1815-1848 (Cambridge; University Press, 1980); MacDonagh, O. ‘The 
Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: a reappraisal’, The Historical Journal 1 
(1958), pp. 52-67. 
52Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines; Morus, Bodies/Machines; Poovey, Making a Social  
Body; Desmond, The Politics of Evolution.
28
constitution  of  a  zoological  science  and  its  close  relation,  'physiological 
psychology',  as specifically academic ‘disciplines’.  However, concerned as I am 
above  all  with  relations  between  the  living  and  the  technical,  I  pay  particular 
attention to the place of what I refer to as 'epistemic' tools and  techniques (ie, 
those tool sand techniques utilised in the constitution of belief)53 that were brought 
to  bear  in  these  disciplines'  formation.54 In  so  doing,  I  follow Mary  Poovey's 
Making  a  Social  Body (1995)  in  refusing  appeals  to  either  technical 
bureaucratization or individual human agency as modes of historical explanation. 55 
Poovey's text brings to the fore ways in which the constitution of disciplines during 
the early nineteenth century can be understood as simultaneously discursive and 
material.56 But where it focuses on 'institutions' as the pre-eminent category of the 
'material',57 I  emphasise  techno-organic  assemblages  more  generally:  epistemic 
tools such as microscopes and museum specimens, as well as humans themselves, 
53 The term ‘epistemic tool’ is an adaptation of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s concept of an 
‘epistemic thing’; a laboratory hybrid of organism and machine. See Rheinberger, H-J. 
Towards a History of Epistemic Things: synthesising proteins in the test tube (Stanford; 
University Press, 1997). Rheinerger develops this concept as an object of his 
‘archaeological’ excavation of experimental systems in scientific life. His focus  is above 
all else on the ways in which scientific truth gets constituted in discourse through the 
construction of such hybrid objects. Whilst sympathetic to the overall aims of this project, 
I am concerned here not with how laboratories constitute 'epistemic things,' but with how 
such techno-organic hybrids came to be valued as entities that were worth producing in 
the first place. Emphasising the technical constitution of knowledge practices in science 
and natural philosophy, the notion of an ‘epistemic tool’ - a tool that is valued because of 
its’ perceived utility in the production of truth – allows an interrogation of knowledge-
constituting practices without assuming a-priori (as Rheinberger tends to)  that the 
means by which such constitution takes place is through a relation between an 
organically-defined, embodied observer and a technical assemblage in a dedicated 
scientific laboratory. Indeed, as Tamara Ketabgian has recently argued, it was a human-
tool interaction (not an organism-tool interaction) that formed the pre-eminent figure of 
production during the nineteenth century. See Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines, pp. 17-
44 and Ketabgian, T. 'The Human Prosthesis: workers and machines in the Victorian 
industrial scene,' Critical Matrix 11 (1997), pp. 4-32.
54 In this emphasis on a need to interrogate relations between ‘the technical’ and natural 
philosophy or science, I follow Forman, P. 'The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of 
Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the History of Technology', History and 
Technology 23 (2007), pp. 1-152; Porter, T.M. ‘How Science Became Technical’ Isis 100 
(2009), pp. 292-309, and Forman, P. '(Re)cognizing Postmodernity: helps for historians - 
of science especially' Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 33 (2010), pp. 157-175.
55Poovey, Making a Social Body, pp. 98-114.
56 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
57 Ibid.
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played at least as critical a role in the formation of disciplines as did the institutions 
and statistical and fictional texts that Making a Social Body analyses.
To this  end,  chapter  one  of  this  thesis  relates  ways in  which the  texts 
attributed to one zoological author, Robert Edmund Grant, came to be shaped by 
the  technical  conditions  under  which  he  worked  during  the  early  nineteenth 
century. During the 1820s, Grant's texts appealed to the microscope as a means by 
which  the  nature  of  relations  between  life  and  non-life  (or  as  they  put  it,  the 
organic  and  the  chemical)  might  be  interrogated.  At  stake  was  the  politically-
relevant question of whether laws developed in relation to non-living matter could 
be extended to the realm of life, or whether a specific, non-material force or spirit  
was required to explain the existence of the living. Yet during the 1830s, after 
Grant had been appointed as professor of zoology at University College London, 
this concern with microscopy came to be displaced by a seemingly more pressing 
concern with relations between anatomical forms visible to the naked eye. Grant’s 
works abandon their concern with relating living and non-living matter in favour of 
the analysis of life itself as a unitary whole. Such a shift is explained in terms of  
the epistemic condition of the time, in which anatomical specimens were privileged 
over lens-based observations of the very small as means of witnessing nature. In a 
setting in which the question of observation was thought in terms of gentlemanly 
agreement  amongst  a  community  of  observationally-privileged  ‘witnesses’, 
microscopes  were  not  considered  an  especially  reliable  means  of  perception. 
Collections of museum specimens, on the other hand, could both be witnessed by a 
large number of observers at one time, and were understood as embodiments of 
personal  and  national  prestige.  Producing  and  analysing  museum  specimens 
thereby came to be understood as more conducive to the formation of zoology as 
an academic discipline than appeals to the observational efficacy of tools such as 
microscopes.
The second chapter follows a similar trajectory to the first, in that it relates 
the differing commitments of two self-proclaimed 'physiological' analysts of the 
human mind in terms of the epistemic tools that their psychologies appealed to. 
The publications  of  William Benjamin Carpenter,  one of  the most  well-known 
physiologists  of  nineteenth-century  Britain,  critiques  prior  characterizations  of 
psychological  nature  on  anatomical  grounds.  In  contrast,  the  publications  of 
Thomas  Laycock  present  microscopic  evidence  as  critical  to  consideration  of 
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psyche as  an embodied phenomenon.  The differing emphases  of  these author’s 
psychologies, as well as their respective attempts to propagate their own notions of  
the psyche,  are  analysed in  relation to  the changing status  of  microscopes and 
museums over the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Psychology, as the 
study of the nervous body,  is  thereby understood as predicated on to the same 
technical commitments as the academic discipline of zoology.
Together, these two chapters delineate ways in which tools and techniques 
relating to the study of zoology were brought to bear on what had hitherto been 
understood  as  nominally  'moral'  questions,  such  as  the  necessity  of  deistic  
intervention in the creation of life, or the relation between reason and emotion.  
Technical concerns are thereby shown to have been integral to both the distinction 
of  and negotiation of  relations between studies of life  and mind in nineteenth-
century Britain.
However,  physiological  psychologists,  unlike  their  more  conventionally 
zoologically-concerned  counterparts,  found  themselves  without  a  ready  set  of 
institutional  conditions  upon  which  they  could  found  their  science  as  a  stable 
'discipline'. Chapters two and three thereby present a contrast between zoological 
and  physiological  psychological  approaches  to  the  formation  of  ‘scientific’ 
disciplines. Where zoologists were able to justify their status as experts and retain a 
sense of common purpose in relation to a museological programme of description 
and organization of specimens, physiological psychologists relied on their mutual 
commitment to a technical epistemology to a far greater extent. Though Carpenter 
and  Laycock  disagreed,  and  emphasised  different  conceptions  of  nervous 
physiology, both were united in their opposition to the notion that mind could be 
thought  as  a  non-physiological  phenomenon.  Physiological  psychological  texts 
(published and unpublished) emphasise a  need to agree on the specific tools and 
techniques that can be considered appropriate to psychological investigation. In so 
doing,  they  begin  to  represent  science  in  general  as  an  inherently  'technical'  
endeavour:  one which both relies  on the development  of  non-textual  tools  and 
techniques  for  its  advancement,  and  concomitantly requires  for  its  practice  the 
mastery of an increasingly esoteric, technical set of linguistic terms.
A specifically ‘physiological’ psychology of learning is thereby understood 
as  an indispensable  element  in  the coming-to-pre-eminence of  laboratory-based 
experimental  techniques  in  British  universities  during  the  nineteenth  century. 
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Examining the institutionalization of experimental practices in laboratories during 
the  1860s  and  1870s,  chapter  three  brings  the  extent  to  which  technical 
commitments were made explicit by nineteenth-century organicism to the fore. Not 
only did physiological psychologies appeal to specific tools and techniques in their 
attempts to define the nature of the nervous subject: their texts were also integral to  
the configuration of experimental pedagogy as critical to the industrial success of 
the nation. The concept of power as physical energy - something that can be said to  
inhere  in  all  material  entities,  and  that  constitutes  a  pre-requisite  for  animate 
existence  -  was  critical  to  this  instantiation.  In  representing  learning  as  an 
inherently bodily,  energetic activity,  the texts of  psychologists  such as William 
Benjamin  Carpenter  and  Alexander  Bain  privilege  muscular  interaction  with 
materials and tools over the representation of truth through language. Physiological 
psychological texts are thereby shown to have constituted a key means by which 
not only the apprehension of non-human nature, but cognition of all kinds begins to 
be thought as an inherently technical endeavour at this time.
Chapters  four  and  five  explore  ways  in  which  late  nineteenth  century 
culture more generally came to be fashioned around tools and techniques valued as 
integral to the conduct of life sciences. Chapter four emphasises the importance of  
engaging with  scientific equipment for those that wished to participate in (and 
contribute to)  scientific  ways of  life.  Such tools  as microscopes were not  only 
valued as a means by which human perception might be 'extended', but also as 
helping  constitute  authoritative  perceptions  in  their  own  right:  perception  was 
coming to be understood not as something that occurs through the human body 
alone, but as interaction between an observing body and the technical equipment 
that it engages with. This critical shift in notions of what it means to be an observer 
is explored in relation to the differing ways in which middle-class women came to 
construct themselves (and be constructed) as competent microscopists. One of the 
most  reputable  women natural  philosophers of  early nineteenth-century Britain,  
Mary  Somerville,  appealed  to  the  rational  capacities  of  her  (to  her  non-
physiological)  mind in her efforts to gain recognition as an original  thinker. In 
contrast,  women  responding  to  the  physiological  conditions  of  mid-to-late 
nineteenth-century culture such as Alice Hart and Elizabeth Hoggan appealed to 
their technical competence and ability to develop new preparatory techniques for 
microscopic investigation. As the conduct of science came to be understood as a 
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matter  of  cultivating  technical  capacity,  so  acknowledgement  within  scientific 
culture came more and more to depend on one's ability to interact with and develop 
specific forms of equipment.
Chapter  four,  and  especially  chapter  five,  also  point  to  ways  in  which 
equipment relating to the investigation of physiology has itself helped constitute 
subjectivities that remain committed to ‘embodiment’,  but which do not confine 
themselves  to  individual  bodily  'soma'.  Examining  two  late-nineteenth-century 
figures - Edward Carpenter and Samuel Butler - who, in different ways, gained 
reputations for radicalism, chapter five notes the key role that vivisected animals 
played in their respective publications. Edward Carpenter came to be recognised as 
one of the founding fathers of British socialism and anarchism. The texts of many 
of  his  speeches,  however,  are  pre-occupied  with  questions  relating  to  the 
foundation of an anti-capitalist, technically non-invasive epistemology. Carpenter 
hoped that, in upholding a vision of science as a re-conciliation of humanity with 
an  unadorned  living  'nature',  he  might  help  inspire  the  formation  of  a  non-
competitive, mutually co-operative way of being in the world. To him, challenging 
capitalism  meant becoming more 'animal'.  In contrast,  Samuel Butler's  fictional 
and speculative conception of being complicates any attempt to consider organisms 
and tools as separate, unrelated entities. Drawing on physiological experimentation 
and  physiological  psychological  tropes  such  as  the  creative  efficacy  of  'habit',  
Butler's works portray a situation in which the organic and the mechanical can no 
longer  be  thought  as  mutually  independent  categories.  It  is,  for  Butler,  at  the 
coming-together of life and mechanism that we become aware of our presence in 
the  world.  Insisting  on  an  organic  subjectivity  that  does  not  acknowledge  'the 
technical'  would  risk  abandoning  ourselves  to  a  technically-determined  future. 
Between Butler and Carpenter's texts, we can begin to apprehend the emergence of 
a  new set  of  questions  relating  to  humanity's  place  in  the  world.  As  Kittler’s 
Discourse  Networks observes,  the  question  of  subjectivity,  by  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth century, was beginning to be thought in terms of a relation between 
organism and machine, as well as (as had been the case in early nineteenth-century  
zoological thought) one between matter and spirit.
As  a  narrative,  then,  this  thesis  moves  from  questions  that  address 
embodiment (the relation or lack thereof of natural law to the conception of the  
body,  and of  the nature  of  nerves  to  the understanding of  mind)  to  those that  
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address  relations  between  forms  of  body  (whether  we  should  privilege  a 
conception of ourselves as amalgamations of organs and tools,  or seek to resist 
such amalgamations through a reconciliation of ourselves with 'nature' as a whole). 
In its focus on the ways in which technical subjectivity has been constituted over 
time, it puts the possibility of conceiving of ourselves as non-technical, 'organic'  
bodies that operate independently of technical entities into question. Yet,  at the 
same time, it positions the notion of the self as an organic being as critical to the 
conceptualization of nature as always-already technical in the first place. Finally, 
as the conclusion to this thesis indicates, this integration of the organic and the 
technical is as relevant to the conduct of historical writing as it is to that of science  
and engineering.
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Chapter 1: 
Techniques of Dispute: microscopes, museums, 
and the discipline of zoology in early-nineteenth-
century Britain
Introduction
My concern with the place of technical entities in the constitution of belief 
is bound up with what I understand as their integral role in contemporary academic 
culture. It is generally acknowledged that the division of intellectual labour into the 
specialised,  distinct  'disciplines'  that  dominated  twentieth-century  thinking  (and 
still maintain a significant presence at the start of the twenty-first) had its origins in  
the nineteenth-century academy. It is now clear that political economic faith in the  
expansion of productivity through the 'division of labour' played an integral role in 
the organization of late-nineteenth-century academic life.1 It would nevertheless be 
an exaggeration to portray political economy as an independent, determining force 
in  academic  culture  during  the  period  in  question.  Political  economists  faced 
similar problems of organization to those experienced by other nascent disciplines 
of the time such as anatomy, zoology, engineering or chemistry.2 
What  marks  nineteenth-century  economists  out  from  other  aspiring 
academicians of the time, however, is their particular concern with sites in which 
human  practices  were  becoming  ever  more  integrated  with  the  operations  of 
industrial  tools.  As  an  analysis  of  factory  production,  political  economy 
characterised  the  division  of  labour  and,  importantly,  its  simultaneous 
reconstitution  around  machinery,  as  the  inevitable  consequence  of  national 
1 Lenoir, Instituting Science, pp. 45-74.
2 Rothblatt, S. ‘State and Market in British University History’, in Collini, S. Whatmore, R. 
and Young, B. (eds.) Economy, Polity, and Society: British Intellectual History 1750-1950 
(Cambridge; University Press, 2000), pp. 224-242.
35
economic and intellectual 'progress.'3 Although the former of these contentions - 
that the division of labour constituted a means of expanding production of all kinds 
- has been addressed by intellectual historians in some detail, its corollary - that 
this  re-organization  of  labour  is  a  pre-eminently  'technical'  endeavour  -  is  less 
frequently acknowledged in considerations of the industrialization of intellectual 
practice. Although academic disciplines are recognised as emerging in conjunction 
with political  economic concerns regarding the specialization of production,  the 
specific means by which they were constituted remains unclear.  Addressing the 
constitution of two aspirant 'disciplines' - zoology and psychology - that constituted 
themselves as mutually relevant during the nineteenth century, the first part of this  
thesis  thereby  re-examines  the  place  of  tools  in  nineteenth-century  academic 
culture.
In this chapter, I focus on the tools and techniques that one interpreter of 
nature – Robert Edmund Grant - brought to bear in his efforts to establish zoology 
as an academic field of study during the first half of the nineteenth century.  Grant 
was  one  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  a  systematic  or  'philosophic'  zoology  in 
Britain.4 Following a relatively privileged, middle-class upbringing in Edinburgh, 
he had around 1811 begun to read classics at the city's university, studying Greek  
and geometry. He also found himself attracted to the then highly respected medical  
faculty of that institution. Studying medicine was not generally considered in terms 
of the joining of a professional body at this time (indeed, the idea of a medical  
'profession'  was  at  best  embryonic  in  Britain  during  the  first  decades  of  the 
century).  Rather,  it  constituted  a  broad-based  investigation  into  the  nature  and 
3 Berg, The Machinery Question.
4 Details of Grant's life can be found in Parker, S.E. Robert Edmund Grant (1793-1874) 
and his Museum of Comparative Anatomy (London, 2006), Parker, S and Desmond, A. 
'The Bibliography of Robert Edmund Grant', Archives of Natural History 33 (2006), pp. 
202-213 and 'Biographical Sketch of Robert Edmund Grant, M.D., F.R.S.L. & E, &c.', 
The Lancet, 56 (1850), pp. 686-695. Other articles that address Grant's work directly 
include; Desmond, A. 'Robert E. Grant: The social predicament of a pre-Darwinian 
transmutationist', Journal of the History of Biology 17 (1984), pp. 189-223; Desmond, A. 
'Robert E. Grant's Later Views on Organic Development: The Swiney lectures on 
“palaeozoology,” 1853-1857', Archives of Natural History 11 (1984), pp. 395-413; Sloan, 
P.R. 'Darwin's Invertebrate Program, 1826-1836: Preconditions for Transformism', in 
Kohn, D. (ed.) The Darwinian Heritage (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1985), 
pp. 71-120; Desmond, The Politics of Evolution; Secord, J. 'Edinburgh Lamarckians: 
Robert Jameson and Robert E. Grant', Journal of the History of Biology 24 (1991), pp. 1-
18.
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philosophy of living bodies (though focused above all on the human body).5 It was 
as an aspiring, middle-class 'natural philosopher,' then, that Grant became one of 
the first Britons to tour Europe following the downfall of Napoleonic France in 
1815. 
Grant  travelled extensively on the continent,  visiting established natural 
philosophers and savants, and coming into contact with many of the most respected 
intellectual  figures  of  early  nineteenth  century  Europe.  Having  returned  to 
Scotland,  and effectively become an 'apprentice'  to his initial  mentor in natural  
history  Robert  Jameson,  he  was  appointed  professor  at  the  newly-founded 
University College London in 1827.6 In becoming a member of this for-the-time 
radical intellectual establishment, founded on a commitment to the emerging ideals 
of  a  law-determined  political  economy,  he  occupied  the  first  professorship  of 
Zoology (full title ‘Zoology and Comparative Anatomy’) to be offered in England.7 
His ideals as a zoologist accorded well with those of the university’s founders. His 
publications articulate a conception of zoological life as similarly law-determined – 
a commitment that went against many accounts of zoological nature in Britain at 
this time.8 As such, he can be identified as an exemplary figure for the institution of 
zoology as an academic discipline in Britain.
Despite  Grant's  pivotal  role  in  the  formation  of  British  zoology  as 
recognisably 'disciplinary'9 during the 1830s, few of the specific contentions that he 
5 Jacyna, L.S. Philosophic Whigs: medicine, science, and citizenship in Edinburgh, 1789-
1848 (London and New York, 1994); Rosner, L. Medical Education in the Age of  
Improvement (Edinburgh; University Press, 1991); Lawrence, C. 'The Edinburgh Medical 
School and the end of the “Old Thing” 1790-1830' History of Universities 7 (1988), pp. 
279-286; Lawrence, C. 'Alexander Monro Primus and the Edinburgh Manner of 
Anatomy', Bulletin of the History of Medicine 62 (1988), pp. 193-214.
6 The institution was originally simply called The University of London, but soon changed 
its name to University College London. To avoid confusion, I refer to it as University 
College London or UCL throughout.
7 On the foundation of UCL see Harte, N. and North, J. The World of UCL, 1828-2004 (3rd 
ed.) (London; University College London Press, 2004), pp. 26-27. On the medical faculty, 
see Mazumdar, P. 'Anatomy, Physiology and the Reform of Medical Education: London, 
1825-1835', Bulletin of the History of Medicine 57 (1983), pp. 230-246. Mazumdar, P. 
'Anatomy, Physiology, and Surgery: Physiology teaching in early nineteenth-century 
London', Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 4 (1987), pp. 119-143.
8 Elwick, J. Styles of Reasoning in the British Life Sciences: shared assumptions, 1820-
1858 (London, 2007), p. 12. Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, p. 84 (n. 141).
9 As in Foucault's work, I use 'discipline' here in two principal senses - firstly, to signify a 
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held regarding the status of natural law and the nature of life came to be adopted by  
his contemporaries or immediate intellectual descendants.10 For example, as will be 
seen, Grant sought to promote a zoology inspired by continental natural philosophy 
that emphasised his belief that it was through an understanding of the nature of the 
non-organic that the key to knowledge of life could be found. The microscopic 
structure of the simplest organisms, he believed, could be explained in terms of  
natural laws that would describe the operation of physical and chemical nature, as 
well as the living. Such contentions remained at the margins of British thought 
throughout the period. Though much British zoology prior to the 1850's and 1860's 
emphasises the unity of  life,  detailed research seeking to  establish the unity of 
nature - and especially natural law - is less prominent.11 It was not the possibility of 
the development of life from inorganic nature that framed the most controversial 
mid-nineteenth-century  zoological  debates,  but  the  possibility  that  a  being  as 
apparently complex as man had somehow grown or developed out of a simpler or  
'lower' organic form. Grant's zoology can be differentiated from that of his British 
peers  by  reference  to  the  particularly  strong  emphasis  that  he  placed  on  the 
explanatory efficacy of natural law.
The formation and significance of Grant's epistemological stance has been 
related in terms of the social context that he inhabited. Most prominently, Adrian 
Desmond's The  Politics  of  Evolution (1989)  draws  on  'interest'-determined 
accounts of scientific knowledge in his presentation of nineteenth-century British 
process of splitting from universalist to specialist knowledge production in academic and 
intellectual life, and secondly, as signifying technologies and techniques that primarily 
function as means of inculcating specific modes of conduct in humans. See Foucault, M. 
The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London, 1974) and 
Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London, 1991 [1977]). 
Lenoir, Instituting Science, pp. 45-51 presents a useful discussion of Foucaultian 
discipline in relation to nineteenth-century science. Such notions are more fully 
developed in chapter three.
10 Desmond, 'Robert E. Grant.'
11 Though the popularity and controversial status of such works as Robert Chambers' 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) demonstrates that there was certainly 
interest in such issues. See Secord, Victorian Sensation. Later concern with 
'spontaneous generation' is addressed in Strick, J.E. Sparks of Life: Darwinism and the 
Victorian debates over spontaneous generation (Cambridge,MA and London; Harvard 
University Press, 2000). Nineteenth-century zoological distinctions between the unity of 
life and the unity of nature are most clearly addressed in Lenoir, T. The Strategy of Life:  
teleology and mechanics in nineteenth-century German biology (London, 1982).
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zoology as riven by a split  between conservative and radical approaches to the  
newly-constituted study of 'life'.12 As a self-declared 'radical', Grant is shown by 
Desmond to have held a set of political concerns that were diametrically opposed 
to the conservative interests of many of his fellow zoologists (exemplified by the 
figure of Richard Owen). Grant's zoology, in Desmond's account, is conceived of 
as an outgrowth of his social position and political beliefs.
However, 'interest'-centred accounts such as Desmond's have become the 
object of criticism in recent years.13 In such accounts, an (invariably human) actor's 
'interests' are understood as a set of social conditions that determine the statements  
that  that  actor  makes  regarding  the  world.  Numerous  articles  have  appeared 
highlighting significant weaknesses that inhere in projects that seek to explain the 
construction  and  validation  of  claims  regarding  the  natural  by  recourse  to  a 
category – the 'social'  – that is by no means itself established as a 'real'  entity.  
Sociologists of science, it seems, are split between a desire to affirm the 'reality' of  
society (and thereby fall back on a foundationally 'scientific' claim regarding the  
the existence of a world 'out there'), and a need to affirm the 'relativity' of scientific 
knowledge (which undermines  any confidence in  the existence 'the  social'  as  a 
mode  of  causation).  By  appealing  to  such  entities  in  the  explanation  of  belief 
regarding the natural, sociologists render science an entity able to be conceived of  
as the same sort of activity as the study of literature or history. For sociological  
authors, the constitution of the natural as a critical object of investigation has no 
specific  historical  'force'  as  it  were  –  in  Foucault's  terminology,  it  cannot  be 
associated with a specific 'episteme'.  Yet  in rendering science transparent to its  
context,  sociological  accounts  posit  a  place  outside  of  either  nature  or 
representation – as Haraway terms it, a 'view from nowhere' - for their own claims.
Social and cultural explanations of contemporary science fail to recognise 
that  the  scientific  modes  of  belief  that  have  become  so  predominant  in  our 
12 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution.
13 See eg. the dispute between David Bloor and Bruno Latour that occurred during the late 
1990s: Bloor, D. 'Anti-Latour', Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 30 
(1999), pp. 81-112;  Latour, B. 'For David Bloor... and Beyond: a reply to David Bloor's 
'Anti-Latour'', Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 30 (1999), pp. 113-
129; Bloor, D. 'Response to Bruno Latour', Studies In History and Philosophy of Science 
Part A, 30 (1999), pp. 131-136. On Bloor and others' 'SSK' approach more generally see 
Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes, pp. 123-182.
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contemporary world are indeed differentiable other forms of endeavour. They are 
so not because they offer epistemologically superior modes of investigation. Nor so 
because they invest in an ontology that is inherently more interesting or powerful  
than any other. Rather, they are marked out by the kinds of entity that are both 
appealed  to  and  produced  during  scientific  practice: not,  as  has  been  argued, 
entities geared towards representation (such as texts and diagrams),14 but by tools 
and techniques intended for the extension of observation and perception. That is to 
say, the nineteenth-century coming-to-pre-eminence of 'science' is accompanied by 
the privileging of an epistemology in which tools and techniques of representation 
are re-evaluated in relation to those of perception more generally. As Pickering and 
others have documented as some length, the practice of science today constitutes a  
specific set of technical entities, the use and proliferation of which have come to be 
valued as indispensable to the apprehension of existence, and as at least as (if not 
more) significant than any verbal or written statement.15 By examining the specific 
conditions under and situations in which these entities came to be valued in this  
way, we can begin to appreciate the specificity of the historical situation that belief  
in  the  project  of  science  has  constituted,  as  well  as  (as  addressed  in  previous 
accounts) its relation to the situations in which it has arisen. It is the contention of  
this study that the nineteenth century saw a transition in which the study of nature 
changed from an inherently representational endeavour (natural philosophy) to an 
inherently technical one (disciplinary science), and that the construction of the self 
as determined by nature was critical to this shift. To affirm this is not to say that the 
study  of  nature  is  impervious  to  its  'social'  or  'cultural'  contexts.  Scientific 
knowledge  is constructed.  But  it  is  also  constructing.  And  both  types  of 
constructiveness have occurred in a rather more literal (ie. technical) sense than 
sociological accounts allow.
Though this chapter begins (in standard sociological mode) by situating 
Grant's  zoology  within  the  context  of  early-nineteenth-century  British  politics, 
then, it also brings into consideration the technical aspects of the conditions upon 
which that author was able to become recognised as an authority on the nature of  
life. The 'disciplinary' identity of zoology, it is emphasised, could be constructed in 
14 See eg. Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life.
15 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice.
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relation  to  certain  perceptual  tools  and  techniques  more  easily  than  others.  As 
already mentioned, the principal contrast made here is that between microscopes  
and museums. Microscopes, as tools that posed problems for the constitution of  
mutual  agreement  between  gentlemanly  equals,  were  generally  held  in  lower 
esteem than  the  apparently  more  trustworthy  museums around which  scientific 
societies were beginning to form. As Tony Bennett has observed, museums would 
come to play a critical role in the formation of the disciplinary culture over the 
nineteenth  century.  Museums  operated  both  as  institutions  around  and  within 
which  intellectual  identities  could  be  forged,  and  as  means  by  which  certain 
attitudes and beliefs might be inculcated into those understood as outside of the 
process  of  knowledge  production.16 Although  Grant  began  by  insisting  on  the 
centrality of microscopic evidence in the characterization of animal life, it was only 
through an engagement with museological specimens that he was able to constitute 
zoology as  a discipline within the confines of University College London.  The 
constitution of zoology as a discipline in Britain came to depend on certain forms 
of epistemic tool to a greater extent than others.
Force,  law,  and  the  natural  philosophic  context  of  Grant's 
zoology
In  a  general  sense,  Grant's  speeches  and  research  contributed  to  the 
development  of  a  broad-based  movement  that  sought  to  integrate  the  study  of 
humanity  with  that  of  the  natural  world  as  a  whole.  By  re-conceptualising 
humanity in relation to the insights of physics, chemistry, comparative anatomy 
and animal physiology, advocates of the universality of natural law sought to make 
the study of medicine more 'philosophic.' Rather than starting with the human and 
working  'down'  a  presumed  hierarchy  of  natural  forms,  representatives  of  an 
emerging middle-class reform movement contended from the start of the nineteenth 
16 Bennett, T. The Birth of the Museum: history, theory, politics (London and New York, 
1995), pp. 95-98. See also Hooper-Greenhill, E. 'The Museum in the Disciplinary 
Society', in Pearce, S.M. Museum Studies in Material Culture (London and New York; 
Leicester University Press, 1989), pp. 61-72.
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century that the proper study of man must start with the simplest kinds of existence 
and work 'up.'17 This contention had important political connotations,  especially 
when it came to controversies surrounding exactly how nature as a whole was to be 
understood.  If  (as many opponents of reform contended) the natural  world was 
created from above by the immediate action of force-like powers, it could not be  
invoked  as  justification  for  democracy,  or  self-government  by  a  'naturally' 
subordinate  and  dependent  polity.  Grant's  specific  contentions  regarding  the 
universal applicability of natural law have been read as embodying a set of ideals  
related to the emerging middle-class culture of nineteenth-century Britain.18 The 
debate over the status of natural law in Britain can thereby be correlated with a  
politically-contentious  tension  that  existed within  natural  philosophy during  the 
early nineteenth century.
Historians have highlighted how, from the seventeenth-century onwards, a 
divergence of interests can be seen as emerging in European culture and politics. In 
this divergence, the concerns of an aristocratic elite regarding the maintenance of 
absolute  personal  authority  come  to  be  re-negotiated  in  terms  of  an  appeal  to 
mutual assent as a limiting factor in the articulation of plausible knowledge. Put 
another way, with the emergence of an ideal of 'civil society,' knowledge comes to 
be understood as something that must be agreed upon by a community of equals, as 
well as (as had been the case in since before the Renaissance) declared to be true  
by an established authority.19 Representatives of sites and organizations such as 
museums, natural philosophic societies and botanical and zoological gardens seek 
to articulate a vision of knowledge as something that should be agreed upon by 
competent  observers, as well as gleaned from authoritative texts or principles. 20 
17 Pickstone, J.V. 'How Might We Map the Cultural Fields of Science? Politics and 
organisms in Restoration France', History of Science 34 (1999), pp. 1-18.
18 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution.
19 Hunter, I. Rival Enlightenments: civil and metaphysical philosophy in early modern 
Germany (Cambridge; University Press, 2001); Cohen, M. Fashioning Masculinity:  
national identity and language in the eighteenth century (London and New York, 1996); 
Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump.
20 Bredekamp, H. (trans. Brown, A.) The Lure of Antiquity and the Cult of the Machine: the 
Kunstkammer and the evolution of nature, art and technology (Princeton, NJ, 1995); 
Spary, E. Utopia's Garden: French natural history from Old Regime to Revolution 
(Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 2000).
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During much of the eighteenth century, questions relating to the relative emphasis 
to  be  put  on  these  two  kinds  of  natural  philosophic  knowledge  had  remained 
unresolved. The emerging ideal of gentlemanly mutual agreement and that of an 
authoritative, established land-owning elite existed side by side without being seen 
as  inherently oppositional.21 Yet  following the anti-aristocratic,  self-determining 
sentiment that came to the fore during the French revolution, debates relating to 
such issues became matters of immediate political concern.22
The tension between the ideals of gentlemanly agreement and aristocratic 
authority that animated much political debate in the years following 1789 was in 
part played out in natural philosophic discourse as a contest between the relative 
power of 'force' and 'law.' On the one hand, it was believed by many that nature 
required  constant  intervention  by  an  immaterial,  active,  and  guiding  force  or 
'principle.'  Others stressed the self-defining, self-generating properties of nature, 
treating  it  as  God's  second,  non-textual  'book'  which  possessed  a  concomitant 
moral legislative authority all of its' own.23 Again, both tendencies had existed prior 
to  the  French revolution.  Many of  the  most  ardent  proponents  of  'enlightened' 
thought in France, for example, had insisted that nature was nothing more than the 
expression of mechanical principles playing themselves out in matter, and that the 
immediate, active presence of heavenly influence on earth could not be discerned 
through the study of life. Many in England and Scotland, on the other hand, were 
engaged in a search for 'vital' fluids that might be identified as means by which 
organisms could be  animated by  heavenly  power.24 For  most  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  disputes  between  'vitalists'  and  'mechanists'  were  relatively  easily 
contained within participants'  broader  commitments to other  ideals,  such as  the 
21 Bredekamp, The Lure of Antiquity; Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity.
22 Gallagher, C. The Body Economic: life, death, and sensation in political economy and 
the Victorian novel (Princeton; University Press, 2006), pp. 7-34; Reddy, W.M. The 
Navigation of Feeling: a framework for the history of emotions (Cambridge; University 
Press, 2001), esp. pp. 199-210; As indeed they had during the English revolution of the 
seventeenth century. See Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump.
23 Jacyna, L.S. 'Immanence or Transcendence: theories of life and organization in Britain, 
1790-1835', Isis 74 (1983), pp. 310-329.
24 French, R.K. 'Ether and Physiology,' in Cantor, G.N. and Hodge, M.S.J. Conceptions of  
Ether: studies in the history of ether theories 1740-1900 (Cambridge; University Press, 
1981), pp. 111-134.
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respectability or gentlemanliness of natural  philosophic endeavour.25 Yet  by the 
early  nineteenth  century,  a  natural  philosophic  author’s  choice  between  such 
concepts had begun to be seen as indicative of their  commitment to seemingly 
irreconcilable  political  positions.26 In  early-nineteenth-century  London,  the 
interventionist  conception of creation remained pre-eminent.  Advocating a law-
determined notion of nature, Grant's publications are split between an evident need 
to  establish  personal  authority  within  a  culture  focused  on  natural  theological  
conceptions of heavenly power, and a hope that it would be possible to confirm as 
natural  'law'-centred  democratic  ideals  that  the  French  revolution  was  seen  to 
embody.
Yet it is not possible, I believe, to reduce absolutely the post-revolutionary 
debates regarding force and law to the contestation of  a purely social  question 
regarding  differing  ideals  of  state  organization.  By  highlighting  the  place  of 
technical entities in debates relating to force and law, this chapter emphasises that 
the  relative  plausibility  of  claims  regarding  nature  cannot  be  mapped onto  the 
convictions of their holders in any simple way. This does not imply that knowledge 
is not 'political' or, for that matter, 'constructed' (indeed, the notion of construction 
here is particularly pertinent). Rather, it shows that, despite the thoroughly political 
constitution of beliefs regarding the natural, personal ideological conviction cannot 
be said to determine what is considered plausible at any given historical moment. 
Or rather, the plausibility of different ideological convictions regarding the natural  
can be said to be mediated by the technical conditions in which those concerned 
find themselves.27 Attempts by Robert Grant to articulate a zoology that was law-
determined,  progressive  and,  critically,  democratic  had to  be  reconciled  with a 
context in which the tool he relied on to construct it - microscopes - were easily 
dismissed as unreliable. It was only through his appeal to a technical entity that 
could command greater mutual assent - the museum specimen - that he was able to 
propagate zoology as an academic discipline.  In such a  context,  the apparently 
revolutionary  notion  of  molecular  self-determination  that  his  early  publications 
25 Ibid, pp. 130-132.
26 Gallagher, The Body Economic, pp. 7-34; Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling, pp. 199-
210.
27 This is, broadly, Andrew Pickering's thesis in The Mangle of Practice.
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articulate came to be severely restricted. I thereby first describe Grant's molecular 
vision of zoological nature, and subsequently move on to discuss the museological 
limitations that this vision became subject to following the commencement of his 
teaching career in London.
Grant's zoological atomism
In his earliest  publications,  Grant's commitment to what John Pickstone 
has called a 'bottom-up,' law-defined conception of life is grounded in an appeal to 
atomistic chemistry as a source of analogy by which living forms might be better 
understood.28 In 1808 John Dalton had controversially (see below) postulated that 
chemical nature could be understood in terms of fundamental atomic molecules. 29 
The notion of an 'organic' atomism analogous to that which was being promoted for 
the non-organic world by Dalton remained a feature of Grant's work throughout his 
life.30 One instance in which connections between chemical atomism and Grant's 
zoology  became  especially  clear  occurred  in  1833,  when  he  gave  the  opening 
lecture for the medical faculty of the new university.31  His speech focuses on what 
he suggests are the ideal accomplishments of a man of medicine. Prominent in such 
accomplishments are (he claims) a background in ancient and modern languages,  
the  philosophy  of  mind,  natural  philosophy  and,  above  all,  chemistry  -  an 
investigation of 'the phænomena which result from the motions of invisible atoms 
at insensible distances.'32 For Grant, the 'complex living processes performed in the 
28 Pickstone, 'How Might we Map the Cultural Fields of Science?'
29 Dalton, J. A New System of Chemical Philosophy (London, 1808).
30 Sloan, P.R. 'Darwin's Invertebrate Program', pp. 77-80.
31 Grant, R.E. On the Study of Medicine: Being an introductory address delivered at the 
opening of the Medical School of the University of London, October 1st, 1833 (London, 
1833), p. 7. 
32 Grant, On the Study of Medicine, pp. 6-9. Grant's commitment to atomism is also 
indicated by his promotion of the candidacy of the then-Daltonian chemist Edward Turner 
to the faculty of UCL in 1827. See Grant, R.E. [CHECK REF!!!: MS ADD 438-448 - 1827 
Professorships (Q-W)]. Turner would return this favour in his support for Grant's later 
unsuccessful application for a lectureship in physiology – see Turner, E. 'To James Mill, 
Esq. Chairman of the Education Committee' The Lancet, 26 (1835), p. 844 and 
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laboratories of living beings' are 'as much the domain of the chemist' as are the  
phenomenon of non-living nature.33  
Chemistry seemed to Grant to present a disciplinary ideal upon which the 
study  of  zoology  could  be  modelled.  As  he  informed  the  assembled  faculty: 
'Comparative  Anatomy,  like  Chemistry  and  Botany,  spurning  its  origin  as 
subservient to man's œconomy or to Medicine, has assumed an independent rank 
among the sciences.'34 Long-established, apprenticeship-focused modes of medical 
training  had almost  invariably  taken the human body as  their  starting point  of 
investigation.35 In  stark  opposition  to  this  assumption,  Grant  claims  in  his 
zoological lectures (which were also being published at this time) that 'everywhere 
the natural philosopher and the chemist are making encroachments on the province 
of  the  physiologist.  Everywhere  do  we find  the  laws  of  natural  philosophy  in 
operation in our bodies.'36 The study of medicine had to start with that of nature as 
a  whole.  In  this  context,  chemical  atoms constituted  the critical  stepping-stone 
between inorganic matter and human physiology.
Grant's articulation of a globular conception of life can be placed in the 
context of a broader contemporary movement that sought to utilize microscopy in 
the revealing of the universality of natural law. Literature relating to 'granules' or 
'globules'  of  living matter  had become a distinctive feature  of  early-nineteenth-
century  microscopic  investigation.  Marcello  Malpighi  and  Anton  van 
Leeuwenhoek  had  described  seeing  microscopic  'globular'  structures  in  living 
Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, pp. 98-99.
33 Grant, On the Study of Medicine, p. 9.
34 Ibid, p. 10
35 Lawrence, Charitable Knowledge, p. 81.
36 Grant, R.E. 'Lectures on Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, delivered during the 
session 1833-4' [IV], The Lancet  (1833-4), p. 198 [henceforth referred to as Grant, 
‘Lectures’ [no.], pp. x-x]. This re-prioritising of zoological investigation is also stated in a 
later address to the BMA. See Grant, R.E. On the present state of the Medical  
Profession in England: being the annual oration delivered before the members of the 
British Medical Association, 21st October, 1841 (London, 1841), pp. 16-20. On 
connections between medical reform and the rhetoric of natural philosophy at this time, 
see Warner, J.H. 'The Idea of Science in English Medicine: The 'Decline of Science' and 
the Rhetoric of Reform, 1815-45', in French, R. and Wear, A. British Medicine in an Age 
of Reform (London, 1991), pp. 136-164; Warner, J.H. 'The History of Science and the 
Sciences of Medicine', Osiris (2nd Series), 10 (1995), esp. pp. 169-170.
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tissue as early as 1665.37 But it was not until the nineteenth century that the concept 
that bodies were entirely made up of these globules came to play an integral role in  
the development of new ideas about organic nature. Most frequently, the apparent 
globularity  of  both  animal  and  plant  tissue  was  highlighted  as  pointing  to  the 
importance of 'life'  (rather than the previously distinct categories of animal and 
vegetable) as a philosophic object of analysis. Early in the century, such German 
Naturphilosophen as Lorenz Oken and Franz von Walther had speculated that all 
living matter  was made up of combinations of simple globular 'infusoria'.  Less 
speculative German-language authors such as Josephus and Carolus Wenzel and 
Johan Frederick Meckel began to observe globules in all types of tissue over the 
next few decades.38
Apart from perhaps Leeuwenhoek, all of these figures would have been 
aware  of  the  influential  speculations  of  Gottfried  von  Leibniz  regarding  the 
fundamentally 'monadic'  constitution of existence.  Leibniz had suggested -  in a  
contention that seemed to some dangerously close to the deistic monism of Baruch 
de Spinoza - that all forms of existence, including mental perceptions, could be 
understood  in  terms  of  a  universal  'plenum'  constituted  by  imperceptible 
mathematical  points.  These  points,  or  monads,  had  no  physical  presence  in 
Leibniz's  metaphysics.  Nevertheless,  they  were  consistently  appropriated  by 
natural  philosophers such as Charles Bonnet,  and especially French materialists 
such as the Comte de Buffon, Pierre Louis Maupertuis and Baron d'Holbach, as 
referring to  the presence of  material  'atoms'  in  nature.  Leibniz  was held up as  
'predicting' the existence of microscopic organisms ('zoophytes') that could not be 
perceived by the unaided eye.39 More generally, Leibniz had argued that perception 
37 On seventeenth- and eighteenth-century microscopic science see Ratcliff, M.J. The 
Quest for the Invisible: Microscopy in the Enlightenment (Farnham and Burlington, 
2009).
38 Jacyna, L.S. 'Romantic Thought and the Origins of Cell Theory', in Cunningham, A. and 
Jardine, N. Romanticism and the Sciences (Cambridge; University Press, 1990), p. 165. 
Baker, J.R. 'The Cell Theory: a restatement, history and critique [Part I]', in Baker, J.R. 
The Cell Theory: a restatement, history and critique (New York and London; 1988), pp. 
114-121. Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century, Ch.2.
39 On connections between the natural philosophy of organisms and Leibnizian 
metaphysics during the eighteenth century, see Rieppel, O. 'The Reception of Leibniz's 
Philosophy in the Writings of Charles Bonnet (1720-1793),' Journal of the History of  
Biology 21 (1988), pp. 119-145. On Leibniz's reception more generally, see Wilson, C. 
'The Reception of Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century,' in Jolley, N. (ed.) The Cambridge 
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could occur without the involvement of consciousness, and that the investigation of 
nature  presented  one  means  of  becoming  aware  of  such  'unconscious' 
discernment.40
During  the  early  nineteenth  century,  Leibniz's  notion  of  the  'monadic' 
composition of existence was frequently interpreted in terms of a commitment to a 
law-determined, atomic materiality. Pickstone has pointed to a brief but vociferous 
fashion  for  globular  or  atomic  theories  of  life  amongst  such  French  natural  
philosophers as Geoffroy St-Hilaire (or Geoffroy, as he was commonly known), 
Henri  Milne-Edwards  and  Henri  Dutrochet  during  the  1820s.41 As  well  as 
emphasising that 'life' in general (rather than plant or animal life alone) constituted 
their principal category of analysis,  Dutrochet and his contemporaries sought to 
constitute a 'vital physics'  in which simple forms of life would be explicable in  
terms of laws relating to non-organic phenomena.42 It seems most likely that it was 
during  his  tour  of  Europe  that  Grant  became  concerned  with  establishing  this 
‘globular’ claim regarding the nature of life.
Radical globulism
By  1833,  Grant  had  developed  a  long-standing  commitment  to 
understanding the nature of the simplest forms of living matter. The origins of this 
Companion to Leibniz (Cambridge; University Press, 1995), pp. 442-474. On Leibniz's 
relation to Anglophone natural philosophy, see Phemister, P and Brown, S. (eds.) 
Leibniz and the English-Speaking World (Dordrecht, 2007).
40 Ellenberger, H.F. The Discovery of the Unconscious: the history and evolution of  
dynamic  psychiatry (London, 1970), p. 312.
41 Pickstone, J.V. 'Golbules and Coagula: concepts of tissue formation in the early 
nineteenth century', Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 28 (1973), pp. 
336-356. See also Sloan, P. 'Organic Molecules Revisited', in Gayon, J. et. al, Buffon 
'88: Actes du Colloque international pour le bicentenaire de la mort de Buffon : (Paris, 
Montbard, Dijon, 14-22 juin 1988) (Science, histoire, philosophie) (Paris, c.1992), pp. 
415-438.
42 Pickstone, J.V. 'Vital Actions and Organic Physics: Henri Dutrochet and French 
physiology during the 1820's', Bulletin of the History of Medicine 50 (1976), pp. 191-211; 
Pickstone, J.V. 'Locating Dutrochet', The British Journal for the History of Science 11 
(1978), pp. 49-64
48
interest can be traced to his extensive tour of continental Europe following the end 
of the Napoleonic wars. As the then-principal centre of the Western intellectual 
world, Paris featured prominently in his travels. Whilst there, he came under the 
influence of such prominent French savants as Geoffroy, Georges Cuvier and Jean 
Baptiste-Lamarck, the latter of whose research on invertebrates appears to have 
inspired his life-long interest in these organisms. On the same trip, he also met 
many of the leading zoological natural philosophers of the Germanic territories, 
including Johan Friedrich Meckel and Friedrich Tiedemann.43 
On  his  return  to  Edinburgh  in  1820,  Grant  had  begun  to  address  the 
physiology of a local organism that had occupied a highly ambiguous status in 
eighteenth-century  natural  philosophic  classification.  His  local  marine 
environment, the Firth of Forth, contained a wide variety of sponges - organisms 
that had been alternately classed as plants and animals, without any resolution of 
the matter. Grant, having conducted a series of experiments and examinations of 
these entities, declared them to be animals on the basis that they circulated water  
through  themselves.44 Such  criteria  as  'sensibility'  to  'irritating'  stimuli,  an 
organism's ability to move of its own accord, and its ability to circulate fluid had 
been  important  to  eighteenth-century  schemes  of  zoological  classification.45 In 
defining sponges as  'animal,'  Grant  was seeking to  establish a reputation as  an 
authority on the boundaries of plant and animal life. In so doing, he also developed 
ideas regarding relations between organic and non-organic existence.
Grant  had  become  convinced  that  the  Firth  sponges  circulated  water 
through extensive  microscopic  examination  of  them.  Magnifying  the  numerous 
'ventricles' which permeated the external surface of the organism, he had claimed 
that it was possible to observe that minute particle-like bodies in the water only 
ever moved outward from some of them, which he termed 'fecal orifices'. He had 
43 Desmond,  'Robert E. Grant', p. 197. Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, pp. 41-59. 
Sloan,  'Darwin's Invertebrate Program', pp. 77-80.
44 Grant, R.E. ‘Observations and Experiments on the Structure and Functions of the 
Sponge’ [articles I-V], The Edinburgh Philosophical Journal 13  (1825)  pp. 94-107 and 
333-346, The Edinburgh Philosophical Journal 14 (1826), pp. 113-124 and 336-341 and 
Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal 2 (1826-27), pp. 121-141.
45 Temkin, O. ‘The Classical Roots of Glisson’s Doctrine of Irritation’, in Temkin, O. The 
Double Face of Janus and other essays in the history of medicine (Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 290-316.
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thereby  concluded  that  water  must  be  taken  in  through  the  other  observable 
ventricles, which he had termed 'pores'.46
Of particular  interest  to Grant  regarding the cause of this circulation in 
sponges had been a 'thin gelatinous matter' that covered their interior.  The green 
matter that covered the inside of the organisms had presented him with what he 
saw as a plausible cause for the circulation of water through them. He had noted 
that  if  magnified by a  microscope when in-situ  around the faecal  orifices,  this 
matter appeared completely 'homogeneous'. Yet after placing it in a small amount 
of water and subjecting it to 'a little agitation', he had claimed that this gelatinous  
matter  'resolves  itself  almost  entirely  into  minute,  pellucid,  green-coloured 
granules, which have a singular tendency to reunite.'47 Significantly for Grant, these 
small granules, observable only at high levels of magnification, had appeared to 
possess the ability to move of their own accord. He had argued that it was their  
capacity  for  movement  –  which  he  had  suggested  could  be  caused  by  'minute 
filaments' protruding from them -  that produced the circulation of water through 
the sponges.48
Grant  had  also  accorded  these  minute  bodies  a  central  role  in  the 
reproductive  process.  Regarding  the  observation  in  sponges  of  larger  granular 
bodies or ova, he had observed that the microscope could detect 'nothing in their 
structure but transparent granular bodies, like those lining the canals'.49 Combining 
this claim with the above-mentioned observation that these transparent bodies had 
a tendency to agglomerate had suggested to him that the ova were constructed out  
of  the  smaller  filamented  particles  that  he  had  attributed  as  the  cause  for  the 
circulation of water. Even seemingly 'fundamental' parts of the species, such as its  
eggs, are constituted by an even more basic,  globular entity.
Finally, Grant had articulated his belief that such 'elementary' microscopic 
46 Grant, 'Observations and Experiments’ [I], pp. 105-107.
47 Grant, R.E. 'On the Structure and Nature of the Spongilla friabilis,' The Edinburgh 
Philosophical Journal 14 (1825-26), p. 281.
48 Ibid. Grant, R.E. 'Observations on the Spontaneous Motions of the Ova of the 
Campanularia dichotoma, Gorgonia verrucosa, Caryophyllea calycularis, Spongia 
panicea, Sp. papillaris, cristata, tomentosa, and Plumularia falcate,' Edinburgh New 
Philosophical Journal 1 (1826), p. 152.
49 Grant, 'On the Structure and Nature of the Spongilla friabilis,' p. 283.
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particles arose 'spontaneously' from inorganic matter, and could not therefore be 
subject to laws or forces different to those that applied to the non-living world.50 In 
his first  lecture to the students of University College,  he had declared that  'the 
simplest  organized bodies,  as  Monades and Globulinæ,  originate  spontaneously 
from matter in a fluid state, and that these simple bodies... are the same with the 
gelatinous globules which compose the soft parts of Animals and Plants.' 51 This 
implied  that  the  simplest  animals  could  be  explained  'on  the  principles  of 
Chemistry or Mechanics.'52 Grant envisaged a nature that developed upwards from 
physical,  non-organic  forms  of  existence.  The  development  of  organisms  was 
nothing more than the expression of laws that had been established at the start of 
creation. Emphasising that,  at the minutest level,  organic bodies appeared to be 
constructed out of entities similar to those that were being postulated for chemical 
structures appeared to constitute a confirmation of this position.
Summing up his research on the sponges in 1827, Grant had suggested that 
the  gelatinous  matter  'appears  entirely  composed  of  very  minute,  transparent,  
spherical or ovate granules, like monades', noting that 'indeed, most of the fleshy 
parts of organized bodies appear to be composed of similar pellucid granular or  
monade-like bodies in different states of aggregation.'53 'Granular' entities found at 
the  limits  of  observation  were,  he  had  claimed,  responsible  for  the  previously 
mysterious  circulation  of  water  in  sponges.  Microscopic  granules  consequently 
appear as fundamental units of organic matter in Grant's early publications. This 
conclusion  not  only  placed  the  zoophyte  sponges  firmly  within  the  animal 
kingdom, but also appeared to suggest a more profound claim regarding the nature 
of animal life. If bodies were indeed made up of 'monade-like' granules, then they 
correlated analogously with the Leibniz-inspired 'atoms' of  chemical nature that  
Dalton had begun to advocate at the turn of the century. 
In  Britain,  organic  'atomism'  was  most  enthusiastically  received  in  the 
50 On the concept of spontaneity in the British life sciences of this time see Strick, Sparks 
of Life.
51 Grant, R.E. An Essay on the Study of the Animal Kingdom. Being an Introductory 
Lecture at the University of London on the 23rd of October, 1828 (2nd ed.) (London, 
1829), p. 18. See also Sloan,  'Darwin's Invertebrate Program', pp. 82-86.
52 Grant, An Essay on the Study of the Animal Kingdom, p. 18.
53 Grant, R.E. 'Observations on the Structure and Functions of the Sponge' [V], p. 124.
51
more radical circles of the natural philosophic elite during the 1820s. A number of 
physiologists,  most  of  whom  known  for  their  reformist  opinions,  highlighted 
above-described propositions of continental naturalists regarding the elementary, 
self-defining composition of living bodies. Unitarian medic Thomas Southwood 
Smith informed readers of the radical quarterly  Westminster Review that he had 
demonstrated  the  uniform,  globular  structure  of  tissues  at  the  private  medical 
school in Webb Street.54 Similarly, in an article in the  London Medical Gazette, 
military surgeon Samuel Broughton proclaimed that his microscopic observations 
lead  him  'to  coincide  with  [the  above-mentioned  French  physiologist]  Dr.  M. 
Edwards  in  all  essentials.'  Broughton took inspiration  from the  possibility  that 
'every  thing  susceptible  of  life  may derive  all  its  parts  from one  constant  and 
primitive molecule, of an uniform character, spherical and colourless, and more or 
less  developed as  the  animal  may be  simply  formed or  otherwise.' 55 For  these 
physiologists, as for Grant, chemical and physical laws presented the most likely 
source by which such entities  might  be explained.  Smith's  connection with the 
radical Westminster Review's founders Jeremy Bentham and James Mill meant that 
his  anatomical  and  physiological  articles  (which  also  adopted  a  approach  to 
nervous anatomy that followed the work of Geoffroy) found a wide,  politically 
conscious  audience.56 Similarly,  Grant's  lectures  were  published  in  the  medical 
journal  The Lancet - then the mouthpiece for an emergent conception of medical 
organization  that  emphasised  the  self-defining,  self-organizing  capacities  of 
medical practitioners over the patriarchal power of the dominant medical colleges.
More generally, 'atomism' as a whole seemed to many to confirm that the 
egalitarian,   democratic  ideals  of  organization  then  associated  with  the  French 
revolution  coincided  with  the  constitution  of  the  natural  world.  The  prominent 
republican Richard Carlile's 1821 Address to Men of Science proclaimed chemists 
to  be 'the  greatest  of  all  revolutionists,  for  they have silently  and scientifically 
54 Smith, T.S. 'Life and Organization', Westminster Review 13 (1827), pp. 215-216.
55 Broughton, S. 'On the Elementary Nature of Animal Structures', London Medical Gazette 
17 (March 29, 1828), pp. 496-497. See also Bostock, J. An Elementary System of  
Physiology, [Vol. I of III], (London, 1824-7), pp. 345-350.
56 See esp. Smith's articles on the nervous system: Smith, T.S. 'Nervous System', 
Westminster Review 17 (1828), pp. 172-197 and 18 (1828) 451-479.
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undermined the dogma of the priest' by enabling us to 'consider ourselves but as 
atoms of organized matter'.57 Like Unitarians such as Smith, Carlile insisted that it 
was only by recognising and acting according to the truths of nature as revealed by 
natural  philosophic  investigation  that  communities  might  be  organized 
satisfactorily.  It  was  only  through  the  universal  recognition  of  the  chemical 
composition of all bodies that man would fulfil his proper place in the creation. If  
all children were taught that 'man, as a part of a whole, or as an atom of matter, is 
immortal  but...  that  [that]  atom can retain no sense of  a former  existence',  the 
'proper character' of mankind would be realised. If this plan were instigated, 'the  
representative system of  government  would  be  found to be  the only  necessary 
government amongst them [the people]'.58 Carlile, along with his many followers, 
argued that the truths of chemistry pointed the way to the instigation of a truly 
democratic  and  egalitarian  politics.  Like  Carlile,  reform-minded  zoological 
naturalists also saw a rationale for democratic government in their conceptions of 
corporeality. 
Anti-globularity, species classification, and the authority of force
Although the perception of chemical-atom-like globules as self-organizing 
entities could be construed by proto-middle-class radicals as nature's endorsement  
of  their  calls  for  democratic  representation,  this  was  not  the  only  possible 
interpretation. Those most closely concerned with the compatibility of conceptions 
of nature with the doctrines of the Anglican church, for example, tended to oppose 
what they believed to be the dangerous implications of conceptualising bodies as 
composed of  countless  small  particles.  Prior  to  the 1820s,  natural  philosophers 
such  as  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge  and  Humphrey  Davy  had  appealed  to  the 
explanatory power of a 'vital' force that they understood as the active manifestation 
57 Carlile, R. An Address to Men of Science (London, 1821), pp. 5-6. Surprisingly little has 
been made of the political implications of Daltonian atomism. Though see Morell, J.B. 
‘Thomas Thomson: professor of chemistry and university reformer’, British Journal for  
the History of Science 4 (1969), pp. 245-265 and Brock, W.H. From Protyle to Proton:  
William Prout and the nature of matter (Bristol, 1985).
58 Ibid, p. 44.
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of  God's  immediate  presence  on  earth.59 Coleridge's  texts  articulate  a  Kantian, 
'transcendental'  philosophy  of  nature  founded  on  a  belief  in  the  vital,  creative 
powers of human spirit and divine will. Advocating a deeply historical vision of the 
creation  of  a  step-like  chain  of  being,  they  are  particularly  concerned  with 
opposing  what  they  characterize  as  the  overly  mechanistic  tendencies  of  law-
determined accounts of creation. Coleridge was insistent on the continual, active 
creation of nature by forces imposed from 'above', and was particularly suspicious 
of what he saw as the dangerously democratic implications of a world composed of 
uniform - and therefore implicitly equal - elementary parts. He aimed to propagate  
a 'vital chemistry,' in which the transmutation of inorganic matter was caused by 
divine creative powers,  to  rival  the science of  simple elements  associated with 
Antoine Lavoisier.60 
Coleridge  was  joined  by  such  respected  figures  as  Davy  and  William 
Whewell in this advocacy of this spiritual, idealistic, and elitist vision of creation 
and  intellectual  discovery.  These  conservative  natural  philosophers  associated 
doctrines  such  as  Dalton's  atomic  chemical  theories  with  a  subversive 
republicanism, and appealed to their idealistic vision of historical development in 
order to preserve the authority of philosophic truth - even (as was the case with 
Whewell's philosophy) at the expense of demarcating the activities of 'scientists' 
and  'philosophers'.61 Such  authoritative  opposition  could  have  far-reaching 
consequences. In 1828, botanist Robert Brown (later acclaimed as the discoverer of  
'Brownian motion') circulated a private pamphlet 'on the general existence of active 
59 On Coleridge, see Levere, T. Poetry Realized in Nature: Samuel Taylor Coleridge and 
early-nineteenth-century science (Cambridge; University Press, 1981). On Davy, see 
Golinski, J. Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-
1820 (Cambridge and New York; Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 204-205 
and 264-265.
60 Levere, T. Poetry Realized in Nature, esp. pp. 64-69, 171-179 and 216-219. On the role 
of such transcendent theories in organic discourse see Jacyna, 'Immanence or 
Transcendence,’pp. 311-329.
61 Temkin, O. ‘Basic Science, Medicine, and the Romantic Era’, in Temkin, The Double 
Face, pp. 352-357. On Whewell see Schaffer, S. 'The History and Geography of the 
Intellectual World: Whewell's Politics of Language', in  Fisch, M. and Schaffer, S. 
(eds.),William Whewell: A Composite Portrait (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1991) esp. pp. 
203-207 and 218-222, and Yeo, R. Defining Science; William Whewell, natural  
knowledge, and public debate in early Victorian Britain (Cambridge; University Press, 
1993).
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molecules  in  organic  and inorganic  bodies.'  This  paper  could  easily  have been 
interpreted  as  confirming  the  observations  of  Milne-Edwards.  However,  the 
following year - after a number of well-respected botanists declared that they had 
failed to observe the molecules - Brown published a clarification that dissociated 
his work from other research relating to organic 'globules'.62
Moreover, globulism was not itself invariably cited as proof of the self-
defining powers of organic molecules. One of the earliest statements of organic 
globulism in  Britain  had  explicitly  denied  the  possibility  that  bodies  could  be 
created by the agglomeration of individually independent particles. In 1822, Sir  
Everard  Home  -  best  known  for  his  controversial  appropriation  of  eighteenth-
century comparative anatomist John Hunter's manuscripts – had suggested in his 
lectures  at  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  that  all  tissues  were  composed  of 
spherical  particles  connected  by  fibres  of  organic  matter.63 But  whereas  Grant 
would conceive of globules as agents causing the circulation of water in sponges, 
Home saw them as passive building-blocks for different kinds of organic matter.  
Globules  could  not  move  around  on  their  own,  but  were  organized  by  gasses 
inherent in the blood and other fluids. As he claimed, he had set out to prove that 
'human blood, in the act of coagulation, evolves a gaseous matter, which, as soon 
as it is disengaged, pervades the coagulum in every direction; passing throughout 
the serum in currents which become permanent tubes'. Having established to his 
satisfaction that this was the case, he then went on to describe the composition of 
62 Brown, R. A Brief Account of Microscopical Observations... on the Particles Contained in 
the Pollens of Plants; and on the General Existence of Active Molecules in Organic and 
Inorganic Bodies (London, 1828) [not published]. Brown, R. Additional Remarks on 
Active Molecules (London, 1829). See also Sloan, 'Darwin's Invertebrate Program', pp. 
92-98. Mabberley, D.J. Jupiter Botanicus: Robert Brown of the British Museum 
(Braunschweig, 1985), pp. 271-272. Another controversy relating to organic atomism 
occurred between William Prout and Wilson Philip. See Prout, W. 'Observations on the 
Applicaton of Chemistry to Physiology, Pathology, and Practice: Lecture I', London 
Medical Gazette 8 (Sat, May 28, 1831), pp. 257-265, and Philip, W. 'Some observations 
suggested by Dr Prout's lectures', London Medical Gazette 9 (Sat, Aug 20, 1831), pp. 
641-652.
63 Home, E. Lectures on Comparative Anatomy; in which are explained the preparations in 
the Hunterian collection, illustrated by engravings (London, 1823). See also Home, E. 
Supplement to the foregoing Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, illustrated by 
engravings (Vol. V) (London, 1828), pp. 170, 194. On Home see Clarke, E. and Jacyna, 
L.S. Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts (Berkeley, Los angeles and 
London; University of California Press, 1987), pp. 58-60.
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all organic tubes as globular.64 Hence whilst his publications clearly depict both 
blood vessels and nervous fibres as composed of globules, the function of these 
globules is to provide passive material for the organization of life by vital gases.  
Following the dissipation of attempts to formulate a vitalist chemistry during the 
1820s,  Home's  speculations  regarding  the  gaseous  ordering  of  globules  largely 
disappeared  from  natural  philosophic  discourse.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  
organic  globulism was by no means monopolized by those concerned with the 
articulation of bottom-up, law-defined notions of nature during this time.
Nevertheless,  for  many  globulism  itself  remained  fundamentally 
suspicious.  A  notable  aspect  of  the  generally  respected  comparative  anatomist 
Richard Owen's arguments in favour of the adoption of Geoffroy's conception of 
anatomical  'homologies'  (see  below)  was  his  1849  warning  (which  he  had 
originally aired in his first Hunterian lectures in 1837)  that if
 
we  reject  the  idea  that  these  [homological]  correspondences  are 
manifestations of some archetypical exemplar on which it has pleased 
the Creator to frame certain of his living creatures, there remains only 
the alternative that the organic atoms have concurred fortuitously to 
produce such harmony.65 
Even after John Goodsir had seemingly established the inherent vitality of cells 
during the early 1840s, Owen could still invoke organic 'atomism' as a threatening 
spectre when addressing his largely elite, high church audience.66 Despite efforts 
aimed  at  re-asserting  the  vitalist  doctrine  of  organic  exceptionalism  in  the 
microscopic realm, it is clear that for some the globular aspects of Grant and others' 
science retained radical and even atheistic connotations.
64 Home, Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, pp. 5-6, 20-39.
65 Owen, R. On the Nature of Limbs: A Discourse (Chicago and London; University of 
Chicago Press, 2007 [1849]), p. 40; Owen, R. The Hunterian Lectures in Comparative 
Anatomy; May-June, 1837 (London, 1992 [1837]), pp. 87-88 and 122.
66 On the development of cell theories in Britain see Jacyna, L.S. 'John Goodsir and the 
Making of Cellular Reality,' Journal of the History of Biology 16 (1983), pp. 75-99; 
Jacyna, L.S. "A Host of Experienced Microscopists": the establishment of histology in 
nineteenth-century Edinburgh', Bulletin of the History of Medicine 75 (2001), pp. 225-
253.
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To those that considered the presence of active forces to be critical to the 
explanation of nature, the proposition that the universal operation of physical law 
was responsible for the development of organic nature seemed absurd. For most of  
these figures, it was not the unity, but the diversity of natural forms that constituted 
the principal descriptive concern appropriate to zoological endeavour. Differences 
between animals and plants constituted a manifestation of God's will on earth, and 
indicated the plenitude of creation. To explain all forms of life as entities made up 
of  fundamentally  identical  types  of matter  seemed to belittle God's  creation by 
reducing it to the effects of a small range of rules.67 Even more fundamentally, it 
constituted a limitation of the power of God in the lived world. If there was no 
need for the Creator to intervene to produce new natural forms, what likelihood 
was there that he had performed other, seemingly less significant miraculous feats? 
Was the biblical account of the resurrection, for example, to be taken as a literal  
reporting of events, or as a seemingly vague metaphor?68 If God was simply a law-
giver who set the universe in motion, it seemed to these figures, there would be no 
place left for revealed religion in every-day life.
As Adrian Desmond has pointed out, though well established as a mode of 
zoological investigation in post-revolutionary Europe, introducing law-determined, 
'philosophical' conceptions of life met with strong resistance in Britain.69 Natural 
historians working within natural theological frameworks emphasised the need to 
address bodies as integrated wholes expressive of God's active presence in earthly  
creation.70 They did this primarily through the description and analysis of human 
and animal  anatomies.  Anatomists  such as  Grant's  university  colleague Charles 
Bell tended to take the individual bodies of species rather than types of organic 
structure  as  their  principal  loci  of  investigation.71 Others,  such  as  Grant's  rival 
Owen, sought to compromise with the notion that nature could be explained in its 
entirety  from  the  'bottom  up.'  Owen  emphasised  -  following  the  French 
67 Temkin, ‘Basic Science’, pp. 352-357.
68 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, pp. 110-124.
69 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution.
70 Jacyna, 'Immanence or Transcendence'.
71 Mazumdar, P. 'Anatomy, Physiology and the Reform of Medical Education’.
57
comparative anatomist George Cuvier - that osteological anatomical forms could 
be classified into four different 'types' or 'plans' that had been individually created 
by God.72 To suggest - as 'philosophical' anatomists such as Grant did - that one 
anatomical  'element'  such  as  the  osteological  or  nervous  system could  only  be 
properly  understood  through  a  comparison  of  all  its  forms  throughout  nature, 
starting with the single 'most simple,' seemed to many to be fundamentally opposed 
to the interpretation of the diversity of species as evidence of heavenly wisdom and 
power.73
To  those  who  emphasised  the  notion  of  a  vital  force  that  worked  on 
principles  entirely  unrelated  to  the  forces  that  animated  the  inorganic  world, 
attempts to delineate the globular nature of the very small seemed at best obscure. 
At worst, this notion threatened to subvert the biblical account of creation adhered 
to  by  the  Anglican  church.  Of  far  greater  concern  for  these  figures  was  the 
identification of diversity in the living world. By observing differences between the 
anatomies of species, humanity would become more clearly aware of the plenitude 
of God's creation. It was not through discernment of a microscopic nature, but by 
that most easily comprehended by unadorned sight that these philosophers believed 
an as-yet ignorant public might best be informed of the constant activity by which 
God expressed his benevolence in the natural world.
Microscopic trust in early-nineteenth-century Europe
The French and German conceptions of globularity that began to appear at 
the margins of British physiology during the 1820s did not enjoy a long career. 
Pickstone has noted the brevity of the fashion for conceptions of organic atomism 
in French natural philosophy.74 Similarly, British adherents of the globule thesis 
had all but disappeared by the mid-1830s. Though many factors could no doubt be 
72 Rupke, Richard Owen, pp. 90-140.
73 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, pp. 93-94. Mazumdar, 'Anatomy, Physiology, and 
the Reform of Medical Education', pp. 234-240.
74 Pickstone, 'Locating Dutrochet.'
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invoked to explain such a decline in speculation, the then-uncertain status of the 
microscope as a trustworthy epistemic tool constituted a critical condition for its 
disappearance.
Jonathan Crary has identified a fundamental tension evident in many post-
renaissance conceptions of perception. He relates the emergence from the sixteenth 
century of a conception of observation predicated on a disembodied, rational 'mind' 
that centres around the figure of the camera obscura and associated technologies 
such as magic lanterns. According to Crary, before the re-evaluation of its cultural 
status  during  the  nineteenth  century,  the  camera  obscura  functions  as  an 
intellectually  pervasive  'philosophical  instrument'  that  presents  contemporaries 
with  both  a  means  of  observing,  and  a  model  for  conceptualising,  human 
observation. The human subject - removed in the operation of the camera obscura 
from  the  act  of  representation  -  accompanies  and  legitimates  a  notion  of  the 
universal existence of a (almost invariably male) rational knower acting through 
the human body, independently from the sense-organs by which he perceives the 
world.75 Conceptions of perception that flourished in western Europe during the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  were  predicated  on  a  fundamental 
differentiation between sense-experience and rational insight. 
Critically, this 'disembodied' mode of subjectivity posits the human body 
as the only medium through which experience of external realities can be effected.  
It thereby identifies minds as inherently individuated, mutually alienated entities, 
confined to the sensory experiences of their specific corporeal hosts. This brings  
into question the possibility of any one mind's ability to produce universally true 
natural  knowledge.  How  can  reliable  truths  be  arrived  at  if  all  sensation  and 
observation  is  necessarily  bound  up  in  the  different  experiences  afforded  by 
different bodies?
One seventeenth- and eighteenth-century response to this dilemma, noted 
in earlier in this chapter, called for a multiplication of rational witnesses. Natural  
philosophers such as Robert Boyle and Leibniz, seeking to establish the veracity of  
75 Crary, J. Techniques of the Observer: on vision and modernity in the nineteenth century 
(MIT Press; Cambridge, MA and London, 1990), pp. 25-66. Cf. Armstrong, I. 'The 
Microscope: mediations of a sub-visible world', in Luckhurst, R. and McDonagh, J. 
Transactions and Encounters: science and culture in the nineteenth century (Manchester 
University Press; Manchester and New York, 2002), pp. 30-54.
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apparently rational insights into the nature of the world, had sought to make the 
truth-value of natural perceptions dependent on the sensory experiences of a large 
number of ‘reputable’ individuals. If a group of suitably ‘disinterested’ observers 
with  very  different  sensory  perspectives  could  be  persuaded  to  agree  on  the 
existence and meaning of a given phenomena, they claimed, then its truth would no 
longer be contingent on the unreliable bodily experiences of any one individual.76 
Within  such  an  epistemic  context,  microscopy  remained  a  problematic 
means  of  producing  natural  truth.  The  technical  limitations  presented  by  most 
microscopes of this period implied that witnesses had to perceive an event or image 
individually -  the above-mentioned 'group'  means of  guaranteeing observational 
truthfulness is difficult to apply to minute natural objects that can be accessed only 
via a single lens (or set of lenses) against which only a single eye can be placed at  
any one time. True sensations relating to moving objects or those at the edge of a  
microscope's magnification power were understood as very difficult to establish, as 
their changing or interpretation-dependent nature could not easily be resolved via a 
community of witnesses - a situation that came to be accompanied by a strong 
emphasis on classificatory uncontroversiality as a means of judging the veracity of 
such knowledge.77
As Crary's work implies, a considerable portion of the microscopic culture 
of  early nineteenth-century Britain was organized around attempts to  overcome 
problems associated with the unreliability of individual experience. Much British 
literature concerning microscopy published during the 1830's and 1840's portrays it 
as an activity fully integrated into a culture of display and witnessing. 78 In 1841, 
Daniel Cooper, member of the recently-founded Microscopical Society of London 
and  editor  of  the  short-lived  The  Microscopic  Journal  and  Structural  Record, 
76 Crary, Techniques, pp. 51-53; Shapin, and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump.
77 Ratcliff, The Quest for the Invisible; Schickore, J. The Microscope and the Eye: a history 
of reflections, 1740-1870 (Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 2007), esp. 
pp. 39-82. On visuality and eighteenth-century microscopic science see also Stafford, 
B.M. 'Images of Ambiguity: eighteenth-century microscopy and the neither/or', in Miller, 
D.P. and Reill, P.H. Visions of Empire: voyages, botany, and representations of nature 
(Cambridge; University Press, 1996), pp. 230-257 and Stafford, B.M. 'Voyeur or 
Observer? Enlightenment thoughts on the dilemmas of display', Configurations 1 (1993), 
pp. 95-128.
78 Chapter four elaborates on this theme in relation to women's participation in 
physiological discourse.
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presented  its  readers  with  his  recollections  of  'The  Rise  and  Progress  of 
Microscopic Science', which he chiefly locates in the previous decade.79 Above all, 
Cooper  attributes  such  'progress'  to  the  cultivation  of  a  public  interest  in  the 
instrument  -  a  consequence,  he  suggests,  of  the  development  of  tools  and 
techniques that facilitate the public display of microscopic phenomena. Whilst he 
notes that the solar microscope (a sun-powered microscopic projector) had been 
used for 'the gratification of the public' for some time, it was, he suggests, only 
with the development of 'oxy-hydrogen' or flame-powered illumination that such 
displays could be made reliable. For Cooper, reliable microscopic observation is 
made possible by the multiplication of witnesses to demonstrations. In addition, in 
cultivating  interest  in  microscopy  amongst  the  population  as  a  whole,  these 
displays  are  understood  as  the  principal  means  by  which  competition  between 
instrument-makers - and with it the motive for technical innovation - have been 
inculcated.80 The 'advance' of microscopic observation is in this sense intimately 
connected with the development of means by which invisible nature can be made 
visible to an audience. The status of microscopic sight is made contingent on its 
ability to be made public, or 'witnessed.'
Though microscopic evidence was beginning to be appealed to more and 
more  often  in  nineteenth-century  disputes  regarding  physiological  nature,  the 
efficacy of most microscopic investigation remained uncertain during the 1820s 
and 1830s.81 Microscopes were not  generally trusted as investigative tools,  and 
many physiologists and natural philosophers remained sceptical regarding specific 
claims relating to microscopic observation.82  Suggesting (as Grant did) that the 
fundamental 'elements' of bodies were to be found at the microscopic level could 
thereby be considered unorthodox regardless of what the claims relating to them 
79 [Cooper, D.] [attr. in text to 'The Editor'] 'A Brief Sketch of the Rise and Progress of 
Microscopic Science, and the Principal Means Enumerated which have tended to its 
General Advancement', The Microscopic Journal and Structural Record 1 (1841), p. 2. 
On eighteenth-century Europeans' extensive engagement with microscopy, see Ratcliff, 
The Quest for the Invisible.
80 Cooper, 'A Brief Sketch', pp. 1-4.
81 Jacyna, '”A Host of Experienced Microscopists”,' p. 253; Schickore, The Microscope and 
the Eye, esp. pp. 133-157.
82 Jacyna. '"A Host of Experienced Microscopists",' pp. 229-232.
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were. At least before the articulation of more observationally sophisticated 'cell'  
theories from the late 1830's, reform-minded naturalists tended to accord a more 
central place to microscopic evidence in their conceptions of organic life than did 
members of the Anglican elite.
Those who remained uncertain regarding the implications of an 'atom'-like 
constitution  of  nature  could  thereby  discredit  such  beliefs  without  attacking 
individual authors (and thereby calling into question the ‘disinterestedness’ of their  
natural  philosophy)  by  casting  doubt  on  the  efficacy  of  specific  forms  of 
microscopic observation.  For example,  microscopists  Joseph Jackson Lister  and 
Thomas  Hodgkin  cited  the  inadequacy  of  their  predecessors  microscopic  tools 
rather than their observational capacities in their dismissal of globular claims. They 
suggested  that  the  perception  of  microscopic  globules  were  caused  not  by  the 
phenomena under investigation, but by the lenses of microscopes which (unlike 
their  own)  had  not  been  corrected  to  account  for  'chromatic’  and  ‘spherical’  
aberration. Hence Milne-Edwards, for Lister and Hodgkin, had been honourably 
misled by the inadequacies of the tools that he used: 'he described what he saw, and  
he only saw amiss through the imperfection of his instruments.'83 Though Lister 
later  asserted his belief in the individually self-defining,  spontaneous actions of  
microscopic particles in blood and plant sap, his and Hodgkin's comments were 
generally  interpreted  as  casting  serious  doubt  on  the  existence  of  organic 
'globules.'84 The  ambiguous  status  of  microscopy  in  early  nineteenth-century 
Britain played at least as significant a role in undermining attempts to establish the 
study of life as an extension of that of physics and chemistry as did any direct  
victory of 'conservative' over 'radical' politics that has been appealed to in previous 
accounts of the zoology of the period.85
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The authority of museums
In  comparison  with  the  above-described  concerns  surrounding  the 
reliability of microscopic vision, bodies of evidence in museums seemed to offer a  
particularly  reliable  source  regarding  the  nature  of  living  creation.  Since  the 
Renaissance, the collection of objects had come to be understood as an important 
signifier  of  a  ruler's  possession of  knowledge  and accumulation of  power.  For 
eighteenth-century Europe's  ruling classes,  cultivating a 'cabinet'  indicated one's  
learning at the same time as embodying one's ability to procure, own, and thereby 
'rule'  the  material  productions  of  far-off  lands.86 Collections  of  specimens  of 
minerals,  plants  and  animals,  as  well  as  of  artistic  productions,  mechanical 
'automata' and natural philosophic tools, offered rulers a convenient means of both 
surveying their kingdoms and demonstrating their wealth to others.87 Museological 
collections were a physical manifestation of princely power that could be referred 
to  easily  and conveniently by  those visiting  state  capitals  or  a  monarch's  rural  
retreat. 
By the end of the eighteenth century,  however,  the aristocratic impulse  
towards collection as a means of demonstrating one's power over art and nature had 
begun to be rivalled by an alternative rationale, centred on the potential of such 
activities to liberate and enlighten their respective nations. Museums had begun to 
be  understood  as  places  of  'utility,'  the  ordering  and  study  of  which  could 
contribute to a wider enlightenment of man. Such conceptions became especially 
prominent in France following the revolution of 1789. The collections at the royal  
Jardin  des  Plantes,  for  example,  underwent  a  fundamental  re-alignment  as  a 
'national' body of natural objects, as indicated by their re-naming as the Museum 
d'Histoire Naturelle.88 Cuvier, Geoffroy and Lamarck were all employees of this 
History, Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History 1750-1950 (Cambridge; 
University Press, 2000), pp. 179-197; Corsi, P. 'A Devil's Chaplain Calling?' Journal of  
Victorian Culture 3 (1998), pp. 129-137. See also Rupke, N.A. 'Richard Owen's 
Vertebrate Archetype,' Isis 84 (1993), pp. 250-251.
86 Findlen, P. Possessing Nature: museums, collecting, and scientific culture in early 
modern Italy (University of California Press; Berkeley, LA and London, 1994).
87 Bredekamp, The Lure of Antiquity.
88 On the early history of the Paris Muséum and botanical and zoological gardens see 
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new  institution.89 Disputes  between  these  figures  regarding  the  unity  and 
transformability of the organic world, as well as the possibility of re-constructing 
now-extinct organic forms, have been read as disagreements not only regarding the 
constitution  of  nature,  but  of  the specific  direction in  which  post-revolutionary 
France should be heading.90
In  Britain,  as  far  as  life-related  studies  such  as  geology,  botany  and 
zoology were concerned, the establishment of new, 'gentlemanly' societies, gardens 
and museums was central to this process of ‘enlightenment’. For example, between 
the end of the Napoleonic wars (1815) and the 1830s, the Royal Society had been 
joined  by  the  Geological,  Linnaean,  and  Zoological  Societies  as  established 
features of London's intellectual landscape.91 These institutions operated as much 
more  than  talking-shops,  providing  focal  centres  for  the  collection  and 
interpretation of minerals, plants and animals from throughout the Empire and the 
globe.92 The  new  societies  of  early  nineteenth-century  London  paralleled  the 
emergence of a respectably gentlemanly movement in natural  philosophy based 
around  utilitarian  ideals  and  the  power  of  natural  law.  Nevertheless,  such 
sentiments never dominated these spaces - rather, they can be seen as sites in which 
the notion of a law-determined nature were brought into contact with the notions of 
elite propriety and natural fecundity outlined above in relation to Coleridge and his 
circle.
Of  the  British  institutions  that  outwardly  devoted  themselves  to  the 
improvement  of  the  nation,  it  was  the  museum and gardens  of  the  Zoological 
Spary,  Utopia's Garden.
89 On Cuvier’s museological activities see Rudwick, M. ‘Georges Cuvier’s Paper Museum 
of Fossil Bones’, Archives of Natural History 27 (2000), pp. 51-67.
90 Appel, T.A. The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate: French morphology in the decades before 
Darwin (New York and Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1987). Corsi, P. (trans. 
Mandelbaum, J.) The Age of Lamarck: evolutionary theories in France, 1790-1830 
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1988).
91 On the politics of London's scientific societies at this time see Boas Hall, M. All Scientists  
Now: The Royal Society in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge; University Press, 1984).
92 See eg. Knell, S.J. The Culture of English Geology, 1815-1851: a science revealed 
through its collecting (Aldershot and Burlington, 2000); Drayton, R. Nature's  
Government: science, Imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World (New Haven 
and London; Yale University Press, 2000).
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Society that had most relevance for Grant's advocacy of zoology as a law-based 
science. The Society's Regents Park gardens provided polite society (and later the 
general  public)  with  a  novel  form  of  'rational  recreation',  simultaneously 
demonstrating  the  dominance  of  Empire,  promoting  awareness  of  animals  as 
potential sources of entertainment, and providing zoologists with new objects of 
study.93 Their  museum was especially important  for the fulfilment of this  latter 
role, providing a repository for the specimens produced from animals that had died 
in the gardens, as well as those donated to the institution.94 Grant was a highly 
active member of this institution during its early years (the late 1820s and early 
1830s), attending meetings and providing anatomical studies for its Proceedings on 
such varied topics as the heart of the Indian tortoise, the cranium of the Grampus 
and the cloaca (the opening of the intestinal, reproductive and urinary tracts) of the 
female Condor.95 
Museums also became the focus of political and nationalistic concerns in 
Britain during the 1820s and 1830s. For example, the British Museum became a 
focus for reform agitation.  The national collection had its  origins in collections 
made by Sir Hans Sloane during the mid-eighteenth century. By the turn of the 
nineteenth  century  it  had  become  a  place  at  which  gentlemen  naturalists  and 
collectors  conventionally deposited their  unwanted or  unmanageable  collections 
(often  for  a  price).  This  haphazard  mode  of  acquisition  was  paralleled  by  an 
equally unsystematic approach to classification and display.96 From the end of the 
Napoleonic  Wars,  British  naturalists  began  to  draw  highly  unfavourable 
comparisons  between their  own national  collection  and the  heavily-invested-in, 
93 Ritvo, H. The Animal Estate.
94 Desmond, A. 'The Making of Institutional Zoology in London 1822-1836' [Parts I and II], 
History of Science 23 (1985), pp. 153-185 and 223-250.
95 Grant, R.E. 'On the heart and the structure of the blood vessels of he large Indian 
tortoise (Testudo Indica, Linn.)', Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London 1 
(1833), pp. 43-44. Grant, R.E. 'On the cranium of the round-headed grampus (Delphinus 
globiceps, Cuv.)' Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London 1 (1833), pp. 65-66. 
Grant, R.E. 'On the cloaca of the female condor (Sacorhamphus gryphus, Dum.)' 
Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London 1 (1833), p. 78.
96 On the early years of the British Museum see; Chambers, N. Joseph Banks and the 
British Museum: the world of collecting, 1770-1830 (London, 2007); Wilson, D.M. The 
British Museum: a history (London, 2002); de Beer, G.R. Sir Hans Sloane and the British 
Museum (Oxford; University Press, 1953).
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well-organized museum collections in Paris.  Having recently visited the Muséum 
d'Histoire Naturelle at which Cuvier, Lamarck and Geoffroy worked, then-radical 
British anatomist William Lawrence declared his dissatisfaction with the state of 
affairs in his Hunterian lectures of 1816:
I return to our own country, and am ashamed to find, that although her 
colonies and commercial establishments are found in every region and 
every climate, while every sea is covered and every coast is visited by 
her ships,  these great  facilities  have been as greatly neglected.  We 
have no national collection of living animals, no museum of natural 
history, no public institution for teaching natural science.97
Twenty years later, in a similar vein to Lawrence, Grant declared the zoological  
collection at the British Museum an 'opprobrium to the British Nation and these 
enlightened  times'  in  his  evidence  to  a  parliamentary  committee  set  up  to 
investigate  the possibility  of reforming the institution.98 Comparing the state of 
British museums with those in other countries (and especially with those in France) 
constituted  a  means  by  which  reform  politics  could  be  expressed  in  terms  of 
national interest - a tactic particularly apposite for those such as Grant, whose non-
English  background  invited  accusations  of  harbouring  unpatriotic  sympathies.99 
Collecting and organizing specimens in the name of a specifically 'British' natural  
philosophy  helped  justify  the  introduction  and  development  of  practices  and 
concepts that had been first developed in 'revolutionary' settings on the continent.
As far as medical politics was concerned, one of the earliest targets for 
reformers campaigning for a more open, accountable and 'philosophic'  medicine 
was the Hunterian Museum at the College of Surgeons. This large collection of 
97 Lawrence, W.  An Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology: being the two 
introductory lectures delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons (London, 1816), pp. 87-
88. Following his early involvement in campaigns for medical reform, Lawrence 
increasingly sided with the College Council in its opposition to radical medical politics. 
See Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, pp. 257-258.
98 Report on the Select Committee of the British Museum; together with minutes of 
evidence, appendix and index... (London, 1836), p. 37. Wilson, The British Museum, pp. 
82-91.
99 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, pp. 112-114.
66
zoological anatomical preparations had been built up by John Hunter during the 
latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  its  care  entrusted  to  the  College  by 
parliament following his death in 1793. Yet the College initially displayed little 
enthusiasm for the collection. Before 1837, members were granted access on two 
afternoons a week, and even then were required to present a letter from a member  
of the elite College of Physicians. No attempt had been made to catalogue it, or 
assess  its  value.100 This  apparent  neglect  provided moderate  and radical  reform 
factions  with  a  complaint  they  could  all  agree  on  -  the  College's  apparent 
unwillingness to allow members adequate access to the museum was indicative of a 
wider lack of support  for the advancement of medical  knowledge.  This general 
agreement amongst reformers provided the movement with a rallying point, and 
contributed to the College's decision to construct a new building in which to house  
the collection, and appoint a new conservator (Owen) tasked with the cataloguing 
of  it.101 The  political  pressure  surrounding  access  to  and  maintenance  of  the 
Hunterian collection also contributed to a more general increase in emphasis on 
zoological anatomy during this period.
Grant's zoology in London
The differences between Grant's focus in and around Edinburgh and his 
work after taking up his post as Professor of Comparative Anatomy and Zoology at 
UCL in 1828 are clearly shown by the research publications he produced from each 
location.  Many of his articles published in Scottish journals relied on extended 
observations of living animals kept alive in a merchant friend's (a Mr. Alexander  
Wilson)  unused  property  on  the  banks  of  the  Firth  of  Forth.  This  private, 
100 Yanni, C. Nature's Museums: Victorian science and the architecture of display 
(Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 46-47.
101 Ibid. See eg. 'Royal College of Surgeons', The Lancet 5 (1825-6), p. 729. 'Proposed 
Outlay of College Money by the College in Lincoln's Inn Fields', The Lancet 21 (1833-4), 
pp. 830-832. 'Petition of the Royal College of Surgeons in London', The Lancet 22 
(1834), pp. 158-160. On relations between museum architecture and natural history see 
Forgan, S. 'The Architecture of Display: Museums, universities and objects in nineteenth-
century Britain', History of Science 32 (1994), pp. 139-162.
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laboratory-like  setting  enabled  Grant  to  concentrate  on  the  study  of  living 
animals.102 In addition to his interest in the local sponge population, he produced 
articles  on  such  topics  as  sounds  made  by  sea-slugs  and  the  phosphorescence 
produced by certain water-borne plants.103
In contrast to his Edinburgh researches, Grant produced only one paper 
that  focused on the study of  living organisms following his  arrival  in  London. 
Shortly after his appointment to the university in 1828, he subjected a sample of 
water found some nearby 'stagnant pools' to microscopic analysis. He reported that 
he  was  able  to  observe  the  motions  of  the  Furcocera  viridis,  an  infusorial 
'animalcule'  named  by  Lamarck  and  described  by  renowned  German  zoologist 
Johannes Müller.  Intriguingly for Grant,  whichever way he turned the vessel in 
which the sample was held, the organisms always collected on the side of the glass  
most exposed to a source of light.104
Though  relatively  short,  this  text  is  significant  because  it  both 
demonstrates a continuation of Grant's interest in nature of simple organic forms, 
and  represents  a  shift  of  intellectual  focus.  Whereas  his  previous  publications 
exhibit a concern with establishing relations between the 'simplest' living beings 
and chemical nature, this article concerns itself above all else with zoological life:
The motions of Infusoria are by many believed to be automatic, and 
Lamarck conceives them to result merely from the action of various 
imponderable fluids pervading all bodies... It is interesting, however, 
to observe, that an agent so extensively diffused over nature as light 
has  an  obvious  and  powerful  influence  on  the  motions  of  the 
Furcocera viridis,  an animalcule which exhibits nearly the simplest 
known form of animal organization.105
102 'Biographical Sketch of Robert Edmund Grant', p. 693.
103 Grant, R.E. 'Sounds produced under water by the Tritoria arborescens', Edinburgh 
Philosophic Journal 14 (1826), pp. 185-186. Grant, R.E. 'Notice regarding the structure 
and mode of generation of the Virgularia Miribalis and Pennatula phosphorea', 
Edinburgh Journal of Science 7 (1827), pp. 330-334.
104 Grant, R.E. 'On the influence of Light on the motions of Infusoria', The Edinburgh Journal  
of Science 10 (1828-1829), pp. 346-349.
105 Ibid, p. 349.
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Critical to this shift is a concern not with demonstrating the agency or chemical  
origin of the most basic living particles, but with the nature of organic agency in 
general and its possible causes. The apparent absence of a nervous system in these 
animals seemed to imply that they would not be able to respond to stimuli - that 
their  movements must be undirected or the result  of vital  forces internal  to the 
organism. The portrayal of movement as 'caused' by light - a stimulus external to 
the body of the animal - appears to be aimed at circumventing the necessity of 
invoking an immaterial internal 'force' to explain organic movement. As will be 
shown below, this suggestion that even very simple animals could respond to an 
external, structurally independent force had important implications for Grant and 
his students' subsequent portrayals of both relations between organic structure and 
function, and the nature of life in general.
Following  the  publication  of  this  paper,  and  despite  the  apparent 
significance of the claims that it made, Grant reported little further research in this 
experimental vein. In subsequent publications, including his Comparative Anatomy 
course  at  UCL,  he  concentrated  almost  exclusively  on  the  description  and 
comparison of anatomical forms, and on relating those forms to living functions. In 
the  context  of  imperial  London,  Grant's  aim  of  establishing  zoology  as  a 
'philosophic'  science (and with it  a  community of  zoological  practitioners)  was  
more  readily  achieved  through  the  collection,  production,  description  and 
utilization of anatomical specimens than by establishing normative claims relating 
to relations between organic and inorganic nature (as microscopic and experimental 
observation seemed to promise).
As  Desmond  demonstrates,  in  showing  how  organisms'  anatomical 
structures formed a gradual progression from the 'simplest' to the 'most complex,' 
Grant was following the work of (amongst others) Geoffroy St Hilaire.106 Geoffroy 
was engaged until 1832 in an extended dispute with his counterpart at the Museum 
d'Histoire Naturelle, the highly-respected George Cuvier, over the extent to which 
organic  nature  could  be  characterized  as  a  unified  whole.107 Much  of  Grant's 
106 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution.
107 Appel, The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate. 1832 was the year of Cuvier's death.
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anatomical work at the Zoological Society was aimed at breaking down Cuvier's 
proposed  'embranchments',  by  which  natural  forms  were  classified  into  broad,  
essentially dissimilar categories.108 In this sense, we can see Grant continuing his 
already-discussed interest  in  establishing a normative position regarding natural 
(rather than simply organic) unity. However, establishing Geoffroy's 'unity of type'  
in  organic  structures  could  say  very  little  about  relations  between organic  and 
inorganic  nature.  By  concentrating  on  describing  relations  between  anatomical 
structures  and  living  functions,  Grant  appeared  to  be  ceding  epistemological 
ground in his advocacy of the unity of nature and universality of natural law. 
Although Grant's research in London has been characterized as calculated 
to support Geoffroy, and as broadly inspired by the transmutationist ideas of Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck, it would be a mistake to assume that either natural philosopher’s 
ideas  provided  a  complete  conceptual  framework  for  Grant’s  lectures.109 As 
indicated by the quote  from the the  Furcocera viridis article  above,  Lamarck's 
characterization of vital force did not feature prominently in Grant's work, though 
both shared an interest in organisms that were difficult to classify as either plant or 
animal,  and  both  were  interested  in  the  possibility  that  life  developed  out  of  
inorganic matter.110 Similarly, Grant shared Geoffroy's belief that basic elementary 
forms could be traced throughout zoological nature, but placed greater emphasis on 
the development of life from microscopic organic structures. In this sense, Grant's  
lectures at UCL can be seen as an attempt to synthesise the work of the two French 
naturalists,  similarly to  the way in  which  Cuvier’s  and Geoffroy's  followers  in 
France sought a synthesis of their more antagonistic views during the 1830s and 
40s.111 The role of Germanic philosophy and zoology in this process was crucial, as 
it provided clear conceptual tools for an understanding of nature as a progressive, 
end-directed  process  that  did  not  have  to  rely  on  active  intervention  of  a  
disembodied or immaterial force.112
108 Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, p. 56.
109 For this characterization see Desmond, 'Robert E. Grant' and Desmond, The Politics of  
Evolution.
110 Desmond 'Robert E. Grant'
111 Appel, The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate, pp. 202-237.
112 Lenoir, The Strategy of Life, pp. 6-16.
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As already noted, like other 'philosophic' anatomists, rather than attempting 
to explain organisms at the species level, Grant takes as his object of explanation 
the development and existence of relations between different systems of organs.  
For example, in his Lancet lectures, the skeletal, nervous and digestive systems are 
each  described  in  turn,  starting  with  characterizations  of  their  'simplest' 
manifestation  and  working  up  to  their  most  complex  (generally  though  not  
necessarily  to  be  found  in  a  universal  'Man').  According  to  Grant  (following 
Geoffroy),  each  set  of  organs  display  a  gradual  progression  of  form,  and  the 
explanation for changes in form along this continuum is to be found in changes to 
the functional requirements of a particular organ. Thus the fact that the skull-bones 
of fishes are not fused together, and resemble vertebrae when compared with the 
skulls of mammals, demonstrates two things; firstly, it shows that fishes' skulls are 
lower down the skeletal developmental scale than those of mammals, and therefore 
closer  to  the 'simplest'  condition in  which bones can be found (in  this  case as 
countless  minute  'spicula'  in  the  sponges);113 secondly,  it  shows  how  fish  are 
'perfectly  adapted'  to  their  environment   -  a  circumstance  that  requires  the 
accommodation of muscles suited to producing the lateral bodily motion necessary 
to move through water. This (Grant suggests) would not be possible with a fused 
skull.114
Explanations  along these lines  do not  necessarily  invoke the functional 
requirements  of  the  external  environment  as  an  immediate  explanation  for  all  
anatomical forms, but consider each form in relation to the whole body and its  
environment.  This  is  most  clear  in  Grant's  lectures  on  nervous  anatomy.  He 
considers the most simple discernible form of the nervous system (though not the 
first  manifestation  of  nervous  function)  as  that  of  the  starfish,  described  by 
Friedrich Tiedemann in 1816.115 This system, according to Grant,  consists  of  'a 
simple circle of nervous filament around the centre of the alimentary canal... placed 
113 Grant, 'Lectures' [IV], pp. 196-200.
114 Grant, 'Lectures' [XII], pp. 544-546. On Grant's views on perfect adaptation see eg. 
'Lectures' II, p. 123.
115 Tiedemann, F. Anatomie der Röhren-Holothurie der pomeranzfarbigen Seesterns und 
Stein-Seeigels: eine im Jahre MDCCCXII vom Fransösischen Institut gekrönte 
Preisschrift (Landshut, 1816).
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near the mouth so as to watch over the kind of substances that are conveyed into 
[it]'.116 In  this 'low'  state  the nerves have a  relatively direct  relation to external 
environmental  conditions,  their  primary  function  being  to  ensure  the  digestive 
system receives appropriate sustenance from without. But in organisms in which 
other functional systems play a greater role, the nervous system's most significant 
relation is with its internal environment. Hence in arachnids the relatively minor  
role played by the sense organs means that the 'supra-œsophageal' ganglion serving 
them  is  small.  In  contrast,  the  importance  of  the  organs  of  motion  for  the 
continuance of arachnid life means that the ganglia relating to them are of greater  
size.117 As the nervous system is traced upwards through the animal kingdom, its  
form  becomes  increasingly  dependent  on  the  relative  importance  of  different 
anatomical  structures, rather than the direct influence of external environmental 
conditions, for keeping the animal alive.
The principal means by which life is seen to develop in Grant's lectures is  
that which was being advocated by Johann Friedrich Meckel around this time: the 
successive  arrest  of  embryological  development  along  a  pre-ordained  plan, 
regulated by the operation of natural law. Though species' bodies themselves do 
not in this conception follow one smooth progressive path from simple to complex, 
all  anatomical structures can be seen to progress along a gradual series as they 
develop into adult  form. Hence anatomical  structures found in adult  specimens 
'lower' down the scale find their parallel in still-developing human or mammalian 
bodies.  Though  Grant  does  not  claim  the  human  embryo  exhibits  the  most 
developed  examples  of  all  anatomical  forms,  it  nevertheless  constitutes  the 
principal example of 'higher' development deployed by him.118 This (at this time 
highly speculative) practice of comparing lower organic forms to anatomies of the 
human embryo accorded well with the broader emphasis on museological evidence 
within Britain at the time.
In his museum and the lectures he produced at University College Grant 
could address one anatomical specimen at a time, moving up an anatomical series 
116 Grant, 'Lectures' [XXXVI], p. 483
117 Grant, 'Lectures' XXXVII, pp. 515-516.
118 See for example Grant,. 'Lectures' XXXIII, p. 369. Grant, 'Lectures' XXXVII, p. 513.
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and relating each organ to the specific environmental and bodily circumstances that  
he considered to explain its structure. At the same time, continual comparison of 
anatomical elements of 'lower' animal adult forms with representations of 'higher' 
animal embryos seemed to demonstrate parallels between all organic structures.119 
Specimen-based comparative anatomy thereby presented a convincing means by 
which the study of human organs could be linked with that of the development of  
non-human nature.
Other aspects of Grant's portrayal of the 'progress' of organic structure in 
his UCL lectures seem more in accordance with his belief in natural unity, rather  
than with his later, specimen-centred zoology which he adopted during his time 
there.  One  example  of  this  (his  suggestion  that  tissues  were  made  up  of 
spontaneously-created,  mutually  independent  globular  'atoms')  has  already been 
discussed. Another, more prominent theme of the lectures is his discussion of the 
gradual formation of the distinct anatomical systems evident in more complex or 
'higher' animals. 
In Grant's view, all the most basic functions necessary for the continuation 
of life are fulfilled not  only by the collective operation of different  anatomical  
structures evident in more complex organisms, but also at the most basic level by a  
'gelatinous  matter'  similar  to  the  one  that  he  first  encountered  in  his  sponge 
research.  He  suggests  that  this  basic  organic  substance  contains  within  it  the 
potential for the development of all organs that fulfil specialized functions. Hence 
'all the systems that enter into the composition of animal bodies are successively 
developed from a primitive, simple,  homogeneous, cellular tissue which at first  
composed  the  whole  body.'120 For  example,  following  a  description  of  the 
experiments  relating  infusoria  and  light  described  above,  Grant  proceeds  to 
describe  the  nature  of  the  simplest  structures  that  can  be  associated  with 
independent  action;  initially,  'nervous',  'muscular'  and  'digestive'  functions  are 
'diffused through every part of the homogeneous cellular tissue of the body, which 
119 On embryology and anatomical specimens see Hopwood, N. 'Producing Development: 
the anatomy of human embryos and the norms of Wilhelm His', Bulletin of the History of  
Medicine 74 (2000), pp. 38-39. Hopwood, N. 'Plastic Publishing in Embryology', in 
Hopwood, N. and de Chadarevian, S. (eds.) Models: the third dimension of science 
(Stanford; University Press, 2004), pp. 182-186.
120 Grant, 'Lectures' II, p. 126
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possesses  the  same properties  in  every  part,  and  is  infinitely  divisible  without 
destroying its vitality.'121
Contending that  functions such as motion and volition -  conventionally 
associated with distinct organs or entities such as muscles, the brain, or even an 
incorporeal  'soul'  -   are  evident  in  the simplest  living  matter  enabled  Grant  to 
emphasise his belief in the unity of organic nature (though not his belief in the 
unity of nature as a whole). The suggestion that muscles, brains, and other organs 
that  were  generally  presumed to  be  functionally-specific  had  their  origins  in  a 
single  substance  marks  an  extension  of  Paris-trained  naturalists'  contentions 
regarding the independence of anatomical structure and living function. Geoffroy 
had  argued  that  the  fins  of  fishes  were  'the  same'  bones  as  the  inner  ear  of 
mammals,  and that  consequentially  anatomical  structures  could  not  be  usefully 
classified according to the functions they fulfilled.122 Grant went further, suggesting 
that all  life developed from an original,  functionally undifferentiated state. This 
contention  can  be  seen  as  a  confirmation  of  the  characterization  of  nature  as 
inherently developmental, progressing from simple to complex  - a concept most 
prominent  in  what  Tim  Lenoir  characterises  as  the  'teleo-mechanic'  natural 
philosophy  prevalent  in  Germanic  territories  at  this  time.123 Like  Germanic 
zoologists such as Meckel  and Karl Ernst  von Baer, Grant was concerned with 
establishing how specialized organic forms arose from an initially 'homogeneous' 
substance (though the more avowedly embryological focus of von Baer meant that 
he emphasised the development of individual organisms to a far greater extent).124
In addition to providing a means by which very simple organisms could be 
brought within the same explanatory framework as 'higher' classes such as reptiles 
and mammals, the invocation of differentiation as an organic 'law' naturalised an 
implicit hierarchy of anatomical forms. The first type of organ thought to develop 
(in this case the skeletal) fulfilled functions that were most fundamental to - and 
therefore 'lowest' in - the progress of life. Organisms further up the series had to  
121 Grant, 'Lectures' XXXVI, pp. 481-482
122 Appel,The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate, pp. 84-98.
123 Lenoir, The Strategy of Life.
124 Lenoir, The Strategy of Life, pp. 80-81.
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respond to more challenging environmental conditions. This meant that different 
types of structure were needed for the species to survive. Hence skeleton, muscles,  
and  nerves  are  portrayed  as  coming  into  being  at  successive  points  in  the 
progressive unfolding of nature. The types and relative sizes of organs perceptible 
in  any given animal  become indicators  of  its  place in  the overall  gradation of 
nature.125 Birds  might  have  presented  the  most  complex  forms  of  osteological 
development, and the most developed digestive systems may have been found in 
the Ruminata, but man remained the 'highest' being in Grant’s lectures because he 
possessed the most complex form of nervous system - the 'highest' organ because 
last to appear in the differentiation of living tissues.
Describing  the  differentiation  of  tissues  out  of  a  simple  homogeneous 
substance enabled Grant to reconcile his emphasis on absolute natural unity with 
the seemingly well-distinguished anatomical 'elements' he sought to explain in is 
lectures.  Nevertheless,  this  view  would  have  been  difficult  to  convey  to  his 
students using the primarily anatomical tools at his disposal. In the absence of any 
established  means  of  demonstrating  the  points  at  which  different  anatomical 
elements were differentiated out of an original homogeneous substance, he appears  
to have simply asserted his views as truth. Though it is possible that he presented 
students with microscopic evidence or illustrated these points with drawings, there 
is no hint of this in his published or unpublished writings. The extent to which his 
reliance on prepared specimens (and illustrations) determined Grant's capacity for 
promoting  his  subject  indicates  a  limiting  effect  of  museology  on  zoological 
discourse. Whilst a very powerful means of associating and comparing particular 
structures of human and animal bodies, the comparison of specimens was not well  
suited to illustrating the nature, origin or development of difficult-to-perceive or 
preserve  organic  phenomena.  The  importance  accorded  to  museums  in  British 
natural philosophy during the early nineteenth century concentrated attention on 
'higher' anatomy at the expense of the microscopic and experimental studies more 
popular  on  the  continent  (and  that  had  constituted  the  main  focus  of  Grant's 
research in Edinburgh).126
125 Grant, 'Lectures' IV, pp. 193-195.
126 Temkin, O. ‘Basic Science’, pp. 364-365 and 368-369.
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Interpreting anatomy
The aspects of Grant's science that were most congruent with his teaching 
at UCL – i.e. comparisons between and explanations of specific anatomical parts - 
were also highly susceptible to appropriation within different and even opposing 
explanatory  frameworks.  The  clearest  example  of  this  is  the  adaptation  of  his 
emphasis on the gradual progress of anatomical structures to natural theological 
discourse by his students.  For example, having been commissioned to write the 
treatise  on  zoology  for  the  natural  theological  Bridgewater series,  Peter  Mark 
Roget  enrolled  on  Grant's  course  in  1832,  and  subsequently  based  a  large 
proportion of the final text on its progressive anatomical schema. Yet this work 
played down Grant's emphasis on the unity of natural law, preferring instead to 
emphasise  abrupt  distinctions  between  whole  species,  and  the  possibility  that 
organic change was produced by a 'subtle and pervading principle'. It also insisted 
that  living  nature  was  'utterly  irreducible  to  the  known  laws  which  govern 
inorganic matter.'127 
Other  attendees  of  Grant's  classes at  UCL interpreted his anatomy in a  
similar  fashion.  Edwin  Lankester  and  Edward  Meryon  both  published  works 
addressing  zoology that  admitted  the  possibility  of  a  continuum of  anatomical 
forms. Nevertheless, both denied that man could be included in this continuum, and 
Lankester was particularly concerned to stress the impossibility of the spontaneous 
development of life out of inorganic matter.128 Though Grant's university lectures 
promoted an uncompromisingly law-determined notion of zoological development, 
this  did not  prevent  his  students from appropriating those aspects  of  them that  
accorded with their own particular conceptions of life, nature, and divine creation.
The  institutional  contexts  that  made  it  possible  for  those  without 
independent  means  to  practice  zoology  tended  to  confine  their  activities  to 
127 Roget, P.M. Animal And Vegetable Physiology Considered with Reference to Natural  
Theology (London, 1834), esp. Vol. I, pp. 9 and 21.
128 Meryon, E. The Physical and Intellectual Constitution of Man Considered (London, 
1836), esp. pp. 25-45. Lankester, E. 'The Natural History of Creation', in Lectures 
Delivered Before the Young Men's Christian Association at Centenary Hall and 
Freemason's Hall, 1847-8 (London, 1848), pp. 1-32.
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anatomical science. Many of Grant's students who went on to publish on zoology 
centred their  work on the collection and interpretation of  specimens.  Museums 
were integral to the livelihoods of such of his students as the naval surgeon and 
naturalist  Robert  McCormick,  and  William  Henry  Flower,  Owen's  successor 
following the latter's retirement from the Museum of Natural History in 1884.129 
Grant himself was certainly aware of the importance of museums as sites in which 
zoological practitioners might gain specialist employment. He argued in his 1836 
evidence to the above-mentioned committee on the reform of the British Museum 
that  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  disordered  state  of  its  collection  was  the 
employment of curators that did not have a prior reputation in their field.130 In a 
culture  that  emphasised the collection and production of  specimens,  gaining an 
appointment in a museum or as a collector on a naval expedition were the most  
obvious way in which aspiring natural philosophers could make their zoological 
interests pay.131 
Though  practices  that  would  later  become  associated  with  'laboratory' 
settings could and did take place in museums from the 1840s, anatomical collection 
and  interpretation  remained  their  principal  raison  d'etre.132 This  meant  that 
advocates of a unified conception of nature were able to promote a zoology that 
emphasised law as the sole motor of organic change. However, such figures found 
129 On Flower's museology see van Keuren, D.K. 'Cabinets and Culture: Victorian 
anthropology and the museum context', Journal of the History of the Behavioural  
Sciences 25 (1989), pp. 26-39. Other students of Grant's who centred their subsequent 
zoological activities around collections and collecting include John Forbes Royal (1798-
1858), Robert McCormick (1800-1890) Thomas Caverhill Jerdon (1811-1872) and Louis 
Hunton (1814-1838). McCormick's memoirs have recently been republished as 
McCormick, R.M. Voyages of Discovery in the Arctic and Antarctic Seas and Round the 
World (2 Vols.) (Boston, 2006 [1884])
130 Report on the Select Committee of the British Museum, pp. 134-135.
131 The development of Thomas Henry Huxley's career is particularly instructive in this 
regard. See Forgan, S and Gooday, G. 'Constructing South Kensington: the buildings 
and politics of T.H. Huxley's working environments', British Journal for the History of  
Science 29 (1996), pp. 435-468; White, P. Thomas Huxley: making the "man of science" 
(Cambridge; University Press, 2003).
132 Kraft, A. and Alberti, S.J.M.M. ''Equal Though Different':  laboratories, museums, and the 
institutional development of biology in late-Victorian Northern England', Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science, Part C: Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 34 (2003), pp. 203-236. See also Grant's comments 
on locating his 'laboratory' in the university museum: Coll. Coll. Grant-Atkinson, 15 Nov. 
1843.
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it  harder  to  question  the  initial  origins  of  life.  Statements  regarding  relations 
between life and non-life could not  be articulated without the utilisation of the  
culturally  problematic  techniques  of  microscopy  and  experiment  that  would 
become associated with organic chemistry and the observation of cells later in the 
century.
Amongst the clearest illustration of the bias towards 'higher' anatomy that  
went along with the status of museums as pre-eminent sites of organic investigation 
is  embodied  by  the  early  publications  of  William Benjamin  Carpenter,  one  of 
Grant's students most sympathetic to his notion of nature as a unity. Significantly, 
although  these  texts  (published  during  the  mid-late  1830’s)  value  microscopic 
observation, they cast doubt on the possibility of observing fundamental atom-like 
organic forms.133 It  was only after  the establishment  of  cell  theory by Matthias 
Jacob Schleiden, Theodor Schwann, Rudolf Virchow and Edinburgh microscopist 
John Goodsir that Carpenter’s publications begin to represent bodies as made up of  
collections  of  nominally-independent  microscopic  parts.134 Even  then,  they 
emphasise  what  they  portray  as  the  impossibility  of  cells  developing  from 
inorganic matter and the wide range of cell-like entities that tissues are made up 
of.135 Carpenter’s early publications indicate his belief  that physiological studies 
have to be distinguished from conceptions of life as chemically-derived, and that 
there is little evidence for the contention that nature is built up of agglomerations of 
essentially similar (and therefore implicitly equal) parts.
Nevertheless,  for  Carpenter,  the apparent  existence of such fundamental 
133 Carpenter, W.B. Principles of General and Comparative Physiology, Intended as an 
Introduction to The Study of Human Physiology, and as a Guide to the Philosophical 
Pursuit of Natural History (London, 1839), eg. on pp. 14 (footnote), 19, 23.
134 Schwann's work is discussed in Otis, L. Müller's Lab (Oxford and New York; Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 59-66. Ackernecht, E.H. Rudolf Virchow: doctor, statesman, 
anthropologist (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1953) remains the most 
comprehensive Anglophone study of Virchow's work. On Goodsir see Jacyna, L.S. 'John 
Goodsir,’ pp. 75-99.
135 Carpenter, W.B. 'Report on the Results Obtained by the Use of the Microscope in the 
Study of Anatomy and Physiology: Part II - On the origin and function of cells', British 
and Foreign Medical Review 15 (1843), pp. 259-281. On Carpenter's changing attitudes 
towards globules and cells see Jacyna, L.S. 'Scientific Naturalism in Victorian Britain' 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980), pp. 120-125. On his hostility to 
spontaneous generation see Carpenter, W.B., 'Natural History of Creation', British and 
Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review 19 (1845), esp. pp. 168-173.
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differences between life and non-life did not imply that organisms could not be 
interrogated on the same basis as the rest of nature (as Roget and others inferred).  
Advocates of spontaneous generation maintained that life was reducible to natural  
law because it was no more than a product of the interaction of chemical or other 
physical forces. Carpenter’s texts adopt an alternative position, suggesting that it is 
not the origin, but the nature of life that constitutes evidence that it is governed by 
discoverable  laws.  Specifically,  they  maintain  that  living  structures  exhibit 
phenomena that imply the existence of a physical force that can be interrogated on 
the same basis as forces such as light, heat, magnetism and electricity. Carpenter 
later suggests that the existence of this force can be understood as extending the 
principle of the conservation of energy to living structures.136 This force's role in 
natural philosophic discourse will be addressed more fully in subsequent chapters. 
It is nevertheless sufficient for present purposes to note that invocation of a force 
related  to  organic  nature  -  apparently  shorn  of  the  spiritualist  connotations  of 
Coleridge  and  Roget's  'subtle  and  pervading  principle'  -  enabled  Carpenter  to 
sidestep  the  problem  of  establishing  the  veracity  of  microscopic  observation 
encountered by advocates of spontaneous generation.
Conclusion
Museums, and the specimens they contained, played a critical role in the 
constitution of zoology as an academic discipline in Britain during the nineteenth 
century.  As  spaces  that  could  be  experienced  by  multiple  witnesses  relatively 
easily, they seemed particularly reliable means of constituting knowledge within a 
culture  in  which  the  mind  was  generally  considered  a  different  category  of 
136 Hall, V.M. 'The Contribution of the Physiologist, William Benjamin Carpenter (1813-
1885), to the development of the principles of the correlation of forces and the 
conservation of energy', Medical History 23 (1979), pp. 129-155. See also Smith, R. 
'Physiological Psychology and the Philosophy of Nature in Mid-Nineteenth-Century 
Britain' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1970)  pp. 245-255. The 
process of conversion of non-living into living matter became a principal concern of other 
students of Grant's, such as Henry Charlton Bastian and the agricultural chemist Joseph 
Henry Gilbert. On Bastian see Strick, Sparks of Life. On Gilbert's work on fertilization 
with John Bennet Lawes, see Brock, W.H. Justus von Leibig: the chemical gatekeeper 
(Cambridge; University Press, 1997), pp. 173-177.
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investigation to that of organic nature. In addition, individual museum specimens 
could  be  utilised  for  the  purposes  of  instruction  more  readily  than  individual 
microscopes. A specimen in a jar could be held up for a whole class to see at once,  
whereas a single microscope demanded that each observer witness the phenomena 
in question separately.137 The production of agreement amongst observers thereby 
seemed far more easily obtainable via the collection and display of specimens than 
through their magnification.
The status of museums as pre-eminent means of researching and teaching 
zoology  encouraged  natural  philosophers  to  ask  different  questions  to  those 
associated  with  other  means  of  intellectual  production.  Microscopes  were 
indispensable in attempts to answer such problems as 'what is the simplest unit of 
life?'  or  'does  life  develop  out  of  non-life?'  The  relative  marginalisation  of 
microscopic  techniques  in  comparison  with  the  collection  and interpretation  of 
specimen-objects meant that such questions came to be seen as less interesting than 
those concerning relations between anatomical structures. In particular, the issue of  
whether  or  not  the  understanding  of  humans  should  be  informed  by  that  of 
zoological nature as a whole became particularly prominent in Britain. Focus on 
museological specimens - along with the importance of museums as sites in which 
zoologists could maintain institutional positions - contributed to a concentration on 
the nature of human-animal relations.
Though  relations  between  life  and  non-organic  nature  were  becoming 
culturally important elsewhere (for example in Germany)138 at this time, it was the 
relation of humans to an historically distinct 'animal' kingdom that most concerned 
the majority of British intellectuals addressing living nature.139 Grant's reliance on 
specimens  as  an  epistemic  tool  reflects  both  a  broader  focus  on  museums  as 
authoritative sites of intellectual production, and the relatively marginal status of 
137 On the development of collective witnessing in microscopy, see Jacyna, L.S. ’Moral 
Fibre: the negotiation of microscopic facts in Victorian Britain,’ Journal of the History of  
Biology 36 (2003), pp. 39-85.
138 On this difference see Schickore, The Microscope and the Eye,  esp. pp. 133-157. 
Lenoir, The Strategy of Life.
139 The three figures most intensely studied in this regard have been Richard Owen, Charles 
Darwin, and Thomas Henry Huxley. On Owen, see Rupke, N. Richard Owen. On Huxley, 
see White, Thomas Henry Huxley. The most comprehensive biographical study of 
Darwin is Browne, Charles Darwin.
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other  means  of  constituting  zoological  knowledge  in  Britain  at  this  time.  His 
political  commitment  to  an  uncompromisingly  law-determined  conception  of 
creation,  in  which  life  could  be  explained  by  'the  principles  of  chemistry  or 
mechanics,' came to be articulated by him in relation to anatomical series rather 
than the microscopic ‘atoms’ that had at first seemed so promising. 
As an epistemic tool that was critical to the instantiation of zoology as an 
academic discipline, museums can thereby be understood as constituting a limiting 
effect on British discourse regarding the nature of animality. Indeed, perhaps the 
most famous nineteenth-century debate regarding the nature of life, that between 
Thomas  Henry  Huxley  (representing  Charles  Darwin)  and  Richard  Owen  (and 
Bishop  Wilberforce),  during  the  1860s,  centred  around  the  interpretation  of 
anatomical  specimens  of  an  organic  'element'  that  was  to  play  a  particularly 
prominent role in nineteenth-century natural philosophy, and which constitutes a 
focus for much of the rest of this thesis; the nervous system. The apparently critical 
status  of  anatomical  disputes  during  the  1860s  indicates  the  central  role  that 
museum specimens had come to play in the constitution of zoology as a prestigious 
scientific  discipline.  The  politics  of  early  nineteenth-century  zoology  was  not 
simply  a  reflection  of  broader  ideological  concerns:  it  also  depended  on 
considerations relating to the kinds of tools which could legitimately be appealed to 
in its investigation.
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Chapter 2:
Politicising Technique: ideology, nervous 
physiology, and the place of tools in 'disciplinary' 
psychology (c. 1830-1860)
Introduction
It is more than coincidental that University College London constituted a 
key site for the emergence of zoology as a recognisable academic discipline in  
nineteenth-century Britain. Indeed, it might be said that, as a site in which a whole 
range of intellectual disciplines - history, modern languages, and political economy 
as well as zoology and botany – first found institutional purchase, UCL offers an  
exemplary case study regarding changing notions of academic practice during this  
time. Such a study would be beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I wish to 
point out in this chapter the possibilities afforded by UCL and similar institutions 
such as the University of Edinburgh for the re-formulation of intellectual activity 
during the nineteenth century.
My principal concern in this chapter is the aspiration of a second science - 
psychology -  to  the status  of  an established,  ‘disciplinary’  field of study in the 
nineteenth-century  academy.1 During  the  twentieth  century,  the  emergence  of 
psychology, as a set of ideas relating to man's 'internal' life and health, became a 
significant concern for historians wishing to interrogate the status of medicine in 
contemporary culture. As such, a wide range of studies have been published in  
which the constitution of psychological knowledge - and especially psychological 
knowledge relating to 'pathological' states of mind - is questioned, interrogated, and 
otherwise  problematized.  Of  particular  concern  in  literature  relating  to  British 
medicine has been the place of asylums as institutions critical to the establishment 
1 On this ‘pre-disciplinarity’ of nineteenth-century psychology in Britain see Rylance, R. 
Victorian Psychology and British Culture, 1850-1880 (Oxford and New York; Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 5-17.
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of  a  psychiatric  'profession'.2 Hence  debates  have  raged  as  to  what  extent  the 
emergence of psychiatry can be associated with institutionalization, the demands of 
industrialization, family life, and changes in the make-up of the state. 3 Somewhat 
paradoxically,  however,  histories  concerned  with  British  medical  practice  have 
until recently tended to neglect the emergence during the mid-nineteenth century of 
efforts to associate mind and life. The constitution of a notion of psychological 
existence as a specifically 'physiological' phenomenon - that is, of a 'physiological 
psychology'  (as  it  came  to  be  termed  by  its  practitioners)  -  in  which  mind  is 
conceived  of  as  co-incidental  to  organic  development,  has  not  been  subject  to 
extensive  examination  by  historians  of  medicine.4 This  may  be  because  of  its' 
concern with the definition of a 'nature' or a set of norms regarding human motives  
and desires rather than mental pathology; physiological psychology was not always 
applied to the treatment of pathological states. Nevertheless, as a key constituent of 
intellectual  culture  in  Britain  at  this  time,  the  movement  as  a  whole  deserves 
greater attention than it has hitherto been given.
Despite not having been addressed in great detail in histories of medicine, 
the  drawing-together  of  zoological,  physiological  and  psychological  discourses 
2 On medical Historians concern with professionalism more generally see Burnham, J.C. 
How the Idea of Profession Changed the Writing of Medical History, Medical History 
Supplement 19 (London, 1998).
3 There is now an extensive literature on the history of nineteenth-century asylums. For 
historiographic overviews see Bartlett, P. and Wright, D. 'Community care and its 
antecendents', in Bartlett, P. and Wright, D. Outside the Walls of the Asylum (London 
and New Brunswick, 1999), pp. 1-18; Melling, J. 'Accommodating Madness; New 
research in the social history of insanity and institutions', in Melling, J. and Forsyth, B. 
(eds.) Insanity, Institutions and Society, 1800-1914: A social history of madness in 
comparative perspective (London, 1999), pp. 1-23. Recent monographs and book-length 
collections on the British context include Suzuki, A. Madness at Home: The psychiatrist,  
the patient, and the family in England, 1820-1860 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London; 
University of California Press, 2006); Melling, J. and Forsyth, B. The Politics of Madness:  
The state, insanity and society in England, 1845-1914 (Abingdon, 2006); Bartlett and 
Wright, Outside the Walls; Scull, A. The Most Solitary of Afflictions: Madness and society 
in Britain, 1700-1900 (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1993).
4 Significant exceptions include James, F.E. 'Thomas Laycock and a Trophic Nervous 
System', Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 7 (1998), pp. 27-31; Jacyna, L.S. 
'Somatic theories of mind and the interests of medicine in Britain', Medical History 26 
(1982), pp. 233-258; Smith, R. Trial By Medicine: Insanity and responsibility in Victorian 
trials (Edinburgh; University press, 1981); See also Bynum, W.F. 'The nervous patient in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain: the psychiatric origins of British neurology', in 
Bynum, W.F., Porter, R. and Shepherd, M. The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the 
History of Psychiatry [Vol. ] (London, 1985), pp. 89-102.
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during the nineteenth century has not  gone unnoticed in the wider literature on 
British history.5 Of particular note in this regard is a substantial body of work that 
seeks to demonstrate that broader literary practices, generally considered to operate 
in isolation from the domain of academic disciplines, have in fact been intimately  
related to the constitution of psychological beliefs.  That is,  historians of a non-
specialized 'literature' (generally conceived of as referring to poetry, novels, short 
stories,  miscellaneous  journal  articles,  and  so  on)  have  identified  specific,  co-
constitutive links between the rhetoric and narrative techniques deployed in texts 
relating to both formal, disciplinary studies of mind, and informal, 'undisciplined',  
commercially-dependent writing.6 The emergence of a specifically 'physiological' 
psychology,  it  has  been  pointed  out,  was  to  a  great  extent  dependent  on  the 
possibilities constituted by the literary forms that prevailed during the nineteenth 
century.7
Physiological psychology as a movement has thereby been characterised as 
5 Smith, R. ‘The Physiology of the Will: mind, body, and psychology in the periodical 
literature’, in Cantor, G. and Shuttleworth, S. Science Serialized: representations of the 
sciences in nineteenth-century periodicals (Cambridge, MA and London; MIT Press, 
2004), pp. 81-110; Dixon, T. From Passions to Emotions: the emergence of a secular 
psychological category (Cambridge; University Press, 2003), pp. 135-179; Rylance, 
Victorian Psychology and British Culture;  Leff, A. 'Thomas Laycock and the Cerebral 
Reflex: a function arising from and pointing to the unity of nature' History of Psychiatry 2 
(1991), pp. 385-407; Jacyna, L.S. ‘Principles of General Physiology;: the comparative 
dimension to British neuroscience in the 1830’s and 1840’s’, Studies in History of  
Biology 7 (1984), pp. 47-92; Danziger, K. 'Mid-Nineteenth-Century British Psycho-
Physiology: A Neglected Chapter in the History of Psychology', in Woodward, W.R. and 
Ash, M.G. (eds.) The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth-Century Thought 
(New York, 1982), pp. 119-146; Jacyna, L.S. ‘The Physiology of Mind, the Unity of 
Nature, and the Moral Order in Victorian Thought’, The British Journal for the History of  
Science 14 (1981), pp. 109-132; Daston, L.J. ‘British Responses to Psycho-Physiology, 
1860-1900’, Isis 69 (1978), pp. 192-208; Smith, R. 'The Human Significance of Biology: 
Carpenter, Darwin, and the vera causa', in Knoepflmacher, U.C. and Tennyson, G.B. 
Nature and the Victorian Imagination (University of California Press; Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1977), pp. 216-230; Young, R.M. Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth 
Century (New York; Oxford University Press, 1990 [1970]); Smith, ‘Physiological 
Psychology and the Philosophy of Nature’.
6 For an overview see Matus, J.L. ‘Victorian Framings of the Mind: recent work on mid-
nineteenth century theories of the unconscious, memory, and emotion’, Literature 
Compass 4 (2007), pp. 1257-1276. See especially Dames, N. The Physiology of the 
Novel: reading, neural science, and form in Victorian fiction (Oxford and New York; 
Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 25-70; Stiles, A. (ed.) Neurology and Literature 
(Basingstoke, 2007); Gallagher, C. The Body Economic: life, death, and sensation in 
political economy and the Victorian novel (Princeton and Oxford; Princeton University 
Press, 2006), esp. pp. 35-61.
7 Smith, ‘The Physiology of the Will’.
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one  form  of  representational  practice  amongst  others.  In  this  conception, 
articulations of notions of mind that depended on zoological notions of corporeality 
participate  in  a  culture  that  is  concerned,  above all,  with the authority  of  text. 
Implicit  in  such  claims  is  that  human-physiology-centred  conceptions  of  'the' 
psyche cannot be differentiated from those that concern themselves above all with 
other, not-necessarily-somatic categories, such as 'the soul,' or 'nature.' All claims  
regarding human motives or behaviours are rendered equivalent, in that they are all  
forms  of  representational  practice  that  ebb  and  flow  according  to  the  literary 
conditions in which they find themselves.
It is my contention in this chapter that the physiological notions of psyche 
that emerged in conjunction with the disciplines of the nineteenth-century academy 
present  historians  with  a  problematic  more  complex  than  most  representation-
focused  studies  have  hitherto  recognised.  Specifically,  I  show  that,  from  its 
foundation, physiological psychology in Britain brought the notion of intellectual 
practice, as above all an activity concerning the 'representation' of nature or truth, 
into question. What sets physiological psychology apart from other approaches to 
mind, I believe, is the power it accords non-linguistic technical entities - what I  
have called 'epistemic tools' - in intellectual practice. As I demonstrate here, by 
aligning  their  contentions  with  the  same  forms  of  scientific  equipment  that  
underpinned  zoological  research,  physiological  psychologists  were  able  to 
differentiate their claims from the contentions of moral philosophers, who appealed 
above  all  else  to  their  ability  to  set  down  rational  thoughts  regarding  mental 
function on paper.
Two  recent  literary  studies  that  explicitly  concern  themselves  with  the 
coming-to-pre-eminence  of  physiological  conceptions  of  psychology  can  help 
expand on this claim. Firstly, Catherine Gallagher’s  The Body Economic (2006) 
identifies ways in which the emergence of a discipline of political economy was 
intimately linked the notion of 'life' as it emerged as a category of knowledge.8 
Though principally concerned with ways in which 'economic' conceptions of life 
came to be instantiated in the bodies of canonical  literary texts,  Gallagher also 
points  to  a  set  of  conditions  that  were  critical  to  the  instantiation  of  political 
economy  as  an  academic  discipline  in  Britain.  On  the  one  hand,  political 
8 Gallagher, The Body Economic.
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economists  appealed  to  a  set  of  environmental  conditions  'external'  to  human 
societies  that,  they  emphasised,  set  limits  to  the  abilities  of  man  to  create 
commodities (and especially,  as in Thomas Malthus'  Essay on the Principal  of  
Population,  food). Secondly, economists appealed to a science of the internal body 
- what Gallagher calls a 'physio-psychology' - in consideration of the motives and 
drives of human beings to consume in the first place. Political economy thereby 
drew on (at least) two neighbouring disciplines, one concerned with the external 
nature of human life, and the other with the internal. My concern here is not with 
political economy per se, but with how these latter two forms of knowledge came 
to constitute each other over the course of the nineteenth century; in other words, 
with how the aspiring disciplines  of  zoology (as  one of  the several  disciplines 
concerned with the definition of non-human nature) and physiological psychology 
(as  a  science  of  man  that  claimed  intellectual  authority  over  other,  competing 
conceptions of humanity) participated in an intellectual milieu that enabled both to 
be  drawn on by  those  with  different  disciplinary  concerns.  Hence  this  chapter 
highlights ways in which the debates and concerns that prevailed in zoology more 
generally, as it was emerging as a discipline (described in the previous chapter),  
were paralleled by similar disputes that emerged in considerations of the human 
'animal.'
Secondly, Nicholas Dames' monograph The Physiology of the Novel (2007) 
brings to the fore a critical feature of physiological psychological approaches to  
literature during the nineteenth century.  Like other historians interested in relations 
between science and literature, Dames is concerned with establishing links between 
formal claims regarding nature and less formal literary tropes. Where his study 
stands out,  however,  is in its  emphasis on the emergence during the nineteenth 
century  of  a  physiologically-related  conception  of  literary  criticism.  In  this 
conception, texts are no longer addressed as things in and of themselves, but rather 
as  objects  that  engender  physiological  responses  within  their  readers.  Where, 
within representation-centred cultures, novels are conceived of primarily in terms 
of  their  formal  characteristics  -  their  narrative  structure,  qualities  of 
characterization, and so on - physiological psychological forms of literary criticism 
consider them as tools or techniques of affect; as means by which certain emotional 
and intellectual  states can be produced in the body.9 Texts thereby begin to be 
9 Dames, N. The Physiology of the Novel, esp. pp. 25-70.
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thought as technical entities that retain the potential to re-figure the bodies of their 
readers.  In  so  doing,  they  bring  into  question  the  place  of  writing  in  culture; 
whether it is to be considered a commodity to be understood in terms of a political  
economy of  consumption,  or  a  specific,  morally-privileged form of  intellectual 
practice. Dames' study indicates that in emphasising the former of these choices, 
literary critics  active  during the middle  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century who 
engaged  with  physiological  psychology  began  to  re-think  texts  as  one  kind  of 
commodity amongst others. In other words, texts come to be thought in terms of a 
much broader  set  of  tools  and techniques  by which specific  modes of  conduct 
might be inculcated into the individual bodies of consumers.
This  chapter,  then,  has  two  aims:  Firstly,  it  aims  to  demonstrate  the 
structuring of physiological psychological discourse, in parallel with an 'external' 
zoology, in terms of the religious and political concerns that permeated nineteenth-
century ideas of life. As detailed in the previous chapter, zoological debate came to 
be structured in terms of differences between bottom-up, law-determined notions 
of  godly  power,  and  top-down,  force-centred  conceptions  of  active  heavenly 
creation. However, where zoology concerned itself with a nature that was almost 
invariably external to the human - that is, an animal creation in relation to which 
man could be defined - psychology placed particular emphasis on the ambiguity of 
that  relation  as  an  index  of  'internal'  life.  That  is,  the  emerging  academic,  
disciplinary consideration of human motives and actions is marked by a tension 
between  a  faith  that  they  constitute  expressions  of  the  natural  laws  of  the 
(zoological) body, and a belief that they are something achieved despite of or as an 
emancipation from the 'animal' aspects of bodily existence. 
Secondly, it points towards what I believe to constitute a critical difference 
between zoology and physiological psychology as disciplinary sciences, and the 
text-centred  philosophies  that  preceded them.  I  have  characterised  the  political 
concerns that were present  within the discipline of zoology as mediated by the  
technical conditions in which their adherents sought to instantiate them. It  was, 
however,  those concerned with articulating physiological  notions of  psychology 
that most explicitly related disputes regarding the nature of life to the techniques of 
investigation that were used to discover them. Where, for example, Robert Grant 
and his rival Richard Owen were unable to reconcile their intellectual differences,  
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and maintained a mutually hostile relationship throughout their academic careers, 
the  two main  protagonists  of  this  chapter  -  Grant's  students  William Benjamin 
Carpenter  and  Thomas  Laycock  -  were  able  to  join  in  common cause  despite 
strongly divergent views regarding the physiological conditions of psychological 
life. They were able to do so, I suggest, because both agreed that it was through 
consideration and instantiation of the legitimacy of different forms of epistemic 
equipment  -  not  just  the representation of nature in  text  -  that  their  competing 
claims might be resolved. In other words, what marks physiological psychology off 
from  other  forms  of  speculation  regarding  human  motives  and  actions  is  its 
specifically technical character – the techniques and tools of zoological practice 
were appropriated by physiological  psychologists  in their  attempts  to constitute 
psychology as an academic discipline in Britain.
Before psychology: moral philosophy and phrenology
The  immediate  intellectual  context  for  the  emergence  of  physiological 
psychology is complex. Discourse relating to mind had conventionally been the 
preserve of ‘moral philosophy’ – an umbrella term for the combined study of what  
came  to  be  known  as  'human'  sciences  such  as  ethics,  aesthetics,  political  
philosophy,  and  conjectural  history.10 In  this  regard,  early-nineteenth-century 
debate  regarding  the  psyche  was  conducted  to  a  great  extent  in  terms  of  the 
philosophy  of  eighteenth-century  humanism.  In  Britain,  psychology  was  also 
conceived  of  in  relation  to  one  of  the  most  characteristic  features  of  British 
philosophy at this time: ‘sensationalism.’ Following Locke, sensationalists such as 
David  Hume  had  portrayed  mind  as  a  ‘tabula  rasa,’  passively  assimilating 
sensations and connecting them together to  form broader,  more complex ideas. 
Within many eighteenth-century philosophies, the nervous system is portrayed as 
acting  as  a  mediator  between  the  senses  and  the  mind  -  a  means  by  which 
impressions are transferred from an external  world to the thinking subject.  The 
status  of  consciousness  as  either  a  physiological  entity  or  an incorporeal  spirit 
remained ambiguous,  being subsumed within a  concern for  the ways  in  which 
10 Gallagher, The Body Economic, p. 2.
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simple senses and broader intellectual concepts might relate to each other.
Yet during the early decades of the nineteenth century, a conception of 
mind as,  above all  else,  a corporeal  entity had begun to emerge in Britain that  
seemed to some to undermine moral philosophers' emphasis on discrete units of 
sensation.   Representatives  of  an  emerging  middle-class  culture  sought  to 
differentiate themselves from the moral philosophic culture that they believed to 
have been detrimental to British commerce and national progress. From the 1820s, 
‘phrenology,’ or the study of the brains and skulls of humans as an index of their  
mental capacities, came to be adopted by a wide range of middle-class adherents of 
political  and moral  ‘reform’  campaigns.11 Though British natural  philosophers  - 
notably figures such as David Hartley and Thomas Willis - had previously sought 
to articulate conceptions of mind and brain as mutually constitutive, phrenologists 
claimed  to  have  been  the  first  to  truly  acknowledge  the  organic  nature  of  the 
psyche.  Working  from  the  premise  that  the  existence  of  any  living  function 
necessarily implies the existence of an associated anatomical structure, they sought  
to elaborate a psychology that connected the categories of sensationalist philosophy 
with cerebral  anatomy.  Despite  phrenologists'  claims,  it  would be a  mistake to 
portray  either  the  inherited  categories  of  moral  philosophy,  or  the  insights  of  
cerebral  anatomy,  as  holding  primacy  in  phrenological  (or  indeed  most  other  
psychological)  doctrines  of  this  period.  Rather,  phrenological  texts  seek  to 
reconcile a broadly moral philosophic or 'rationalist' classification of psychological 
function with anatomical evidence relating to human brains (the organ assumed to 
be the 'seat' of consciousness).12
Critical  to phrenological endeavour was the assignation of specific (and 
nominally anatomically-distinct)  regions of the brain to particular psychological 
functions. Hence the 'sexual propensity' or 'organ of amativeness' is assigned to the 
cerebellum - a section of the nervous system in between the spinal column and the  
11 Cooter,  The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science, pp. 101-133. Shapin, S. 
'Phrenological knowledge and the social structure of early nineteenth-century Edinburgh', 
Annals of Science 32 (1975), pp. 219-243. Though see also van Wyhe, J. 'Was 
Phrenology a Reform Science? Towards a new generalization for phrenology', History of  
Science 42 (2004), pp. 313-331.
12 Cooter, The Cultural Meaning, pp. 126-127. On relations between metaphysics and 
physiology more generally during the nineteenth century, see Jacyna, ‘The Physiology of 
Mind’; Smith, 'The background to Physiological Psychology'.
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brain proper, located at the back of the skull.13 But while the ‘organ of amativeness’ 
could at that time be fairly easily differentiated from the rest of the brain through 
simple dissection, phrenologists tended to rely on less well-established anatomical 
evidence for their separation of the brain more generally into a large number of  
distinct  functional  regions.  Most  frequently,  Franz  Joseph  Gall's  careful  (and 
highly contested) tracing of individual nerves of the spinal column into the brain is 
cited by them as proof that  the nervous fibres terminate at distinct  parts  of the 
cerebrum (the large outer  part  that  covers the other parts  of  the brain in many 
organisms).14 Hence  phrenologists  split  the  outer  regions  of  the  brain  into 
functionally  distinct  sections,  each  relating  to  distinct,  already-established 
‘psychological’ (‘mental’) categories.
For  those  concerned  with  the  definition  of  psychology  as  a  discipline 
separate  from other  moral  philosophic  concerns  such as  political  economy and 
anthropology,  phrenology,  as  a  body  of  knowledge,  constituted  an  ambiguous 
object.  On  the  one  hand,  its  popularity  amongst  those  benefiting  from  the 
commercial and industrial developments in Britain at this time seemed to indicate 
its potency as an alternative approach to mind. Though eighteenth-century figures 
such as Hartley had proposed seemingly fully ‘embodied’ conceptions of intellect,  
it was only with the emergence of phrenology during the nineteenth century that 
such conceptions were widely upheld as explicitly legitimating the emergence of  
new forms of political endeavour. The phrenological insistence that each person 
could in  some way ‘train’  different  parts  of  the brain to  work more effectively 
offered  adherents  a  rationale  for  self-determination  that  seemed  far  more 
immediate than the self-generating ‘molecular’ conceptions of existence discussed 
in the previous chapter. Phrenology constituted the human as an autonomous, self-
defining individual, in possession of his or her cerebral faculties. It could thereby 
be  understood  as  supportive  of  the  independence  of  those  seeking  to  define 
themselves as psychological researchers (a tendency especially prevalent amongst  
13 Shapin, S. 'The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social Interests in the 
Edinburgh Phrenology Disputes', in Wallis, R. (ed.) On the Margins of Science: the social  
construction of rejected knowledge (Keele, 1979), pp. 161-167.
14 On Gall see van Wyhe, J. 'The Authority of Human Nature: the Schädellehre of Franz 
Joseph Gall', British Journal for the History of Science 35 (2002), pp. 17-42; Young, 
Mind, Brain and Adaptation, pp. 9-53.
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asylum attendants at this time);15 a means of differentiating one's activities from the 
moralising concerns of one's ‘philosophic’ superiors.
But  if  the self-determining aspects  of  phrenological  thinking seemed to 
some to be helpful for the constitution of psychology as something that could be 
practised in isolation from moral philosophy more generally, others felt that simply 
projecting the categories  of  the latter  intellectual  movement  onto the brain and 
skull failed to address the subtleties of nervous physiology. Specifically, from the 
1830s,  a  number  of  psychological  thinkers  -  those  that  would  come  to  define 
themselves as ‘physiological psychologists’ - began to suggest that the study of the 
nervous system as an entity present throughout zoological nature, understood as an 
embodiment of the psyche, actually brings the categories of mind used in moral 
philosophy into question. In physiological psychology, then, we begin to see the 
definition of an identity for the psychologist as someone who is, unlike the general 
population (or even doctors and asylum attendants), able to appreciate the insights 
that those engaged in the systematic study of non-human life can bring to the study 
of mind.
William Benjamin Carpenter and Thomas Laycock
This  chapter  highlights  the  differing  attitudes  towards  phrenology 
articulated by two early physiological psychologists - William Benjamin Carpenter 
and Thomas Laycock - as a means of interrogating the points of contention that  
animated physiological psychological discourse, and also of bringing to the fore 
some of the means by which participants in physiological  psychological  debate 
sought to resolve their differences. 
As  two  of  the  first  academics  in  Britain  to  identify  themselves  as 
physiological psychologists, these figures were key to the cultivation of the tenuous 
institutional foothold that the movement briefly gained in Britain during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Laycock almost immediately set about instructing 
his  students  in  his  distinctive  brand of  physiological  psychology following  his 
appointment to the prestigious chair for the Principles and Practice of Medicine at 
15 Cooter, The Cultural Meaning.
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Edinburgh  University  in  1855.  He  was  responsible  for  introducing  such  later-
acclaimed psychological  and  cerebral  investigators  as  David  Ferrier  and  James 
Crichton  Browne  to  the  simultaneous  study  of  mind  and  nervous  system.16 
Carpenter, in complementary contrast, cultivated a successful administrative career 
at University College and its associated regulatory body the University of London. 
In  the course of  his  activities  at  these institutions,  he helped  instigate  a  wide-
ranging  reform  of  the  university  curriculum,  part  of  which  entailed  the 
incorporation  of  physiology  and  moral  philosophy  within  a  faculty  devoted 
exclusively to the pursuit of 'physical' science.17 As Registrar of the University of 
London, he became a sponsor of the careers of such physiological psychological  
thinkers as Alexander Bain and Henry Maudsley.  Between them Carpenter and 
Laycock  were  in  no  small  degree  responsible  for  the  instigation  of  the  first 
sustained academic programme of 'physio-psychological' investigation in Britain.
Carpenter and Laycock first met in either 1834 or 1835, while they were 
students at University College. Both attended Grant's lectures.  According to a later 
claim by Laycock, Carpenter 'set on the same researches with himself when both  
were studying comparative anatomy and physiology.'18 Whether or not they met in 
one of Grant's courses, it is certainly the case that both engaged closely with his  
classes.  On  his  arrival  Laycock  attended  Grant's  introductory  address  to  the  
16See Barfoot, M. 'Introduction', in Barfoot, M. (ed.) "To ask the Suffrages of the Patrons":  
Thomas Laycock and the Edinburgh Chair of Medicine, 1855  (Medical History; 
Supplement 15, 1995), pp. 1-51. And Laycock, Thomas, DNB. On Laycock see also Leff, 
‘Thomas Laycock and the Cerebral Reflex’; James, 'Thomas Laycock and a Trophic 
Nervous System'; James, F.E. 'Thomas Laycock: psychiatry and neurology', History of  
Psychiatry 9 (1998), pp. 491-502 and James, F.E. 'The Life and Work of Thomas 
Laycock', (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1995); Smith, R. 'Physiological 
Psychology’, pp. 71-100.
17 Carpenter, J.E. ‘Memorial Sketch’, in Carpenter, W.B. (Carpenter, J.E. ed.) Nature and 
Man: essays scientific and philosophical (London, 1888), pp. 4-152. On Carpenter see 
Winter, A. ‘The construction of Orthodoxies and Herterodoxies in the Early Victorian Life 
Sciences’, in Lightman, B. (ed.) Victorian Science in Context (Chicago and London; 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 24-50.
18 Laycock-Combe, 6 June 1845. Nat. Lib. Scot. MS 7276, f.14. Carpenter also noted in a 
later testimonial for Laycock that the two had met at University College, though he did 
not mention that they had attended the same class in Comparative Anatomy or 
Physiology. Nor do University College's Student Records record them attending Grant's 
classes in the same year. See Laycock, T. Evidence of Professional Acquirements 
Submitted to the Honourable the Patrons of the University of Edinburgh... (York, 1855), 
p. 10 and Appendix. That Grant was giving extra-mural classes in physiology at this time, 
however, makes it possible that they did meet during one of his courses.
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medical  faculty,  which he declared 'splendid'  in  his  diary.19 He also considered 
himself a favourite of Grant's, describing admiringly how his mentor claimed to 
lecture with no papers except a note  to '”speak louder”, in order that he might not 
mumble  so.'20 Carpenter's  early  research  into  the  nervous  physiology  of 
invertebrates  (completed  under  William  Pulteney  Alison  at  the  University  of 
Edinburgh) also draws on Grant's work, and his biography recounts its subject's 
fond recollections  of  the zoology lectures  at  UCL.21 Yet  despite  their  common 
interest  in zoology,  Laycock and Carpenter relate conceptions of the connected 
nature of life and mind in rather different ways. Whereas Laycock's texts adhere  
relatively  closely  to  Grant's  hints  in  his  research  that  the  simplest  beings  are 
'globular',  and his suggestion that  microscopic investigation presents the key to 
understanding  'more  complex'  organic  forms,  Carpenter's  place  far  greater 
emphasis on museological evidence, and establishing anatomical relations between 
living beings.
Carpenter  and  Laycock's  differing  conceptions  of  zoological  existence 
parallel the both their differing backgrounds and the differing sets of beliefs that 
each adhered to early in their careers. Carpenter hailed from a prominent Bristolian  
family of Unitarians. His father, Lant Carpenter, had preached Unitarian's belief in 
the  inherent  moral  force  of  nature  to  the  upper-middle-classes  of  this  then-
fashionable town since 1817.22 Like his sister Mary (who became a well-known 
advocate of women's rights and educational and prison reform), William Carpenter  
enjoyed  a  highly  privileged,  education-focused  upbringing,  staying  on  at  his 
father's school as a teacher after he had completed his own time there as a student. 23 
Laycock,  on  the  other  hand,  was  the  son  of  a  lower-middle-class  Wesleyan 
19 Laycock, T. 'A journal, 1833-1857', Edin. Uni. MS Gen. 1813, f. 6. 
20 Ibid, f. 92. See also f. 104 on Laycock's early commitment to applying comparative 
anatomy and physiology in his considerations of the human body. On his 'favourite' 
status see Laycock-Combe, 6 June 1845. Nat. Lib. Scot. MS 7276, f.14.
21 Carpenter, W.B. Prize Thesis: Inaugural Dissertation on the Physiological inferences to 
be deduced from the Structure of the Nervous System in the Invertebrated Classes of 
Animals (Edinburgh and London, 1839), pp. 8-13, 16-17. On Carpenter's fond 
recollections of Grants teaching see Carpenter, 'Memorial Sketch', p. 10.
22 Carpenter, ‘Memorial Sketch’, p. 4.
23 Carpenter, ‘Memorial Sketch’, pp. 4-8.
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Methodist preacher.24 Apprenticed to a local medic at the age of fifteen, he had 
entered University College with a hope that he might escape what he saw as the 
impoverished context in which he had been brought up.25 Carpenter stayed aloof 
from the political controversies that were raging amongst medical practitioners and 
students during the 1830s and 1840s. Laycock became a convinced advocate of the 
formation of democratically-elected professional bodies.26
The first chapter of this thesis has drawn a contrast between the potentially 
radical but epistemologically problematic conclusions that could be drawn from 
microscopic vision on the one hand, and the epistemologically trusted and rather 
less  controversial  conclusions  that  were  generally  adduced  from  museological 
evidence on the other. This distinction was not of course absolute - radical claims 
were made in anatomical studies just as microscopic evidence was made to support 
conservative conceptions of nature. But to the extent that microscopes seemed to 
offer visions (however mistrusted) of a globule-constituted, bottom-up, democratic 
nature,  they  also  presented  more  fundamental  challenges  to  the  general 
assumptions of nineteenth-century British elites than did the questions regarding 
anatomical  relations  associated  with  museums.  Laycock's  emphasis  on  the 
significance of microscopic evidence in his psychology can thereby be read as an 
expression of a particularly 'radical,' law-determined notion of the psyche. This can 
be  contrasted  with  Carpenter's  more  elitist  concern  with  the  definition  of  
anatomical difference using museological specimens. Physiological psychological 
and  zoological  debate  thereby  proceeded  in  tandem.  But  where  zoological 
discourse revolved around a questioning of differences between species and the 
ontological status of 'life', physiological psychological questioning of humanity's 
'internal' nature concerned the make-up of the nervous system above all else.
24 Barfoot, ‘Introduction’, p.4. 
25 Barfoot, ‘Introduction’, p.4.
26 Ibid. pp. 7-11.
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Phrenology and William Benjamin Carpenter’s physiological 
psychology
William Benjamin Carpenter's texts appeal to the authority of comparative 
anatomy as a means of differentiating his conception of human psychology from 
that that had been adopted by the middle-class phrenologists. The first of his many 
textbooks intended for use by medical students (published in 1839) is a work on 
comparative anatomy and physiology subtitled as 'intended as an introduction to 
the study of human physiology'.27 Concentrating almost exclusively on plants and 
non-human  animals,  it  claims  to  offer  an  authoritative  account  of  the  latest 
zoological and (to a lesser extent) botanical researches. Above all, it emphasises 
that the study of man needs to be re-considered on a new epistemic footing - one 
that takes into account what it portrays as a now-established (and foundationally 
anatomical), comparative approach to life. As with Grant's comparative anatomy, 
this approach appeals to the nature of simple organisms as a means by which the 
more complex (such as humans) might be understood ‘philosophically.’
One  critical  element  of  Carpenter's  publications  during  the  1830s  and 
1840s is their reliance on Marshall Hall's experimental identification of a 'reflex 
function' in the nervous system between 1832 and 1837. Hall's studies consolidated 
a long-standing interest in ‘reflexive’ or uncontroversially ‘bodily’ characteristics of 
certain  aspects  of  mental  function  amongst  philosophers  of  mind.  Within  the 
Aristotelian  philosophical  tradition,  the  soul  had  been  differentiated  into  three 
distinct categories - those relating to the vegetable, the animal, and the human. The 
human or ‘rational’  soul  was marked by its  dominion over the other two – the 
‘animal’ soul which was responsible for such functions as the reception of sensation 
and the instigation of muscular movement, and the ‘vegetative’ soul which fulfilled 
the  basic  or  ‘nutritative’  functions  of  life.28 Eighteenth-century  philosophers 
concerned with the nature of sensation had paid particular attention to the middle,  
27Carpenter, Principles of General and Comparative Physiology.
28Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, pp. 26-61; Jacyna, L.S. ‘Animal Spirits and 
Eighteenth-Century British Medicine’, in Kawakita, Y., Sakai, S. and Otsuka, Y. The 
Comparison  Between Concepts of Life-Breath in East and West: proceedings of the 15th 
international symposium on the comparative history of medicine – East and West 
(Shizuoka, 1990), pp. 139-162; Young, R.M. 'Animal Soul' in Edwards, P. (ed.) The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Vol. I] (New York and London, 1967), pp. 122-27 [Available 
at http://human-nature.com/rmyoung , accessed 25/11/2009].
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‘animal’ aspects of the self. Philosophers such as Thomas Reid emphasised that this  
element of human life remained independent of conscious experience or reason – 
sensation could occur instinctually or 'reflexively’, without the participation of the 
elements of  the soul  associated with reason and intellect  (these latter  generally 
being  conceived  of  as  those  aspects  of  cognitive  existence  least  dependent  on 
bodily function).29 The term 'reflex' had thereby come to refer to a class of changes 
in  the  nervous  system  unconnected  with  consciousness,  which  only  arise  in 
response to external, non-nervous stimuli.30 By presenting his research as revealing 
of  a  physiologically-determined aspect  of  mental  existence,  Hall  seemed to  be 
confirming  the  notion  that  nervous  function  could  be  differentiated  into  two 
distinct components - sensory, and intellectual.31
Carpenter's texts, influenced by those of his mentor in Edinburgh, William 
Pultney Alison, seek a more refined differentiation of nervous function than had 
been evident in Hall’s texts.32 In considering sensation and volition in relation to 
the brain (rather than the nervous system as a whole), many physiological texts of 
the late 1830s and early 1840s implicitly identified non-cerebral nerves exclusively 
with 'lower' animal and vegetable functions. Frequently, as in phrenology, this was 
expressed  in  terms  of  a  binary  contrast  between a  communicative and sensory 
nervous system, and a 'thinking' brain.33 Carpenter, however, instead of adopting a 
simple dichotomy between automatic, or what he terms 'excito-motor' reflexes, and 
'ideo-motor' intellect or agency, introduces a third set of functions, termed 'sensori-
motor.'34 Located in the cerebellum and medulla oblongata, this anatomical division 
29 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, pp. 83-86.
30 See Clarke, and Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neroscientific Concepts, pp. 
102-114, and Canguilhem, G. 'The Concept of Reflex', in Delaporte, F. (ed.) and 
Goldhammer, A. (trans.) A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem 
(MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1994), pp. 179-202.
31 Leys, R. 'Background to the Reflex Controversy: William Alison and the doctrine of 
sympathy before Hall', Studies in History of Biology 4 (1980), pp. 1-66. Leys, R. From 
Sympathy to Reflex: Marshall Hall and his opponents (New York and London, 1991), pp. 
170-201 and 240-245. See also Clark and Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins, pp. 114-
122.
32 See Carpenter-Laycock, June 12 1855. RCPE MS Box 22 Folder 148. and Leys, 
'Background to the Reflex Controversy'. 
33 Leys, From Sympathy to Reflex, pp. 246-255.
34This relation of Carpenter's anatomical nervous scheme and its critique is indebted to 
96
of the nervous system operates as a half-way house between completely automatic,  
'nervous' life, and a realm of pure rationality located in the cerebrum. As such, it 
constitutes  the  site  of  a  set  of  psychological  functions  related  to  involuntary, 
instinctual  passions  or  'emotions'  (which  are  nevertheless  conceived  of  as 
intermediate  between animality  and humanity),  and semi-conscious,  'reflex'-like 
muscular movements.
The specifics of Carpenter's differentiation are founded on the presumption 
that there exists a progression of psychological function that is accompanied by a 
progression of structure throughout the animal kingdom. First, recalling Grant’s 
comments on the Furcocerca viridis described in the previous chapter, the simplest 
animals possess truly animal, not-necessarily-nervous ‘excito-motor' reflexes which 
operate  without  any accompanying psychological  function.  Non-cerebral  nerves 
fulfil  these reflex functions in  humans.35 Second,  in 'lower'  animals,  apparently 
purely 'instinctive' or emotion-like behaviour accompanies a predominance of those 
anatomical parts that make up the mid-brain in humans. It is therefore to these parts 
(by analogy) that feeling must be referable. Third, the unparalleled predominance 
of the cerebrum in humans is associated with what Carpenter presumes to be their  
unquestionable status as the most rational beings in nature. This indicates that it is 
in this anatomical part (the cerebrum) that consciousness inheres.36 This categorical 
differentiation constitutes a basis from which Carpenter articulates an alternative to  
phrenologists' claims.
Carpenter's  initial  critique  of  phrenology  -  in  the  first  edition  of  his 
Principles of Human Physiology (1842) - emphasises the importance of non-human 
anatomical evidence in the consideration of psychological function.37 Specifically, 
it characterises phrenological anatomy as falling into epistemic error. Advancing a 
Leys, From Sympathy to Reflex, esp. pp. 307-315.
35 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology, with their Chief Applications to Pathology, 
Hygiene and Forensic Medicine... [1st ed.] (1842), pp. 197-198. On Carpenter's suspicion 
of microscopic claims regarding spontaneous generation see Carpenter, 'Natural History 
of Creation', esp. pp. 168-173.
36 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology (1842), pp. 197-199.
37 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology (1842), pp. 203-211. Phrenology's 
ambiguous relationship with anatomical cerebral research is highlighted in a number of 
studies. See esp. Shapin, 'The Politics of Observation'.
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critique of the above-mentioned phrenological portrayal of the cerebellum as the 
organ  of  'amativeness'  or  sexual  function,  it  highlights  what  it  portrays  as  the 
inconsistency of phrenologists' associations of mind with brain with accounts of  
nervous anatomy informed by comparative anatomy. In ignoring studies relating to 
‘simpler’  forms  of  life  (Carpenter  claims),  phrenologists  ignore  evidence  - 
suggested by the physiological experiments that had been conducted on simpler 
animals  conducted  by  the  French  physiologists  Marie  Jean  Pierre  Flourens, 
François  Magendie,  and  others38 -  that  ablation  of  the  cerebellum  produces 
uncoordinated  movement.  In  confirmation  of  these  physiological  experiments, 
comparative anatomy reveals that this organ tends to be larger in those animals that 
need to control many different moving parts.39 Hence for Carpenter the cerebellum 
cannot be considered as exclusively concerned with sexual desire, as it has been 
shown to be important in coordinating bodily actions as well. 
Carpenter's texts do not seek to challenge the association between structure 
and function that  remained central  to  the identity of phrenology as  a science.40 
Rather, they cast doubt on the possibility of establishing true relations between 
body and mind by focusing on human anatomy alone. It should be noted here that  
phrenologists did at times make use of comparative anatomical evidence. Carpenter  
nevertheless  characterized  phrenology as  science  the  attended  to  human  brains 
alone,  and  the  movements  defenders  did  not  seek  to  contradict  this 
characterization.
Carpenter's position concerning anatomical evidence developed into a full-
blown attack on any nervous physiology that fails to take non-human anatomy into 
account. Phrenologists - in particular the Manchester physician Daniel Noble in 
The Brain and its Physiology (1846) - acknowledged Carpenter's initial critique, 
and  sought  in  response  to  cast  doubt  on  the  reliability  and  admissibility  of 
comparative anatomical evidence in considerations of human physiology. In direct 
contradiction to this, Carpenter's review of Noble's phrenological work contends 
38 See Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, pp. 54-94.
39 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology (1842), pp. 203-205. For more on this 
association, see the discussion of Grant's interpretations of the causes of nervous 
structure  in the previous chapter.
40 Stack, D. 'William Lovatt and the National Association for the Political and Social 
Improvement of the People', The Historical Journal 42 (1999), pp. 1027-1050.
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that  an  exclusive  concern  with  human  anatomy does  not  produce  an  adequate 
account of the brain. It suggests that the cerebellum is not only responsible for the 
co-ordination of motion (as he had previously argued), but is also the most likely  
site  at  which  sensation  occurs  as  well.41 Indeed,  Carpenter  contends  that  the 
relatively small size in man of the parts of the brain directly connected with the 
sensory organs had blinded anatomists  to  their  significance in  the reception  of 
sensation.  The distinction between sensory parts  of  the nervous system and the 
cerebrum is clear in simpler animals, and these parts'  close connection with the 
organs of sense can only have been overlooked because of an over-emphasis on 
human anatomy in nervous physiology more generally.42
Carpenter's claim that systematic comparative studies should constitute the 
basis from which a conception of humans' nervous systems be established is more 
than an attempt to present physiologists or moral philosophers with a more accurate 
localization of  psychological  function.  It  is  also a bid to  limit  the authority  of 
studies by those he refers to as the 'mere human anatomist'  (or,  for that matter,  
anatomically insensitive moral philosophers).43 Carpenter argues that comparative 
studies should be accorded greater epistemic weight than anatomy and physiology 
focused  exclusively  on  human  bodies.  Any  psychology that  seeks  to  reconcile 
human  nature  with  established  mental  categories  in  philosophy  also  has  to 
reconcile evidence relating to animal physiology with their actions in the world. 44 
Such arguments relocate intellectual authority away from moral philosophers and 
phrenological practitioners, and towards what was then a nascent community of 
specialists in zoology, organizing around expensive - and at that point relatively 
rare - collections of organic specimens. 
That  opposition  to  phrenological  doctrines  should  have  presented  the 
occasion for Carpenter's departure from conventional psychological accounts might 
be considered significant; he chose to contest the claims of a set of doctrines that  
had come to be associated by many of his contemporaries with calls for political 
41 Carpenter, W.B. 'The Brain and its Physiology', British and Foreign Medical Review 22 
(1846), esp. pp. 504-511.
42 Ibid, p. 495.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, pp. 518-519 and 544.
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change.  Carpenter,  as  Alison  Winter  has  highlighted,  went  out  of  his  way  to 
establish connections amongst the Anglican elite that held sway over a significant 
proportion of intellectual endeavour during the first half of the nineteenth century. 45 
His  move  to  align  the  study  of  psychological  function  with  a  specifically 
comparative-anatomical conception of nervous physiology can in this respect be 
understood in terms of a resistance to the interests  and beliefs of  the emergent 
middle-classes.  Nevertheless,  as  the  below  examination  of  Thomas  Laycock's 
relation  with  the  leading  advocates  of  phrenological  thinking  makes  clear, 
zoologically-aligned conceptions of mind were by no means exclusively employed 
in opposition to calls for political reform at this time.
Laycock's psychology, phrenology, and Combe
Articulating an account of human cognition reliant on conceptions of non-
human  life  did  not  necessitate  the  elaboration  of  an  explicit  challenge  to 
phrenology  per  se.  In  1845,  as  Carpenter  was  formulating  his  1846  critique, 
Laycock  was  engaging  in  a  rather  less  antagonistic  correspondence  with  the 
figurehead  of  the  phrenological  movement  in  Britain,  George  Combe,  and  the 
comparative anatomist and physiologist John Reid, then Professor of Anatomy at  
St Andrews. The vast majority of this correspondence was published in the Lancet, 
and - along with his article 'On the Reflex Function of the Brain' of the same year  
and his Treatise On the Nervous Diseases of Women (1840) - constitutes Laycock's 
early  attempt  to  articulate  what  he  considered  an  entirely  new  approach  to 
psychology.46
Where Carpenter appeals for attention to be paid to comparative anatomy, 
Laycock places greater emphasis on the need to begin any analysis with what he 
45 Winter, ‘The construction of Orthodoxies and Herterodoxies’
46 Laycock, T. A Treatise on the Nervous Diseases of Women: comprising an inquiry into 
the nature, causes, and treatment of spinal and hysterical disorders (London, 1840); 
Combe, G., Reid, J. and Laycock, T. 'Correspondence between Geo. Combe, Esq, 
Professor Reid, and Dr Laycock, on the Reflex Anatomy and Physiology of the Brain', 
The Lancet 46 (1845), pp. 231-233, 255-258, 283-284, 308-310, 347-348 and 364; 
Laycock, T. 'On the Reflex Function of the Brain', British and Foreign Medical Review 19 
(1845), pp. 298-311. On Laycock's evaluation of his own work see Laycock, 'A Journal, 
1833-1857', Edin. Uni. MS Gen. 1813, f. 242.
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considers a proper understanding of the implications of the doctine of the unity of  
natural law. Above all, this implies that any account of human psychological nature 
must begin with a conception of the identity of all natural forms:
If we would obtain a large and definite knowledge of the action of 
force upon matter and intelligence, in exciting the phenomena of life 
and thought as displayed in man,  we must examine the laws of its 
action, as exhibited both in every living organism, and the molecular 
changes in inorganic matter. A thousand circumstances assure us, that 
between these last and the highest efforts of human intellect, there is a 
continuous chain of phenomena, although we are unable to follow it 
link by link.47
A gross anatomy of the nervous system (comparative or otherwise) cannot assist in 
revealing relations between psychological categories and organic bodies, without 
the prior adoption of a conception of all of nature as unfolding gradually from the 
bottom up, from simple to complex.
This approach places particular weight on microscopic evidence relating to 
what  Laycock  refers  to  as  'molecular'  or  'bio-molecular'  life.48 Specifically, 
Laycock sees in the most basic organic forms the same kinds of entities that he  
believes  constitute  the  minute  histology  of  the  nervous  system.  Microscopic 
evidence thereby presents a means by which both simple animals' actions can be 
characterised, and nervous action in general understood.49 Above all, these forms 
constitute an exemplary point  of reference in his conceptualization (in common 
with many other British physiologists of the time) of 'instinctive' action as a non-
rational impulse to self-preservation.50 His texts attribute such actions not only to 
47 Laycock, A Treatise, p. 92. This statement originally appeared in one of Laycock's earlier 
articles on hysteria. See Laycock, T. On anomalous Forms of Hysteria', Edinburgh 
Medical and Surgical Journal 50 (1838), p. 50.
48 Laycock, A Treatise, pp. 99-100, 205. Laycock, 'On the Reflex Function', pp. 308-310. 
For Laycock's comments regarding microscopes themselves, see Laycock, T. 'On the 
Methods of Obtaining a Natural History of Diseases' British and Foreign Medical Review 
22 (1846), esp. p. 528.
49 Laycock, A Treatise, p. 96. Laycock, 'On the Reflex Function', p. 308.
50 'Correspondence', p. 256. See Leys, From Sympathy to Reflex, pp. 35-62.
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simple, organically-undifferentiated 'molecular' animals, but to the organ-systems 
which make up the more complex. As Laycock’s first letter to Combe comments;
the tissues and organs entering into the composition of organisms, and 
constituting  the  individual  by  their  congeries,  display  each  in  its  
sphere the same law of conservation as the individuals they make up. 
Vascular  systems,  hollow  muscles,  and  the  cellules  of  plants  and 
animals, so microscopically minute as they are, all display movements 
having an  obviously beneficial object in reference to their  individual 
existence.51
As detailed below, this 'law of conservation' plays an important role in Laycock's 
understanding of more complex manifestations of life. Here it is enough to note 
Laycock's  understanding  of  all  organic  systems  as  composed  of  functionally 
similar microscopic entities.
The  assumed  histological  identity  of  all  nervous  structures  implies  for 
Laycock that all functions associated with nerves must arise from the same cause. 
His  texts  adopt  Hall's  conception  of  a  reflex  nervous  function  that  operates 
independently  of  consciousness.  However  (unlike  other  physiological  texts  that 
address the brain during this period) they extend this function to the entire nervous 
system. By expanding the role of reflexes in this way,  they identify them with 
neither unconsciousness, 'instinct', or any other specific psychological function, but 
with a material 'substrata'  to which all  accounts of mind must be referable.52 In 
other words, in contrast with then-prevalent conceptions of different parts of the 
nervous system as 'possessing' properties of unconsciousness, sensation, volition 
and so on (as evident in Carpenter's texts), Laycock considers all such properties as  
functions arising from psychologically-independent reflex actions of the nerves.
Just  as  Grant's  lectures  portray  the  nervous  system as  emergent  in  the 
unified body of all living structures, Laycock conceives of a capacity for purposive 
action  (or  at  least  that  which  originates  from  organic  bodies)53 as  gradually 
51 'Correspondence', p. 256. Original emphases.
52 Laycock, 'On the Reflex Function', pp. 308-310. 'Correspondence', p. 347.
53 On Laycock’s conception of the sources of non-material agency, see Jacyna, 'The 
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emerging  in  conjunction  with  the  self-preserving  activity  of  an  increasingly 
complex  order  of  organic  forms.  He  calls  for  the  adoption  of  an  approach  to 
psychology  that  starts  with  a  consideration  of  the  simplest  manifestations  of 
psychological  life.  The  most  fundamental  of  these  is  'automatic'  action,  which 
Laycock appears to conflate with the aforementioned instinctive impulse to self-
preservation.54 This is followed by a progressive complication of function, passing 
through emotional states, and ending in what he presumes to be the most complex 
forms of mental life such as will and volition.55 The simplest psychological states 
constitute the conditions under which the more complex become possible.56 Hence 
human consciousness cannot be understood without a thorough appreciation of the 
causative role  of  non-conscious elements  in  the formation of  the psychological 
states of all living entities.
Laycock's views as described above might appear to have posed a far more 
fundamental challenge to phrenological conceptions of mind than did Carpenter's 
anatomical critique. It makes little sense from Laycock's perspective to talk of any 
particular part of the nervous system as 'for'  sexual desire (for example), as the 
function of sexual desire is itself the product of the self-preserving physiological 
action of the system as a whole. Indeed, his Treatise makes in passing precisely the 
same  criticism  as  Carpenter  respecting  phrenologists'  'appropriation  of  the 
cerebellum to the sexual  impulse'  to the exclusion of other functions.57 Though 
Laycock's texts do tend to assign such phenomena as sensation, consciousness or 
volition to the brain, this is not their primary concern. Rather, they aim to articulate 
accounts  of  the  ways  in  which  psychological  functions  arise  from  the  (more 
fundamental) principles of automatic action and reflex function within the nervous 
system as a whole.  Yet in his correspondence with Combe and Reid, Laycock 
minimises  such   points  of  potential  conflict  between himself  and  the  foremost 
advocate of phrenology in Britain.
Physiology of Mind'.
54 Laycock, 'On the reflex Function', p. 309.
55 Ibid, p. 311.
56 Ibid, p. 308.
57 Laycock, A Treatise, p. 122.
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The principal point of contention in Laycock's correspondence with Combe 
and Reid revolves around the extent to which it is possible to distinguish between 
truly  'excito-motory'  or  reflex  parts  of  the  nervous  system,  and  those 
conventionally associated with volition.  As might  be expected from the above, 
Laycock denies - in opposition to Reid - that it is possible to draw an absolute  
distinction between reflexive and volitional acts,  referring both to 'a mechanism 
within the central axis' of the nervous system.58 But as far as he addresses Combe, 
he is  almost  entirely  complimentary,  declaring  at  the  outset  that  the  latter  had 
'appreciated most exactly' his conception of the presence of reflex function in the 
brain.59 Commenting on an article of Combe's on 'the application of phrenology to 
the fine arts' he declares himself to 'agree entirely with your [ie. Combe's] views, as 
far  as  they  go.'60 Such  compliments  appear  to  be  aimed  at  gaining  Combe's 
confidence, possibly in the hope of gaining a powerful convert to his doctrines.  
Where he is forced to disagree with Combe, Laycock defers stating his views in 
detail: 
It would require a volume to answer the three letters now before me... 
a complete exposition of our respective views as to the physiological 
nature of consciousness and will is requisite. I suspect we differ on 
this point, and unless we come to a clear understanding respecting it, I 
fear our epistolary labours will be much prolonged.61
In this way Laycock avoids antagonizing Combe, the figure-head in Britain for  
both  phrenology  and  the  desire  to  'reform'  society  according  to  phrenological 
principles.
Despite his articulation of a seemingly fundamentally challenging position 
respecting phrenology,  Laycock's  care  to subsume this  perspective in favour of 
58 'Correspondence', pp. 255-256.
59 Ibid, p. 255
60 Ibid, p. 258.
61 Ibid, p. 347. Laycock even advised Noble and Combe on their responses to Carpenter's 
critical article described above. See Laycock-Combe, 9 June 1845. Nat. Lib. Scot. MS 
7276, ff. 14-15. Noble-Laycock, October 22 1845. RCPE MS B. 22 F. 149. Laycock-
Combe, October 20 1846. Nat. Lib. Scot. MS 7280, ff. 117-119.
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preserving the good-will of Combe indicates his adherence to a rather different set 
of interests to those displayed by Carpenter. Whereas Carpenter is concerned to 
establish  in  human  physiological  discourse  a  critical  perspective  grounded  in 
comparative  anatomy,  Laycock  cultivates  an  alliance  between  himself  and  the 
middle-class  reformers  he  engages  with.  It  seems  clear  that  physiological 
psychology could express both positive and negative conceptions of self  vis a vis 
the middle-class politics of reform.
That physiological psychology does not appear to have expressed middle-
class reforming interests in any simple way does not however imply that it did not 
have any relevance to changing conceptions of politics or political practice. Rather, 
it  highlights  how connections  between  life  and  mind  were  coming  to  play  an 
increasingly central role in the conceptualisation not only of ideal visions of state,  
but also of notions of human conduct and motives. Physiological psychology, like 
the discipline of zoology that it positioned itself as a corollary of, emerges during 
the nineteenth century as a site at which differing political concerns are negotiated 
and played out. The precise conditions of power that this development constituted 
is the concern of much of the rest of this thesis. However, in order both to re-iterate  
the contested status of attempts to correlate mind with life, and to bring out the 
intimate  connections  between  the  disciplinary  formation  of  psychology  and 
psychological interest amongst the British population as a whole at this time, I will  
first  highlight how Carpenter and Laycock articulated their claims in relation to 
another popular middle-class psychological movement; mesmerism.
Anti-mesmerism  and  the  politics  of  will  in  Carpenter  and 
Laycock's psychologies
Carpenter's  psychological  texts  underwent  a  crucial  shift  of  emphasis 
during the late 1840s and early 1850s.62 At least two aspects of his intellectual 
context  during  this  time  appear  to  have  been  critical  to  this  change.  Firstly, 
Carpenter's  anatomical  differentiation  of  the  nervous  system  came  under 
increasingly  hostile  scrutiny  from  other  physiological  researchers.  Secondly, 
62 Smith, R. 'Physiological Psychology', pp. 109-111.
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Carpenter sought to extend his psychology to articulate a physiological account of 
'spiritualist' (and especially mesmeric) phenomena.
In  contrast  with  phrenologists'  assumption  that  anatomical  evidence 
supported  or  would  be  found  to  support  their  doctrines,  mesmerists  stressed 
evidence  relating  to  the  performative  elements  of  their  science.  Mesmerism 
constituted  both  a  claim regarding  psychological  truth,  and  the  introduction  to 
'public' life of a phenomenon that appeared inexplicable within then-conventional 
rationalist discourse. As already noted, most philosophical and psychological texts 
available during the 1830s and 40s characterise rationality as constitutive of mental 
activity, which is in turn understood by them to be the most distinctive feature of 
being human. Yet mesmerists seemed able to suspend this rationality for a short 
time, an ability accompanied by the production in their subjects of almost complete 
obedience to the instructions of the mesmeriser. The only - or at least the most  
plausible - explanation for such irrational anomalies, many mesmerists claimed, 
was that a force of some kind acted on the mesmerised subject which disturbed the 
ability of a person's soul to communicate actions to its body.63
Such  a  claim  seemed  particularly  problematic  for  attempts  to  connect 
mental function with physiological life.64 If a simple act such as the swinging of an 
object  could disrupt  mental  function so readily -  apparently without  any direct 
intervention in the physiology of the nervous system - how was it possible to claim 
that all mental functions arose from physiological processes? Conversely, if human 
action in the world did not rely on the purposive action of a disembodied soul or 
spiritual  force,  how else  could  the  effectiveness  of  such  simple  techniques  be 
explained?
Induced hypnotic, mesmeric or trance-like states came to be understood as 
important  phenomena  which  any  science  of  psychology  should  be  capable  of 
explaining. From around 1839, when John Elliotson - then professor of Clinical  
medicine  at  University  College  -  was  forced  to  resign  following  his  public 
demonstrations  of  mesmeric  phenomena at  the university's  hospital,  respectable 
63Winter, Mesmerised, pp. 1-5.
64 Though some phrenologists (such as John Elliotson) sought to combine phrenology and 
mesmerism into a 'phreno-mesmerism'. See Ketabgian, T. ‘Martineau, mesmerism, and 
the “night side of nature.”’, Women’s Writing 9 (2002), pp. 351-368; Cooter, The Cultural  
Meaning, pp. 150, 153.
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scientific authors called for the adoption of careful, rational study of trance-like 
states.65 Contributors to the British and Foreign Medical Review were amongst the 
foremost advocates of such an approach, producing a number of articles setting out  
histories of mesmeric practices and recording cases relating to them.66 Elliotson 
was singled out for particular attention, being cited as a source of embarrassment 
for the reputation of physiology and the medical profession more generally.67 
Yet  although  medical  journals  called  for  physiological  explanations, 
conceptions of nervous function prevalent in the late 1840s offered little guidance 
for the articulation of a rationalist  interpretation of trance-like phenomena.  The 
foremost  interpreter  of  mesmeric  states  who  did  not  describe  himself  as  a 
mesmerist - James Braid - had restricted his analysis to the description of cases,  
and  recommending  the  continuing  accumulation  of  'facts'  from  which  he  was 
confident  inferences  regarding  the  true  explanation  for  the  phenomena  would 
eventually be made.68 Nor had other physiologists sought to explain hypnosis in 
terms of nervous physiology.69 The sense that physiology should be able to account 
for  mesmeric  phenomena,  combined  with  the  continuing  absence  of  such  an 
account, presented physiological psychologists with an opportunity to legitimate 
their doctrines as able to contribute to the broader contestation of 'superstition' and 
uncritical  belief  that  was  becoming  characteristic  of  an  emerging  ideal  of 
disciplined, 'scientific' endeavour. Carpenter came to be recognised as a leading 
figure in the articulation of such explanations. This recognition was due at least in 
part to the close engagement with the concept of the physiological reflex in his 
65 On Elliotson see Winter, Mesmerised.
66 'History of Animal Magnetism in France, Germany and England', British and Foreign 
Medical Review 7 (1839), pp. 301-352; 'On Mesmerism', British and Foreign Medical  
Review 19 (1845), pp. 428-485; 'Dr Esdaile on the Application of Mesmerism in Surgery 
and Medicine', British and Foreign Medical Review 22 (1846), pp. 475-487. See also eg. 
'Mesmerism', Blackwoods Magazine 57 (1845), pp. 219-241; 'Madamoiselle Julie; or, 
witchcraft for the aristocracy', The Athenaeum 957 (28th Feb 1846), pp. 221-223.
67 See eg. 'History of Animal Magnetism...', p. 304. 'On Mesmerism', p. 484
68 Braid, J. Neurypnology; or, the Rationale of Nervous Sleep, considered in relation with 
Animal Magnetism (London, 1843), pp. 153-157.
69 Laycock had however made a number of what he later considered to be highly 
suggestive remarks on the subject - see Laycock-Combe, 14th August 1851. Nat. Lib. 
Scot. MS 7317, ff. 42-43. Carpenter-Laycock, 23rd January 1855. RCPE MS B. 22 F. 
148.
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texts,  and  his  connection  of  it  with  conceptions  of  autonomous  action  and 
voluntary will, as related below.
Towards the end of the 1840s, Carpenter's tripartite differentiation of the 
anatomy of the nervous system described above began to attract critical scrutiny 
from researchers interested in the minute study of nerves. Microscopists argued 
that  the  specific  connections  that  would  be  appropriate  to  an  anatomical 
differentiation of nervous function could not be found in the minute histology of 
nerves.  Most  tellingly,  there  seemed  to  be  no  way  of  differentiating  three 
independent systems of nervous fibre that emerged from anatomically distinct parts 
of  the brain to  the non-cerebral  nervous system. Without such a  differentiation 
(they  argued),  specific  functions  could  not  reliably  be  associated  with  specific 
regions of nerves.70
In  an  1850  article  that  indicates  the  increasingly  reputable  status  of 
microscopic research during the mid nineteenth century, Carpenter acknowledges 
the  legitimacy  of  this  critique.71 Coincident  with  his  acknowledgement  is  a 
seemingly sudden move to extend the reflex function to explain the operation of 
the whole of the nervous system.72 But rather than retract his claims regarding the 
relations of physiology and psychology, he uses it as an opportunity to restate his 
doctrines.  His  adoption  of  the  reflex  function  as  constitutive  of  all  nervous 
functions operates as more a rhetorical  device in his texts than it  substantively  
changes his views on the constitution of mind.
In  effect,  Carpenter  maintains  his  initial  system in  his  post-1850 texts. 
Though he now contends with Laycock that the entire nervous system is subject to 
the  operation  of  automatic  reflexive  nerves,  he  does  not  (as  Laycock  does) 
conceive of simpler, reflex states as more fundamental than consciousness in the 
consideration of  mental  life.  Rather  than inhere in  the cerebellum and medulla 
oblongata, the intermediate 'sensori-volitional' actions are now considered to arise 
from the interaction of consciousness, automatic nervous reflexes, and the actions 
70 Todd, R.B. 'The Physiology of the Nervous System', in Todd, R.B. and Bowman, W. 
(eds.) The Cyclopedia Anatomy and Physiology [Vol. 3] (London, 1835-59), pp. 720G-
723G. Leys, From Sympathy to Reflex, pp. 312-313.
71 Carpenter, W.B. 'On the Physiology and Diseases of the Nervous System', British and 
Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review 5 (1850), pp. 1-50.
72 Smith, 'Physiological Psychology', pp. 109-111.
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of sensory organs.73 The cerebrum itself constitutes the site in which ideas occur 
'reflexively',  but  these  reflexes  are  now  subject  to  the  controlling  force  of  an 
independently-operating (but apparently still cerebral) 'will.'74 In such a conception, 
the  automatic  action  of  nerves  is  not  only  considered  productive  of  conscious 
states, but also as threatening to their integrity.
The constitutive presence in physiology of an autonomous volition or will 
thereby becomes critical to Carpenter's conception of psychological existence. His 
texts from this period emphasise to a far greater extent than previously the need for 
such a presence. Self-determination of purpose, as the means by which rational 
action can be differentiated from animal instinct, appears in his work as a bulwark 
against the dangers of materialism and impiety. Hence:
All  educational  efforts,  as  it  seems  to  us,  must  be  based  on  the 
assumption, that until the self-directing power has been acquired, the 
character  is  the  resultant  of  original  constitution,  and  of  the 
circumstances  in  which  the  individual  is  placed...  The  real  self-
formation commences with his consciousness of the power of  self-
control;  a  power  which  is  exercised  by  the  Will,  in  virtue  of  its 
dominion over what may be designated the automatic operation of the 
mind.75
The  relation  of  such  comments  to  physiological  psychologists'  more  general 
conceptions of learning and pedagogy will be addressed later in this thesis. What is  
important to note here is that this conception of psychology is one in which the 
cultivation of self-control actually constitutes autonomous self-hood - that it is by 
controlling  the  'automatic'  effects  of  one's  'original  constitution'  that  will  gains 
ascendancy over reflexively-determined instincts and ideas.
73 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology... [4th ed.] (London, 1853), pp. 667-672.
74Carpenter, W.B. 'On the Influence of Suggestion in Modifying and Directing Muscular 
Movement, Independently of Volition', Notices of Proceedings of Meetings of Members 
of the Royal Institution 1 (1851-1854), pp. 151-152. This characterization and that below 
largely follows Smith, 'Physiological Psychology', pp. 110-114.
75 Carpenter, W.B. 'On the Relations of Mind and Matter', British and Foreign Medico-
Chirurgical Review 10 (1852), p. 510. Original emphases.
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The powerful presence of a potentially volatile, 'automatic' nervous system 
nevertheless places limits on the ability of the will to determine mental action. The 
fourth edition of Carpenter's  Principles of Human Physiology (1853) relates how 
sensorial 'impressions' travel in an 'upward' direction through the nervous system 
towards the cerebrum. If these impressions are interrupted, they form 'purely' reflex 
acts, unmediated by consciousness. But if they pass straight to the cerebrum they 
can take one of two forms. Either they constitute unmediated sensation, from which 
'simple ideas' are formed. Or they are accompanied with a feeling of pleasure or 
pain, and take on the character of 'emotional ideas'.76 Sensation thereby constitutes 
the  means  by  which  physiological  nervous  action  is  communicated  to 
consciousness:
either as a simple or as an emotional idea, it [sensation] becomes the 
subject of  intellectual operations, whose final issue is in a volitional  
determination, or act of the Will, which may be exerted in producing 
or checking a muscular  movement,  or  in  controlling or directing a 
current of thought.77
The will retains a more fundamental status than in its reflex-dependent portrayal in 
Laycock's  psychology.  Yet  whilst  according  will  an  important  role  in  the 
determination  of  rational  'intellectual  operations,'  Carpenter  also  accords  it  a  
comparatively minor place in psychological action. It is not for a volitional will or 
soul to produce intellect, as assumed in many of the then-available texts addressing 
nervous action. Rather, the will operates as 'controlling or directing' an already-
present current of thought, caused by the operation and interaction of nerves. 78 It is 
this physiologically-restricted status of will that presents Carpenter with a means of 
explaining  the  apparent  ease  with  which  trances  are  produced  in  mesmeric 
performance.
76 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology (4th Ed.), pp. 671-672 See Winter, 
Mesmerised, p. 290 for Carpenter's diagramatic representation of this arrangement.
77 Principles of Human Physiology (4th ed.) , pp. 671-672.
78 Ibid. pp. 800-801. See also Carpenter, 'Electro-Biology and Mesmerism', The Quarterly  
Review 93 (1853), pp. 507-508.
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Accompanying  Carpenter's  re-formulation  of  his  psychology  is  a  vocal 
portrayal of the induction of trance-like behaviour as indicating a subversion of the 
proper  working  of  will-power  in  mental  life.  During  normal  psychological 
existence,  the  will  is  constantly  exercising  its  judgement  over  physiologically-
produced ideas. However, this judgement (Carpenter claims) 'can only take place 
while  the  Will  has  the  power  of  selecting  those which  are  appropriate,  and  of 
bringing them into collocation with each other.'79 Mesmerists, by concentrating the 
attention of their subjects on one single point to the exclusion of all others, are able 
to suspend the will's ability to discriminate between 'real' and the 'illusory' ideas,  
and thus to direct thought. This places it in a state of 'abeyance',  in which it is  
possible to direct the actions of the subject directly, via the automatic and 'sensor-
volitional'  operation of  the nervous system.80 It  is  not  only by focusing on the 
attention of their subjects on one object, but also through the exclusion of all other 
sources of distraction, that mesmeric practitioners are able to produce their effects.  
Given the apparent physiological basis for such an explanation, it now appears to 
Carpenter incumbent on those who assert the mystical significance of mesmeric 
states to produce evidence in favour of their contentions.81
Mesmerism thereby appears in Carpenter's texts as the artificial induction 
of an exclusively emotional, 'instinctive' state in humans that is entirely natural in 
'lower' beings. Mesmeric, or 'hypnotic' practices enable the flow of physiologically-
constituted 'dominant ideas' to override the normal directing action of the will. As a 
subversion of the ability of the will to determine mental direction, mesmerism is an 
'epidemic disorder'  that  is  potentially dangerous to its  participants.82 Carpenter's 
texts  extend the application of  this  conception of  the potential  subversion of  a 
normal,  will-directed  psychology  to  account  for  a  wide  range  of  mental 
pathologies. Excessive consumption of alcohol or a lack of rational education tend 
to leave the will weak, and thereby open to subversion from emotional or even  
automatic states.83 Indeed, even the origin of erroneous religious belief
79 Carpenter, 'Electro-Biology', p. 508.
80 Ibid, pp. 510-511.
81 Ibid, pp. 550-555.
82 Ibid, p. 556.
83 Ibid, p. 557.
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has uniformly lain in the preference given to  the feelings over  the 
judgement,  on  the  inordinate  indulgence  of  emotional  excitement 
without adequate control on the part of the rational will... What kind 
of  spirits  they  are,  which  thus  take  possession  of  credulous  and 
excitable minds, we hope that we have made sufficiently plain. They 
are Dominant Ideas.84
Carpenter's critique of mesmerism is part of a wider articulation of a physiological 
psychological conception of relations between reflexes, instincts and will-power or 
rationality.  The swift  adoption of his analysis of  the phenomena in question in 
subsequent  attacks  on mesmerists'  claims -  most  immediately and famously by 
Michael Faraday85 - accompanied an intensification of interest in Carpenter's and 
others' advocacy of the need to link conceptions of mind with claims about nature, 
and assisted in the legitimation of physiological psychology within a rationalist,  
'scientific' academic discourse.
Physiological psychological critiques of spiritualist  mesmeric claims can 
be understood as  an early instance of  what  Rhodri  Hayward characterises  as  a 
general effort within psychological discourse to rationalise instances of apparent 
mental  discontinuity.86 Whilst  agreeing  with  this  evaluation,  I  wish  here  to 
highlight  that  such efforts  did not  necessarily  entail  the adoption of  a  uniform 
response by psychologists committed to the articulation of embodied explanations 
of  psychological  existence.  For  example,  Laycock  reached  rather  different 
conclusions to Carpenter regarding the appropriate response to mesmerism, despite 
similarly expressing skepticism regarding mesmerists' claims.
In accordance with his emphasis on what he considers to be the primitive 
nature  of  non-conscious  states,  Laycock  understands  'empirical'  beliefs  (as 
84 Ibid. Original emphasis.
85 'Professor Faraday on Table-Moving', The Athenaeum Journal of Literature, Science, 
and the Fine Arts 1340 (July 1853), pp. 801-803.
86Hayward, R. Resisting History: religious transcendence and the invention of the 
unconscious (Manchester; University Press, 2007).  On Carpenter and Laycock's joint 
commitment to explaining mesmeric practices, see Laycock-Combe and Carpenter-
Laycock, 28th April [1851]. RCPE MS Box 22 Folder 148.
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contrasted  with  truly  scientific,  'inductive'  beliefs)87 such  as  mesmerism  or 
homoeopathy  as  relying  on  the  presence  of  potentially  useful  but  as-yet  not 
understood aspects of medical practice. When they are not making disingenuous 
claims,  'empiricists'  succeed  because  they  adopt  practices  that  (at  least 
occasionally) produce tangible effects.88 Their principal mistake is to attribute the 
effectiveness of their practices to causes that explain only that practice - and that 
are likely to be inconsistent with more general beliefs.89 The appropriate response 
to  such  'primitive'  practitioners  is  therefore  a  laissez-faire  one  -  to  allow  the  
continuation of unexplained practices whilst at the same time seeking to bring the 
effects of them within the wider explanatory framework offered by a 'scientific' or  
'inductive' perspective.90
In  contrast,  Carpenter  understands  the  practice  of  mesmerism  to  be  a 
danger  that  demands  more  immediate  refutation  through rational  argument  and 
empirical demonstration.91 Though Carpenter's (like Laycock's) conception of mind 
accords  non-conscious  states  an  important  role  in  conscious  life,  it  is  only  by 
avoiding  their  influence  that  true  thought  or  rationality  can  be  maintained. 
Connected with this belief is a deep-seated concern with the active and constitutive 
role of volition in mental life, and a commitment to willful direction as a guarantor  
of  rational  belief.  In  a  later  article,  Laycock criticises  Carpenter  and  Faraday's 
response to mesmerism as inconsistent with their advocacy of 'scientific' beliefs. 92 
87 Both Carpenter and Laycock advocate the adoption of an 'inductive' approach to medical 
practice similar to that that had been proposed by William Whewell. See Whewell, W. On 
Induction: with especial reference to Mr J. Stuart Mill’s system of logic (London, 1849).
88 Laycock, T. 'The Relation of True Medicine to Empirical Systems', British and Foreign 
Medico-Chirurgical Review 5 (1850), p. 287. 
89 Ibid. p. 293.
90 Ibid, pp. 302-305. Laycock, T. 'Odyle, Mesmerism, Electro-Biology, &c.' British and 
Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review 8 (1851), p. 431.
91 Laycock's articles on mesmerism do nevertheless contain many similarities with those of 
Carpenter cited above. See Laycock, T. 'Modern Demonology and Divination', The 
Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology 7 (1854), pp. 1-23; Laycock, T. 
'The Psychology of Monomaniacal Societies and Literature', The Journal of  
Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology 7 (1854), pp. 301-326. Faraday devised a 
number of experiments intended to test mesmeric claims. See Winter, Mesmerised, pp. 
290-294.
92 Laycock, 'The Psychology of Monomaniacal Societies', p. 326.
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Though  both  Carpenter  and  Laycock  deny  the  legitimacy  of  mesmeric 
interpretations of hypnotic practices, each stresses subtly different aspects in their 
articulation of re-interpretations of the nature of trance-like states. For Carpenter  
(unlike Laycock), it  is not primarily through manipulation of the non-conscious 
influences  on  conscious  life,  but  the  cultivation  of  will,  that  goals  are  best  
achieved.
It is tempting to portray Carpenter's doctrines as a half-hearted engagement 
with Laycock's  more systematic  articulation of the necessary primacy of reflex  
function in any thoroughly 'physiological' psychology.93 Yet for all their apparent 
inconsistencies, they attracted far more attention at the time of their publication 
than did Laycock's more complex and at times esoteric works. Given the academic 
contexts in which each figure operated, Carpenter's simultaneously anatomically 
based and will-constituted physiology and psychology, I suggest, accompanied the 
adoption of what was at that time a more easily accepted and culturally resonant 
approach to political action.94
The intellectual culture of nineteenth-century Britain was beginning to be 
re-oriented  around  a  specific  conception  of  academic  practice.  Physiological 
psychologists, to a greater extent than phrenologists or their predecessors the moral 
philosophers,  prided themselves  on their  ability  to  comprehend,  assimilate,  and 
incorporate into their texts the publications of those considered authorities on areas 
that  were  not  their  immediate  concern.  These  academics,  aspiring  to  the 
constitution  of  a  disciplinary  psychology,  sought  to  articulate  a  conception  of 
psyche that would enable them to collaborate as equals with figures from other  
recognisable 'disciplines' such as zoology and political economy. The culture of  
universities  such as  UCL,  founded on  a  presumption that  competition between 
individuals and the division of academic labour constituted the most appropriate 
means of  organizing the production of knowledge,  seemed to offer  particularly 
fertile ground for the establishment of such a discipline. Indeed, as will be made 
clearer  later  in  this  thesis,  physiological  psychological  notions  would  become 
critical  to  the  entrenchment  of  conceptions  of  the  economically  active  liberal 
93 Carpenter-Laycock, 26th October 1849. RCPE MS Box 22 Folder 148.
94 The relation of Carpenter’s work to the politics of pedagogy  is addressed more fully in 
chapter three.
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individual as a masculine ideal later in the century. Before the means by which 
physiological  psychological  discourse  contributed  to  this  entrenchment  can  be 
made clear, however, it is first necessary to move on to the second stated aim of  
this chapter - the examination of ways in which physiological psychologists placed 
particular emphasis on the persuasive power of both textual and non-textual objects  
in their attempts to establish themselves as authorities on the 'nature'  of  human 
minds.
Physiology and Psychology
Through  their  above-mentioned  attainment  of  prestigious  positions  in 
academic life, Carpenter and Laycock helped establish psychology as a matter of 
physiological and zoological as well as of moral philosophic concern. Yet their  
psychologies claimed little that had not already been articulated without substantial  
reference  to  physiological  evidence.  Laycock  cited  the  philosophy  of  William 
Hamilton  in  support  of  his  claims.95 Drawing  on  the  Scottish  ‘common sense’ 
tradition  (and  especially  the  work  of  Thomas  Reid),  as  well  as  the  German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant, Hamilton had articulated an 'intuitionist' conception 
of mind in which non-conscious elements played a fundamental role.96 Elsewhere, 
Coleridge and his followers drew heavily on Germanic philosophy to make similar 
claims.97 By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the understanding of  
mind  as  a  purely  rational  entity  had  come  under  criticism  from  a  number  of 
different quarters, of which zoologically-informed physiology was only one.
What  marks  physiological  psychology  out  from  other  means  of 
conceptualising  mind is  not  the  substantive  claims  that  it  makes  regarding  the 
psyche,  but  the  ways  in  which  its  adherents  sought  to  put  their  doctrines  into 
practice, and the means by which they addressed differences amongst themselves. 
Physiological  psychologists'  common  commitment  to  articulating  embodied 
95 Laycock, Mind and Brain, pp. 72, 117-118.
96 Hamilton, W. 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned', in Hamilton, W. et. al. Kant's Thought in  
Britain: The Early Impact (London, 1993 [1829]), 38 pp.
97 Levere, Poetry Realized in Nature.
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conceptions of mind meant that their texts privilege very different sorts of evidence 
than do those of their contemporaries engaged in moral philosophy. For example, 
Hamilton privileges  non-conscious or  'unconditioned'  elements  of  psychological 
existence on textual, rational grounds - a commitment held in common by the vast 
majority  of  philosophers.98 In  contrast,  within  physiological  psychology,  non-
textual entities are given far greater political and epistemic weight. 
In  this  final  section,  I  briefly  highlight  the  for-the-time  unusual 
conceptualization by physiological psychologists of both textual and non-textual 
objects as tools of persuasion. Firstly, drawing on Dames' insights regarding the 
physiologically-determining  potential  of  literature,  and  its  consideration  as  a 
technique by which affect  can be inculcated into individuals'  bodies,  I examine 
Laycock's use of text as a mechanism of persuasion during his campaign for his  
post at the University of Edinburgh. Secondly, in an extention of Dames' analysis 
to non-textual objects, I point to one means by which physiological psychologists  
sought to reconcile disputes amongst themselves. In appealing to the persuasive 
power  of  specific  epistemic  tools,  I  suggest,  Carpenter  and  Laycock's 
psychological commitments placed particular weight on the persuasive power of 
non-linguistic  objects  in  intellectual  endeavour.  Psychology  in  Britain  thereby 
emerges  as  a  movement  constituted  not  only  around  textual  and  institutional 
formations (such as landmark publications, or bodies such as UCL), but also in 
relation to a specific set of tools and techniques: those appealed to by zoologists 
concerned with the definition of a nature that exists 'outside' of the human body.
Laycock and the conceptualization of texts as persuasive objects
Phrenological sympathisers played an important role in Laycock's surprise 
appointment  to  the  much-sought-after  chair  of  the  Principles  and  Practice  of 
Medicine at Edinburgh in 1855. A phrenologist even influenced his initial decision 
regarding the post. Since their initial exchange, Combe had introduced Laycock to 
the  target  of  Carpenter's  critique,  Daniel  Noble.99 The  latter,  along  with  the 
98 Hamilton, 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned', esp. pp. 11-19.
99 Laycock, T. 'Account of the Election of Dr Thomas Laycock to the Chair of the Practice of 
Medicine Edin University 1855 Autobiographical', in Barfoot (ed.), "To ask the 
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Mancunian zoologist William Williamson, were the first men Laycock consulted 
about his chances, the two having stayed at his house in York the evening after he 
received  notice  of  the  vacancy.  His  wife  Anne  (whom he  had  conferred  with 
initially) believed it would be better to stay in York. The two friends (who had 
been invited by Laycock as honoured guests at a meeting of the Provincial Medical 
and Surgical Association) recommended he should stand. In a move completely in 
accordance  with  his  published  opinions  on  what  he  characterises  as  women's 
inferior capacity for rational contemplation, he left that morning for Edinburgh.100
The details of Laycock's campaign have been related at some length by 
Michael Barfoot, in an introduction to the 1860 apologia of the former recounting 
the circumstances of his appointment.101 However, although Barfoot's history offers 
a wealth of detail regarding both the social context of Edinburgh and the personal 
interests of members of the university medical faculty, it does not attempt to link 
these to  Laycock's  efforts  to  articulate  a  physiological  psychology.  In order  to 
highlight the ways in which Laycock's psychology related to his conduct of his 
campaign,  I  will  concentrate  on his  personal  approach to  it  rather  than on the 
broader contexts foregrounded by Barfoot.
Laycock's positioning of his work as complementary to phrenology gained 
him a sympathetic audience in Edinburgh. The Scottish city had been at the centre 
of  the initial  formulation of  the movement  in  Britain,  and though phrenology's 
influence as a viable science of man was beginning to wane,  it  still  held great  
attractions  for  many  intellectually-engaged  townspeople.  In  his  campaign, 
Laycock's  inner  circle  included  the  evolutionary  author  Robert  Chambers  (the 
foremost  phrenological  sympathiser  in  Scotland  at  that  time,  as  Combe  was 
abroad),  Chambers'  future  son-in-law  William  Overend  Priestley,  and  David 
Ramsay Hay,  who had drawn on phrenology in his  articulation of a  'scientific'  
theory  of  aesthetics.102 The  combined efforts  of  these  figures  -  along  with  the 
crucial  but  more ambiguous support  of  James Young Simpson,  who appears to 
Suffrages...", pp. 55-56.
100 Ibid, p. 55.  Laycock, A Treatise, esp. pp. 72-76. Physiological psychological 
conceptions of the mind as gendered are discussed in Chapter 4.
101 Barfoot, 'Introduction', pp. 1-51.
102 Barfoot, 'Introduction', pp. 36-37.
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have  simultaneously  supported  the  efforts  of  a  rival  candidate,  John  Hughes 
Bennett - presented Laycock with a campaign team and support group.
Although  an  interest  in  phrenology  might  have  constituted  a  common 
ground for  Laycock's  close  supporters,  it  was  of  little  advantage  as  far  as  the 
university medical faculty was concerned. Edinburgh University had by 1855 built 
up a reputation as a particularly hostile place for phrenologists. Combe had applied 
for the Chair of Logic there nineteen years before, in defiance of the first serious  
attempt in Britain (led by William Hamilton) to discredit its supporters' claims to 
advocate a science of mind and brain.103 His narrow defeat had set the tone for an 
oppositional relationship between town and gown on the issue.104
Despite  the  historical  hostility  of  its  members  to  embodied  notions  of 
mind,  the  faculty  of  Edinburgh  University  did  not  have  the  power  to  appoint 
professors to its body - a right invested in Edinburgh's Town Council.105 This had 
profound implications for candidates to Edinburgh chairs. Rather than address a  
small  community of  academics,  they had to  convince the representatives  of  an 
entire town of their suitability for any post.
Laycock's extensive apologia (mentioned above) is the principal body of 
evidence  relating  to  the  election.  As  evidence  of  Laycock's  and  his  rivals' 
campaigns, it is a problematic document. It was written in 1860, following a bitter 
dispute  with  a  number  of  his  new academic colleagues,  including Bennett,  his 
principal rival during the election.106 In addition, as a historical account it is highly 
unusual - it remains less than clear what motivated Laycock to write such a long 
narrative of the campaign. He did not seek to publish it, and appears to have used it 
as a means of justifying his own success to himself.107 This places severe limits on 
the sorts of claims that it can be made to support.  
103 Cantor, G.N. 'The Edinburgh Phrenology Debate: 1803-1828', Annals of Science 32 
(1975), pp. 195-219; Shapin, 'Phrenological Knowledge', pp. 219-243. See also van 
Wyhe, J. Phrenology and the Origins of Victorian Scientific Naturalism (Aldershot and 
Burlington, 2004), pp. 85-92.
104 Shapin, ‘Phrenological Knowledge’, pp. 234-240. On Laycock’s anxieties over being 
‘called a materialist’ see Laycock, ‘Account’, pp. 41-42.
105 Barfoot, 'Introduction', pp. 24-32.
106 Ibid, pp. 47-50.
107 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
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I here offer a reading of it that takes into account its problematic nature. 
Instead of  interpreting the text  as  testimony to the campaign itself,  I  use  it  as  
evidence of the ways in which Laycock himself conceived of effective political 
action. Written at a distance of five years from the events themselves, it is best  
understood  as  a  reflection  of  Laycock's  own  conception  of  what  made  the 
campaign  successful,  rather  than  as  evidence  regarding   the  campaign  as  it  
happened. Specifically, its privileging of the potential for texts to inculcate specific 
emotional states in their readers accords well with Dames' account of the status of  
literary entities as tools and techniques of affect in physiological culture.
As  far  as  his  campaigning  is  concerned,  Laycock  characterises  the 
collecting  of  testimonials  as  central  to  his  efforts.  He  casts  himself  a  relative 
unknown in Edinburgh, seeking the Town Council's approval in the face of anti-
English prejudice and established local power networks.108 The public system of 
academic  appointment  required  candidates  to  place  successive  rounds  of 
attestations of their suitability for a position before the Town Council, each seeking 
to outdo the others in both the volume and gravitas of their support.109 On the face 
of it, such a system would appear to entail a simple popularity contest, with the  
intellectual community constituting the field to which candidates must appeal. Yet  
Laycock recalled what he characterised as the 'art'  of  requesting testimonials to 
involve much more than this:
It is of great importance that the testifier should express himself so as 
to carry his readers with him, in the expression of his opinion. To this 
end an earnest style, free from conventionalism is the most important 
characteristic; but earnestness in expression is only attained through 
feeling in the writer. This need not necessarily be one of friendship; 
vanity, hatred to a rival, the mere love of encouraging the weaker side,  
the desire to patronise a rising man and similar feelings would equally 
serve to give earnestness and vigour to the language.110
108 Laycock, 'Account', p. 59.
109 Barfoot, 'Introduction', pp. 23-32.
110 Laycock, 'Account', p. 61.
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This  passage  hints  that  Laycock  adopted  an  unconventional  approach  to 
campaigning. He does not consider himself to have taken the task of collecting 
testimonials as simply a matter of appealing to an already-existent support network, 
but  as  of  manipulating the emotions of  his  acquaintances  in  a  way that  would 
maximise his support.  Implicit  in the above quotation is that written appeals to 
more ‘instinctive’, uncontroversially ‘bodily’ states are more likely to be effective 
than those addressing the rational faculties of their readers. In other words, that  the  
most  powerful  testimonials  are  those composed for  the inculcation of  affective 
response. This, I suggest, parallels the primacy accorded the more 'simple' mental 
states in Laycock's early psychological texts. If (as Laycock argued) rational states  
are dependent for their existence on a pre-existing field of feelings, appeals to the 
latter would constitute a more effective means of persuasion than appeals to the  
former.
Along  with  the  testimonials  themselves,  the  apologia  portrays  the 
packaging of a catalogue of Laycock's own publications along with them as having 
the  most  powerful  influence  in  favour  of  his  candidature.  Simpson  had 
recommended that such a list be sent along with the testimonial request letters and 
appeals to Council members, as a means of convincing prospective supporters.111 
The publication of the catalogue constituted an opportunity for Laycock to claim 
authorship of a wide range of texts that would not otherwise have been attributed to 
him.  Though  he  had  by  1855  produced  a  number  of  signed  articles  for  such 
journals as the Dublin Medical Press, the Lancet and the London Medical Gazette, 
the  vast  majority  of  his  literary  output  remained unsigned.  The then-recent  re-
orientation  of  literary  culture  around  a  collection  of  increasingly  specialised 
journals was accompanied by the general maintenance of anonymity in reviews.112 
This policy remained in place even when (as often happened in Laycock's case) 
authors advanced what they considered new or unusual  claims.  Hence amongst 
Laycock's  numerous  anonymous  articles  published  in  the  British  and  Foreign  
Medical Review (the editorship of which Carpenter was to take over in 1847)113 
111 Laycock, 'Account', p. 66.
112 On connections between physiological psychology and journal culture, see Smith, ‘The 
Physiology of the Will’. For an overview of the historiography of nineteenth-century 
journal culture and science see Dawson, G. and Topham, J.R. ‘Science in the 
Nineteenth-Century Periodical’, Literature Compass 1 (2004), 11 pp.
113 Carpenter, 'Memorial Sketch', p. 41 - see below.
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were claims relating to such diverse topics as the origin of epidemics,  medical 
ethics and relations between anatomy and art.114 By producing a catalogue of them, 
he could highlight the extent of his hitherto unacknowledged literary labours.
The account emphasises the importance of the catalogue as a document in 
the campaign:
The effect of this catalogue was instantaneous. Dr Laycock had not 
formed any adequate conception of the extent of his labours, much 
less those to whom the greater part was unknown. Its influence was 
that  of  an  astonishing  surprise,  both  in  and  out  of  the  profession. 
Testimonials  were  more  easily  attained  from  every  quarter,  and 
breathed a more hearty and earnest spirit.115
As  well  as  appealing  directly  to  what  he  considered  the  affect-constituted 
psychological  states  of  those  who  he  hoped  would  influence  his  appointment,  
Laycock portrays his  campaign as bringing to  his electors'  (and their  advisers') 
consciousnesses a whole range of textual materials that they would have otherwise 
remained unaware of (and may have otherwise considered irrelevant). 
Laycock  portrays  himself  as  adopting  a  more  general,  text-centred 
approach  to  political  action  that  parallels  his  conception  of  psychology  as 
inherently embodied. The early pages of his apologia characterise him as:
not ambitious of cash so much as desirous of power over the minds of 
men. This he had exercised largely through the press, although to a 
great  extent  secretly...   He  had  thus  abundant  opportunities  for 
influencing the mind of the profession upon all great questions of the 
day, whether medico-scientific, ethical, scientific or practical, and he 
felt a pride in exercising this influence behind the scenes of periodical 
anonymousness [sic].116
114 Laycock, T. Evidence of Professional Acquirements, pp. 14-24.
115 Laycock, 'Account', p. 66.
116 Ibid, pp. 53-54. 
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This comment makes clear two important points regarding Laycock's view of the 
catalogue;  that  it  relied on his  participation in  secretive and indirect  means by 
which he hoped to influence intellectual life; and that he saw this indirect mode of  
influence as a source of power.
In addition to the above-described textual means of persuasion, Laycock 
portrays  his  personal  conduct  during  the  campaign  as  consistent  with  a  more 
general  'psychological'  approach  to  the  contest.  He  portrays  himself  as  highly 
aware of what he considers the state of ignorance as to academic matters of the  
town councillors, commenting that 'they found themselves in a difficult position,  
because their previous education and habits of life had certainly not qualified them 
to be judges of the merits of professors.'117 Understanding his electorate as unable 
to differentiate between the candidates on academic grounds, Laycock sought to 
influence the opinions of those to which they might turn for advice. Hence the  
construction and distribution of the catalogue and testimonials was heavily oriented 
towards the persuasion of local medical men.118 This tactic could also operate at a 
more personal level -  Laycock relates how he sought to persuade a particularly  
inscrutable councillor - one 'Ex-Baille Tullis' - by convincing the latter's wife of his  
suitability. Other candidates targeted the councillor directly.119 In Laycock's view, 
the most effective aspects of the campaign had not been those in which he had 
addressed the Town Council - indeed the councillors themselves receive very little 
attention - but his attempts to influence the emotional and intellectual environment 
in which they sought to make their decisions.
For the Laycock of 1860, then, it appears that textual entities are critical to 
the conduct of political action or the persuasion of a population. It was not only the 
literary  critics  that  Dames  highlights  such  as  Eneas  Sweetland  Dallas  and 
Alexander  Bain  that  portrayed  texts  as  having  physiological  impacts  on  their 
readers.  For  physiological  psychologists,  texts  designed  for  the  inculcation  of 
specific bodily states could help constitute an environment in which one's  own 
broader  aims  might  be  achieved  more  readily.  As  noted  later  in  this  thesis, 
117 Ibid, p. 60.
118 Ibid. p. 61
119 Ibid, p. 93.
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Carpenter appears to have adopted a similar attitude with regard to his engagement 
with ‘amateur’ microscopic practitioners during the 1850s. Physiological notions of 
effective political action tended to highlight books and pamphlets as means to an 
end (rather than entities valuable in and of themselves).
It should however also be noted that as far as physiological psychologists'  
disagreements amongst themselves are concerned, a far broader range of objects 
are brought to bear in matters of dispute. Though texts were considered entirely 
effective  means  of  inculcating  consent  amongst  populations  unschooled  in  the 
physiological aspects of psychology, it was the tools and techniques of zoology 
that cwere brought into question when discussing the physiological nature of mind. 
The  'internal'  disciplinary  dynamic  of  physiological  psychology  privileged  the 
persuasive capacities of non-representative techniques, rather than those of literary 
objects. In order to expand on this point, I conclude this chapter by examining the 
means by which Carpenter and Laycock sought to resolve some of the differences 
between their respective claims regarding the nervous psyche.
The place of tools in physiological psychology 
During the late  1840s and early 1850s,  Carpenter  and Laycock became 
involved in a dispute regarding the application of the reflex function to the entire 
nervous system. The conflict between the two had its origins in the question of 
exactly how this application should be achieved. Though only one side of their 
correspondence appears to have survived, it nevertheless enables an interrogation 
one  significant  way  in  which  psychological  psychologists  sought  to  resolve 
disagreements  amongst  themselves.  As  already mentioned,  Carpenter  sought  to 
connect  psychological  categories  and anatomically-distinct  parts  of  the  nervous 
system. Laycock was consistently critical of such an approach.120 Such criticism 
was not only a matter of establishing a claim relating to physiological truth. As 
stressed above, in a discourse seeking to identify nervous and psychological life, 
claims regarding the nature of the nervous system become psychologically (and 
politically), as well as physiologically, relevant.
120 See eg. Laycock-Combe, 27th Feb 1845, Nat. Lib. Scot. MS 7276, ff. 3-4; 
Laycock-Combe, Oct 1846. Nat. Lib. Scot. MS 7240 ff. 117-119.
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At  some  point  in  1849,  Laycock  appears  to  have  submitted  a  text  to 
Carpenter as editor of the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review critical 
of the latter's anatomical stance (and supportive of the already-mentioned, more 
general microscopic criticisms of his work at this time). Specifically, he appears to 
have claimed the presence of nerves directly connecting organs of sense with the 
cerebrum,  rather  than  the  cerebellum or  medulla  oblongata.  As  Carpenter  had 
claimed all  sensory nerves passed through these latter parts,  this drew a hostile 
response from him. His position as editor constituted a unique position with regard 
to the expression of his opinion on the matter. As he indicated to Laycock:
I found myself obliged to omit parts of your article, as inconsistent 
with doctrines already expressed in the former review of Todd, and as 
only embarrassing (in my apprehension) the discussion of the question 
of  which  you  treat...  What  you  call  a  nerve  is  a  commissure, 
connecting the olfactory ganglia to the spinal axis (see Fisher). The 
corp[us]. striata and thal optici [optic thalamus], moreover, are quite 
independent of the cerebrum as both Comp[arative]. Anat[omy]. and 
develop[men]t show... You must forgive me doctoring this Art[icle]. a 
little, as it so closely trenches on my own subject.121
As editor, Carpenter was able to censor those portions of Laycock's article that did 
not agree with his own views on the subject. Equally significant, however, is the 
way that  Carpenter  appeals  to  museological  evidence in  his  justification of  his 
position.  Regardless  of  his  position  as  editor,  it  is  on  comparative  anatomical 
grounds that Laycock's claims cannot be admitted.
Following  this  initial  exchange,  the  correspondence  becomes  more 
mundane, and peters out entirely in 1852. To Carpenter it must have seemed that 
his  appeal  to  comparative  anatomy was  successful,  as  the  1853 edition  of  his 
Principles of  Human Physiology contains a note on Laycock's  work seeking to 
differentiate it  from his own. Though he had been the first  author to apply the  
reflex function to the entire nervous system, Laycock, Carpenter claims, had not 
121 Carpenter-Laycock 5th Dec [1850 (attached to Carpenter-Laycock 15th Jan 1851)] 
RCPE MS B. 22 F. 148. See also Carpenter-Laycock, 26th Oct and 6th Nov 1849 at the 
same location.
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recognised  'the  essential  distinction,  both  in  their  anatomical  and  physiological 
relations, between the Sensory Ganglia and the Cerebrum.'122 In addition, he had 
failed, in Carpenter's estimation, to 'mark-out the distinction between the 'sensori-
motor' or 'consensual' actions, which are the manifestation of the reflex power of 
the former [sensory ganglia],  and the 'ideo-motor'  actions which depend on the 
reflex action of the latter [cerebrum].'123 Carpenter's text clearly marks out what he 
considers  to  be  his  original  contribution  to  nervous  psychology.124 In  his 
subsequent  1855  edition,  he  drops  reference  to  Laycock's  work  entirely.125 By 
claiming the originality of his doctrines in this way, Carpenter also claims the right  
to define what constitutes reflex or 'automatic' cerebral action - a phenomenon that  
in his (but not Laycock's) view is distinct from the operation of the will in nervous 
life.
In 1855, Laycock responded to Carpenter's claim. In a long letter, which he 
sent to both Noble and another (presumably the geologist David) 'Forbes',126 he sets 
out  his  objections  to  Carpenter's  position.  His  chief  concern  is  to  portray 
Carpenter’s term 'unconscious cerebration' as (as it  describes nothing more than 
Laycock’s own previously-worked-out doctrine of reflex action of the cerebrum) 
entirely unnecessary. As such, this term operates in Laycock's view as a means for  
Carpenter to avoid engagement with Laycock's own publications on the relations of 
physiological to psychological states:
As to that which he claims in the 4th [1853] Ed[ition]. namely the 
[sic] having marked the distinction between  sensori-motor and  ideo-
motor - my answer is  that the distinction has been enumbrated [ie. 
articulated] by me (in the true sense of the term) from the very first. 
The sensori-motor actions are as much reflex as the ideo-motor in my 
system,  and  are  often  equally  independent  of  the  will  or 
122 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology (4th ed.), note on pp. 799-800.
123 Ibid. Original emphasis.
124 Ibid, pp. xi-xii.
125 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology (5th ed). 
126 Carpenter's mentor Edward Forbes had died in 1854.
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consciousness.  C[arpenter]  has an  anatomical scheme...  the truth of 
which I very much doubt and which is I think in our present state of 
knowledge incapable of proof.127
Again, it is the status of anatomical evidence that is at issue here. As set out at the  
beginning of this chapter, Laycock's psychology relied to a far greater extent than 
did  Carpenter's  on  establishing  the  nature  of  microscopic  organisms.  By 1855, 
microscopy enjoyed a rather more respectable status within intellectual culture than 
it had during the early decades of the nineteenth century.128 Laycock's rejection of 
Carpenter's  'anatomical  scheme'  reflects  a  sense  of  confidence  in  the  epistemic 
status of his own conception of nervous action. Critically, however, the dispute as a 
whole did not result in an irrevocable split between the two academics.
As the first chapter of this thesis highlights, appeals to the unreliability of 
microscopic vision presented early-nineteenth-century researchers with a means by 
which controversial claims could be managed within a gentlemanly tradition of 
natural  philosophic  debate.  Similarly,  deferring  disagreements  relating  to  the 
psyche  to  disagreements  relating  to  the  epistemic  status  of  various  forms  of 
scientific  equipment  helped  maintain  a  sense  of  common  purpose  amongst 
physiological psychologists. Though Carpenter seeks to establish the originality of 
his physiological  psychology,  and Laycock denies the legitimacy of his claims, 
when it  comes  a  direct  confrontation between the two,  psychology itself  is  no 
longer at issue. Instead, the commitment of both to establishing a science of mind 
and brain means that their disagreement revolves to a significant extent around the 
appropriate means of conducting nervous research.
In  an  immediate  sense,  these  psychologists'  agreement  that  nerves  and 
mind are co-terminous contributed to their ability to maintain a collaborative if at 
times  strained  working  relationship.129 Appealing  to  the  means  of  researching 
nervous life rather than specific claims regarding the nature of mind meant that  
disagreements  regarding  the  politically-contentious  issue  of  the  psyche  could 
127 Laycock-Forbes, 6th June 1855. RCPE MS B. 22 F. 148. Original emphases.
128 Jacyna, ‘”A Host of Experienced Microscopists”’.
129 See eg. Carpenter-Laycock 23rd Jan 1855 and Carpenter-Laycock 12th Dec 1873. Both 
RCPE MS B. 22 F. 148.
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(ideally) be resolved in the academic arena of zoological investigation, through the 
evauation  of  the  legitimacy  of  differing  forms  of  epistemic  equipment.  The 
resolution of this particular debate is of less concern here than the ways in which 
psychological concerns were incorporated into those relating to tools established in 
more established academic disciplines such as zoology.  To the extent  that  they 
defer  psychological  differences  amongst  themselves  to  questions  relating  to 
techniques  of  nervous  investigation,  physiological  psychologists  invested 
physiological (and more generally scientific) equipment with the power to define 
psychological life.
Conclusion
As an academic discipline, British psychology enjoyed considerably less 
prominence than did zoology during the nineteenth century.130 The foundation of 
two journals devoted to psychological 'science' -  Mind in 1876, and  Brain three 
years later - indicates that by the latter third of the century, psychology was coming 
to be recognised as a discipline in which one might specialise. Yet British zoology 
had by this point come to be lauded to the extent  that  a national museum (the  
Natural  History  Museum  in  South  Kensington)  had  been  dedicated  to  its' 
dissemination  throughout  the  population,  and  zoology  professorships  had  been 
established  in  all  of  the  major  universities.  In  contrast,  those  recognised  a 
authorities on the psyche in Britain were split into different camps; those relating to 
a  specific  interpretation  of  an  academic  'moral  philosophy'  (as  with  Alexander 
Bain's examinership at UCL), those that concerned themselves above all with the 
treatment  of  mental  pathologies  in  asylums  such  as  Henry  Maudsley,  and 
independent  scholars  earning  a  living  from  writing  such  as  Herbert  Spencer.  
Laycock, for example, based his course on the physiology of mind in an asylum 
local to Edinburgh University. Maudsley (one of the most prominent late-Victorian 
alienists), after a brief academic career, focused exclusively on treatment within 
private institutions for the psychologically unwell. Carpenter, in contrast, remained 
130 See Danziger, K. Naming the Mind: how psychology found its language (London, 
1997), pp. 51-52.
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firmly within the academy, as did experimental physiological psychologists such as 
David Ferrier. Physiological psychology as a discipline remained fragile, split as it 
was between a variety of approaches and institutional loyalties.
Yet  the  diverse  range  of  psychological  investigators  committed  to  the 
linking of  mind and nerve did,  it  seems,  feel  themselves  to  hold something in 
common. Carpenter's texts, and especially those of Spencer, the one physiological 
psychologist  with no institutional  ties  whatever,  were used as  touchstones  in  a 
movement that sought to construct psychology as a science that could assimilate 
the  latest  research  from  other  disciplines.  To  a  certain  extent,  this  feeling  of 
commonality of purpose was achieved via a rhetorical rejection of 'metaphysical' 
philosophy - ie. that which speculated on the causes of mental phenomena without  
recourse to a tangible forms of evidence. Indeed, it almost seems to go without 
saying that it was precisely physiological psychology's articulation of a notion of 
mind  that  was  above  all  tangible that  constituted  its  disciplinary  identity. 
Nevertheless,  the  final  sections  of  this  chapter  suggest  that  these  figures'  
conceptualisation of the tools of psychological research and practice as the ultimate 
arbiters of scientific truth was at least as critical to the constitution of physiological 
psychology as an academic field. This insight will be expanded upon in the next 
chapter.
Physiological  psychology,  as  an  aspirant  (even  if  in  Britain  ultimately 
unsuccessful)  disciplinary science,  played a critical role in the constitution of a 
specifically  'technical'  conception  of  disciplinarity.  Texts,  microscopes, 
museological specimens, and other epistemic tools are employed by physiological 
psychologists  as  means  by  which  their  discipline  can  be  both  constituted  and 
policed. On the one hand, conceiving of texts as means of inculcating affective  
responses  in  the  bodies  of  their  readers,  physiological  psychologists  sought  to 
deploy  them  as  objects  of  persuasion;  means  by  which  academic  and  other 
institutional  positions  might  be obtained.  On the other,  when disputes  amongst 
physiological  psychologists  did  arise,  an  appeal  to  the  relative  legitimacy  of 
differing techniques of nervous investigation became the principal means by which 
such disputes  (it  was believed)  could be resolved.  Non-textual  tools  relating to 
nervous investigation thereby helped constitute an exclusively 'internal' discourse, 
in which dispute could (in principle) be resolved amongst gentlemanly equals. This 
contrasts  with efforts  to  inculcate  specific  emotional  states  in  a  ‘non-specialist’  
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‘public’ via the publication of texts. In this latter sense, physiological psychology 
exemplifies a more general tendency within nineteeenth-century disciplinarity; the 
policing  of  boundaries  via  the articulation of  technical  languages,  the  meaning 
which  remaining exclusive to recognised specialists.
The  establishment  of  physiological  psychology  as  an  intellectual 
movement constituted a means by which knowledge of non-human life became a 
means of articulating specific approaches to interpersonal  relations.  The second 
half of this thesis will examine in more detail ways in which differing techniques of 
studying  life  were  made,  via  psychological  discourse,  into  objects  of  explicit 
political concern in mid-to-late-nineteenth-century Britain.
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Chapter 3:
Cultivating  Technique:  Energy,  physiological 
psychology, and experimentation as discipline (c. 
1860-1880)
Introduction
By  1870,  a  rhetorical  connection  between  industrial  success  and 
experimental  discipline  had  become  firmly  embedded  within  a  discourse  that 
sought  to  prioritise  'science'  and  -  as  importantly  -  'the  scientist'  in  the  then-
emerging  economy of  liberal  democracy.  As  University  College's  professor  of 
chemistry Alexander William Williamson proclaimed, in a speech that year at the 
opening of the institution's newly-constituted Faculty of Science:
Efficient  and  improving men of  business  get  more and more the 
command of markets, whilst those who cannot advance with their time 
gradually  get  pushed  out,  and  are  known  by  their  complaint  that 
"business is not as good as it used to be."
Now the mental qualifications which enable a man of business to 
contribute to progress in the particular industrial operations which he 
conducts, may be described by one word: - they are the qualifications 
of an experimentalist.
The  introduction  of  any  change  in  an  industrial  system  is  an 
experiment; and whoever manages it ought to know that it is one, and 
to  conduct  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  a  true  and  good 
experiment.1
1 Williamson, A.W. A Plea for Pure Science: Being the Inaugural Lecture at the Opening of 
the Faculty of Science, in University College London, October 4th, 1870 (London, 1870), 
p. 21.
130
Williamson (as  the title  of  this  lecture,  'A Plea  for  Pure  Science',  indicates)  is 
careful to reserve a space for 'pure'  science in his discourse. However, it is the 
pragmatic necessity of experimentation for the evolution of industry that constitutes 
the  principal  justification  for  establishing  it  as  the  most  appropriate  mode  of  
training a new generation. 
My  concern  in  this  chapter  is  to  link  the  previous  two  chapters' 
interrogation of  the role that  tools and techniques played in the constitution of  
zoological  and  physiological  notions  of  self  and  nature  to  broader  shifts  in 
intellectual  and  pedagogic  practice  that  occurred  during  the  1860s  and  1870s.  
Historians have long acknowledged that these decades saw profound changes to the 
way natural philosophical investigation was conducted in Britain. Specifically, they 
have  pointed  to  the  emergence  of  a  strong emphasis  on  the  emergence  of  the 
'scientist' or 'man of science' as an identity marked by his mastery of experimental  
techniques  and  practices.2 What  remains  in  question,  however,  are  the  exact 
conditions  under  which  such  identities  and  the  spaces  within  which  they  were 
constituted came to be instantiated as critical elements of economic and intellectual 
activity.
The academic experimental laboratory begins to be held up in Britain as an 
exemplary space in which science is to be conducted from around 1860. Whereas 
French and German governments had previously supported physiology and physics 
laboratories as places of research, laboratories in British educational institutions 
had  invariably  been  established  as  a  result  of  individual  initiative  (or  at  least 
patronage).  During the 1870s,  laboratories were established in all  of  the higher  
educational  institutions  in  Britain,  with support  (and sometimes direction) from 
government. A whole host of legislation, largely piecemeal, presented universities 
with far more substantial funds for experimental research and teaching  than had 
existed  previously.3 Laboratories  were  established  or  expanded  for  chemistry, 
2 Barton, R. ''Men of Science': language, identity and professionalization in the mid-
Victorian scientific community', History of Science 41 (2003), pp. 73-119; White, Thomas 
Huxley); Mussel, J. 'Private Practices and Public Knowledge: science, professionalization 
and gender in the late nineteenth century' Nineteenth-Century Gender Studies 5 (2009), 
pp. 1-36 [accessible at http://www.ncgsjpournal.com/issue52/mussell.htm (retrieved 
23/08/2010)]; White, P. 'Darwin's Emotions: the scientific self and the sentiment of 
objectivity,' Isis 100 (2009), pp. 811-826. The association of science with masculinity is 
addressed in chapters four and five of this thesis.
3 Anderson, R.D. European Universities from the Enlightenment to 1914 (Oxford and New 
York; Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 191-193; Sanderson, M. Education and 
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physics and physiology at Oxford and Cambridge, these subjects and engineering 
and  biology  at  University  College  and  Kings  College,  and  new,  purpose-built 
buildings erected in South Kensington for the School of Mines.4 At the same time, 
the founding of self-consciously 'scientific' institutions such as Owen's College in 
Manchester, University College Liverpool, and the Birmingham Science College 
extended  the  number  and  diversity  of  sites  committed  to  teaching  through 
experimental practice.5
Such institutional developments were in large part the consequence of the 
implementation of the report of an 1867-1868 government select committee tasked 
with investigating 'Provisions for Giving Instruction in Theoretical  and Applied 
Science to the Industrial Classes.'6 Despite its title, much of the report concerns 
itself with what it characterises as a need for the inculcation of a new, experimental 
ethos  into  the  managers  of  British  industries.  The  report  as  a  whole  makes  a 
Economic Decline in Britain, 1870 to the 1990s (Cambridge; University Press, 1999), pp. 
48-49; Cardwell, D.S.L. The Organization of Science in England (London, 1972 [1957]), 
pp. 125-126, 130-131. Key literature relating specifically to nineteenth-century 
laboratories is cited in note [24] of the introduction to this thesis.
4 On government intervention and laboratory science at Cambridge see Geison, Michael  
Foster, pp. 81-115; Schaffer, S. 'Late Victorian Metrology and its Instrumentation: A 
Manufactory of Ohms', in Budd, R. and Cozzens, S.E. (eds.) Invisible Connections:  
Instruments, Institutions, and Science (Washington, 1992), pp. 23-54; Blackman, H.J. 
'The Natural Sciences and the Development of Animal Morphology in Late-Victorian 
Cambridge', Journal of the History of Biology 40 (2007), pp. 82-91; Weatherall, M.W. 
Gentlemen, Scientists and Doctors: Medicine at Cambridge, 1800-1940 (Woodbridge, 
2000), pp. 121-132. On experimentation at Oxford see Fox, R. and Gooday, G. (eds.) 
Physics in Oxford, 1839-1939: laboratories, learning and college life (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Romano, T.M. Making Medicine Scientific:  
John Burdon Sanderson and the Culture of Victorian Science (Baltimore and London; 
John Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 139-160. On laboratories at UCL see Harte, 
N. and North, J. The World of UCL, 1828-1990 [3rd ed.] (London; UCL Press, 2004), pp. 
80-95. On laboratories at King's College London see Hearnshaw, F.J.C. The Centenary 
History of King's College London, 1828-1928 (London, Bombay and Sydney, 1978 
[1929]), pp. 288-292. On the School of Mines see Forgan and Gooday, 'Constructing 
South Kensington’; Forgan, S. and Gooday, G.  '"A Fungoid Assemblage of Buildings": 
Diversity and Adversity in the Development of College Architecture and Scientific 
Education in Nineteenth-Century South Kensington', History of Universities 13 (1994), 
pp. 153-192.
5 Cardwell, The Organization of Science, pp. 139-140. 
6 'Report of the Select Committee on the Provisions for Giving Instruction in Theoretical 
and Applied Science to the Industrial Classes with Minutes of Evidence Appendix and 
Index 1867-68', Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Education,  
Scientific and Technical [Vol. I] (Shannon, 1970). On the report, see Cardwell, The 
Organization of Science, pp. 111-119.
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number of recommendations regarding the teaching of such technical subjects as 
drawing, physical geography, and 'the phenomena of nature' in elementary schools, 
and characterises the introduction of scientific instruction in secondary schools as 
'urgently required'.7 On a more general level, it associates a desire that government 
increase  industrial  production  in  order  that  it  might  better  compete  with  other 
nations  with a  need  to  provide the 'proprietors  and managers'  of  industry  with 
'scientific  training'  in  a  laboratory.8 It  marks  a  threshold  after  which  it  was 
increasingly assumed that experimental discipline constituted a (if not the) critical  
means by which educational institutions might train a population of scientific men 
suited to the demands of international industrial competition.
As already highlighted, one key plank upon which considerations of life, as 
well  as  of  industry and national  competition,  had come to enjoy such political 
urgency  in  Britain  at  this  time  was  the  emergence  of  a  discipline  of  political 
economy.  Gallagher's  already-highlighted  study  shows how notions  of  life  and 
mind did  not  develop  in  isolation  from the  emphasis  that  political  economists 
placed on competition. In a similar  vein, Robert  M. Young has highlighted the 
coming-to-pre-eminence of an evolutionary rationale for freedom of competition 
during this period.9 But as the Williamson quote above indicates, it was not only 
zoologists  and  physiologists  that  sought  to  orient  their  activities  towards  a 
pragmatic  rationale  of  industrial  efficacy  at  this  time.  Gallagher  and  Young's 
analyses  need  to  be  coupled  with  a  complementary  understanding  of  how 
experimental  investigators  in  general  were  able  to  construct  their  activities  as 
constituting an appropriate response to the vagaries of international competition. 
Not only are liberal economies 'naturalised' by evolutionary conceptions of man 
during this period, but 'scientists' more generally come to construct themselves as 
key contributors to the economic well-being of nations. 
Though the significance of the committee on ‘Instruction in Theoretical 
and  Applied  Science'  for  future  British  educational  practice  has  been 
acknowledged in a number of texts, what is less clear is exactly why its authors  
chose  to  emphasise  the  need  for  experimental  instruction  in  schools  and 
7 'Report of the Select Committee,' pp. viii-ix.
8 Ibid, pp. vii-viii.
9 Young, Darwin's Metaphor, esp. pp. 23-55.
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universities quite so vehemently.10 How was it that competence in experimentation 
- rather than mathematical skill, or mastery of language, for example - came to be 
understood as the most important element in the cultivation of British industrial  
prowess?
The central claim of this chapter is that the emergence of a zoologically-
informed notion of psyche as an inherently 'embodied' phenomenon constituted a  
critical condition of possibility for a rhetorical connection of experimentation in 
laboratories with industrial  advancement of the nation.  The thinking-together of 
mind and body that occurred during the nineteenth century positioned experimental 
equipment as a 'motor' of national economic success. It should be noted that this 
discourse was one amongst many - it was accompanied by various appeals to the 
need for an unregulated labour force, free trade, protectionism and so on as critical 
to their own activities.11 Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
laboratory  had  attained  a  privileged  status  in  discourse  regarding  industrial 
development.
Accompanying  the  physiological  psychological  assertion  that  mind  and 
body are congruous, I here emphasise, is a presumption that learning is inherently 
'bodily,' and therefore dependent on muscular movement. For many physiological 
psychologists, the centrality of movement in the production of knowledge implied 
a necessary re-constitution of  learning around tools  that  required active,  skilful  
manipulation  for  their  effective  operation.12 Physiological  psychology  thereby 
10 Gooday, G. 'Precision Measurement and the Genesis of Physics Teaching Laboratories 
in Victorian Britain', British Journal for the History of Science 23 (1990), pp. 25-26. On 
teaching practices in laboratory settings see Jacyna, '"A Host of Experienced 
Microscopists"’. The literature on laboratories is vast. On the recent historiographic shift 
away from concerns regarding laboratories as institutions, see Gooday, 'Placing or 
Replacing the Laboratory’; Kholer, 'Lab History: Reflections', p. 767; Latour, 'The Costly 
Ghastly Kitchen'. Though see also Lenoir, Instituting Science.
11 See eg. Berg, The Machinery Question.
12 On scientific pedagogic practice see also Rudolph, J.L. 'Epistemology for the Masses: 
The Origins of "The Scientific Method" in American Schools', History of Education 
Quarterly, 45 (2005), pp. 341-376; Josefowicz, D.G. 'Experience, Pedagogy and the 
Study of Terrestrial Magnetism', Perspectives on Science 13 (2005), pp. 452-494. On the 
historiography of education and subjectivity see Warwick, A and Kaiser, D. 'Conclusion: 
Kuhn, Foucault, and the power of pedagogy’, in Kaiser, D. (ed.) Pedagogy and the 
Practice of Science: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT 
Press, 2003), pp. 393-410; Olesko, K.M. 'Science Pedagogy as a Category of Historical 
Analysis: Past, Present, and Future', Science & Education 15 (2006), pp. 863-880; 
Rudolph, J.L. 'Historical Writing on Science Education: A View of the Landscape', 
Studies in Science Education 44 (2008), pp. 63-82.
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emerges as critical to the instantiation of a skill-centred, technical ideal of truth-
production.
This claim touches on a number of issues raised by recent work on the 
history of ideals of 'objectivity.' Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have identified 
the mid nineteenth century with the emergence of what they term a 'mechanical' 
ideal  of  scientific  practice.13 Focusing  above  all  on  changing  forms  of  natural 
philosophic representation in relation to changing conceptions of subjectivity, they 
argue  that  a  wide  range  of  practitioners  subscribed  to  a  notion  of  self  that 
privileged  automatic,  mechanism-determined  forms  of  observation.  Scientific 
practitioners,  they  suggest,  'willfully'  sought  to  inhibit  their  individual  sensory 
perceptions (which they presumed to be observationally unreliable) in favour of 
techniques that they believed would constitute a reliable, objective conception of 
nature.14 'Mechanical objectivity,' as a form of representative practice, is contrasted 
with a prior, already-established ideal of truth in which natural philosophers had 
sought to arrive at stable, 'true-to-nature' representations of natural forms via an 
extensive process of collection and comparison. More notably given this chapter's 
concern  with  the  institutionalization  or  'disciplining'  of  experimental  practice, 
mechanical objectivity also preceded (Daston and Galison claim) the emergence of 
separate  ideal  that  privileges  the  agency  of  the  experienced  observer  in  the 
evaluation  of  scientific  images.15 This  latter  ideal,  which  they  term  'trained 
judgement,' is characterised as emerging from within the context of the disciplined,  
laboratory sciences, principally during the twentieth century.
This  chapter  indicates  that  both  of  Daston  and  Galison's  categories  of 
mechanical objectivity and trained judgement are inextricably bound up with an 
underlying conception of scientific practice as a skilful, bodily encounter with an 
ever-changing  set  of  epistemic  tools.  Further,  emphasising  that  physiological 
13  Daston, L. and Galison, P. Objectivity (New York, 2007).
14 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, pp. 115-190. See also Lightman, B. 'The Visual 
Theology of Victorian Popularizers of Science: from reverent eye to chemical retina', Isis  
91 (2000), pp. 651-680; Noakes, R. ''Instruments to Lay Hold of Spirits': technologizing 
the bodies of Victorian spiritualism', in Morus, Bodies/Machines, pp. 125-163; Gooday, 
G. 'Spot-Watching, Bodily Postures and the 'Practiced Eye': the material practice of 
instrument reading in late Victorian electrical life', in idem, pp. 165-195.
15 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, pp. 309-362.
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psychological modes of subjectivity call the status of representation into question, 
it  shows  how  physiological  psychologists'  conceptions  of  learning  privileged 
bodily interaction with technical entities over the representation of scientific truth 
in text or image. The privileging of both mechanically-constituted representations, 
and  the  notion  that  accurate  perception  can  only  be  achieved via  an  extended 
process of training with the tools of the laboratory, emerged in conjunction with the 
articulation  of  a  notion  of  mind  as  an  embodied  phenomenon.  Physiological 
psychologists,  in  insisting  on  the  necessity  of  active  bodily  movement  in 
intellectual endeavour, helped constitute a culture in which technical objects and 
the organic self emerge as mutually dependent entities that develop together, and 
even begin to be understood as different aspects of the same perceiving whole.16
In advocating conceptions  of  learning  that  emphasised  the work of  the 
perceiving  body,  physiological  psychological  texts  presented  experimental 
scientists  with  a  rhetoric  that  effectively  naturalised  their  own  techniques  of  
investigation  as  activities  best  suited  to  the  cultivation  of  individuals  as 
economically effective units. Critical to the emergence of this non-representational 
conception of subjectivity is the configuration of psychological life around a notion 
of an all-pervasive natural 'power' or 'energy.' The science of nineteenth-century 
Britain  was  deeply  concerned  with  relations  between  nature  and  the  industrial  
processes  that  (it  was  generally  presumed)  would  harness  nature's  potential  to 
human ends. The possibility of converting natural power into industrial production 
- or organic 'energy' into human 'work' - became a key pre-occupation of mid-to-
late nineteenth-century science.17 The rhetoric of power and energy was thereby 
16 On the constitution of this culture see Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines; Ketabgian, 'The 
Human Prosthesis’; O’Connor, E. Raw Material: producing pathology in Victorian culture 
(Durham and London; Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 102-147; Morus, I.R. ‘’The 
Nervous System of Britain’: space, time and the electric telegraph’, British Journal for the 
History of Science 33 (2000), pp. 455-475; Ketabgian, 'Martineau, Mesmerism’; Schaffer, 
S. ‘Babbage’s Intelligence: calculating engines and the factory system’, Critical Inquiry 
21 (1994), pp. 203-227. This tool-centred conception of perceptive activity contrasts with 
the merely 'rhetorical' association of science with technical improvement earlier in the 
century. See Berg, The Machinery Question, pp. 145-178.
17 Rabinbach, A. The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity 
(Berkeley, CA; University of California Press, 1990), esp. pp. 45-68 and 120-145; 
Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 118-159. See also Kremer, R.L. 'The 
Thermodynamics of Life and Experimental Physiology, 1770-1880' (unpublished PhD 
thesis, Harvard University, 1984). On the specifics of energy physics and physiology in 
Britain see Hall, 'The Contribution of the Physiologist’. Recent English-language 
examples of the much larger literature on physiology and energy physics in Germany 
includes Cahan, D. (ed.) Herman von Helmhotz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-
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inextricably linked with the bodily practices and technical bodies that constituted 
the factory as a critical site of industrial culture.
This chapter starts, then, by emphasising ways in which the articulation of 
a  dynamic,  'energy'-centred  conception  of  life  came  to  be  linked  with  the 
investigation of the human body in a broad range of work-focused settings during 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The conception of life as a particular  
kind of energy that could be converted into other forms (such as electricity, or  
chemical heat) through bodily labour paralleled an expansion in the range of sites 
in  which  physiologists  undertook  their  investigations.  Inhabitants  of  prisons, 
military barracks, and other places associated with intense muscular labour became 
key objects of interest for those concerned with the energetic 'correlation of forces.' 
It  then goes on to delineate the connection of this discourse with physiological  
psychological speculation regarding mind as an inherently embodied phenomenon. 
Focusing on the work of the Scottish psychologist and language-theorist Alexander 
Bain, it highlights ways in which learning began to be conceived of as a kind of  
bodily work. Through Bain, Carpenter, and others, a notion of learning-as-practice 
took hold in British culture. The final part of this essay thereby relates ways in  
which the committee on ‘Instruction in Theoretical  and Applied Science,'  along 
with  experimental  practitioners  themselves,  adopted  this  physiological 
psychological  rhetoric.  In  so  doing,  they  helped  constitute  a  broad-based 
commitment to technique- and skill-centred learning in British academic life. Such 
a conclusion calls into question the received stereotype of British academic life as 
dominated by text-based disciplines and as disdainful of technical practices.18
Century Science (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1993); Lenoir, Instituting 
Science, esp. pp. 75-95; Rabinbach, idem.
18 Barnes, B. and Shapin, S. 'Head and Hand: Rhetorical Resources in British Pedagogical 
Writing, 177-1850', Oxford Review of Education 2 (1976), pp. 231-254. See also Secord, 
A. 'Botany on a Plate: Pleasure and the Power of Pictures in Promoting Early Scientific 
Knowledge' Isis 93 (2002), pp. 28-57;   Kehler, G. 'Gothic Pedagogy and Victorian 
Reform Treatises', Victorian Studies 50 (2008), pp. 437-456. On the tensions highlighted 
by Barnes and Shapin in relation to later laboratory practices in physics see Schaffer, 
'Late Victorian Metrology'.
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Correlating life-force
In 1865, fifteen years after the initial publication of his only article to be 
included  in  the  Royal  Society's  Philosophical  Transactions,  William  Benjamin 
Carpenter  suggested  in  an  article  for  the  Quarterly  Journal  of  Science that  its 
general  neglect  amongst  physiologists  might  be accountable  by reference to  its 
overly  'speculative'  nature.19 This  latter  article  portrays  his  initial  publication  - 
entitled 'On the Mutual Relations of the Vital and Physical Forces' - as an attempt 
to undermine the notion of a generative 'germ force' or 'Bildungstrieb' as productive 
of organic forms. In order to support what he claims were his initial conclusions, he 
concentrates on recounting ways in which the simplest elements of life (presumed 
to be cells) maintain their 'vitality' by converting chemical into organic matter. In 
so doing, he claims, cells produce 'animal heat' in the process.20 
In  articulating  this  conception  of  life  as  a  kind  of  'force'  which 
distinguishes it from other kinds of physical body, Carpenter might have been read 
as  declaring his  allegiance to the vitalist  doctrines  that  had emerged in Europe 
during  the  eighteenth  century.   At  that  time,  various  'subtle  fluids'  such  as 
electricity, fire and 'ether' had been held up as immaterial ‘principles’ which might 
be  appealed  to  as  causes  of  the  movement  of  passive,  inert  matter.21 For  the 
vitalists, it was a principle or force that inhered in the material of organisms - not a  
universal spirit external to living matter - that was responsible for their animation.  
'Force,'  which  had  until  the  eighteenth  century  been  conceived  as  a  term  that 
denoted the effects of moving matter on other bodies, comes in vitalist texts to be 
19 Carpenter, W.B. 'On the Correlation of the Physical and Vital forces', in Youmans, E.L. 
(ed.) The Correlation and Conservation of Forces: a series of expositions (New York, 
1865), p. 406. Carpenter, W.B. 'On the Mutual Relations of the Vital and Physical 
Forces', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 140 (1850), pp. 727-
757. The 1850 article does not, however, appear to have escaped the attention of Harriet 
Martineau and Henry G. Atkinson in their Letters on the Law's of Man's Nature and 
Development (1851). See Ketabgian, 'Martineau, Mesmerism' pp. 351-355.
20 Carpenter,  ‘On the Correlation’, esp. pp. 411-412. It should be noted that the originality 
or otherwise of Carpenter's work is not at issue here. German physiologists articulated 
far more sophisticated conceptions of the actions of cells and their relations with non-
organic matter, for example, than any British investigator of this period. See eg. Parnes, 
O. 'The Envisioning of Cells', Science in Context 13 (2000), pp. 71-92.
21 French, ‘Ether and Physiology’
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elevated to  the status  of  an originator  of  bodily movement.22 In  addressing the 
nature of a 'vital force'  then, Carpenter's title might have been read as implying 
something about the nature of life; that it could only be conceived of as an entity in  
and of  itself,  unrelated  to  other  kinds  of  physical  activity  or  law.  Life  for  the 
vitalists constituted a phenomenon entirely independent from the laws that underlay 
non-organic nature.
Despite  Carpenter's  adoption  of  the  terminology  of  vitalism,  his 
Philosophical Transactions article could also be read as marking a series of subtle 
shifts in the way in which force, matter and life was being considered. This text 
articulates a cellular explanation of the origin of bodily heat, indicating that the 
notion of a force specific to life, although valid, can only be understood as enjoying 
a status equivalent to that of gravity in Newtonian mechanics or chemical attraction 
in Lavoisier's chemistry - not as a means of explaining the origins or development 
of life per se, but as a phenomena characteristic of life that renders it amenable to  
sustained  investigation.23 Though  it  does  not  use  the  word  'energy',  that  was 
beginning to be talked of at this time as a unifying category for the investigation of 
physical science (preferring to talk of force and power), it is clear that Carpenter's 
text is working towards a notion of life that will constitute it as the equal of other,  
more established scientific disciplines.
By 1865,  despite Carpenter's  disquiet  over the neglect  of  his paper,  the 
broader thrust of it - that all worldly phenomena could be conceived of as mutually 
convertible manifestations of different kinds of power - had become a prominent 
theme in European natural philosophic discourse. Nineteenth-century conceptions 
of different forces as interrelated aspects of an more fundamental and ultimately 
indestructible energy have become the object of sustained historical investigation 
since Thomas Kuhn drew attention to them during the 1950’s.24 Historical accounts 
highlight  how the diverse  interests  of  such  figures  as  the  speculative naturalist 
Julius Robert Mayer, physiological chemist Justus von Liebig, brewer and physicist 
James  Prescott  Joule,  physical  philosopher  and  physiologist  Hermann  von 
22 French, ‘Ether and Physiology’, pp. 130-134.
23 Carpenter, 'On the Mutual Relations’, esp. pp. 728-733.
24 Kuhn, T.S. ‘Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery,’ in Clagett, 
M. (ed.) Critical Problems in the History of Science (London; University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1969), pp. 321-356.
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Helmholtz,  and  the  electrical  physicist  William  Robert  Grove  could  be  made 
mutually  relevant  via  the  concepts  of  correlation  and  convertibility.25 Notions 
regarding  correlation  constituted  an  important  means  by  which  scientific 
investigation  was  differentiated  from  philosophical  speculation  more  generally 
during the middle decades of the century.26
Yet although correlation became a means by which apparently disparate 
research in physical science could be brought together, I wish to point here to the 
particular emphasis that British authors placed on what they perceived to be its  
implications  regarding  the  cultural  status  of  technical  entities  in  industrial 
production.27 As Iwan Morus highlights, for experimentalists such as Grove, this 
correlation of forces was as important as a means of re-conceptualising industrial  
machinery as  a  productive entity  in  its  own right  as  it  was in  legitimating his 
extensive  use  of  demonstrative  experiments  in  lectures.  The  displacement  of 
human labour, potentially a threat to the authority of industrial managers, came to 
be  assimilated  via  the  concept  of  correlation  into  an  ideology  of  harmonious 
worker-machine relations.28 Yet conceptualisations of physiological (and especially 
'nervous')  force  remain  an  under-acknowledged  element  in  analyses  of  this 
industry-centred discourse.29 Physiological claims relating to the nature of learning 
25 Morus, I.R. When Physics Became King (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), pp. 71-85, 123-155; Smith, C. The Science of Energy: A Cultural History of  
Energy Physics in Victorian Britain (London, 1998), pp. 1-14.
26 This is particularly clear in the philosophy of science advocated by William Whewell. On 
Whewell see Yeo, Defining Science.
27 On the aestheticization of machines outside of industrial settings within bourgeois 
German culture, and relations between this circumstance and German interpretations of 
correlation during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, see Norton Wise, M. 
'Architectures for Steam', in Galison, P. and Thomson, E. The Architecture of Science 
(Mass; MIT Press, 1999),  pp. 107-140. On aesthetics in relation to German energy 
research more generally, see Lenoir, Instituting Science, pp. 131-178.
28 Morus, I.R. 'Correlation and Control: William Robert Grove and the Construction of a 
New Philosophy of Scientific Reform', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 
22 (1991), pp. 610-616. See also Ketabgian, 'Martineau, Mesmerism’; Smith and Norton 
Wise, Energy and Empire; Smith, The Science of Energy.
29 Of the numerous studies addressing British physiology during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, I have only been able to find detailed analysis of relations between 
nervous physiology and energy in Smith, 'Physiological Psychology’, on pp. 131-193. 
Though see also Danziger, Naming the Mind, pp. 62-65; Musselman, Nervous 
Conditions. On the articulation of pathologies of nervous energy during the late 
nineteenth century see Gosling, F.G. Before Freud: Neurasthesia and the American 
medical community (Urbana; University of Illinois Press, 1987); Gijswijt, M. and Porter, 
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played an indispensable role in institutionalising the technical (ie. experimental) 
means by which the doctrine of correlation was coming to be established in physics 
and chemistry. This was primarily due to physiological psychologists' positioning 
of  concepts  relating  to  nervous  and muscular  action as  critical  to  the effective 
conduct of pedagogy in universities and schools. 
Before moving on to expand on and clarify these points, however, it is first 
necessary to examine the means by which notions of bodies as 'energetic' entities 
came to be established in British natural philosophic discourse in the first place. 
Physiological notions of the body as a site in which different kinds of 'power' were 
converted into each other relied for their construction on a linking of the chemical  
laboratory with sites of especially strenuous muscular endeavour.
Muscular labour and the physiological body
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious impetus to the 1867-8 committee 
on  science  instruction  is  presented  by  a  report  on  the  1867  Paris  'Universal 
Exhibition'  by  the  chemist,  politician  and agitator  for  educational  reform Lyon 
Playfair.  In May of that year,  the then-chancellor of the University of London, 
Lord Granville, forwarded a letter to The Times, in which Playfair (who had both 
acted as an assistant in Thomas Graham's UCL laboratory and studied with the 
German bio-chemical pioneer Justus von Liebig during the 1830's)30 sets out his 
main concerns. Principally, he is dissatisfied with what he portrays as the lack of 
innovation  demonstrated  by  British  representatives  of  industry  in  Paris,  in 
comparison with other nations: 'I am sorry to say that, with very few exceptions, a 
singular  accordance  of  opinion  prevailed  that  our  country  had  shown  little  
inventiveness and made but little progress in the peaceful arts of industry since [the 
last major international exhibition, in] 1862.' He is also clear about his opinions as 
to the reasons for the comparatively rapid 'progress' made by other nations; 'the one 
R. (eds.) Cultures of Neuasthenia from Beard to the First World War (Amsterdam and 
New York, 2001).
30 On Playfair see Hardy, A. 'Lyon Playfair and the Idea of Progress: Science and Medicine 
in Victorian Parliamentary Politics', Clio Medica 23 (1993), pp. 81-106.
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cause upon which there was most unanimity of conviction is that France, Prussia,  
Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland possess good systems of industrial education for 
the masters and managers of factories and workshops, and that England possess 
none.'31 Playfair  calls  for  attention  to  be  paid  to  the  cultivation  of  technical 
innovation amongst British industrialists on the grounds of national necessity. That 
he frames this in terms of a need for 'industrial' education of managers might seem 
uncontroversial, until it is remembered that in Britain at this time education had 
been understood in terms of a specifically moral (rather than economic) discourse, 
consciously differentiated from question of economy or production.
'Scientific training' had not always enjoyed a privileged place in debates 
surrounding  the  perceived  need  for  industrial  expansion.  As  Barry  Barnes  and 
Steven Shapin have pointed out,  during the first  half of  the nineteenth century,  
many  British  commentators  were  particularly  anxious  that  natural  philosophic 
investigation should not be associated with processes of production. The possibility 
that a practical, hand-centred knowledge embodied by artisanal skill might supplant  
a culturally 'higher' type of learning focused on linguistic dexterity (and presumed 
to be centred on the head) constituted a source of much concern for many early  
nineteenth-century pedagogues.32 Daston and Galison also note this denigration of 
hand-centred  learning  as  non-intellectual,  and  associate  this  trope  with  the 
emergence during the century of their 'mechanical' conception of observation.33 Yet 
as will be elaborated below, Playfair, along with the  physiological psychologists, 
challenged the assumption that thinking was something that occurred exclusively in 
the  head,  as  well  as  the  characterization  of  work  as  an  inherently  'unthinking' 
activity undertaken by hands or machines. The context in which they did so was 
one in which places of experimentation were beginning to be though of as places of  
physical work, and vice versa.
As already noted, educational reform was not Playfair's only concern. As 
well as enjoying considerable eminence as a chemist,  he was also an important 
focus  for  debates  surrounding  the  government  of  health  and  (later)  animal 
31 All of the above quotes are from Granville, 'Industrial Education' The Times, Wed. May 
29th, 1867, p. 5.
32 Barnes and Shapin, 'Head and Hand’
33 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, pp. 137-138.
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experimentation.34 Especially relevant to this chapter however is Playfair's interest 
in  the  correlation  of  forces  -  in  particular,  with  the  investigation  of  relations  
between the chemistry of food and muscular effort - and the ways in which this  
interest intersected with his efforts to associate industrial stagnation with what he  
considered to be the inappropriate priorities of British educational institutions.
Both German and British researchers became particularly concerned with 
calculating the transfer of energy from foodstuffs into bodies during the 1860s. 
Much controversy evident in these texts centres around questions regarding which 
of the substances present in and around muscle tissues are expended during bodily 
movement. Following Antoine Lavoisier,  Liebig had suggested in 1842 that  the 
power necessary for physical exertion was retained in the tissues of muscles, and 
released by tissues being broken down during the exertion of muscular effort. This  
led him to speculate that due to its preponderance in muscular fibres, protein must 
be the primary source of the body's motive power.35 
During  the  1860s,  a  number  of  studies  challenged  Liebig's  muscular 
proposition.  Utilising  an  analogy  that  had  become  widespread  within  energy 
research, chemical physiologists such as the Zurich-based physiologist Adolf Fick 
and  chemist  Johannes  Wislicenus,  and  UCL's  professor  of  chemistry  Edward 
Frankland (who had studied with Playfair at the latter's laboratory in Westminster 
during the 1840s), argued that muscles were no more than machines for converting 
the heat energy latent in fat and starch into motion.36 In Frankland's words: 'Like 
the  piston  and  cylinder  of  the  steam  engine,  the  muscle  itself  is  only  a 
transformation of heat into motion; both are subject to wear and tear, and require  
renewal; but neither contributes in any important degree, by its own oxidization, to 
the  actual  production  of  the  mechanical  power.'37 Almost  identical  analogical 
34 On Playfair and the government of health see Hardy, 'Lyon Playfair and the Idea of 
Progress'. The politics of vivisection is discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this 
study.
35 Brock, Justus von Liebig, pp. 190-203.
36 Fick, A. and Wislicenus, J. 'On the Origin of Muscular Power', Philosophical Magazine 
[Fourth Series], Suppl. to 31 (1866), pp. 485-503. Frankland, E. 'On the Origin of 
Muscular Power', Philosophical Magazine [Fourth Series], 32 (1866), pp. 182-199. On 
Frankland see Russel, C.A. Edward Frankland: Chemistry, Controversy, and Conspiracy 
in Victorian England (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1996). See Brock, Jutus 
von Liebig, esp. pp. 183-214.
37 Frankland, 'On the Origin', p. 194.
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language had been used by natural philosophers such as Grove in theoretical works 
on conservation and correlation.38 However, whereas Grove derived a large part of 
his  authority  from  ‘performing’  his  experiments  in  reputable  public  arenas, 
physiological research along these lines relied to a lesser extent on theatrical means 
of persuasion. Physiologists expanded the category of ‘laboratory’ to include spaces 
associated  with  muscular  labour,  thereby  re-categorizing  physical  work  from 
something done by unthinking, labouring bodies (and that was thereby  irrelevant 
to the life of the mind), to a source of knowledge in its own right.
Though reliant on chemical analysis for calculations of the energy content 
and convertibility of different foodstuffs, British studies of muscular energy place 
at  least  as  much authorial  emphasis on sites  in  which heavy muscular effort  is 
carried out as they do on experimental apparatus.39 One typical study - conducted 
by assistant physician at London's Brompton Hospital for Consumption, Edward 
Smith - proposes estimates of the amount of power required to maintain the body 
during  the  gruelling  disciplinary  exercises  then  required  in  almost  all  British 
prisons.40 Calculating the minimum amount of food that would supply power for 
sessions  on  the  treadmill  and  'crank-labour'  (the  manual  powering  of  heavy 
industrial  equipment  by  turning  a  crank),  Smith's  publications  call  for  the 
rationalisation of diets according to the nutritional value of foodstuffs, as defined 
by chemical analysis.41 Others conducted similar studies. The Irish geologist and 
physiologist the Reverend Samuel Haughton produced calculations of the amount 
of energy expended during the 'shot-drill', in which prisoners had to lift and carry 
cannon-balls  from  location  to  location.42 In  1865  Playfair,  interpreting  such 
38 Morus, When Physics Became King, pp. 123-155.
39 On the background to this mode of investigation see Ashworth, W.J. 'England 
and the Machinery of Reason', in Morus, Bodies/Machines, pp. 39-65.
40 Smith, E. and Milner, W.R. Report of the Action of Prison Diet and Discipline on the 
Bodily Functions of Prisoners. [Part I.] (London, 1862), pp. 43-81.
41 Ibid. Smith, E. Practical Dietary for Families, Schools, and the Labouring Classes 
(London, 1864). See also Smith, E. 'On the Elimination of the Urea and Urinary Water, in 
Relation to the Period of the Day, Season, Exertion, Food, Prison Discipline, Weight of 
the Body, and other Influences Acting in the Cycle of the Year’, Philosophical  
Transaction of the Royal Society of London 151 (1861), pp. 747-834.
42 Haughton, S. Address on the Relation of Food to Work, and its Bearing on Medical  
Practice (Dublin; University Press, 1868). See also LeConte, J. 'The Correlation of 
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research in terms of Liebig's protein-based conception of muscular action, added 
extensive calculations of the amount of power expended during military exercises 
to such prison-based studies.43
A corollary of these texts'  concern with the transfer of power from one 
state to another is  an underlying assumption that  all  kinds of manual  work are  
equivalent,  and therefore that studies of one kind of work can be applied to all 
others.  Smith, for example,  sought to extend his studies to encompass common 
occupations  amongst  the  labouring  poor.44 Though  Fick,  Wislicenus  and 
Frankland's  study  was  conducted  during  a  hike  up  the  Faulhorn  mountain  in 
Switzerland, they claim to be investigating muscular work of all kinds.45 Measuring 
work becomes a matter of calculating the inputs and outputs of chemical force into 
a system - calculations that could be (and were) understood as means of ensuring 
the efficient (or 'healthy') operation of bodies in relation to sites of any kind of  
labour. 
As  related  to  non-nervous  physiology,  the  doctrine  of  correlation 
constituted the theoretical component of a discourse that sought to calculate the 
minimum foodstuffs necessary for different kinds of labour by measuring flows of 
substances into and out of the body. Reliant on overtly 'disciplinary' spaces such as 
barracks and prisons, it linked the study of ‘muscular’, ‘economic’ activity to the 
practices of the chemical laboratory. Yet such links alone did not establish that 
experimentation  in  laboratories  was  necessarily  'useful'  or  advantageous  to  the 
cultivation of industry (let alone of individuals likely to contribute to industrial 
progress).  It  was  only  with  the  development,  via  physiological  psychology,  of 
notions  of  learning as  a  work-like activity  that  experimentation and the spaces 
devoted to it came to be seen as critical to national economic success.
Physical, Chemical, and Vital Force, and the Conservation of Force in Vital Phenomena', 
Philosophical Magazine [Fourth Series] 19 (1860), pp. 133-148.
43 Playfair, L. On the food of Man in Relation to His Useful Work (Edinburgh, 1865). 
44 Smith, Practical Dietary for Families.
45 Fick and Wislicensus, 'On the Origin of Muscular Power'. On the historical place of 
mountains in scientific culture see Science in Context 22 (3) (2009). On the Faulhorn in 
the nineteenth century see Aubin, D. 'The Hotel that became an Observatory: Mount 
Faulhorn as Singularity, Microcosm and Macro-Tool', idem, pp. 365-386.
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Nervous power and intellectual labour
Carpenter's 1850 publication in the  Philosophical Transactions places at 
least  as  much  emphasis  on  a  rather  different  set  of  relations  between  bodily 
processes and non-somatic nature than had those texts concerned with the transfer 
of energy from foodstuffs into work. The paper is indeed partly concerned with 
analysing what it  refers to as 'vital  power'  in terms of the ways in which cells 
convert  chemical  power into organic matter  and heat,46 but  it  also articulates a 
conception of another, separate force, associated with nerves alone:
in  animals  we  find  an  additional  power,  termed  Nervous  Agency, 
nothing analogous to which exists in plants; this power, related on the 
one  hand  to  the  conscious  mind,  to  which  it  communicates 
impressions derived from the external world, is also related, in a very 
remarkable  manner,  to  the  vital  endowments  of  the  organism  in 
general, as will be presently seen, and particularly to the contractile 
tissues; the most perfect form of which (the striated muscular fibre) is 
usually called into action through its instrumentality, in obedience to 
mental impulses.47
It  then  goes  on  to  assert  the  agency  of  nervous  action  in  the  process  of  cell  
production  and  growth,  and  the  mutual  convertibility  between  nervous  and 
electrical  force.48 Citing  the  work  of  Humphrey  Davy,  Michael  Faraday,  and 
especially the Italian nervous physiologist Carlo Matteucci on the production of 
shocks by 'electric fishes', it draws a strong contrast between the mode of nervous 
action and that of other bodily or physical processes. This notion of the presence 
within the body of two distinct forces became a key means by which mind would 
begin to be conceived of as a 'labouring' entity.
Playfair  had been campaigning for what he termed 'industrial  instruction' 
46 Carpenter, 'On the Correlation,' pp. 733, 737, 741 and 751-2.
47 Ibid. p. 736
48 Ibid. pp. 740-744.
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long before his report of 1867. Granville’s aforementioned letter printed in  The 
Times of  1867  refers  its  readers  to  a  tract  of  Playfair’s  (entitled  Industrial  
Instruction  on  the  Continent),  published  fourteen  years  previously.  This  tract 
compares Continental with British exhibits at the Great Exhibition of 1851.49 Like 
the Times letter, it articulates Playfair’s perception of a need for greater investment 
in  education  as  a  means  of  competing  with  other  industrialising  nations.  
Significantly, it elaborates on this theme by distinguishing between different types 
of bodily labour: 
Labour... is of two kinds - corporeal and mental, or, as Mill calls it - 
muscular  and  nervous...  The  fact  is  every  day  more  apparent,  that 
mere muscular labour, in the present state of the world, is little better 
than raw material, and that both are sinking in value as elements of 
production, while nervous or intellectual labour is constantly rising. 
The whole of industrial competition is now resolved into a struggle to 
obtain a maximum effect by a minimum expenditure of power. But 
this power is derived from natural forces, and not from brute strength: 
mental  labour  has  engrafted  itself  upon muscular  effort,  and,  by  a 
healthy growth, has reduced the size and relative force of the latter.50
From  enjoying  a  status  as  an  ideal  means  of  producing  and  maintaining 
49 Granville, ‘Industruial Education’; Playfair, L. Industrial Instruction on the Continent:  
being the introductory lecture of the session 1852-1853 [Royal School of Mines] 
(London, 1852).
50 Playfair, Industrial Instruction on the Continent, p. 5. See also Playfair, L. Science in its  
Relations to Labour: Being a Speech Delivered at the anniversary of the People's 
College, Sheffield, on the 25th October, 1853 (London, 1853). By 1853, Playfair had 
already sought to articulate a need for investment in 'scientific' instruction as a means of 
encouraging competition, but did not do so in terms of a 'force'-based naturalism. See 
Playfair, L. 'The Study of Abstract Science Essential to the Progress of Industry, Being 
the Introductory Lecture at the Government School of Mines, in 1851', in anon, (ed.) 
Literary Addresses, Delivered at Various Popular Institutions [Second Series] (London 
and Glasgow,  1855), pp. 47-86, and Playfair, L. 'The Chemical Principles Involved in the 
Manufactures of the Exhibition as Indicating the Necessity of Industrial Instruction', in 
Lectures on the Results of the Great Exhibition of 1851, Delivered Before the Society of 
Arts, Manufactures and Commerce  [Vol. I] (London, 1852), pp. 159-208. In so doing, he 
was echoing an earlier statement by James Martineau. See Berg, The Machinery 
Question, pp. 155-158.
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gentlemanly conduct (as described by Barnes and Shapin),51 knowledge, embodied 
in mental labour (ie. the nervous system), becomes in Playfair and Carpenter's texts 
a pragmatic means of ensuring national competitive advantage.
But it was only by the late 1860s that such a re-evaluation appears to have 
begun to have any discernible effect on government legislation. The invigoration 
between 1850 and 1870 of  physiological  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  learning 
appeared to substantiate Playfair's contentions, enabling him to cite his earlier work 
as a prescient diagnosis of the perceived failure at the Paris Exhibition in 1867. The 
articulation of physiological psychologies thereby constituted a critical aspect of a  
broader  re-evaluation  of  the  cultural  status  of  practical  investigation  as  an 
intellectually significant (and hence desirable) form of educative practice during 
the period.
During the 1850's and 1860's, psychologies seeking to connect conceptions 
of mind and body invariably incorporated some notion of force or power. As well 
as  Carpenter,  such  physiological  psychologists  as  Thomas  Laycock,  Alexander 
Bain,  Herbert  Spencer,  Henry  Maudsley  and  John  Daniel  Morell  all  published 
statements  addressing  relations  between  mind  and  force  during  this  period.52 
Differences regarding the nature of force constitute an important point of departure 
for analysing the differing theological and philosophical emphases of physiological 
psychologists'  claims.53 Of  particular  interest  for  the  purposes  of  this  chapter, 
however,  are  points  of  common  ground  between  them  regarding  a  practice-
oriented, inherently developmental conception of the nature of learning. Mid-to-
late nineteenth-century physiological texts' discussion of notions of force or power 
generally  signify  their  adoption  of  a  distinctly  dynamic  conception  of  bodily 
activity.54 Physiological psychologists express this dynamism in terms of a relation 
between nervous and non-nervous elements of individual bodies as they develop 
51 Barnes and Shapin, ‘Head and Hand’, pp. 231-240.
52 Laycock, T. Mind and Brain: or, the correlations of consciousness and organization [Vol. 
II] (Edinburgh, 1860), pp. 250-269; Spencer, H. First Principles [2nd ed.] (London, 1867), 
pp. 185-221; Maudsley, H. The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind (London, 1867), 
esp. pp. 38-42, 60, 169-179; Morell, J.D. An Introduction to Mental Philosophy on the 
Inductive Method (London, 1862), pp. 36-63.  Bain's statements on force are examined 
in detail below.
53 Smith, 'Physiological Psychology', esp. pp. 131-135.
54 Rabinbach, The Human Motor, pp. 1-4.
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over time.
Nearly all physiological psychological conceptions of the nature of nervous 
activity  characterise  it  as  intimately  connected  to  the  operation  of  bodies  as 
individual wholes. The concern of Laycock's texts with the representation of simple 
organic molecules as the principal condition of possibility for the emergence of 
purposive behaviour is addressed in chapter two of this thesis. Other authors placed 
similar emphasis on the importance of non-nervous life in the analysis of mind. 
Perhaps  the  most  widely  read  physiological  psychological  text  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  Spencer's  Principles  of  Psychology (1855),  interprets  the 
psyche as  emergent  from a natural  resistance between organic  and non-organic 
entities.  All  forms  of  life  must  struggle  against  the  deleterious  effects  of  non-
organic forces, a circumstance which favours the evolution of nerves as means of 
responding  to  and  interpreting  the  rest  of  nature.55 Indeed,  in  Spencer,  the 
perception of force in nature is portrayed as originating in precisely this experience 
of  resistance.56 Similarly,  Alexander  Bain's  then-influential  associationist 
physiological  psychology  portrays  what  it  terms  the  manifestation  of  bodily 
'energy'  as  constituting  a  critical  condition  for  the  emergence  of  human 
perception.57 Because many of Bain's texts place particular emphasis on what they 
portray as the implications of physiological conceptions of psyche for pedagogical 
practice, it is necessary to examine them in some detail.
 
Alexander Bain and the work of perception
As in  Spencer's  evolutionary  philosophy,  Bain's  texts  articulate  a  more 
avowedly  developmental  conception  of  physiology  and  psychology  than  do 
55 Spencer, H. The Principles of Psychology (London, 1855), pp. 339-490. See Young, 
Mind, Brain and Adaptation, pp. 150-196.
56 Spencer, First Principles, pp. 158-171. This and the following paragraphs are especially 
indebted to Smith, 'Physiological Psychology', pp. 131-193.
57 Bain, The Senses and Intellect, p. vii. On Bain see Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, 
pp. 101-133; Smith, 'Physiological Psychology', pp. 160-193; Flesher, M.M. 'Human 
Nature Surpassing Itself: An Intellectual Biography of the Early Life and Work of 
Alexander Bain (1818-1903)' (unpublished PhD thesis, Lehigh University, 1986).
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Laycock's. Rather than emphasise an analogy between the nature and development 
of  cells  and  that  of  larger  bodies,  Bain's  statements  regarding  physiology 
foreground  an  emergence  of  psychological  categories  during  post-natal  human 
bodily growth and interaction with the wider world.58
In addition, and despite their emphasis on the role of non-nervous elements 
of bodies in the production of nervous states (on which see below), Bain's texts  
follow much contemporary British physiology in treating nervous activity as an 
object of study apart from bodily physiology more generally. The principal authors 
Bain draws from for his physiology include Lorenz Oken, the principal advocate of 
'Okenian'  natural  philosophy  in  Britain,  Richard  Owen,  and,  in  particular,  the 
Berlin  physiologist  Johannes  Müller.59 Expressing  both  anatomical  and 
experimental  strands of  physiology,  publications attributed to these authors had 
tended to address bodily systems as distinct, largely independent entities. As such, 
they had isolated elemental systems such as (for example) the 'skeletal', 'digestive'  
and 'nervous' parts of the zoological body, and characterised each as operationally 
independent from the others.
The notion of a correlation of nervous, organic and other physical forces 
presents  Bain with the linguistic  means of  obviating these distinctions  between 
nerves  and  other  parts  of  the  body.  Bain's  first  book-length  publication  on 
psychology,  The Senses and the Intellect (1853),  adopts Carpenter's distinction of 
nervous from physiological force more generally:
The nerve force that is derived from the waste of a given amount of 
food, is capable of being transmuted into any other form of animal 
life. Poured into muscles during violent conscious effort, it increases 
their activity; passing to the alimentary canal, it aids in the force of 
digestion; at other points it is converted into sensible heat; while the 
same power is found capable of yielding true electrical currents. The 
evidence  that  establishes  the  common  basis  of  mechanical  and 
58 Flesher, 'Human Nature Surpassing Itself', pp. 215-244.
59 Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, pp. 114-121. Flesher, 'Human Nature Surpassing 
Itself', pp. 184-196. On Owen see Rupke, Richard Owen. On Müller's research on 
nervous physiology see Lohff, B. 'Facts and Philosophy in Neurophysiology. The 200th 
Anniversary of Johannes Müller (1801-1858)', Journal of the History of the 
Neurosciences 10 (2001), pp. 277-292.
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chemical  force,  heat,  and  electricity,  namely,  their  mutual 
convertibility  and common origin,  establishes  the  nerve  force  as  a 
member of the same group.60
Indeed, recognition of the transfer of force within the body 
leads to a considerable departure from the ancient mode of viewing 
the brain as the organ of mind... The organ of mind is not the brain 
itself:  it  is the brain,  nerves,  muscles,  organs of sense and viscera. 
When the brain is in action there is some transmission of nerve power,  
and  the  organ  that  receives,  or  that  originated,  the  power,  is  an 
essential part of the circle of the mechanism.61
The  presence  of  two  nominally  distinct  organs  -  the  brain  and  the  muscles  -  
between which force is transmitted, implies that neither can be understood as able  
to determine the actions of the other.
The  combination  of  muscular  with  cerebral  force  thereby  becomes  a 
fundamental category of psychological existence in Bain's texts.  For example, it 
constitutes the grounds upon which Bain challenges a then-predominant conception 
amongst  sensationalist  philosophers  of  perception  as  a  'passive'  assimilation  of 
extra-bodily reality by the mind. Writers living during the 1850s could potentially 
access  a  wide  variety  of  texts  challenging  the  sensationalist  assumption  that 
perception of a world external to the individual body relies on the passive reception 
of sense impressions. For example, philosophers such as George Berkeley (1685-
1753) and Thomas Brown (1778-1820) had emphasised the importance of mental  
activity in the production of sensation.62 Their philosophies claim that in order to 
operate,  sense  organs  need  to  be  manipulated  by  muscles  directed  by  an 
individuals' mind. In so doing, they claim, the activity of mind is implicated in all 
60 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect (London, 1864 [1855]), pp. 65-66.
61 Ibid. See also Bain, A. 'On the Correlation of Force in its Bearing on Mind', Macmillan's  
Magazine 16 (1867), pp. 372-383.
62 For a brief survey of this 'muscle sense' in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
philosophy see Smith, 'Physiological Psychology', pp. 135-160.
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sensations -  perception is  an inherently ideal  or  'mindful'  phenomenon.63 Bain's 
texts naturalise such idealistic conclusions by locating the origins of perceptive 
activity  not  in  an  incorporeal  'mind,'  but  rather  in  the  energetic  interaction  of 
muscles and nerves.
For  Bain,  the movement  of  muscles  does  not  simply involve the  brain 
acting on the body; the action of movement is itself productive of nervous activity. 
Hence force is transmitted into as well as out of the brain during bodily movement.  
In its (re)active effects on the brain, muscular activity is accompanied by a category 
of sensation entirely distinct from sight, smell, hearing, taste or touch, which Bain 
terms 'muscle sense'.
As muscles are involved in the operation all of the conventional five senses 
for Bain, 'muscle sense' constitutes a more fundamental condition for perception 
than  any  other.  The  constant  interaction  between  nervous  and  other  forces  is 
manifest as initially undirected or 'spontaneous' action in the bodies of infants. As 
The Senses and the Intellect claims:
I  have  thought  proper  to  assign  to  Movement  and  the  feelings  of 
Movement a position preceding the Sensations of the senses;  and I 
have  endeavoured  to  prove  that  the  exercise  of  active  energy, 
originating in purely internal impulses,  independent of the stimulus 
produced  by  outward  impressions,  is  a  primary  fact  of  our 
constitution.64
Such a claim is repeated in relation to a presumed need for muscles to  expend 
energy in the subsequent The Emotions and the Will (1859):
experience  proves  that  the  active  tone  and  tension  of  the  moving 
members is never entirely at a stand while life remains; not in rest, nor 
in sleep, nor in the most profound sensibility that ever overtakes us. 
We must recognise central energy or activity as a fundamental and 
63 For a recent interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy see Arsiç, B. The Passive Eye: Gaze 
and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett) (Sanford, CA. Stanford University Press, 2003). 
On Grove's use of Brown see Morus, 'Correlation and Control', pp. 598-606.
64 Bain, The Senses and Intellect, p. vii.
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permanent property of the system; and this being once shown to exist, 
we are at liberty to suppose that it  may show itself in a variety of  
ways.65
As infants develop, they begin to control the spontaneous actions engendered by 
the release of energy by associating some of those actions with specific sensations 
(see below). Will (and with it moral sense) emerges out of a natural interaction 
between individual bodies'  tendency to expend energy, and the environments in 
which they act.66 Bain's texts thereby claim that the manifestation of force in the 
physiology of individual bodies constitutes a fundamental basis for and origin of 
human culture and understanding.
Bain's neuro-muscular epistemology
It is notable that Bain did not practice experimental physiology personally, 
preferring instead to concentrate on writing,  fulfilling his duties as professor of 
Logic  at  the University  of  Aberdeen (from 1860),  and teaching English.  Bain's 
pedagogic articles articulate a critical  stance on what they portray as debatable 
assumptions  regarding  the  place  of  linguistic  instruction  in  English  culture. 
Specifically, they attack the then-prevalent notion that the learning of grammatical  
rules should be valued as means of instilling disciplined reason in students. 67 For 
Bain, the educational utility of grammar can only be considered in relation to its 
function  in  assisting  in  composition.  His  texts  portray  the  production  of 
compositional  -  not  rational  -  ability  as  the  appropriate  end  of  linguistic 
65 Bain, A. The Emotions and the Will (London, 1859), p. 329.
66 Ibid. pp. 327-567. Flesher, 'Human Nature Surpassing Itself', pp. 245-273.
67 Bain, A. 'English University Education', Westminster Review 49 (1848), pp. 441-463; 
Bain, A. 'The Retentive Power of the Mind in its Bearing on Education' Fortnightly  
Review [New Series] 21 (1868) pp. 237-249; Bain, A. 'On Teaching English', Fortnightly  
Review [New Series] 26 (1869), pp. 200-214. On Bain's continuing commitment to the 
production of a science of education, see Bain, A. Society for the Development of the 
Science of Education: Second Presidential Address of the Society (London, 1879). On 
grammar in science pedagogy see Barnes and Shapin, ‘Head and Hand’. On Bain's 
relation to literary studies, see Dames, The Physiology of the Novel, esp. pp. 47-70.
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instruction.68 Potential motivations for such assertions seem obvious from Bain's 
complaint that the 'dead languages have yet such a hold of the [academic] ground 
that only a mere corner can be got for our living tongue.'69 Yet the assertion that 
classical  grammar  is  not  particularly  useful  in  the  cultivation  of  reason  also 
contained broader implications -  not least  that  instruction in classical languages 
might  be  supplanted  by  instruction  in  practice-  rather  than  language-oriented 
activities (such as those utilized in experimental science). Bodily, or 'hand’-centred 
learning, for Bain, could occur without constituting a threat to the cultivation of 
rationality amongst the population as a whole. Indeed, to neglect the centrality of 
muscular effort in intellectual activity would itself constitute an abandonment of  
the scientific project of national economic and cultural progress.
Historians have highlighted the above-described ways in which Bain's texts 
constituted a conception of psychology as inherently physiological.70 Less attention 
has however been paid to what these texts portray as the implications that such 
commitments to the embodiment of psyche had for the conduct of pedagogy.71 For 
Bain, adequate recognition of the physiological nature of mind had to include a re-
assessment of the nature of learning. In its elevation of the release of muscular  
energy to the status of a condition of possibility for the emergence of perception,  
Bain's  psychology  constituted  a  fundamental  re-assessment  of  the  cultural 
importance of hand-centred learning.
Bain's  psychology  classifies  consciousness  into  three  primary  groups; 
'discrimination',  or  the awareness of difference;  'similarity',  or  the awareness of  
identity;  and  (most  importantly  for  its  conception  of  human  learning) 
'retentiveness.'  This  latter  category  'sums  up  all  that  we  should  understand  by 
memory,  acquisition,  education,  habit,  [and]  learning  by  experience'.72 Indeed, 
'retentiveness' is assigned a fundamental place vis a  vis the other two categories, as 
68 Bain, 'On Teaching English', esp. pp. 201-204 and 206-207.
69 Ibid. p. 214.
70 Rylance, Victorian Psychology, pp. 150-202 and Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, pp. 
101-133.
71 Though see Flesher, 'Human Nature Surpassing Itself', pp. 274-291 for an account of the 
place of 'habit' in Bain's psychology of learning.
72 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 5.
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'we could not discriminate two successive impressions, if the first did not persist  
mentally to be contrasted with the second; and we could not  identify a present 
feeling with one that had left no trace in our framework.'73 In accordance with their 
general emphasis on dynamic modes of causality, Bain's texts portray conceptions 
of similarity and difference as arising in the physiology of the nervous system in 
conjunction with the emergence of an individual's sense of temporal change.
Physiological  conceptions  of  memory  had  been  articulated  before  the 
publication of Bain's Senses and the Intellect. For example, the fourth edition of 
Carpenter's  Human Physiology (1853) suggests that the repetition of mental and 
physical exercises have physiological effects. According to this text, by going over 
the same thoughts or actions again and again, specific nerve-paths are built up in  
the brain. In this way actions or thoughts are eventually conducted via 'unconscious 
cerebration' (ie. without a feeling of conscious effort).74 Learners thereby subsume 
abilities  into  the  non-conscious  parts  of  their  nervous  system.  Actions  such  as 
walking  might  thereby become 'automatic',  enabling  the  conscious  elements  of 
mind to attend to other things whilst they are being carried out.75 
Nevertheless,  Bain's  texts constitute the first  detailed articulation of  the 
explanatory power of such a conception of nervous training.76 Specifically, they 
draw a close correlation between the repetition of specific bodily movements and 
nervous growth. As already noted, the spontaneous release of energy within the 
body constitutes the principal precondition for cognition in Bain's psychology. This 
state of undirected action presents Bain with the problem of how to explain the 
progression  from  such  an  initial  state  to  one  in  which  bodily  actions  become 
organised  into  apparently  intentional  acts.  Such a  question  is  resolved  through 
recourse to iteration as a means of elevating certain bodily movements over others:
spontaneous movements are without doubt confirmed by repetition, 
and thereby made to recur more readily in the future. Any movement 
73 Ibid.
74 Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology, [4th Ed.] (London, 1853), pp. 741-743, 783-
784.
75 Ibid.
76 Flesher, 'Human Nature Surpassing Itself', pp. 274-291.
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struck out by central energy leaves as it were a track behind, and a less 
amount  of  nervous  impulse  will  be  required  to  set  it  on  a  second 
time...  The iteration of all  these various movements does not make 
them voluntary movements in the proper sense of the expression; but 
it  prepares  them  for  becoming  such  by  a  future  and  distinct 
acquisition.77
The  iteration  of  movements,  through  its  production  of  'tracks'  in  the  brain, 
constitutes one crucial condition of possibility for the emergence of consciousness. 
Though this text is concerned to differentiate 'repetitive' from 'voluntary' actions, it  
seems clear that such a schema called distinctions between the two into question.78 
For present purposes, it is enough to note the emphasis on the repetition of specific 
muscular actions that accompanies this conception of learning.
Memory is made contingent on the development of the corporeal frame: 
'Actions, Sensations, and States of Feeling tend to grow together, or cohere in such 
a way that when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are 
apt to be brought up in idea.'79 The recollection of groups of sensations and feelings 
had been a (if not the) prominent trope in association psychology more generally.80 
In  their  re-consideration  of  sensation  and  feeling  as  bodily  states,  Bain's  texts 
emphasise a third element -  corporeal  movement -  by which the processes that  
associationists assume to constitute 'elements' of mind become co-joined. Bodily 
movements  thereby  gain  a  new  status  in  discourse  surrounding  the  nature  of  
learning.  If,  prior  to  Bain,  much  anglophone  psychology  had  been  especially 
concerned with the means by which ideas became associated, the question of the 
role  of  bodily  movement  in  such  a  process  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
emphasised previously. 
As Bain's articles demonstrate, the implications of his claims were profound 
77 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 334.
78 See Smith, R. Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain 
(London, 1992). Leys, R. 'Mead's Voices: Imitation as Foundation, or, the Struggle 
Against Mimesis' Critical Enquiry 19 (1993), pp. 277-307.
79 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 332.
80 See eg. Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature (London, 1985 [1739-1740]), pp. 56-73.
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as  far  as  educational  practice  was  concerned.  An  1848  piece  by  him  in  the  
Westminster  Review criticising  ‘English  University  Education’,  presents  a  fairly 
typical example. Comparing the pedagogic efficacy of mathematics and chemistry, 
it portrays the practical bent of the latter in a favourable light: 
in chemistry...  there is a discipline more than merely mathematical. 
The  laboratory  operations  of  testing  and  analysis,  in  which  every 
blunder recoil upon the operator, and where his knowledge, ingenuity 
and  watchfulness  are  incessantly  on  the  stretch,  may  be  strongly 
recommended as a disciplining of the reasoning and judging faculties; 
and in many instances it would probably be the best training that could 
be chosen [for cultivating the reason].81
This elevation of the place of practice in learning is expanded in a later article in 
the  Fortnightly  Review.  As  in  the  above  quote,  the  effectiveness  of  practice-
oriented,  'concrete  branches'  of  natural  science  for  the  conduct  of  learning  are 
emphasised  over  more  abstract  studies.82 In  addition,  linguistic  instruction  is 
conceived of as most effectively conducted through the vocal cords and ear-drum 
as much as in the brain (or 'head'):
Language, like mechanical skill, is distributed between active organs 
and senses, there being, in the first instance, the voice and the ear; 
written language introducing the hand and the eye. Great aptitude for 
vocal utterance, or speech proper, is founded partly on the activity, 
flexibility, and graduated exertion of the muscles of the voice and of 
the mouth, and, for the largest part, on the delicacy of the ear.83
As already stressed, Bain's psychology seemed to imply a necessity for a broad re-
81 Bain, A. 'English University Education', p. 455. The conduct of mathematical education at 
Cambridge was also undergoing significant changes at this time. See Warwick, A. 
Masters of Theory: Cambridge and the rise of mathematical physics (University of 
Chicago Press, 2003).
82 Bain, A. 'The Retentive Power of the Mind',  pp. 243-247.
83 Ibid. p. 245.
157
orientation  of  pedagogic  practice  around  a  conception  of  bodily  action  as  the 
principal means of mental cultivation.
The  final  point  that  is  important  to  note  regarding  Bain's  conception  of 
pedagogy is the extent to which he employs the notion of the transference of power 
as a limiting factor in the conduct of learning. Given that (Bain supposes) mind is a 
physiological  phenomenon,  then the correlation of  forces  must  apply to  mental  
acts.  Hence  the  ability  to  learn  becomes  contingent  on  the  amount  of  energy 
possessed  by  the  organic  system.   Learning  capacity  is  limited  not  by  the 
'willingness' of pupils conceived in the abstract, but by their bodily functionality. 
The most  direct  implications of this for pedagogic practice (as characterised by 
Bain) relate to the need to alternate learning activities:
If a pupil has sat four or five hours intently studying mathematics, he 
can have little  power  left  for  any subject.  But  after  a limited time 
devoted to one thing, the mind can turn with a certain freshness to 
another thing,  so far  different  as to strike into new avenues of the 
brain. This is a pleasure, and not a burden. From mathematics one can 
pass  to  language,  then  to  music,  and  thence  to  bodily  manual 
discipline.84
Bain's re-casting of mental processes as manifestations of bodily activity presents  
cognitive activity as a process that can and should be maximized according to the 
potential energy present in the corporeal system. He thereby articulates a work-
based, practice-oriented conception of mental cultivation, in which manual labour,  
mathematical  calculation  and  experimental  skill  become  different,  equivalent 
expressions of bodies' conversion of latent energy into work.
Neuro-muscular learning
Though Bain's texts articulate the most intellectually thorough link between 
physiological conception of mind and pedagogy of this period, others emphasised 
84 Bain, 'The Retentive Power of the Mind', p. 242.
158
similarly  'physiological'  conceptions  of  ideal  pedagogic  conduct.  The  Swiss 
pedagogue Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) had advocated a 'natural' mode 
of teaching closely informed by his understanding of physiological development 
some  time  before  the  physiological  psychologists  emerged  in  Britain.  Early 
advocates of experimental  discipline in Prussia had appropriated his concept  of  
learning  as  a  combination  of  personal  observation  and  mental  activity,  or  
Anschauung.85  In  British  interpretations  of  the  so-called  'Pestalozzian  system', 
lessons were conducted around 'natural'  objects rather than texts.  This mode of  
teaching was understood as a means of allowing children (in formal pedagogic 
contexts,  boys)  to  develop  'according  to  their  nature',  and  became  particularly 
prevalent in homes and elementary schools during the 1830's and 1840's.86
Spencer's  widely-read  Education: Intellectual,  Moral and Physical (1861) 
presents a critique of the Pestalozzian system on the grounds that its naturalism, 
whilst welcome, does not go far enough. Instead of teachers acting as mediators of 
the  significance  of  objects,  Spencer  claims,  students  should  be  encouraged  to 
investigate such objects for themselves, without supervision.87 Such independently 
conducted object-lessons should also be extended beyond early childhood:
They should not be limited to the contents of the house; but should 
include those of the fields and the hedges,  the quarry and the sea-
shore. They should not cease with early child-hood; but should be so 
kept up during youth, as insensibly to merge into the investigations of 
the naturalist and the man of science.88
85 Coleman 'Prussian Pedagogy', and Kremer, 'Building Institutes for Physiology', pp. 94-
100. Significantly, Kremer emphasises that Pestalozzian justifications for experimental 
discipline did not accompany attempts to link laboratory practices with the cultivation of 
industry. Kremer, Idem, pp. 100-109.
86 Keene, M. 'Object Lessons: Sensory Science Education 1830-1870' (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 2008); Layton, D. Science for the People: The Origins of  
the School Science Curriculum in England (London, 1973),esp. pp. 23-34. See also 
Barnes and Shapin, 'Head and Hand', pp. 240-245.
87 Spencer, H. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical (London and Edinburgh, 1888 
[1861]), pp. 69-70.
88 Ibid. p. 76.
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Learning would thereby be made consonant with Spencer's conception of the nature 
of  man's  historic  evolution,  in  which  development  from  simple  to  complex 
physiology is paralleled by an analogous progression from empirical to theoretical  
knowledge.89 Similar  sentiments  are  expressed  in  an  article  by  the  principal 
advocate  of  Spencer's  philosophy  in  North  America,  Edward  Youmans,  in  a 
London-published collection of writing on 'scientific education'.90 For these figures, 
the superiority of practice-based approaches to intellectual discipline implies that  
the learning of knowledge related to a primarily 'external' nature will become the 
principal (and in time even the only significant) mode of learning.
Nor is  such discourse confined to avowedly physiological  writing of this 
time. The grammar school Master and advocate of teacher training Robert Hebert 
Quick's  Essays on Educational  Reformers (1868)  presents  a  critique of  what  it 
portrays as school-teachers' over-reliance on book-centred instruction:
Not  recognising  the  truth  that  the  function  of  books  is 
supplementary... teachers are eager to give second-hand facts in place 
of  first-hand  facts.  Not  perceiving  the  enormous  value  of  that 
spontaneous education which goes on in early years, not perceiving 
that a child's restless observation, instead of being ignored or checked, 
should be diligently ministered to and made as accurate and complete 
as possible, they insist on occupying its eyes and thoughts with things 
that are, for the time being, incomprehensible and repugnant.91
Quick's  comparatively  conservative  work  remains  sceptical  about  Spencer's 
elevation of 'science' as a discipline to be valued above all others, insisting on the  
independence of the teaching of business and the arts. Hence the above quote is 
intended to apply to all  modes of pedagogy.92 Such passages indicate the broad 
89 Ibid. Eg. pp. 89-90.
90 Youmans, E.L. 'Observations on the Scientific Study of Human Nature: a lecture 
delivered before the London College of Preceptors', in Youmans, E.L. (ed.) Modern 
Culture. Its True Aims and Requirements: A Series of Addresses and Arguments on the 
Claims of Scientific Education (London, 1867), pp. 320-361.
91 Quick, R.H. Essays on Educational Reformers (London, 1868), pp. 249-250. On Quick 
see DNB
92 Ibid. pp. 229-245.
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rhetorical  reach that  physiological  conceptions of childrens'  'natural'  spontaneity 
enjoyed during the 1860s.
By the late 1860s, a considerable body of writing on relations between the 
conduct  of  pedagogy  and  the  physiological  mind  had  appeared.  Such  writing 
presents  learning  as  an  inherently  practical,  movement-centred  activity,  to  be 
conducted via individual students' interaction with 'nature', rather than passed down 
from teacher to pupil. Of course, as the first two chapters of this thesis make clear, 
such interaction was never (and could never have been) entirely unmediated. In 
insisting  that  individuals  discover  nature  'for  themselves',  physiological 
psychologists  implicitly  invested  those  objects  or  tools  presumed  to  grant 
investigators access to natural truth with the power to discipline and instruct.
Work, intellect and the privileging of experiment
It is no coincidence that physiological psychologists played an active role 
in  promotion of  experimental  science  in  British universities  and schools.  Their 
conception of mind was predicated on a notion of bodily activity as critical to the  
assimilation of knowledge. Experiment, as a hand-centred, highly ‘skillful’ practice,  
became an ideal mode of pedagogic conduct in many physiological texts. The rest  
of  this  chapter  is  devoted to  the ways in  which the physiological  emphasis  on 
bodily skill came to be adopted by experimental practitioners and lobbyists alike in 
their calls for the reformulation of learning. Laboratories, as sites in which bodies 
could be instructed in practical skills, came to be understood as critical to Britain’s 
future industrial success.
As  far  as  giving  evidence  during  government  enquiries  is  concerned, 
Carpenter was amongst the most active of the various proponents of physiological 
notions regarding education. As well as being an important instigator of the move 
to constitute a faculty devoted exclusively to physical science at UCL, he acted as a 
key witness to the 1867-1868 committee on ‘Instruction in Theoretical and Applied 
Science'.  His  evidence to  the committee  draws heavily on the tropes  regarding 
learning  that  were  being  articulated  by  Bain  and  others.  For  example,  he 
emphasises  the  particular  malleability  of  young  students,  and  especially  the 
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potential harm that then-prevailing conceptions of appropriate pedagogic conduct 
might do to them. Asked of his opinion on 'the bearing of elementary education on 
subsequent scientific education', he is recorded as having stated himself to hold a  
'very strong opinion on the subject': The 'power of apprehending scientific facts', he 
claims, is 'more easily brought out' in children than it is in those whose faculties 
'are left undeveloped, or even repressed, by ordinary systems of culture.'93
Carpenter’s  testimony  emphasises  two  key  points;  that  it  is  easier  to 
harness the spontaneous energy of (male) children than adults; and that the best  
means of  achieving this  to  be by encouraging participation in  practice-oriented 
lessons.  Asked  which  scientific  subjects  should  be  taught  at  'the  general 
preparatory  schools  to  which  our  middle  classes  go',  Carpenter  considers  'the 
elements of natural philosophy, and, where practical in the country... botany' to be 
appropriate, commenting that 'I quite agree with those who consider that all these 
studies should be as practical as possible, and should be that which a pupil can  
acquaint himself with, objectively or tangibly.'94
He also claimed that  a  too-exclusive emphasis  on text-based study had 
engendered problems at  the university  level  as  well  as  in early education -  the 
alleviation of which would benefit learning in general. Responding to a question 
suggesting  that  the  introduction  of  scientific  instruction  in  schools  might 
potentially have negative effects of on students' literary studies, Carpenter suggests 
that
an hour a week is quite sufficient to impart this scientific knowledge. 
It is a change for them, bringing their minds into contact with external  
realities; and all our experience points to the fact that those who have 
really tried the system find that it acts by quickening the intellect and 
enabling it to move with greater energy.95
This statement is clearly reminiscent of Bain's comments regarding the possibility 
of maximizing intellectual endeavour through the alternation of different types of 
93 Ibid. p. 107.
94 Ibid. p. 109.
95 Ibid. pp.
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pedagogic  activity.  Connecting  students'  minds  with  'external  realities'  through 
practical  instruction would increase rather  than diminish their  capacity to  learn 
other subjects.
Carpenter  emphasises  the  rational  efficacy  of  practice-oriented  modes  of 
instruction, portraying them as equivalent if not superior to text-centred modes of 
instruction. Asked whether the principal purpose of introducing object lessons in 
schools would be to train observation, he responds: 
Yes, and to train the mind in reasoning upon facts observed. In the 
case of  natural  history it  is  scientific  classification and learning to 
estimate the value of characteristics which would be specially taught; 
the mode of determining the value of plants,  or animals, or fossils,  
according  to  their  special  characters.  On  the  other  hand  in 
experimental science it is reasoning with regard to the application of 
principles on which I should lay stress.96 
For  Carpenter,  as  with  Spencer,  a  movement  from  object  interrogation  to 
experimental  practice  would  encourage  a  parallel  movement  from  narrowly 
empirical study of nature to a more theoretical inculcation of natural principles.
Given the physiological conceptions of learning related above, it might be 
seem unsurprising that Carpenter would advocate to the committee an educational 
policy  conceived  around  objects  and  experimentation  rather  than  text.  Yet  the 
broader  persuasive  efficacy  of  such  claims  rested  on  the  linking  of  practice-
oriented  learning  with  industrial  success.  Playfair  had  outlined  his  principal 
concern at the start of the enquiry; that a lack of resources for 'practical' teaching in 
science  was  at  the  heart  of  a  perceived  lack  of  industrial  momentum amongst 
British manufacturers:
Although the great improvements in iron making have chiefly arisen 
in  this  country,  we  have  far  from  exhausted  the  economy  which 
science offers to the art.... I believe that there is cheaper production 
abroad in  many cases,  only  from the  science  that  is  applied  to  it, 
96 Ibid. pp. 111-112.
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where there is also a diminished cost of labour, which partly arises 
from the intelligence used in the application of that labour.97
Carpenter's  evidence  fully  accords  with  this  view.  A presumed  need  for  more 
'scientific' knowledge in the so-called 'Bessemer' process (a then-new mode of steel 
manufacture)  presents  a  commonly  utilised  example  in  witness  statements, 
including his own:
Take the manufacture of implements on the old method, it  is mere 
rule-of-thumb work; of course, for the manufacturers of Bessemer’s 
steel a very much higher scientific knowledge is necessary to carry it 
out thoroughly and effectively. It has always struck me that where the 
mere rule-of-thumb method constitutes the staple of the work, there is 
a less demand for intelligence.98
'Intelligence', as a manifestation of physiological force in the nervous system, had 
been as fully incorporated into the liberal economy of supply and demand as any 
other form of bodily labour.
Of  course,  the  re-conceptualisation  of  'intellect'  in  terms  of  economic 
capacity  was  not  the  only  condition  of  possibility  for  the  legitimation  of 
governmental investment in pedagogy-oriented laboratories. Other factors should 
be recognised as important in the adoption and implementation from 1870 of many 
of  the  recommendations  of  the  report.  These  include  a  resurgent  regionalism 
centred  around  sites  of  urban  and  industrial  expansion,  coupled  with  anxieties 
surrounding the potential consequences of the extension of suffrage in 1867, as  
well  as  a  growing  interest  in  the  'Humboldtian'  ideal  of  a  liberal  education 
(forcefully expressed in Mathew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy (1869)).99 But such 
97 Ibid. p. 58.
98 Ibid. p. 113. On the significance of a rhetoric of precision in the introduction of 
experimental discipline see Gooday, 'Precision Measurement'. Schaffer, 'Late Victorian 
Metrology' addresses relations between precision measurement and the 
'industrialisation' of knowledge-practices.
99 Anderson, European Universities, 193-194, 199-203. On regional and inter-urban 
rivalries and debates surrounding the theological significance of correlation see Smith, 
The Science of Energy, esp. pp. 170-191. On the perceived threat of suffrage extension, 
see Stephens, Education in Britain, pp. 80-81.  On relations between Humboldt's concept 
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factors do not explain the new legislative focus - as manifest in the constitution of  
the Department of Science and Art in order that government might foster working-
class skill - on experiment-centred education as a means of cultivating a population 
of middle-class men suited to the specificities of industrial life.100 It seems unlikely 
that  fears  surrounding  the  'hand'-centred  disciplining  of  Britain's  potential 
'proprietors  and  managers'  could  have  been  overlooked  without  the  above-
described incorporation of conceptions of learning into physiological life, grounded 
in the maximization of individual bodies' potential in labour.
Physiological-experimental discipline
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the shift from an ideal of pedagogy based around 
the role of the teacher to one focusing on the inculcation of skilled bodily action on 
the part  of the taught is most evident  in the publications of those experimental 
scientists  of  the  time most  closely  involved in  pedagogic  training.  By the  late 
1860's,  the  newly  instigated  government  Department  of  Science  and  Art  was 
searching for institutions that might be employed in training a new generation of 
school-teachers  in  principles  of  scientific  instruction.  The  Royal  College  of 
Chemistry and the Government School of Mines attracted particular attention. The 
significance of these institutions in the broader re-constitution of laboratories as 
disciplinary  spaces  has  been  addressed  elsewhere.101 For  the  purposes  of  this 
chapter, the pedagogic writings of two of the principal lecturers in these institutions 
- namely the already-mentioned Edward Frankland, and Thomas Henry Huxley - 
of liberal education and German materialism, see Daum, A.W. 'Humboldtian Thinking 
and the Transformations of Civil Society in Germany', Osiris [Second Series] 17 (2002), 
pp. 107-140.
100 Jarrell, R.A. 'Visionary or Bureaucrat? T.H. Huxley, The Science and Art Department 
and Science Teaching for the Working Class', Annals of Science 38 (1998), p. 223.
101 See Forgan and Gooday, ‘Constructing South Kensington’ and Forgan and Gooday, ‘A 
Fungoid Assemblage’. Historical analysis of the School of Mines is perhaps most 
prominent in accounts of Thomas Henry Huxley's career. See eg. Desmond, 'Redefining 
the X-Axis', pp. 29-34; Jarrell, 'Visionary or Bureaucrat?'. On the Royal College of 
Chemistry see Russell, C.A. Coley, N.G. and Roberts, G.K. Chemists By Profession:  
The Origins and Rise of the Royal Institute of Chemistry (Milton Keynes; Open University 
Press, 1977), esp. pp. 75-93.
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are of particular interest.
In an 1860 address to the students of the Museum of Geology (part of the 
School  of  Mines)  in  South  Kensington,  its  then  demonstrator  Thomas  Henry 
Huxley presents a typically strident opinion of the role of a teacher of science: 
the  great  business  of  the  scientific  teacher  is,  to  imprint  the 
fundamental, irrefrangible facts of his science, not only by words upon 
the mind, but by sensible impressions upon the eye, and ear, and touch 
of the student...
Now  this  important  operation  can  only  be  achieved  by  constant 
demonstration,  which  may take  place  to  a  certain  imperfect  extent 
during a lecture, but which ought also to be carried on independently, 
and which should be addressed to each individual student, the teacher 
endeavouring, not so much to show a thing to the learner, as to make 
him see it for himself.102
By 1869, the desirability of tutorial demonstration of 'facts' via objects had been 
replaced by somewhat different learning process:
in explaining to a child the general phænomena of Nature, you must, 
as far as possible, give reality to your teaching by object-lessons; in 
teaching  him  botany,  he  must  handle  the  plants  and  dissect  the 
flowers...  Don't  be satisfied with telling him that  a magnet  attracts 
iron. Let him see that it does; let him feel the pull of the one upon the 
other for himself.103
From  advocating  a  mode  of  instruction  whereby  objects  constitute  a  powerful 
means by which teachers might impress the lessons of nature on pupils' senses by 
their own demonstrative actions, Huxley had adopted physiological psychologists' 
rhetoric  of  discipline  via  pupils  own  individual  bodily  actions.104 It  should  be 
102 Huxley, T.H. Collected Essays [Vol. VIII] (London, 1893-1894), pp. 220-221.
103 Huxley, T.H. Collected Essays [Vol. III] (London, 1893-1894)., p. 127.
104 Huxley has been characterised as utilising laboratories as a means of advancing his 
institutional interests as a physiologist. See Gooday and Forgan, 'Constructing South 
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stressed that both elements are present in both texts. Nevertheless, the emphasis of 
his remarks undergoes a subtle but important shift.
The publications of Frankland undergo a more clear-cut change. His first 
pedagogic publication, Lecture Notes for Chemistry Students (1866) - drawn from 
his lectures at the Royal College - is almost entirely devoted to the introduction of 
new forms of notation of formulae for various chemical substances and reactions. 
This text, in its emphasis on written modes of instruction, pays scant attention to 
more  practice-oriented  activities  that  pupils  might  engage  in  during  lessons.105 
Whether or not it reflects Frankland's pedagogic activity during this time remains 
uncertain.  Frankland  did  nevertheless  come  to  advocate  practice-oriented 
instruction  in  his  classes.   His  subsequent  How to  Teach  Chemistry:  Hints  to  
Science Teachers and Students (1875) complains that 'Our scholars are told what 
other people have observed, but they are not taught to observe for themselves. In 
the teaching of science this ought not to be; and students ought to be shown what to 
look for, and required to make their own observations.'106 This comment is followed 
by a series of terse descriptions of experiments, through the performance of which 
simple  chemical  forms  are  to  be  produced,  and  the  atomic  nature  of  elements 
demonstrated.107 Such a dramatic shift, whilst potentially explicable in terms of the 
differing contexts in which Frankland expected his different texts to be used, is 
nevertheless indicative of a broad re-formulation of pedagogic practice during the 
1870s.
The  incorporation  of  experimental  discipline  as  an  uncontroversial  and 
increasingly commonplace scientific practice in higher educational institutions was 
accompanied  by  a  general  re-constitution  of  pedagogic  literature  around 
investigative equipment. A wide range of literature offering guides to the use of 
laboratory  equipment  appears  during  this  time.  Texts  such  as  Williamson's 
Kensington'. Whilst I agree with this assessment, I am arguing here that such interests 
were also dependent on the more general prevalence of physiological notions of learning 
at this time.
105 Frankland, E. Lecture Notes for Chemistry Students: Embracing Mineral and Organic 
Chemistry (London, 1866)
106 Frankland, E. How to Teach Chemistry: Hints to Science Teachers and Students 
(London, 1875), p. 1.
107 Ibid.
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Chemistry for Students (1866), UCL and Edinburgh professor of Civil Engineering 
Henry Charles Fleeming Jenkin's Electricity and Magnetism (1873), Huxley's own 
A Course of Practical Instruction in Elementary Biology (1875), and John Burdon 
Sanderson's  controversial  Handbook  for  the  Physiological  Laboratory (1873) 
present  a  very  different  mode  of  learning  than  had  (for  example)  Carpenter's 
extremely  popular  Principles  of  Human  Physiology (five  editions,  1842-1855) 
referred  to  extensively  in  the  previous  chapter.108 Whereas  this  latter  text  is 
concerned above all with propounding truths regarding nature, the former take it as  
their principal task to present students (and teachers) with the technical means by 
which such truths will (they presume) be revealed.
Conclusion
Literature  articulating  a  specifically  physiological  notion  of  learning 
published during the late 1860's and 1870s does not merely indicate a change in the 
status of experimental equipment in conceptions of the purposes of instruction - it 
was  also  indispensable  to  attempts  to  conduct  practice-centred  investigation  in 
general.  As chapter one of this study makes clear, at the start of the nineteenth  
century, the status of different forms of epistemic equipment played a critical role  
in the sorts of questions that those concerned with the definition of life could aspire 
to  address.  Yet  early-nineteenth-century  physiologists  and  zoologists  did  not 
generally  seek to  instantiate  their  contentions  by promoting particular  forms of 
investigative  practice  (microscopic  investigation,  for  example).  Articulations  of 
natural truth considered inappropriate were primarily understood to be so because 
108 Williamson, A.W. Chemistry For Students (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1868 [1866]); 
Jenkin, F. Electricity and Magnetism (London, 1873); Huxley, T.H. A Course of Practical  
Instruction in Elementary Biology (London, 1875); Sanderson, J.B. (ed.) Handbook for  
the Physiological Laboratory (London, 1973). See also George Carey Foster's translation 
of Prussian physicist Adolf F. Weingold's Introduction to Experimental Physics,  
Theoretical and Practical: including directions for constructing physical apparatus and for 
making experiments (London, 1875). As Foster declares in his preface to this work: 'The 
great secret of effectual teaching in any subject is to excite the pupil's interest, so that, 
instead of being passively receptive, and regarding it as his teacher's business to make 
him learn, he may actively assert his mind in order to understand the matter in hand. In 
the case of Physics no method is so nearly efficacious for this purpose as that of letting 
him make apparatus and try experiments with his own hands.' Foster, G.C. 'Preface', in 
idem, p. ix.
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of their implications for the organization of human populations, not their relation to 
the use of specific kinds of equipment. 
In  contrast,  as  this  and  the  following  chapter  of  this  study  contend, 
physiologically-inspired, experiment-centred pedagogic literature places far greater 
emphasis on a need for investigators to operate and interact with equipment itself in 
an appropriate manner. In their emphasis on the interaction of physiological bodies 
with  technical  equipment,  physiological  psychological  statements  regarding 
learning effectively naturalise skilful  individuals as principal producers of natural 
truth. It is no longer only the status of a disciplined community of 'knowers', but 
now  also  a  relation  between  a  single  investigator  and  their  equipment,  that  
embodies this physiological ideal of truth-production.
This  shift  had  profound  implications  as  far  as  the  articulation  of 
conceptions  of  nature  that  might  be  considered  subversive  were  concerned.  In 
effect, the emphasis of physiological psychologists on the power of investigative 
tools  to  define  psychological  life  is  translated  in  these  texts  into  a  means  of  
inculcating a certain set of attitudes and beliefs regarding the nature of self and 
world via the manipulation of equipment. Questions regarding natural truth come 
to be mediated less by questions of direct analogies regarding the organization of  
communities,  and more by questions regarding individual  knowledge-producers' 
possession  (or  not)  of  observational  skill.  Not  only  should  learning  now  be 
conducted through experimentation, but the inculcation of 'correct'  experimental 
practices  agreed  upon  by  a  community  of  recognised  specialists  (or  ‘men  of  
science’)  becomes the most  efficacious means of  eliminating 'incorrect'  notions 
regarding nature. Unacceptably radical claims regarding nature can be regulated by 
training in the manipulation of scientific equipment. Indeed, as examined in the 
next chapter, epistemic tools come to play a significant role in the regulation of 
membership of a community of trusted knowledge-producers at this time.
More generally, the privileging of bodily skill in the conduct of learning 
contributed to a longer-term undermining of the status of representational objects 
in  intellectual  endeavour.  In  elevating  the  status  of  experimental  tools, 
physiologically-constituted culture drew attention away from the texts and images 
contained in books, atlases and journals. The 'mechanically'-produced images that  
Daston and Galison engage with, though a powerful means of persuasion, were 
nevertheless understood by many as secondary to tool-centred practices themselves 
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in  pedagogical  endeavour.  It  was  through  a  human-object  interaction  in  the 
laboratory, rather than a specific approach to the representation of nature, that a  
subjectivity appropriate to the cultivation of industry was to be constituted. The 
training of  'judgement,'  which later  came to the fore as critical  to  the properly  
scientific  interpretation  of  mechanically-produced  images,  had  thereby  been 
present at the beginning of organized laboratory science. It was in the judgement of 
one's  relation  to  experimental  equipment,  as  much  as  mechanically-constituted 
images, that scientists were to be trained and evaluated.
Chapter 4:
App  ro  p  riating  T  echnique:  m  icroscopy as resistan  c  e   
in physiological culture (c. 1860-1880)
Introduction
Up to this point, this thesis has sought to chart some of the ways in which 
'the'  nervous  system  emerged  as  an  object  of  concern  during  the  nineteenth 
century. Specifically, it has examined the coming-to-pre-eminence of a conception 
of  human  nerves  as  fundamentally  similar  to  those  of  animals,  and  sought  to 
convey ways in which this re-figuring of human subjectivity came to accompany a 
re-orientation of scientific practice around investigative tools.  The promotion of 
academic  science  as  fundamentally  a  laboratory-based  practice,  it  has  been 
suggested, has been accompanied by a conception of human bodies and minds as 
energy-exchanging, inherently 'work'-oriented entities, subject to laws of nature in 
the  same  way as  all  other  natural  bodies.  But  one  theme that  remains  under-
acknowledged in this analysis is the ways in and extent to which such subjective 
modes, as well as helping constitute certain forms of identity (eg. 'the organically-
defined individual' or the ‘man of science’), could, for those that had largely been 
precluded from the definition of their  own natures,  also be made into tools  of 
resistance. Physiological subjectivities and the institutions that accompanied their 
emergence  did  not  unproblematically  or  irrevocably  displace  those  (invariably 
theocentric)  forms  of  life  that  both  preceded  them  and  helped  constitute  the 
conditions under which they were able to flourish.1 But such emerging conceptions 
and environments did constitute a specific set of possibilities as regards political  
action. They presented groups that had historically been conceptualised as objects 
of  natural  philosophic  concern  (non-European  peoples,  women,  the  working 
classes) with a new means by which they might become recognised as definers of  
nature as well as the defined; technical engagement.
That broad swathes of humanity had historically been identified as objects 
of  natural  philosophic  concern,  and  had  thereby  largely  prevented  from  the 
1 Smith, R. 'The Physiology of the Will’. On the inherently theological constitution of pre-
nineteenth century science see Cunningham, A. 'How the Principia Got Its Name: or, 
taking natural philosophy seriously', History of Science 24 (1991), pp. 377-392.
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possibility  of  contributing  to  natural  philosophic  debate  in  any  direct  way,  is  
certain.  Historians  have  highlighted  at  some  length  ways  in  which  natural 
philosophic  discourse  had  before  the  nineteenth  century  equated  the  attributes 
considered desirable  in  rational,  knowing philosophers  of  nature  with  those of  
elite, Caucasian, heterosexual males.2 
What seems to mark the nineteenth century out from previous eras is the 
extent  to  which  groups  that  had  historically  been  precluded  (if  not  entirely 
excluded)3 from natural philosophic discourse began to insist on their ability to 
participate in  a newly-authoritative discourse of 'science.'  Such claims mark an 
extension of the political valency of the category 'nature.' It increasingly comes to 
be recognised from this period that effective resistance to the dominance of the 
Western,  male  elites  of  nineteenth-century  Europe  does  not  merely  entail 
challenging those institutions that establish and maintain highly asymmetric power 
relations directly. It also requires the articulation of challenges to those institutions'  
claims regarding the nature of the world. Representing nature differently comes to 
be understood as a means of counteracting the determination of life by aristocratic,  
imperial,  or  male  interests.4 Another  way of  saying  this  is  that  it  came to  be 
recognised that institutions constitute intellectual relations (and vice versa).
But,  in  addition to  helping constitute  different  conceptions  of  nature,  I 
argue that the efforts of groups that had historically been 'objectified' in European 
natural  philosophic  discourse  to  participate  in  science  also  helped  constitute  a 
science less  beholden to  representations  than  to  the technical  conditions  under 
which such representations could be produced and maintained as plausible. My 
claim here is that the culture in which these groups found themselves during the 
nineteenth century paradoxically presented both justification for, and a mode of  
2 See eg. Keller, E.F. Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven; Yale University 
Press, 1985); Phillips, P. The Scientific Lady: a social history of women’s scientific  
interests 1520-1918 (London, 1990); Wertheim, M. Pythagoras’ Trousers: god, physics  
and the gender wars (New York, 1995).
3 Some aristocratic women, for example, did participate in eighteenth-century natural 
philosophy. They were however always considered as ‘exceptions’ to their (or rather 
‘the’) ‘sex’. See Schiebinger, L. The Mind Has No Sex?: women in the origins of  
modern science (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA. and London, 1989); 
Findlen, P. 'Translating the New Science: Women and the Circulation of Knowledge in 
Enlightenment Italy', Configurations 3 (1995), pp. 167-206.
4 The publications of Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche present key examples of 
intellectual forms of resistance during this period. On imperial subjects and the 
constitution of racial science see Anderson, Race and the Crisis of Humanism. On the 
re-constitution of science by groups that have historically been forced to acknowledge 
their 'partial' perspectives more generally see Harraway, 'Situated Knowledges’.
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resistance to, their continuing status as natural objects. As the previous chapters of 
this thesis have shown, the nineteenth century saw the coming-to-pre-eminence of  
a notion  of  the human as  organic object.  This  conceptualisation  privileged the 
concerns of the middle-class men that helped constitute and adhered to it.  The 
positive engagement of non-European, working-class, and non-masculine subjects 
with this discourse, I here suggest, was predicated on an emphasis on the practical 
constitution of scientific tools  and techniques  over any  representational claims 
these ‘men  of  science’  made regarding  the  nature  of  life.5 Non-Europeans,  the 
working  classes  and women were,  through their  adaptation and constitution  of 
technical  forms,  on  occasion  able  to  mount  effective  responses  to  what  most 
nineteenth-century natural philosophers assumed to be their self-evident rational 
and authorial supremacy.
Although this  claim is  intended to comment  on the status of technique 
within a physiology-centred culture in general, I attend here to only one group that 
had  historically  been  categorised  as  'within'  nature,  and  thereby  unable  to 
comprehend it; middle-class women. Whilst the gender category 'woman' as a not-
fully-developed kind of man had been present in Western Europe since antiquity, it 
was  only  from  the  seventeenth  century  onwards  that  such  categories  were 
explicitly and insistently founded on mutually differentiating 'male' and 'female' 
anatomies.  Londa  Schiebinger  and  Thomas  Laqueur  have  identified  a  strong 
differentiation  of  sexual  labour  as  emerging  in  post-Rennaisance  European 
culture.6 Pre-renaissance  Europeans'  assumptions  regarding  the  sovereignty  of 
(male) 'man' over nature begin to be brought into question, they suggest, with the 
re-configuration  of  political  and  economic spaces  and the  articulation  of  a de-
corporealized  (and  thereby  'de-sexed')  conception  of  mind  from  the  late 
seventeenth century onwards. As minds came to be described as independent of 
human bodies (though nevertheless dependent on them for their interaction with 
the material world), some authors began to argue that the presumption of man's 
dominance over nature had arbitrarily made women into inferior citizens to men. 
In particular, with the revolutions of the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
formalization of men's rights in the constitutions of France and the United States  
5 I take my contrast between practice and representation in science from Pickering, The 
Mangle of Practice.
6 Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex?; Laqueur, T. Making Sex: body and gender from 
the Greeks to Freud (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA. and London, 1990). 
See also Schiebinger, L. Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science (New 
Brunswick, 2004 [1993]).
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came to be understood by some as irrationally exclusive of women.7 Schiebinger 
and Laqueur argue that a binary, male-female sexual anatomy is constructed from 
this  time  as  both  a  recuperative  response  to  women's  claims  to  universal 
rationality,  and as  evidence for  the continuing  exclusion  of  women from such 
rational  discourse.8 The  female  body  becomes  a  precluding  factor  in  rational 
contemplation, distracting women from detached thought through its reproductive 
purpose and heightened sensuality in comparison with male bodies. Women, then,  
had been made into scientific objects in a particularly vehement way during the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The nature of their bodies were thought  
to preclude all but a small number of exceptionally 'rational' of their number from 
the comprehension (let alone construction) of the world.
Rather than analyse British women’s engagement with science in general 
during the nineteenth century, I concentrate here on microscopy as, firstly, a tool 
that had become (from the late 1840’s) a key means of defining life, and, secondly,  
a form of scientific practice that was (during the 1860’s) becoming particularly  
amenable to participation in by those coming to define themselves as middle class.  
In privileging a scientific tool rather than an object of explicitly natural concern 
(such as electricity, for example), I am following Paul Forman's recent comments 
on  the  place  of  ‘technology’  and  science  in  contemporary  politics.9 Forman's 
articles suggest that our culture is not so much characterised by a concern with the 
nature of the world, as by the technical capacities frequently associated with our 
study and control of it. It is not so much our presently prevalent conceptions of  
'nature',  but  those of 'technology'  that Forman sees as underlying much present 
interest in profit, productivity and enterprise in science, as elsewhere.10 If this is 
indeed the  case,  then  a historical  engagement  with  tools  and  techniques  -  and 
especially those tools and techniques that  have participated in  the definition of 
'modern' science - is urgently needed for those (such as myself) who perceive their 
present  as  one in  which economic exchange between biologically-differentiated 
7 Eg. Wollstonecraft, M. A Vindication of the Rights of Women: with strictures on political  
and moral subjects (London, 1792).
8 Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex?, esp. pp. 214-244. Laqueur, Making Sex, esp. pp. 
154-163.
9 On the problematic status of the term ‘technology’, see the discussion in the 
introduction to this thesis.
10 Forman, '(Re)cognizing Postmodernity’; Forman, 'The Primacy of Science’.  For a 
recent critique of the lack of critical attention to notions of ‘productivity’ within science 
studies, see Herzig, R. ‘On Performance, Productivity, and Vocabularies of Motive in 
Recent Studies of Science’ Feminist Theory 5 (2004), pp. 127-147.
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individuals  has  become  an  ideological  norm  rather  than  a  means  of 
empowerment.11 The relative paucity of literature relating to women's engagement 
with  technical  entities  (and  especially  with  tools  connected  with  scientific 
investigation)  is  a  secondary  but  nevertheless  significant  motivation  for  the 
technical rather than scientific emphasis of this chapter.12 The principal contrast 
that I draw here as regards the political possibilities experienced within differing 
nineteenth-century subjectivities, is between a culture in which scientific practice 
and scientific representation are equated, and a one in which technical competency 
is differentiated (if not divorced) from scientific representation itself 
To this end, I concentrate in the initial section of this chapter on literature 
associated  with  women  microscopists  who  tended  to  align  themselves  with  a 
disembodied  conception  of  cognition.  Up  until  the  middle  decades  of  the 
nineteenth century, this mode of subjectivity appears to have been most frequently 
expressed in British culture in conjunction with natural theological conceptions of 
nature. For many natural theologians, the soul's nominal independence from and 
simultaneous reliance on the organic body constitutes a critical starting point for 
any  scientific  engagement  with  the  material  world.  This  presents  peculiar 
difficulties for aspiring women microscopic writers, defined as they were in terms 
of their supposedly less-than-rational bodily capacities. Following this, I move on 
to  consider  the  re-figuration  of  notions  of  microscopic  perception  around 
microscopic tools themselves. This development, I suggest,  is paralleled by the  
emergence of a form of writing that privileges technical competence, and which is 
11 This, of course, is not to deny that liberal individualism might present others with a 
source of inspiration. My position is inherently 'partial.' See Harraway 'Situated 
Knowledges.'
12 Whilst there is a large and rapidly expanding body of work on women' engagement with 
(especially digital) technologies developed during the twentieth century, few historians 
have paid much attention to women's relation to technologies before around 1914. 
Significant exceptions include Schwartz Cohen, R. More Work for Mother: the ironies of  
household technology from the open hearth to the microwave (London, 1989); McGaw, 
J.A. Most Wonderful Machine:  mechanization and social change in Berkshire paper  
making, 1801-1885 (Princeton University Press; Princeton and Guildford, 1987); 
Tucker, J. 'Gender and Genre in Victorian Scientific Photography', in Shtier, A.B. and 
Lightman, B. (eds.), Figuring it Out: science, gender and visual culture (Hanover, NH. 
and London, 2006), pp. 140-163. On the historiography of women and technology more 
generally, see especially Wajcman, J. 'From Women and Technology to Gendered 
Technoscience', Information, Communication & Society 10 (2007), pp. 287-298; 
Pursell, C. 'Feminism and the Rethinking of the History of Technology', in Creager, 
A.N.H., Lunbeck, E. and Schiebinger, L. Feminism in Twentieth-Century Science,  
Technology, and Medicine (University of Chicago Press; Chicago and London, 2001), 
pp. 113-127; McGaw, J.A. 'No Passive Victims, No Separate Spheres', in Cutcliffe, S.H. 
and Post, R.C. (eds.) In Context: History and the History of Technology (Bethlehem, 
London and Toronto, 1989), pp. 172-191.
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adopted  by  women  microscopic  authors  as  a  means  of  claiming  authorial  
legitimacy regarding natural observation.13 Finally, I conclude by contrasting this 
technical form of writing with a rather different - yet equally 'scientific' - form of  
authorship,  in  which  microscopic  tools  begin  to  figure  not  as  legitimating 
authorities outside of narrative, but as narrative forces in and of themselves.
Women microscopists and ‘disembodied rationality’
The  publication  of  Mary  Somerville's  On  Molecular  and  Microscopic  
Science in 1869 marks a transitional point in British women's engagement with 
microscopy. By 1869, Somerville had built up an almost unassailable reputation as 
one of Britain's most respected women natural philosophers.14 Like most women 
writers on scientific subjects up until the mid nineteenth century, Somerville relied 
heavily on her aristocratic status as a means of legitimating her activities.15 Born in 
Scotland in 1780, her father (Sir William George Fairfax) had risen to become a 
Vice-Admiral in the British Navy, and she had received a small pension following 
the  death  of  her  husband  in  1807.  Using  her  independence  as  a  widow  and 
extensive family connections, she was able to devote much of her life to natural 
theological  research  and  writing,  a  career  that  placed  her  in  a  highly  unusual 
category for  a woman of  the period.  Considered an exception to  the generally 
irrational  nature of her sex,  Somerville's  authoritatively rational  style was both 
lauded by and unsettling to the gentlemanly culture of her age.16
13 This line of argument broadly follows Mussel, 'Private Practices and Public Knowledge’. 
On women as scientific authors see also Barton, R. ''Men of Science': language, 
identity and professionalization in the mid-Victorian scientific community', History of  
Science 41 (2003), pp. 73-119.
14 On Somerville see Brock, C. 'The Public Worth of Mary Somerville', British Journal for  
the History of Science 39 (2006), pp. 255-272. On Somerville see also Neeley, K.A. 
Mary Somerville: Science, Illumination, and the Female Mind (Cambridge; University 
Press, 2001) and Fara, P. 'Mary Somerville: a scientist and her ship', Endeavour 32 
(2008), pp. 83-85.
15 On the dependence of most women natural philosophers on their aristocratic 
connections before 1850 see eg. Findlen, 'Translating the New Science’; Algazi, G. 
'Scholars in Households: refiguring the learned habitus' Science in Context 16 (2003), 
pp. 9-42, and Mascetti, Y.A. 'A "World of Nothing But Pure Wit": Margaret Cavendish 
and the gendering of the imaginary', Partial Answers 6 (2008), pp. 1-31.
16 Brock, 'The Public Worth’. On the construction of women scientific authors as 
exceptions to their sex prior to the nineteenth-century see Findlen, 'Translating the New 
Science.'
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Since the 1830's, Somerville had been struggling to reconcile her ambition 
to establish original insight regarding nature, with a need to confirm herself as 
properly 'womanly,' and hence lacking in her capability for original rational insight 
in comparison to men. As Claire Brock has highlighted, the originality of her at 
times  esoteric  engagement  with  Laplacian  mathematics,  Mechanism  of  the  
Heavens (1831),  and  renowned  series  surveying  scientific  thought,  On  the  
Connexion of the Physical Sciences (ten editions, 1834-1877) were brought into 
question during that decade. This occurred largely in relation to a controversy in 
parliament over whether or not it had been appropriate to accord her a civil list  
pension  (awarded  in  1835).  Subsequent  to  this  (to-her  highly  embarrassing) 
episode, Somerville began to present herself - and to be presented - as both an 
unusually rational woman and, paradoxically, an un-original popularizer of others' 
insights regarding nature. Having attained public acclaim, Somerville's persona as 
an 'exceptional' woman came to be fashioned in accordance with post-Renaissance 
conceptions of women's proper place in public life as subordinate to that of men.17 
Nevertheless, despite Somerville's status during the later part of her life as an 'un-
original'  collator and expositor of others' work,  On Molecular and Microscopic  
Science adopts  a  specific,  and  for  the  period  potentially  controversial,  stance 
regarding microscopic nature. 
I  highlight  here  two  aspects  of  Somerville's  relation  to  the  natural 
philosophic  culture  of  her  time;  firstly,  that  the  epistemic  assumptions  that 
underpinned Somerville's conclusions regarding the nature of the universe relied 
on a sharp differentiation between a sensorial or 'bodily' perception and a rational 
or 'mindful' reflection; and secondly, that this differentiation inhibited her ability to 
construct herself as an original contributor to natural philosophic discourse. Later,  
I will go on to suggest that the break-down of this differentiation during the 1860s 
and 70s presented women who sought acknowledgement as producers, as well as 
reproducers, of microscopic knowledge with a rather different set of possibilities 
than those that had been accorded Somerville. Somerville would characterize On 
Molecular and Microscopic Science,  her final  scientific work,  as a failure,  and 
lament  that  she  had had to  abandon analytical  mathematics  in  favour  of  more 
general exposition of natural truth as defined by others.18 Yet even as she was so 
doing, a new generation of women were beginning to fashion themselves in a very 
different way - as skilled manipulators of tools rather than rational interpreters of 
17 Brock, 'The Public Worth.'
18 Neeley, Mary Somerville, p. 190; Brock, 'The Public Worth', p. 267.
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sensation. As the previous chapter has made clear, such skill-centred notions of 
scientific  subjectivity  were  predicated  on  a  conception  of  cognition  as  the 
exclusive property of nerves acting in conjunction with the rest of an individual's 
body.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  then  that  these  women  engaged  with 
physiological  conceptions  of  psychology.  Before  moving  on  to  consider  these 
figures,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  situate  their  activities  in  the  context  of 
nineteenth-century microscopic practices more generally.
Microscopy and the extension of sensation
Before  the  1860's,  most  British  authors'  evaluations  of  the  status  of 
microscopes in the study of nature remain firmly within the sense-reason duality 
described by Jonathan Crary and examined in chapter one of this thesis. 19 Above 
all, this literature portrays microscopes as means by which the sensory power of 
the eye might be extended, or the organ 'brought closer' to objects of concern. As  
Edwin  Lankester's  best-selling  tract  Half-Hours  with  the  Microscope  (1859) 
comments: 
Just in proportion as we bring our eyes close to objects, do we see 
more of them... the nearer we can get our eyes to the print [of a hand-
bill, for example], the more we shall see. The most important part of a 
Microscope, then, consists of a lens, by means of which the eye can 
be brought nearer to any object, and is thus enabled to see more of it.20
In thereby extending the eye's vision, the mind is presented with a broader sensory 
vista, through the contemplation of which creative purpose might be revealed. The 
moral  potential  of  such  scenes  appears  as  self-evident  in  much  microscopic  
literature of the time. For example, John Passmore Edwards' single-issue journal  
The Microscope comments that
19 See also Schickore, The Microscope and the Eye, esp. pp. 83-132.
20 [Lankester, E.] Half-Hours with the Microscope; being a popular guide to the use of the  
microscope as a means of amusement and instruction. Illustrated from nature by  
Tuffen West (London, [1859]), p. 2. For a differentiation between seeing with single and 
compound microscopes according to this mode of subjectivity see Pritchard, A. and 
Goring, C.R. The Microscopic Cabinet of Select Animated Objects; with a description of  
the jewel and doublet microscope, test objects, &c. (London, 1832), pp. 103-106.
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The microscope,  and  its  revelations...  places  us  in  the  midst  of  a 
world before invisible, which, like a new creation in the freshness of 
beauty,  stretches away in enchanting prospects on every side...  our 
discoveries terminate not for want of unknown fields to explore, full  
of the developments of creative power, but because our sight grows 
dim,  and  we  have  no  further  means  of  pouring  light  upon  what 
remains unseen21
Here the literary figure of 'the microscope' constitutes a instrument of revelation, a 
tool that furthers the cultivation of faith in both God and Nature. Yet for some, 
such revelation retained the potential  to  present  problematic conceptions  of the 
constitution of existence.
Crucially,  without  a simultaneous cultivation of a reason separate from 
sensory experience, microscopic augmentation of vision could constitute a threat to 
the divine order. Gideon Mantell's  Thoughts on Animalcules  (1846) portrays its 
exposition of the scenery of microscopic life as an act of faith in the rationality of 
its  reader,  implicitly  indicating  the  potentially  impious  conclusions  that 
insufficiently 'regulated' minds might draw from it:
I would leave the intelligent reader to draw his own inferences  from 
what has been advanced; being convinced, no well-regulated mind can 
rise  from  the  contemplation  of  the  marvels  revealed  by  the 
microscope, without being so deeply impressed with a sense of awe, 
of humility, and of dependence, as to be secured from the arrogance 
and presumption of attempting to interpret the final purposes of the 
ETERNAL, even in the minutest of HIS works.22
The possibilities understood as being afforded by microscopic vision - chiefly the 
further penetration and comprehension of God's creation through the augmentation 
of visual sense - are clearly linked in these texts to the condition that such vision is 
accompanied by a sense of both internal and external fixity; external fixity, in the 
perception of the creative permanence and ultimate impenetrability  of heavenly 
21 Edwards, J.P [attr.] The Microscope 1 (London, 1852), p. 3. Similar comments can be 
found in much British microscopic literature during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. See eg. Prichard and Goring, The Microscopic Cabinet.
22 Mantell, G.A. Thoughts on Animalcules; or, a glimpse of the invisible world revealed by  
the microscope (London, 1846), p. 89. Mantell's emphases.
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nature;  and  internal  fixity,  in  the  assertion  that  the  principal  condition  of 
possibility  for  such  perception  lies  in  the  individuals'  possession  of  a  well-
regulated, assumedly universal standard of rationality.23
Somerville's texts subscribe whole-heartedly to this notion of an absolute 
distinction between an external, sensory realm and an internal, universal 'reason.'  
On Molecular and Microscopic Science cites the nervous anatomy of Sir Charles 
Bell to this effect:
The sensory nerves convey external impressions to the brain, and by 
them  alone  the  mind  is  rendered  conscious  of  external  objects...  
Conversely,  the  mind or  will  acts  through the  brain  on  the motor 
nerves, which by alternately contracting, relaxing, and directing the 
muscles, produces muscular motion... By these admirable discoveries, 
Sir Charles Bell has proved that 'we are placed between two worlds, 
the invisible  and the material';  our  nervous  system is  the bond of 
connection.24
Somerville's conviction regarding the distinction between mind and nerve is fully 
in  accordance  with  the  general  beliefs  of  many  Britons  during  much  of  the 
nineteenth century. Such beliefs were accompanied by an assumption that original 
thought is rational, and that male bodies are more conducive to rational thought  
than female.
Rational perception by ‘irrational’ bodies
From  the  point  of  view of  women’s  status  as  students  of  nature,  this 
linking of correct perception with an at-best indeterminately embodied mind had 
profound consequences. The strong correlation between rationality, sex and gender 
noted in the introduction to this chapter was if anything more prevalent during the 
nineteenth  century  than  the  eighteenth.  For  example,  texts  such  as  Thomas 
Laycock's first  book-length publication, A Treatise on the Nervous Diseases of  
23 Another key natural theological work concerning microscopic creation is Philip Gosse's 
Evenings at the Microscope (1859). On this see Armstrong, 'The Microscope', pp. 36-
40.
24 Somerville, M. On Molecular and Microscopic Science, Vol. II (London, 1869), p. 5.
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Women (1840),  posits  an intimate connection between both sexes'  reproductive 
organs and nervous activity. Laycock characterises the functions of ovaries (the  
principal female organ of reproduction in most nineteenth-century physiology) as 
subversive of rational contemplation:
after the age of eighteen the [female] reproductive organs are fully - 
probably  largely  -  developed,  and  strong  passions,  indolence,  and 
luxury, fail not to produce their effects on the [nervous] system, and 
to develope [sic] the sthenic [ie. the pathologically energetic] form of 
of  hysteria.  It  is  to  such  that  marriage...  is  so  useful;  although 
doubtless  the asthenic  [ie.  the pathologically  debilitated] forms are 
sometimes benefited from this procedure; the ovaria being excited to 
the  performance  of  their  proper  function,  and  the  cares  of  life 
dispelling the "vapours" so apt to congregate about the idle and well-
fed.25
Such statements undergo considerable elaboration in many medical publications 
later in the century. For example, an 1863 article by Henry Maudsley integrates 
such claims with the notion of bodily energy, claiming that as a child-bearer and 
help-meet, 'a woman needs all her force at home, and has none to spare for the 
philanthropic enlightenment of humanity.'26 In characterising nervous systems as 
linked  to,  and  frequently  defined  by,  organs  of  regeneration,  physiological 
psychologies cemented an ideal of labour as sexually divided between workplace 
and home in the nature  of  the body.27 As will  be related later  in  this  chapter, 
25 Laycock,  A Treatise. On W.B. Carpenter's characterisation of femininity see Beer, G. 
Darwin's Plots: evolutionary narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and nineteenth-century  
fiction (3rd ed.) (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge and New York, 2009 [1983]), 
pp. 212-214. Laycock's association of femininity with the ovaries was a common trope 
in medical discourse. See Oppenheim, J. "Shattered Nerves": doctors, patients, and  
depression in Victorian England (Oxford University Press; New York and Oxford, 1991), 
esp. pp. 141-232; Moscucci, O. The Science of Woman: gynaecology and gender in  
England, 1800-1929, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne, 1990), pp. 33-34.
26 Maudsley, H. 'Considerations with Regard to Heredity Influence', Journal of Mental  
Science 8 (1862-1863 [1863]), p. 497. Maudsley's concern regarding energy loss 
echoes many of the comments relating to onanism made during the eighteenth century. 
See Laqueur, T. Solitary Sex: a cultural history of masturbation (New York, 2003). 
27 On the development of the science of sexual division in Britain see also Browne, J. 
'Botany for Gentlemen: Erasmus Darwin and "The Loves of the Plants"', Isis 80 (1989), 
pp. 593-621 and Scheibinger, L. 'The Private Lives of Plants: sexual politics in Carl 
Linnaeus and Erasmus Darwin', in Benjamin, M. (ed.) Science and Sensibility: Gender  
and scientific enquiry 1780-1945 (Oxford and Cambridge MA, 1991), pp. 121-143.
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physiological  psychology  as  a  movement  constituted  a  more  ambiguous 
intellectual context for women concerned with the investigation of nature than that  
indicated by the quotes above.28 It is important nevertheless to note the close ties 
between  nervous  anatomy,  sexual  anatomy,  and  notions  of  rationality  that 
permeate nineteenth-century discourse.
Yet if the notion of a rationally destabilising female anatomy meant that 
women were conceived of as unlikely to be able to provide original insight into  
microscopic  nature,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  were  excluded  from  such 
observation  in  general.  If  anything,  the  contrary  seems to  have been the  case. 
Women participated fully in the culture of microscopic display, albeit adopting a 
reproductive  rather  than  productive  role  vis  a  vis microscopic  knowledge,  and 
largely  confining  their  engagement  with  microscopes  themselves  to  domestic 
contexts.29 The  publications  of  the  Irish  natural  theological  astronomer  and 
microscopist Mary Ward present a rather more representative example of women's  
engagement  with  these  tools  during  the  first  half  of  the  century  than  does 
Somerville's  treatise.30 Ward's  first  foray  into  microscopic  publishing  presents 
readers  with  a  series  of  'panoramas'  of  objects,  an  endeavour  which  she 
supplements  in  a second volume with  hints  on  how to  project  images  for  the 
entertainment of guests at home.31 Above all, these works are concerned with the 
exposition of and means of displaying already-known facts of nature, for 'rational 
recreation' rather than the constitution of an 'original' authorial voice.32
28 On the problematic status of sexual distinction in the nineteenth-century 'bio-' sciences 
more generally see Moscucci, O. 'Hermaphroditism and Sex Difference: The 
construction of gender in Victorian England', in Benjamin, Science and Sensibility, pp. 
174-199; Krug, K. 'Women Ovulate, Men Spermate: Elizabeth Blackwell as a Feminist 
Physiologist', Journal of the History of Sexuality 7 (1996), pp. 51-72; Deutscher, P. 'The 
Descent of Man and the Evolution of Woman', Hypatia 19 (2004), pp. 35-55.
29 On engagement by women with science along these lines see Richards. J.L. 'In Search 
of the "Sea Something": reason and transcendence in the Frend/De Morgan family', 
Science in Context 20 (2007), pp. 509-536.
30 On Ward see Harry, O.G. 'The Hon. Mrs Ward (1827-1869) Artist, Astronomer and 
Ireland's First Lady of the Microscope', The Irish Naturalists' Journal 21 (1984), pp. 
193-200.
31 Ward, M. A World of Wonders Revealed by the Microscope (London, 1858). Ward,  M. 
Microscope Teachings: descriptions of various objects of interest and beauty adapted  
for microscopic observation. (London, 1864). For a further example of this kind of 
microscopic publication see Bury, Mrs. Figures of Remarkable Forms of Polycistins, or  
Allied Organisms, in the Barbados Chalk Deposit (Windermere, 1862 and London, 
1865). On the construction of women as readers see Shteir, A.B. 'Elegant Recreations? 
Configuring Science Writing for Women', in Lightman, B. (ed.) Victorian Science in 
Context (Chicago University Press; Chicago and London, 1997), pp. 236-255.
32 On rational recreation see Bailey, P. Leisure and Class in Victorian England: rational  
recreation and the contest for control (London, 1987 [1978]).
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Authorial agency in Ward's work is limited to the power of 'selecting a few 
from the  multitude  of  lovely  scenes  presented  by  the  microscope'.33 Similarly, 
observation is of the simplest, least original kind. As she concludes:
A teacher who truly loves his art or science is best pleased when those 
whom he has instructed outdo in after years their early lessons. And 
such is my feeling about this little book. I wish that those who read it 
may enter on many fields of observation to which I have not directed 
them... and also that they may study the objects which I do describe in 
more  completeness,  and  with  a  far  deeper  understanding  of  their 
meaning than I have [attained].34
The role of women microscopic practitioners is to guide the novice in their initial 
encounter with microscopic nature, ensuring the accurate reproduction of reliably 
simple preparations within the domestic sphere. 'You will do well', she suggests, to 
have 'some of the beautiful  microscopic preparations supplied by opticians...  at  
hand... because if you wish to prepare objects for yourself, the ready-made ones 
will  show  you  what  your  work  ought  to  resemble.'35 In  keeping  with  the 
presumption  that  women  are  capable  only  of  a  passive  reception  of  already-
discovered truth, Ward, in a less ambiguous way than Somerville, constructs her 
scientific  persona  as  one  of  a  devoted  wife  and  mother  seeking  to  introduce 
children and friends to the entertaining visions afforded by the tool.
All of which is not to say that Ward articulates her activity as a negative, 
passive  participation  in  scientific  endeavour  more  generally.  Indeed,  her  final 
remarks indicate the extent to which she seeks to foreground difficulties faced by 
middle-class women seeking to adopt the role of educators of their children: 
If my book has helped to place them [the readers] on the way to such 
studies as may enable them to add to the stock of knowledge, I shall 
not regret the time and application it  has cost me - not as it  might  
once have been,  as the delightful  employment of abundant leisure, 
33 Ward, Microscope Teachings, p. viii. On the panoramic in Somerville's texts see 
Neeley, Mary Somerville, pp. 130-168.
34 Ibid. pp. 215-216.
 
35 Ibid. p. 17.
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but, on the contrary, a serious occupation, done amidst interruptions 
and under pressure of numerous home duties, in the feeling that I had 
a few things to say which might be pleasant and instructive to some 
readers at the present time, and to my own dear children by and by.36
Most middle class women of the middle decades of the nineteenth century sought 
to cultivate their children's interests in a manner appropriate to their expected place 
in the world - in the case of middle-class girls, as sophisticated hosts capable of  
engaging their husbands and guests in intelligent, entertaining, yet uncontroversial  
conversation - in the case of middle-class boys, initially as informed and energetic 
schoolboys, and eventually as respectable gentlemen able to turn their capacity for 
penetrative  rationality  into  an  occupation  fit  for  a  head  of  a  family.37 Ward's 
characterization  of  women  educators  as  engaging  in  a  'serious  occupation' 
constituted a means of articulating the confinement of many women to the home as 
demanding,  necessary,  and  worthwhile.  But  it  left  little  room  for  claims  to 
originality.
Reviews of Somerville’s  On Molecular  and Microscopic Science locate 
both its perceived virtues and its failings in what they imply to be her lack of 
rational  ability.38 The  Edinburgh Review,  whilst  disappointed that  she does not 
address the notion of conservation of energy to a greater degree, notes approvingly 
that 'Mrs. Somerville does not attempt to generalise, much less to bring forward 
any  original  observations  of  her  own...  she  does  not  presume  to  describe  the 
'cosmos,' but simply aims to give in clear language some of the most interesting 
results of recent investigation.'39 For this reviewer, Somerville is to be applauded 
for her modesty as a woman. Whilst she may have neglected the latest researches 
into the nature of nature's forces, her lack of 'presumption' regarding her ability to  
originate knowledge makes the treatise a success. 
The Athenæum,  in  contrast,  emphasises  the  exceptional  abilities  of  the 
author: 'Mrs. Somerville is a woman gifted by nature with mental powers of a high 
order and of a rare character... We have evidence in her works... of an inductive 
36 Ibid. pp. 215-216.
37 On middle-class family life see Davidoff, L. and Hall, C. Family Fortunes: men and  
women of the English middle class, 1780-1850 (2nd ed.) (London, 2002).
38 On the reception of On Molecular and Microscopic Science see also Neeley, Mary 
Somerville, pp. 164-167.
39 [Roscoe, H.E.] [attr. - see Neeley, Mary Somerville, p. 166] 'On Molecular and 
Microscopic Science', Edinburgh Review 130 (1869), p. 138.
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tendency which is rarely found amongst them [ie. women].'40 Yet despite the hopes 
raised by such exceptionality, it is ultimately her inability to sustain her argument  
in a rational manner that lets the book down:
Mrs. Somerville, as we have already intimated, intended to show that 
science has almost  proved  that the physical  forces can resolve into 
forms  of  beauty  the  brute  atoms...  This  has  not,  however,  been 
effected; and although a most instructive book has been produced - 
one in which a very large amount of real knowledge can be gained - it  
does not satisfactorily sustain the argument upon which it is based, 
and it is therefore left in a state of incompleteness.41
Evaluated from this standpoint, Somerville might be exceptionally rational for a 
woman,  but  her  work nevertheless  remains  unable  to  stand the scrutiny  of its' 
(male)  readers'  rational  interrogation.  The  very  epistemic  commitments  that 
pervade nineteenth-century life, and that Somerville adheres to, contribute to her 
inability to define herself as an original researcher.
If  the  respectably  scientific,  predominantly  male  audience  that  On 
Molecular and Microscopic Science sought to address largely dismissed it,  that 
does not  imply that  the work had no significance in  the burgeoning culture of 
microscopy in 1860s and 1870s Britain. As will be related in some detail later in 
this  chapter,  literature  on microscopy openly attributed to  women becomes far 
more common from the late 1860's onwards.42 The emergence of societies devoted 
to the promotion of microscopic practice, an elevation of the importance of the tool 
within the medical  profession (a body that  some women of this  time begin to 
characterise as unjustly exclusive to men), as well as the convenience with which 
microscopes could be used at  home (at  least  in  those homes that  could afford 
them), might all be cited as contributing to this trend. Nevertheless, the literary 
presence of so well-known and widely respected a female figure as Somerville 
must  also  have contributed to  her contemporaries'  enthusiasm for looking to  a 
40 Anon. 'On Molecular and Microscopic Science'  The Athenæum 2154 (Feb. 6th, 1869), 
p. 202.
41 Ibid. p. 203.
42 A comprehensive list of publications by women microscopists during the nineteenth 
century can be found in Creese, M.R.S. Ladies in the Laboratory? American and British  
Women in Science, 1800-1900: a survey of their contributions to research (Lanham and 
London, 1998).
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nature  beyond the  ordinarily  visible.  Indeed,  one of  Somerville’s  most  famous 
mentees, Ada Lovelace, had entertained a range of speculations on the ‘atomic’ 
nature of organic matter (though in keeping with the presumption that women’s 
engagement  with  science  be  ‘passive’,  she  did  not  publish  on  the  matter).43 
Somerville’s declaration in the preface to On Molecular and Microscopic Science 
that microscopic investigations had 'brought a new accession to the indefinitely  
small  within  the  limits  of  modern  science'44 presented  followers  of  Ward's 
domestically-oriented work with the tempting prospect of participating in as well 
as  following  such research.  Though  herself  frustrated  by  a  teleologically  male 
world of disembodied rationality, Somerville's publication indicated to those of her 
readers  that  had  hitherto  confined  themselves  to  recreational  (and  re-creative) 
aspects  of  microscopic  practice  that  such tools  might  present  means  by  which 
women might constitute, as well as reproduce, scientific truth.
Women’s participation in London’s microscopy societies
Underlying the previous chapter of this thesis is the contention that the 
articulation  of  embodied  conceptions  of  cognition  have  been  indicative  of  a 
broader elevation of the cultural status of epistemic tools in Western cultures. The 
above consideration of the possibilities one form of technical object (microscopes) 
are understood as affording one group of historically-objectified actors (women) 
within a specific regime of subjectivity (disembodied rationality) presents a very 
different evaluation of the place of tools in scientific practice. Where physiological  
psychological  texts emphasise a connection between bodies'  skilful  engagement 
with natural and technical objects and the attainment of a corporeal rationality, the 
passages cited above posit a radical distinction between a technical extension of 
worldly sensation, and the cultivation of a disinterested, non-corporeal, rationally-
knowing  subject.  Here,  I  wish  to  bring  out  this  contrast  in  more  detail  by 
examining how physiological notions of subjectivity fed into a re-evaluation of 
microscopic practice during the 1860s.
It should not however be assumed that I wish to attribute physiological  
43 Winter, A. ‘A Calculus of Suffering: Ada Lovelace and the bodily constraint on women’s 
knowledge in early Victorian England’, in Lawrence, C. and Shapin, S. Science 
Incarnate: historical embodiments of natural knowledge (Chicago and London; 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 202-239.
44 Somerville, M. On Molecular and Microscopic Science, Vol. I. (London, 1869), p. 1.
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psychology a primary, causative role in this re-evaluation. Rather, I consider the 
emergence of  a new rhetorical  emphasis  on microscopic skilfulness  as much a 
response  to,  as  cause  of,  the  rapid  ascendancy  in  the  cultural  value  accorded 
microscopes during  this  period.45 Microscopic  culture,  centred on urban spaces 
such as Paris, Edinburgh and London, underwent a rapid expansion from around 
1850 onwards. In Edinburgh, the development of pedagogic tools and techniques 
specifically designed to circumvent problems associated with collective witnessing 
such  as  those  highlighted  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  study  accompanied  the 
emergence  of  academic  groups  committed  to  the  investigation  of  microscopic 
nature.46 In a similar but contrasting development, London saw the rapid expansion 
and  functional  specialisation  of  microscopic  societies,  and  a  fashion  for 
'microscopic  soirées'  that  seemed  to  some  as  potentially  disturbing  to  moral 
order.47 The articulation of skill-centred notions of microscopic practice derive as 
much  from  concerns  engendered  by  these  developments  as  they  do  from 
physiological notions of subjectivity.
The case of London is of especial concern in this chapter for two reasons; 
the extensive opportunities the fashion for microscopy afforded middle-class urban 
women for participation in science; and the particularly engaged responses to this 
participation  from scientific  leaders  in  the city.  The first  lasting  association  of 
microscopists in Britain, the Microscopical Society of London, had been founded 
in  1840,  along  the  lines  of  many  of  the  gentlemanly  clubs  of  the  period.48 
45 On non-specialists and the constitution of scientific culture see Cooter, R. and Pumfrey, 
S. 'Separate Spheres and Public Places: reflections on the history of science 
popularization and science in popular culture', History of Science 32 (1994), pp. 237-
267. Cf. Shinn, T. and Whitley, R. 'Editorial Preface', in Shinn, T. and Whitley, R. (eds.) 
Expository Science: forms and functions of popularization (Dordrecht, 1985), pp. vii-xi.
46 Jacyna, L.S. 'The Romantic Programme and the Reception of Cell Theory in Britain', 
Journal of the History of Biology 17 (1984), pp. 13-48; Jacyna, ‘"A Host of Experienced 
Microscopists"’. On microscopy in Paris, see La Berge, A.F. 'Debate as Scientific 
Practice in Nineteenth-Century Paris: the controversy over the microcope', 
Perspectives on Science 12 (2004), pp. 424-453.
47 On academic microscopy in London at this time see Bracegirdle, P.H. 'The 
Establishment of Histology in the Curriculum of the London Medical Schools: 1826-
1886' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1996).  On the fashion for 
microscopy in the United States, see Warner, J.H. ''Exploring the Inner Labyrinths of 
Creation': Popular Microscopy in Nineteenth-Century America', Journal of the History of  
Medicine and Allied Sciences 37 (1982), pp. 7-33. An overview of histories of 
microscopy published before 1999 is presented in La Berge, A. 'The History of Science 
and the History of Microscopy' Perspectives on Science 7 (1999), pp. 111-142. 
48 For an overview of microscopic societies and their associated journals, see Brock, W.H. 
Patronage and Publishing: journals of microscopy 1839-1989' Journal of Microscopy 
155 (1989), pp. 249-266.
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Membership, though not officially restricted to men, was nevertheless presumed to 
be so. Seemingly minor opportunities for women to engage with the society did 
however  exist.  One  important  feature  that  grew  up  alongside  its  regular 
(exclusively male) meetings and excursions was an annual gathering that women 
were also allowed to attend.  As microscopy began to gain in  popularity,  these 
microscopic  'conversaziones'  were  joined  by  similar  events  organised  by  other 
gentlemanly groups. The Society of Apothecaries held a series of well-attended 
microscopic gatherings during the 1850s, and such events became a key focal point 
for many practitioners following the establishment of self-consciously 'amateur' 
microscopic  societies  such  as  London's  Quekett  Club  during  the  1860s.49 
Microscopic conversaziones were well attended. As president of the Microscopical 
Society, Edwin Lankester boasted that about 'three thousand persons' had attended 
their meeting held at the Museum of Practical Geology in South Kensington in 
1860.50 These  events  presented  middle-class  women  with  the  possibility  of 
engaging with microscopy outside of domestic contexts - confinement to which 
increasing numbers of women were beginning to characterise as oppressive.
Although most women's role at microscopic functions (or at least those of 
the larger societies) appears to have remained one of passive observation of male 
society members'  microscopic  'preparations',  such meetings  nevertheless  signify 
the entrance of women microscopists into public life. Soirées were enthusiastically 
attended  by  women,  not  least  early  pioneers  of  female  professionalism.51 The 
North  American  surgeon  and activist  Mary  Edwards  Walker  attended the  first 
conversazione of the Quekett Club at University College London in 1867, being 
described in the widely-distributed journal  Hardwicke's Science Gossip as one of 
the principal attractions of the event.52 In touring around the numerous tables at a 
49 On conversaziones and scientific culture see Alberti, S.J.M.M. 'Conversaziones and the 
Experience of Science in Victorian England', Journal of Victorian Culture 8 (2003), pp. 
208-230. On microscopy at the Society of Apothecaries see Richardson, R. 
'Microscopical Conversaziones', The Lancet 358 (2001), p. 2004. Newspaper articles 
concerning these meetings indicate a considerable crossover between the display of 
microscopes and of those illusory technologies identified by Crary as participating in the 
break-down of 'disembodied' conceptions of observation such as stereoscopes. See eg. 
The Morning Post, Apr. 30th 1858, p. 6, March 16th, 1868, p. 2 and Nov. 16, 1872, p. 
6., and The Standard, March 20th, 1871, p. 6. ;  [all accessed from C19th British 
Library Newspapers, 28/06/10]
50 [Lankester, E.] 'President's Address', Transactions of the Microscopical Society of  
London (New Series) 8 (1860), p. 91.
51 On women's involvement in these events see eg. [West, T.] 'History of the Postal 
Microscopical Society' The Journal of the Postal Microscopical Society 1 (1882 [1877]), 
p. 6.
52 'The Quekett Soirée', Harwicke's Science Gossip 3 (1867), p. 43. On Walker see 
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microscopic  conversaziones,  women  could  display  their  allegiance  to  an 
increasingly  prominent  culture  of  natural  observation,  and  potentially  even 
demonstrate  the  extent  of  their  microscopic  learning  in  conversation  with 
prominent men active in the field.
Perhaps the best indication of microscopic conversaziones' role in the re-
figuring of women's place in scientific culture can be found in the attitudes of 
members of the various societies to their involvement in such events. Where both 
sexes' simultaneous participation in microscopic soirées is defended in the larger 
societies' journals, it is done so in terms of a careful differentiation of gender roles.  
As one Quekett soirée report relates:
The interest manifested by the members, and the satisfaction exhibited 
by visitors of both sexes, gave no sign of decadence. There was the 
same  sturdy  phalanx  of  members  who  had  their  microscope,  and 
something  under  it,  and  the  same  smiling  and  blooming  troop  of 
female friends peeping anxiously down the hundreds of brazen tubes 
erected for the delectation. The prophecy that these "shows" would 
soon  come  to  an  end,  which  some  crusty  antiquarians  have  been 
known to utter, seems as far distant as ever.53
By  the  time  these  comments  were  published  (1871)  however,  the  heyday  of 
women’s involvement in the culture of microscopic display was coming to an end: 
the above-quoted article was published shortly after a suggestion from the council 
that women be admitted as members had been voted down.54 
Simultaneous  male  and  female  participation  in  microscopic  gatherings 
were understood by some as bringing their ostensibly moral purpose of cultivating 
the scientific awareness of the populace into question. The Apothecaries set aide 
separate 'ladies' days’ at their soirées.55 But most events included men and women, 
and seem to have presented clear opportunities for conversation between strangers 
LeClair, M.K, White, J.D. and Keeter, S. Three 19th-Century Women Doctors:  
Elizabeth Blackwell, Mary Walker, Sarah Loguen Fraser (New York, 2007), pp. 43-86 
and Synder, C.M. Dr Mary Walker: the little lady in pants (New York, 1974).
53 'The  Soirée', The Journal of the Quekett Microscopical Club 2 (1870-1871), p. 
185.
54 See 'February 28th, 1868' and 'March 17th, 1868', The Journal of the Quekett  
Microscopical Club 1 (1868-1869), pp. 50 and 84.
55 Richardson, 'Microscopical Conversaziones'.
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of different genders. From 1871, the (increasingly professionalized, by that point  
'Royal') Microscopical Society stopped hosting microscopic gatherings following a 
number of complaints  to  the effect  that  it  was 'extremely difficult  to unite the 
requirements of a scientific gathering with those of an evening party.'56 Seeming 
incompatibility  with  specialised,  technical  endeavour  such  as  that  generally 
associated with the emerging ethos of professionalism begins to be cited from this 
time as  justification for the abandonment  of  public  demonstration  and display.  
Women’s  involvement  in  this  (now-prestigious)  society  thereby  came  to  be 
severely restricted.
  Yet the formalisation of the exclusion of women from the most prestigious 
microscopic societies does not imply that they were henceforth unable to engage 
with microscopy more generally. As intimated at the beginning of this chapter, a 
then-emergent re-configuration of scientific practice around tools of investigation 
presented some women with a very different set of possibilities to those that had 
accompanied the rational culture of display and witnessing described above.
Physiological psychology and microscopy after 1850
One  of  the  most  visible  participants  in  the  many  of  the  major 
microscopical  societies'  meetings  during this period was the popular zoological 
and physiological psychological author William Benjamin Carpenter. As has been 
observed in  a previous chapter regarding his  engagement  with phrenology and 
mesmerism, Carpenter was especially concerned with the arbitration of who could 
and could not claim to speak on behalf of nature. Similar questions to those that  
mesmerism  raised  are  addressed  in  his  microscopic  writings.  But  where 
mesmerism had only presented Carpenter with problems regarding the appropriate 
interpretation  of  trance-like  phenomena  (he  was  careful  to  acknowledge  the 
effectiveness of mesmeric or hypnotic techniques),  microscopy also brought the 
issue of technical competency to the fore.  For Carpenter,  microscopy presented 
less  of  a  danger  to  scientific  practice  than  had  mesmerism,  but  nevertheless 
demanded more effort from established authorities such as himself (he had come to 
be  recognised  as  the  principal  British  expert  on  Foraminifera,  a  genus  of 
56 'Royal Microscopical Society', The Monthly Microscopical Journal 3 (1870), pp. 213-
214; 'Royal Microscopical Society', The Monthly Microscopical Journal 5 (1871), p. 194.
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microscopic  fossil  regarding  which  Charles  Darwin  sought  his  advice)57 with 
regard to the guidance of less experienced practitioners' investigative skill.
Carpenter's  first  extensive  comments  on  microscopy  appear  in  a 
presidential address he gave to the Microscopical Society of London in 1855. The 
rhetoric  of  energy  correlation  and  need  for  national  economic  efficiency  that 
infuses his physiological writing is immediately apparent: 
I cannot but feel that a great deal of excellent microscope power, if I 
may use the expression, is running to waste... I would not be thought 
unmindful of the many admirable [British] memoirs and monographs, 
which may challenge comparison with those of any other country; 
they are excellent  as far  as they go;  but  I am sanguine enough to 
believe that  these could  easily  be  multiplied tenfold,  if  those  who 
spend  their  time  in  desultory  observation...  would  but  concentrate 
their  attention  upon some particular  topic,  and work  out  this  with 
patience and perseverance.58
Discipline  in  techniques  of  observation,  along  with  a  stronger  division  of 
microscopic  labour,  will  enable  Britain  to  compete  with  countries  such  as 
Germany, at that time generally recognised as leading the world in microscopic 
research.59 But equally significant here is the principal direction that Carpenter’s 
own  efforts  at  stemming  such  'waste'  of  'microscopic  power'  took.  Instead  of 
seeking to organise the London Society more effectively, or founding a separate 
over-arching  managerial  body  that  might  direct  microscopists'  activities  more 
efficiently, he authored a text-book (The Microscope: and its revelations (1856) - 
hereafter The Microscope) that sets out his own conception of correct microscopic 
conduct - a guide to technical manipulation and observation, aimed at the large 
numbers of people that  he supposes  possess  microscopes but  remain unable  to 
investigate nature effectively using them.
Carpenter's  best-selling  microscopic  publication  (it  reached  a  seventh 
57 Jardine, B. 'Between the Beagle and the Barnacle: Darwin's microscopy, 1837-1854', 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (2009), pp. 386 and 388.
58 [Carpenter, W.B.] 'Address of the President at the Annual Meeting of the Microscopic 
Society, February 28, 1855', Transactions of the Microscopical Society of London (New 
Series) 3 (1855), p. 54. Carpenter's emphasis.
59 On microscopy in German science at this time see Schickore, The Microscope and the  
Eye, pp. 133-219.
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edition in 1881), like his psychological and physiological statements, is permeated 
by  a  moralistic  stance  regarding  the  final  purposes  of  scientific  endeavour.  It  
foregrounds what it  portrays as a piety inherent  to all  investigations of nature, 
more  in  line  with  the  natural  theological  treatises  outlined  above  than  with 
contemporary  technical  treatises  on  the  use  of  the  tool.60 Accompanying  such 
assertions is a similarly greater willingness to prescribe to its  readers particular 
forms of behaviour regarding the conduct of natural investigation. The Microscope 
is filled with recommendations not only regarding microscopic observation, but 
also the constitution of legitimate observation more generally. These comments are 
marked  by  a  tension  between  a  desire  to  instil  in  his  readership  technical 
competency  as  a  guarantor  of  observational  accuracy,  and  a  commitment  to 
rationality as the final arbiter of sensory experience. 
The Microscope is  consistently  critical  of  what  it  portrays  as the over-
simplistic  assumptions  of  many  microscopists  regarding  the  activity  of 
microscopic investigation itself. Above all, it suggests, microscopists have under-
estimated  the  extent  of  technical  skill  necessary  for  the  perception  of  many 
microscopic  phenomena.  Whereas  early-nineteenth-century  microscopists  had 
generally  evaluated the efficacy of their  tools  in  terms of magnification power 
(either lauding their ability to penetrate nature, or cautioning against the use of 
high powers on the grounds that observational veracity could not be ensured), 61 
Carpenter's  text  emphasises  that  such  observation  is  equally  dependent  on 
observers'  manipulation  of  a  range  of  tools  seemingly  peripheral  to  the  lenses 
themselves.  Such is  the author's  feeling regarding what  he regards as an over-
emphasis on 'resolving power'  at the expense of these other techniques that  he 
quotes his own above-mentioned presidential address to the London Microscopic 
Society at length:
This superiority in resolving power...  is obtained at the expense of 
other advantages... the adequate performance of such a lens can only 
be secured by the greatest exactness of the [focal] adjustments. Only 
that part of the object that is precisely in focus, can be seen with any 
60 Compare Carpenter, W.B. The Microscope: and its revelations (London, 1856), eg. pp. 
v, 30-33 with Quekett, J. A Practical Treatise on the Use of the Microscope (London, 
1848), p. vii, or Beale, L. How to Work with the Microscope (London, 1857). On 
microscopic manuals as a genre see Schickore, The Microscope and the Eye, pp. 220-
239.
61 Schickore, The Microscope and the Eye, pp. 83-104; Ratcliff, The quest for the  
Invisible.
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approach to distinctness... it is requisite too, that the adjustment for 
the  thickness  of  the  glass  that  covers  the  object,  should  exactly 
neutralize the effect of its refraction; and that the arrangement of the 
mirror  and condenser  must  be such as  to  give the object  the  best 
possible illumination. If there be any failure in these conditions, the 
performance of a lens of very wide aperture is  very much inferior... 
except in very experienced hands.62
What is  especially  notable here is  the way in which this passage broadens the 
range of  tools  considered  requisite  for  accurate  observation.  In  addition  to  the 
lenses, stands and object-stages generally considered necessary to extend vision to 
the microscopic realm, The Microscope seeks to inculcate in its readers the ability 
to arrange and manipulate a multitude of lamps, measuring devices, slide-types,  
and  dissection  and fixing  techniques.63 Microscopy  in  this  respect  becomes  as 
much about training the hand, as extending the eye. 
As argued below, this emphasis on skilful manipulation helped constitute 
an intellectual milieu in which rational competency could begin to be evaluated not 
in  terms  of  organic  capacity,  but  rather  as  an  expression  of  organic-technical 
interaction.  For  the  moment,  it  is  enough  to  note  the  way  in  which  The 
Microscope displaces the responsibility for accurate sensation away from the eye, 
and onto a tool that had up until that point been conceptualised in terms of that  
organ's extension into the world. It is no longer the eye alone, so much as it and its  
host  body's  interactive  relationship  with  a  microscope  that  'sees'  an  object  of 
interest. In some respects then, the publication of this text can be understood as 
marking the emergence of a notion of perception that constituted the perceiving 
subject as an empowered alliance of 'man' and 'machine.'
Yet despite the seeming conflation of organism and tool  in this text,  it 
should  also  be  noted  that  it  also  places  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  need  for  a 
somatically individualized, 'rational' approach to the evaluation of the results of  
such perception. Far from suggesting that the correct manipulation of microscopes 
will alone guarantee truthful observation, Carpenter is at pains to emphasise the 
62 Carpenter, The Microscope, pp. 196-197. Carpenter's emphasis.
63 Ibid, pp. 108-184, 204-259. On the considerable work involved in constructing 
microscopic technologies as 'transparent' mediators of nature even in established 
institutional settings, see Gooday, G. ''Nature' in the Laboratory: domestication and 
discipline with the microscope in Victorian life science', The British Journal for the  
History of Science 24 (1991), pp. 307-341 and Jacyna, '"A Host of Experienced 
Microscopists"'.
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mutual  constitution  of  observation  and  interpretation.  Where  observation  is 
connected  with  the  tool  itself,  interpretation  is  associated  with  the  individual 
observer.  In  this  respect,  Carpenter  fully  accords  with  the  conception  of 
gentlemanly witnessing outlined in the first chapter. His publications insist that no 
single observer can ever claim observational  authority.  All  are liable to project 
their  expectations  onto  their  observations:  'It  is  a  tendency  common  to  all 
observers, and not by any means peculiar to Microscopists, to describe what they 
believe and  infer,  rather  than  what  they  actually  witness.'64 Accompanying  the 
above-described emphasis on technique as a means to observational accuracy is a 
conviction  that,  even  given  such  technical  competency,  the  attainment  of 
objectivity is only achievable by recourse to mutual agreement between rational 
individuals.  Indeed,  disagreement  is  understood  as  a  key  indicator  of  the 
inadequacy of one or another part of the observational process:
it  will  always  be  found  here,  as  well  as  elsewhere,  that  -  good 
instruments  and  competent  observers  being  pre-supposed  -  the 
accordance in results will be precisely proportional to the accordance 
of  conditions...The  more  completely,  therefore,  the  statements  of 
Microscopic  observers  are kept  free from those fallacies,  to  which 
observations of any kind are liable... the more completely will it be 
found that an essential agreement exists among them all, in regard to 
the facts which they record.65
Ultimately,  as his  1872 address as President  of  the British Association for the 
Advancement  of  Science  indicates,  when  it  comes  to  the  production  of 
observational  truth,  Carpenter  places  his  faith  in  a  community  of  technically 
competent observers:
trustworthiness...  arises from its dependence, not on any one set of 
experience,  but  on  our  unconscious  co-ordination  of  the  whole  
aggregate of our experiences - not on the conclusiveness of any one 
train of reasoning, but on the convergence of all our lines of thought  
towards this one centre.66
64 Carpenter, The Microscope, p. 8. Carpenter's emphasis. See also pp. 184-185.
65 Carpenter, The Microscope, pp. 9-10.
66 Carpenter, 'Man the Interpreter', p. 194. Carpenter's emphases.
193
A community of practitioners does not even have to be aware that they are acting  
in concert - their experiences are 'unconsciously co-ordinated' towards the common 
goal of attaining truthful representation of nature.
As far as microscopic culture during the 1860s and 1870s is concerned, 
Carpenter's statements place it in parallel with much a broader movement towards 
the construction of specialist,  'professional'  communities  as ultimate arbiters  of 
scientific opinion that I have already noted in passing in relation to the efforts to 
constitute a faculty of science at UCL. It is significant that The Microscope makes 
a  clear  distinction  between  those  practitioners  who  might  contribute  original 
insight, and those who must confine themselves to the reporting of observation:
It has been the purpose of the foregoing sketch, to convey an idea, not 
merely of the services which the Microscope has already rendered to 
the collector of facts in every department of the Science of Life, but 
also  of  the  value  of  these  facts  as  a  foundation  for  philosophical  
reasoning... But as it is not every one who is prepared by his previous 
acquirements to appreciate such researches, according to the scientific 
estimate of their importance, it may be well now to address ourselves 
to  that  large  and  increasing  number,  who  are  disposed  to  apply 
themselves to Microscopic research as amateurs, following the pursuit 
rather as a means of wholesome recreation to their own minds, than 
with  a  view  to  the  extension  of  the  boundaries  of  existing 
knowledge.67
This passage is followed by an extensive comment on the value of microscopy as a 
means of inculcating disciplined reason in those groups (such as young boys, and 
'the Labouring population')  deemed most likely to adopt 'evil habits' due to their  
'wrong exercise of the natural powers' of the body.68
Carpenter's  distinction  between  'fact  collectors'  and  'philosophical 
reasoners'  clearly  resonates  with  the  sense/reason  duality  highlighted  at  the 
beginning of this chapter. But at the same time, it subtly re-configures this duality  
as a difference between groups of people (or nervous systems) rather than aspects 
of existence. Just as the operation of the senses is critical to (but not sufficient for)  
67 Carpenter, The Microscope, pp. 29-30. Carpenter's emphases.
68 Ibid. pp. 30-35.
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rational  perception,  collectors  of  facts  are  critical  to  (but  not  sufficient  for)  
philosophical reasoning. Instead of there being two kinds of entity in the world - 
mind (the rational philosopher) and matter (the object of philosophical concern) - 
there are now two kinds of practitioner - professional and amateur. In addition, 
both the conditions for correct observation and for the attribution of originality 
undergo a notable shift.
Carpenter  re-states  the  sense-reason  divide,  but  constructs  sense  as 
inevitably technically  mediated,  and the cultivation of reason as contingent  not 
only on bodily anatomy, but also technical competency. It is no longer the working 
of the bodily eye alone, but that of the eye in conjunction with tools that augment 
sight, that constructs the conditions upon which a community that is able to judge 
perceptual  truth  can  be  built.  In  the  world-view  associated  with  belief  in  an 
inherent difference between spirit and matter,  it is human bodies that constitute  
both a critical means of attaining, and the principal barrier to, rational insight. In 
that  in  which mind is  understood as congruous with bodily presence,  technical 
operations (and operators) perform a similar function.
Again,  the assertion that  cognition  is  a function of  nervous action had 
profound implications as far as women's involvement in microscopic culture was 
concerned. As already noted, the construction of the female body as more liable to  
disrupt the rational operation of mind had presented women authors as a whole 
with a dilemma regarding claims to original insight. Women such as Somerville,  
who  considered  rationality  to  be  the  basis  of  originality,  were  understood  as 
'exceptions' to the general character of their sex. Yet where they sought to engage 
with men on a rational basis, their work was evaluated in relation to this 'more 
general' irrationality, and thereby comparatively easily dismissed as admirable, but 
ultimately inferior to that of the more 'naturally' rational sex. In contrast, women 
authors  operating  within  the  above-described  regime  of  embodied  subjectivity 
were faced with a choice. Either they could seek to construct authorial voices that 
elided the supposed cognitive disadvantages of womens'  bodies,  or,  they could 
seek  to  challenge  the  technical  authority  that  helped  constitute  professional 
exclusivity itself.
Medical women, nervous subjectivity, and microscopic science
Far  from  simply  contributing  to  the  enclosure  of  rationality  as  the 
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exclusive  preserve  of  Western,  male  bodies,  physiological  psychological  texts' 
emphasis  on the skilful  manipulation  of  tools  helped constitute  a new field of 
political action for groups that had historically been constituted as natural 'objects' 
rather than participants in  natural  philosophic  discourse.  Here,  I claim that  the 
emphasis on technical means of observation associated with embodied notions of 
cognition constituted one amongst a number of factors (including the gaining of 
admission  to  educational  institutions,  and  constitution  of  campaigning 
organizations and networks discussed extensively elsewhere)69 that presented some 
women with  the possibility  of  articulating  positive  claims  regarding  their  own 
professional  abilities.  From  the  late  1860's,  a  number  of  middle-class  women 
began to build a reputation for scientific trustworthiness through an engagement 
with microscopic tools and techniques. By situating themselves as skilful operators 
and builders of investigative equipment,  rather than as rational  observers,  these 
women began to substantiate then-increasingly vocal claims that women in general  
were as capable of contributing to scientific and medical culture as men.70 In this 
section, I focus on two women who became especially prominent in medical and 
scientific discourse during this period, and chart the ways in which a skill-centred 
conception of microscopic practice constituted a resource with which they were 
able to construct themselves as legitimate participants within it.
The claim that  women’s engagement  with microscopy helped constitute 
challenges to the male domination of professions should not be taken as militating 
against  the  notion  that  professionals  themselves  were  becoming  increasingly 
dominant  in  scientific  and  medical  culture  at  this  time.  Indeed,  medical  
professionals  relied  for  the  maintenance  of  their  authority  on  the  difficult-to-
discern, microscopic nature of many of the new diseases and ailments that they 
claimed to be able to diagnose and/or treat. The increasing prominence of germ-
centred  notions  of  disease  presents  perhaps  the  most  obvious  example  of  the 
centrality of microscopic analysis in late-nineteenth-century medical science.71 But 
other aspects of medical culture were also being re-oriented around the analysis of 
a nature that remained imperceptible to those unable to operate such tools. The 
69 There is an extensive literature on these topics. On Britain see eg. Dyhouse, C. No 
Distinction of Sex? Women in British universities 1870-1939 (London; UCL Press, 
1995); Gates, B.T. Kindred Nature: Victorian and Edwardian women embrace the living  
world (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1998); Crawford, E. 
Enterprising Women: the Garretts and their circle (London, 2002).
70 See eg. Dyhouse, No Distinction, pp. 13-17.
71 Warboys, M. Spreading Germs: diseases, theories, and medical practice in Britain,  
1865-1900 (Cambridge University Press; New York, 2000).
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attribution of conception to the coming-together of difficult-to-discern sperm and 
eggs,72 the accompanying development of early-stage embryology,73 as well as a 
mounting panic over the weakness of sperm in men74 all point to microscopes as 
tools  that  were  becoming  increasingly  prominent  in  the  mediation  of  lay-
professional  relations  at  this  time.75 As  far  as  women  aspiring  to  engage  in 
professional discourse were concerned then, demonstrating mastery of microscopic 
tools  and  techniques  constituted  a  powerful  means  of  indicating  professional 
competency in both the science and medicine of the time.
 Both of the authors I concentrate on here - Frances Elizabeth Hoggan (née 
Morgan),76 and  Alice  Marian  Hart  (née  Rowland),77 - engaged  extensively  in 
microscopic  research  and  practice.  By  the  time  Hoggan  began  publishing  on 
microscopy  in  1876,  she  had  already  established  a  reputation  as  a  pioneer  of 
women's right to participate in professional medical life. In 1870, she had become 
only  the  second  woman  to  defend  a  medical  thesis  before  the  faculty  of  the 
University of Zürich, one of the earliest of the established European institutions to 
open their doors to women students. She had also become a physician at the New 
Hospital for Women in London, an institution set up during the 1870s by women 
72 Farley, J. Gametes & Spores: ideas about sexual reproduction, 1750-1914 (John 
Hopkins University Press; Baltimore, 1982).
73 Lenoir, The Strategy of Life;  Nyhart, L.K. Biology Takes Form: animal morphology and  
the German universities (University of Chicago Press, 1995).
74 On the 'spermatorrhea panic', see Rosenman, E.B. 'Body Doubles: The spermatorrhea 
panic', Journal of the History of Sexuality 12 (2003), pp. 365-399, Stephens, E. 'Coining 
Spermatorrhea: medicine and male bodily fluids', Sexualities 12 (2009), pp. 467-485 
and Walker, D. 'Continence for a Nation. seminal loss and national vigour', Labour  
History 48 (1985), pp. 1-14.
75 Cassedy, J.H. 'The Microscope in American Medical Science, 1840-1860', Isis 67 
(1976), pp. 76-97; Warner, D.J. 'The Campaign for Medical Microscopy in Antebellum 
America', Bulletin for the History of Medicine 69 (1995), pp. 367-385; Smith, S.D. 
'Coffee, Microscopy, and the Lancet's Analytical Sanitary Commission', Social History  
of Medicine 14 (2001), pp. 171-197.
76Thomas Neville Bonner refers to Hoggan (née Morgan) as Morgan throughout his study 
of nineteenth-century women's medical education. See Bonner, T.N. To the Ends of the  
Earth: women's search for education in medicine (Cambridge, MA and London, 1992), 
esp. pp. 38-39. As I primarily engage with her post-matrimonial publications, I will refer 
to the authorial name given in these (ie. Hoggan). On Hoggan (née Morgan) see also 
Thomas, O.  Frances Elizabeth Hoggan, 1823-1927 (Brecon, 1970).
77As with Hoggan, I refer to Hart (née Rowland) as Hart as that is the name under which 
she published her microscopic works. The only other substantial scholarly work on Hart 
relates to her later publication on colonial life, Picturesque Burma: past and present  
(1897). See Keck, S.L. 'Picturesque Burma: British travel writing 1890-1914', Journal of  
Southeast Asian Studies 35 (2004), pp. 387-414.
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medics  in  response  to  their  exclusion  from  already-established  medical 
institutions.78 Though  Hart  does  not  appear  to  have  joined  a  professional 
organization, she trained at the Laboratoire d'Histologie at the Collège de France in 
Paris during the late 1870's, and her adoption of the microscopic techniques and 
practices developed there constitute the basis for a number of articles published 
during the early 1880s.79 Of the two, Hoggan was the more outspoken regarding 
the politics of professionalism, authoring a wide range of articles and pamphlets 
calling  for  improvements  to  women's  education,  opposing  vivisection,  and 
resigning  from  the  New  Hospital  due  to  her  disagreement  with  her  fellow 
physician  Elizabeth  Garrett  Anderson's  performance  of  ovarian  surgery  there.80 
What is of concern here however is the ways in which a technical conception of 
microscopic practice could be enlisted to confer a status of professional authority 
on women's opinions regarding such matters.
Perhaps  surprisingly  given  the  then-pervasive  supposition  that  women 
were unlikely to be able to contribute to assumedly rational forms of knowledge 
such as  psychology,  evidence  exists  that  both  Hart  and  Hoggan engaged with 
physiological  conceptions  of  cognition.  Indeed,  some  of  Hart's  early  scientific 
activities were facilitated by the renowned authority on neurological diseases (and 
favoured pupil of Thomas Laycock) James Crichton-Browne. A letter from him 
dated  29th  of  November  1874  describes  his  efforts  to  send  a  'Sciopticon' 
(seemingly  a  kind  of  projector)  for  what  he  describes  as  Hart's  'school  
entertainments' from his base in the West Riding Lunatic Asylum at Wakefield. 81 
Later,  in  1879,  Hart  received  a  letter  from another  physiological  psychologist,  
Daniel Hack Tuke, thanking her for sending him a review (which unfortunately I 
have been unable to locate) of a physiological psychological work, and offering a 
few  words  of  encouragement  regarding  her  evidently  positive  portrayal  of 
connections between mind and brain: 'One cannot be too thankful that a man like 
Charcot has arisen in this our age, to take up obscure nervous phenomena in a  
scientific way.'82
78 Bonner, To the Ends of the Earth, pp. 38-39.
79 Hart mentions her training in Hart, A. ['Mrs. Ernest'] 'On the Micrometric Numeration of 
the Blood-Corpuscles, and the Estimation of their Hæmaglobin', Quarterly Journal of  
Microscopical Science 21 (1881), pp. 132 and 133-134.
80 'Frances Elizabeth Hoggan', DNB  [accessed 20/08/2010].
81 James Crichton-Browne-Mrs Ernest Hart, 29th Nov. 1874. Wellcome Library, Western 
MS.5423/6
82 Daniel Hack Tuke-Mrs Ernest Hart, 19th Dec. 1879. Wellcome Library, Western 
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Evidence  for  Hoggan's  personal  engagement  with  physiological 
conceptions of psychology is more tenuous, but it is certainly the case that she, 
along with  her  husband and fellow activist  George,  undertook research  on  the 
functions of nerves. In an article published during the early 1880's, they challenge 
the then-widespread belief  that  different  sites  of  nerve-endings  were associated 
with different kinds of touch-sensation. Instead, using a then-familiar metaphor, 
they  propose  that  all  nerves  operate  in  the  manner  of  an  electric  telegraph, 
conveying messages to the 'nerve-centres of consciousness.'83
In support of my contention that physiological notions of subjectivity were 
accompanied by an emphasis on tools and techniques in observational practice, 
both  women's  microscopic  publications  concentrate,  first  and  foremost,  on  the 
novelty  of  their  claims  regarding  microscopic  technique.  Hart  justifies  her 
participation in scientific discourse on the pragmatic grounds that the efficacy of 
medical practice is being held back by the imperfection of techniques for analysing 
blood. As she comments in her first article, published in the Quarterly Journal of  
Microscopic  Science in  1881,  although  'micrometric  numeration  of  the  blood-
corpuscles and the estimation of hæmoglobin' had only recently been developed, it 
had 'rapidly passed out of the sphere of laboratory experiment into practical use as 
exact methods of physiological and clinical investigation.'84 However, she goes on 
to  suggest,  'the  methods  and  instruments  hitherto  in  use  are  inconveniently 
imperfect and vitiated by numerous sources of error. Some recent improvements  
by M. Malassez, assistant in the Laboratory of Histology in the Collége de France, 
appear  to  me to  have done  much to  remove these disadvantages.'85 Above all, 
Hart's article's principal concern is not with histological nature itself, but with the 
improvement of microscopic practice. As one of the few British students at the 
MS.5423/12. See also James Crichton-Browne-Mrs Ernest Hart, 5th Nov. 1895 
Wellcome Library, Western MS.5423/32 and John Scott Burdon-Sanderson[-Mr and 
Mrs Hart], Wellcome Library, Western MS.5423/36. On Hart's husband Ernest's 
commitment to the 'nervous' interpretation of hypnotism see Leighton, M.E. '"Hypnosis 
Redivivus": Ernest Hart, the British Medical Journal, and the Hypnotism Controversy', 
Victorian Periodicals Review 34 (2001), esp. pp. 112-113.
83 Hoggan, G and Hoggan, F.E. 'On Some Cutaneous Nerve-Terminations in Mammals', 
Journal of the Linnaean Society (Zoology) 16 (1882), pp. 546-593. See also Hoggan, 
G. 'On the Functions, Character, and Positions of the Ultimate Nerve-Terminations in 
the Skin and Hairs', British Medical Journal 1146   (Dec. 16th, 1882), pp. 1197-1200.
84 Hart, 'On the Micrometric Numeration’, p. 132. On microscopy and blood-research 
more generally at this time see Warner, J.H. 'Therapeutic Explanation and the 
Edinburgh Bloodletting Controversy: two perspectives on the medical meaning of 
science in the mid-nineteenth century', Medical History 24 (1980), esp. pp. 247-254.
85 Hart, 'On the Micrometric Numeration', p. 132.
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Laboratoire  d'Histologie,  she  constructs  herself  as  already  working  within  a 
professional context, and as merely 'translating' an (in this case technical) form of 
knowledge from one context to another (an activity conventionally understood as 
especially appropriate to women aspiring to scientific authorship).86
Women's  claims  to  scientific  originality  during  this  period  remained 
subject to a significant degree of scepticism, and on occasion attracted outright 
hostility  from  respected,  well-qualified  medical  practitioners.  If  Hart's  earliest 
microscopic publication retained a self-image as a cautious translator of others'  
work, Hoggan - to an extent already established as a medical authority through her 
attendance at Zurich - was more bold. Her first microscopic article, published in 
1876 issue of  The Journal  of  the Quekett  Microscopic Club,  describes  what  it 
claims to be an entirely new histological staining technique.87 Yet even articulating 
this  claim  in  print  appears  to  have  been  a  difficult  process.  Hoggan's  first 
submission had been to the more prestigious British Medical Journal, but, as her 
Quekett article notes, there had been some difficulty in getting it published in that  
organ:
Although that paper has been in the hands of the editor of the Journal 
[Alice Hart’s husband Ernest Abraham Hart] for the last nine months, 
it  has  not  been  published,  but  inadequate,  and  in  some  cases 
erroneous, accounts of my process, have largely been circulated...  I 
have, therefore, considered it advisable to give, as shortly as possible,  
the details of this very simple and effective process to your Society, 
whose members will, I doubt not, put it to every sort of test.88
Whether the BMJ article was held back because of Hoggan's gender identification,  
reputation as an activist, or because she was perceived as a rival to Ernest Hart's  
microscopist wife, what is of importance here is the emphasis her Quekett article 
places on the veracity of the technique she is putting forward. Hoggan, in inviting 
the 'amateur' members of the Quekett Club to put her staining method (which, she 
claims,  requires  no  materials  that  cannot  be  obtained  at  a  local  chemist  and 
86 Findlen, 'Translating the New Science'; Neeley, K.A. 'Woman as Mediatrix: women as 
writers on science and technology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.' IEEE 
Transactions on Professional Communication 35 (1992), pp. 208-216.
87 Hoggan, F.E. 'On a New Process of Histological Staining', The Journal of the Quekett  
Microscopical Club 4 (1874-1877), pp. 180-181.
88 Ibid. p. 180.
200
druggist)89 to 'every sort of test', deflects attention away from her gender. It is not  
as a observer, reasoner, or woman that she wishes to be judged, but a microscopic 
inventor - her scientific reputation in this field is (she hopes) to be judged on the 
efficacy of her technique in the hands of others, rather than anything that might  
rely on her own bodily capacities. 
Both Hoggan and Hart only begin to claim observational authority once 
they  have  established  themselves  as  contributors  to  the  development  of 
microscopic technique. Even then, their statements regarding microscopic nature 
are continually referred back to their technical competency. For example, although 
Hart's  second  publication  brings  a  question  of  observational  interpretation,  not 
technical  skill,  to  the  fore,  she  nevertheless  emphasises  the  authoritative 
significance of technical matters. One year before her initial publication, in 1880, a 
physician - one Richard Norris - had claimed to have observed what he understood 
as a new translucent,  or 'invisible'  species of corpuscle during the formation of 
'fibrine' (matter constitutive of blood-clots).90 Hart contests this claim, suggesting 
instead (following the work of the German physiologist Alexander Schmidt) that 
these invisible corpuscles are in actuality blood corpuscles that have lost their red 
matter: 'Dr Norris discovers, by various means of staining, his invisible corpuscle. 
That it is there I do not deny, but that it is there because it previously existed in  
this condition in the blood in the living state is I think open to dispute.' 91 Despite 
the clear question of interpretation that seems to be at stake here, Hart does not 
emphasise  her  rational  or  observational  perspicacity  to  substantiate  this  claim. 
Rather, her Paris-obtained technical skills constitute her basis for critique. It is, she 
claims, 'the staining agents recommended by Dr. Norris' that are 'not sufficiently  
powerful' for him to detect the red matter escaping from these corpuscles, not his 
vision, reason or observational capacity.92 As in Hoggan's article, Hart removes her 
bodily  self  from  the  debate,  emphasising  the  perceptive  efficacy  of  technical 
processes above questions of personal interpretation. A similar rhetorical strategy 
can be found in the numerous other microscopic publications Hoggan authored in 
89 Ibid. p. 181.
90 Norris, R. The Physiology and Pathology of the Blood: comprising the origins,  mode of  
development, pathological and post-mortem changes of its morphological elements in  
mammalian and oviparous vertebrates (London, 1882).
91 Hart, A. [Mrs Ernest] 'Note on the Formation of Fibrine', Quarterly Journal of  
Microscopical Science 22 (1882), p. 255.
92 Ibid. p. 256.
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partnership with her husband.93 Through their engagement with technical aspects 
of microscopic practice, both Hoggan and Hart are able to construct an authorial 
voice for themselves as researchers with the ability to provide observational insight 
into the nature of the very small.94
In  addition  to  adopting  a  technically  authoritative  rhetoric  in  her  own 
researches,  Hoggan sought  to  persuade other  women of  the  liberation  that  she 
believed microscopic tools could provide. In a short article in the  Englishwoman's  
Review for  1879  (reprinted  in  pamphlet  form),  she  sets  out  ways  in  which 
microscopes might assist 'those who are looking about them and longing for work,  
but  who are withheld  from choosing  a  profession  or  trade by  the authority  or 
wishes of parents and friends, or by the silent but no less potent influences of their 
education  and  surroundings.'95 Indeed,  in  a  statement  that  plays  up  to  the 
assumptions of anatomically determined differences of sex, she claims that women 
are particularly suited to the technical demands of microscopic observation: 'The 
quick eye, the neat hand, the habitual close attention to details which distinguish 
many of our sex are valuable qualities in this particular field of work.' 96 Above all, 
microscopes hold out the possibility that women might produce original insight  
into nature:
A steady, conscientious worker is sure to discover new facts, and you 
may at any moment light on a discovery which may give the clue to 
the observations of others, which may revolutionize your section of 
the  scientific  world,  which  may  lead  to  the  elucidation  of  some 
obscure form of disease, which may promote the wellbeing or save 
93 Hoggan, G. and Hoggan, F.E. 'On the Development and Retrogression of the Fat Cell', 
Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society 2 (1879), pp. 353-380; Hoggan, G. and 
Hoggan, F.E. 'On the Development and Retrogression of Blood-vessels' Journal of the  
Royal Microscopical Society 3 (1880), pp. 568-584; Hoggan, G. and Hoggan, F.E. 'On 
the Comparative Anatomy of the Lymphatics of the Uterus', The Journal of Anatomy  
and Physiology, Normal and Pathological 16 (1882), pp. 50-89.
94 Though she did herself not aspire to be a ‘professional’ scientist or medic, Ada 
Lovelace again presents a supporting example of the potential that scientific tools could 
have in the construction of authority. Lovelace (who also engaged with physiological 
notions of mind) only began to declare herself a ‘real’ natural philosophic thinker 
following her collaboration with Babbage on the latter’s mathematical ‘analytical engine.’ 
See Winter, ‘A Calculus of Suffering’, pp. 227-228 and 230-233.
95 Hoggan, F.E. The Microscope as Affording Employment and Recreation to Women,  
with hints for beginners on how to set to work (London, [1879]), p. 4.
96 Ibid, p. 6.
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the lives of thousands97
Hoggan's confident recommendation of microscopy as a particularly appropriate 
scientific pursuit for women is most plausibly seen not as a response to the latest 
fashion for microscopic display (which was by that time in terminal decline), but  
as emerging out  of  her extensive engagement  with the tool  during a period in 
which women's presence in professional organisations remained subject to much 
doubt and opposition.
What is not being suggested here is that Hoggan and Hart develop a form 
of rhetoric that is specific to women, or that seeks to privilege women as scientists  
or  medics.  Indeed  as  both  the  previous  chapter  and  the  above  comments  on 
Carpenter's publication make clear, technical competency is beginning to be held 
up as a scientific ideal for all aspiring professionals during this period. Rather, I  
wish to emphasise that it is precisely the technical constitution of this rhetoric that 
made it  attractive to women seeking to attain professional status.  The technical 
emphasis  that  emerged  as  an  ideal  of  scientific  practice  alongside  embodied 
notions of subjectivity paradoxically effaced the involvement of the 'naked' body 
in  scientific  observation.  This  elevation  of  technique-as-observation  presented 
opportunities  for  groups  that  were  considered  inherently  inferior  to  men  with 
regard  to  their  rational  ability.  With  the  physiological  constitution  of  tool-
manipulation as an indicator of rational competency, emphasis on technique could  
be made into a way of eliding the imputation that one's individual body constitutes  
a barrier to accurate perception. 
Although the above comments have been confined to women's engagement 
with microscopy, it should be possible to expand this claim to encompass other 
historically 'lower' groups, such as non-European peoples and the working classes, 
and  also  other  observation-related  tools  as  photographic  cameras,  the  pulse-
inscribing sphygsmograph, and electrical monitoring equipment.98 Nevertheless, in 
comparison to other investigative equipment of the mid-to-late nineteenth century,  
microscopes  were  particularly  amenable  to  engagement  with  by  women.  The 
comparatively low cost of microscopes would have made them relatively easy to 
get hold of unlike other kinds of scientific equipment. In addition, they were easily 
97 Ibid, p. 7.
98 On early photography and gender see Tucker, 'Gender and Genre'. On the 
sphygmograph as a human 'prosthesis' see Brophy, G. 'The Sphygmograph,' Victorian  
Review 35 (2009), pp. 13-17. See also Henchman, A. 'The Telescope as Prosthesis,' 
Victorian Review 35 (2009), pp. 27-32.
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adapted for use in domestic contexts,  a property that  many writers on the tool 
(including Hoggan) pointed to when discussing their potential for enlightening the 
masses.99 Hence the proliferation of women microscopists during the 1860s and 
1870s can be understood as a particularly dramatic instance of more general shifts  
in women’s relation to scientific practice at this time.
Yet increasingly, even microscopic research was being put out of the reach 
of  those  who  did  not  have  access  to  institutional  resources.  Microscopes 
considered appropriate for professional contexts were coming to be differentiated 
from those suited to home use. As Graham Gooday has shown, microscopes in 
laboratory settings became ever more complex (and thereby expensive) objects as 
greater attention was paid to the nature of the very small.100 It was manufacturers of 
investigative tools that had most to gain from the cultural shift towards technical  
ways  of  knowing,  and  fields  such  as  engineering  and  tool  design  remained 
particularly resistant to the involvement of women within them.101 The period in 
which  women  working  in  domestic  contexts  were  able  to  engage  with  the 
professional,  laboratory-centred  discourse  of  microscopy was  thereby relatively 
short. As microscope-related tools, along with the formal scientific disciplines that 
they  were was made to  serve,  became ever  more specialised,  barriers  between 
recreational  and  work-centred  observation  became  ever  more  marked. 
Nevertheless, a significant number of women scientists and medics did publish on 
both  microscopic  technique  and nature  between 1860  and 1880.102 For  a  short 
period of  time at  least,  the  acceptance of technical  conceptions  of  microscopic 
observation helped constitute a context in which professionally ambitious women 
99 Hoggan, 'The Microscope as Affording Employment', pp. 5-6;  Cooper, 'A Brief Sketch', 
p. 1; Carpenter, The Microscope, p. v; Beale, How To Work With the Microscope, pp. 
3-4.
100 Gooday, ''Nature' in the Laboratory.'
101On women's (limited) involvement in trade in scientific tools during the nineteenth 
century see Morrison-Law, A.D. 'Women in the Nineteenth-Century Scientific 
Instrument Trade', in Benjamin, Science and Sensibility, pp. 89-117. On industrial 
culture and exclusivity more generally, see Berg, The Machinery Question.
102 Women authors on microscopy of this time include Miss E.F. Staveley, Eleanor Anne 
Ormerod, Alice Johnson, and Jessie A. Sallitt. On these figures and for lists of their 
publications see Creese, Ladies in the Laboratory?. Though she does not present a 
clear case of a woman aspiring to professional recognition, Ormerod's publications 
demonstrate perhaps the most extensive of all women's engagements with microscopy 
during this period. On Ormerod see Sheffield, S.L-M. Revealing New Worlds: Three  
Victorian Women Naturalists (London, 2001), pp. 139-194, and McDirmid Clark, J.F. 
'Eleanor Ormerod (1828-1901) as an Economic Entomologist: 'Pioneer of Purity Even 
More than of Paris Green'' The British Journal for the History of Science 25 (1992), pp. 
431-452.
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were able to construct themselves as original contributors to medical and scientific  
discourse.  In  so  doing,  they  were  able  to  challenge  gendered  barriers  to 
professional  membership,  and  thereby  complicate  future  claims  to  sexual 
exclusivity that posited a direct relation between bodily constitution and perceptual  
capacity.
Techniques of resistance, or resistance to the technical?
The adoption of tool-centred modes of scientific writing were not the only 
- nor even the principal - way in which women wrote on science during the latter  
decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  I  thereby  wish  to  conclude  this  chapter  by 
pointing to a rather different way in which epistemic tools such as microscopes 
appear in the scientific literature of the period.  Scientific novelists  and popular 
authors such as George Eliot and George Henry Lewes, and authors of texts aimed 
at  children  such  as  Arabella  Burton  Buckley,  could  command  a  far  broader 
readership  than  the  esoteric  publications  associated  with  the  likes  of  Hart  and 
Hoggan.103 In  the  texts  of  these  former  authors  -  who  adhere  to  notions  of 
embodied  subjectivity  just  as  much  if  not  more  explicitly  than  the  technical 
authors discussed in the previous section - tools are made to participate in, rather 
than constitute an authority for, the construction of scientific narrative. In making 
explicit the narrative capacity of tools, they indicate the emergence of a different  
form of resistance to Western, male dominance than that which aspired to break 
down the exclusivity of the professions through gaining admission to them.
Like  Hart  and  Hoggan,  Buckley  -  one  of  the  most  successful  woman 
writers  on  science of  late-nineteenth  century  Britain  -  engaged enthusiastically 
with  physiological  psychologists'  claims  regarding  the  embodied  nature  of 
perception. In taking on the position of editor of the tenth edition of Somerville's  
On the Connexion  of  the Physical  Sciences (1877),  Buckley was aware of  the 
respect  that  her  predecessor  could  command  within  certain  sections  of  the 
scientific  community.  Nevertheless,  she  was  also  concerned with  developing  a 
scientific reputation of her own, having worked as the famed geologist Sir Charles 
103 On Buckley see Gates, B.T. 'Revisioning Darwin With Sympathy: Arabella Buckley', in 
Gates, B.T. and Shtier, A.T. Natural Eloquence: women reinscribe science (Madison 
and London, 1997), pp. 164-176 and Lightman, B. Victorian Popularizers of Science:  
designing nature for new audiences (University of Chicago Press; Chicago and London, 
2007), pp. 238-253.
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Lyell's secretary between 1864 and 1875, and recently published her first book, A 
Short History of Natural Science (1876). Promising not to disturb any passage in 
which Somerville's 'own views' were expressed, even if they were in Buckley's 
view occasionally 'somewhat antiquated',104 she nevertheless felt the need to update 
On the Connexion to address some the more recent scientific trends. Specifically, 
significant  portions  of  molecular  and  energy  science  (including  researches  by 
James Clerk-Maxwell, Sir William Thomson, John Tyndall and, most notably, the 
pre-eminent physiologist and psychologist in Germany, Hermann von Helmholtz) 
had not been included in previous editions.105 The publications of Helmholtz, in 
Buckley's  opinion,  offered  an  important  update  for  Somerville's  previous 
comments on the perception of colours. Somerville had relied on the work of Sir  
David  Brewster,  who  had attributed  the  perception  of  colour  difference  to  the 
nature of the solar spectrum. In contrast with Newton, Brewster considered that  
three 'primary' colours were pre-existent in nature, and that it  was these natural 
colours which made up the spectrum as a whole.106 Buckley's edition draws on 
Helmholtz  to  articulate  a  different  conclusion.  Rather  than  the  three  primary 
colours  being  present  in  a  nature  external  to  human  perception,  she  suggests, 
Helmholtz's conclusions demonstrate that the perception of colour depends on the 
nature of the body - specifically, that of the eye and its associated nerves. 107 This 
linking of  perception with bodily  processes  is  a consistent  theme in  Buckley's 
work. In  A Short History, she cites the most famous physiological psychologist, 
Herbert Spencer, as 'one of our greatest living thinkers', and makes a number of 
comments regarding what she understands as the close relations of nervous and 
psychological  life  in  her  later  works.108 Yet  her  engagement  with  investigative 
equipment presents a very different conception of the role of tools in scientific life  
than does Hart and Hoggan's publications.
104 Somerville, M. (corr. and rev. Buckley, A.B.) On the Connexion of the Physical  
Sciences [10th ed.] (London, 1877), p. vii.
105 Ibid. pp. ix-x.
106 Somerville, M. On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences [9th ed.] (London, 1858), 
pp. 160-162.
107 Somerville, On the Connexion... [10th ed.], pp. 183-186.
108 Buckley, A.B. A Short History of Natural Science, and of the Progress of Discovery  
from the Time of the Greeks to the Present Day, For the Use of Schools and Young  
Persons (London, 1876), p. 139; Buckley, A.B. Life and Her Children: glimpses of  
animal life from the amœba to the insects (London, 1880), eg. pp. 266-268 and 300-
301; Buckley, A.B. Winners in Life's Race or the Great Backboned Family (London, 
1882), eg. pp. 8-9.
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Rather  than  look  to  tools  and  technical  competency  as  means  of 
guaranteeing observational truth, Buckley - like a number of her contemporaries - 
adopts an authorial voice which seeks to acknowledge the contingency of all truth-
claims regarding nature. To this end, she emphasises the uncertainty of her own 
narrative suppositions. Gillian Beer has pointed to the articulation of a problematic 
relation  between  subject  and  object  in  late  nineteenth  century  literature.  The 
publication of such figures as Charles Darwin and Eliot, she suggests, are linked 
by their articulation of new forms of authorial voice, marked by their concern to 
acknowledge  the  indeterminacy  of  scientific  investigation.  Where  Darwin 
emphasises the uncertain nature of his claims regarding nature, or Elliot brings the 
determination  of  her  novels'  protagonists  futures  into  question,  these  authors 
privilege the contingent,  transformative and relational  aspects of perceptions  of 
nature.109 In  a  similar  way,  Buckley  insists  on  the  uncertainty  of  her  claims 
regarding  the  Darwinian,  naturally  selected  world  of  life  that  her  publications 
portray.  A  Short  History concludes  with  a  eulogy  to  the  power  of  scientific 
investigation, which not only encourages piety and devotion, but instils a profound 
sense of the unknowability of the universe:
'True  science,  like  true  religion,  leads  to  an  entire  and  childlike 
dependence upon the Invisible Ruler of the Universe... it leads even 
the most instructed to feel how extremely limited our knowledge is, 
and that we are after all, like inexperienced children, dependent on the 
love and power of our Maker to bring us safely out of the darkness 
into the light.'110 
Science in this passage becomes the path to true enlightenment, to a belief in the  
'love and power of our Maker'. But unlike the claims of those natural theological  
texts that seek proof of heavenly influence in God's creation itself, it does so above 
all through its inculcation of a sense of the incomprehensibility of creation as a 
whole.111 Religious life does not end with an demonstration of the creative hand of 
109 Beer, Darwin's Plots, pp. 33-43, 67-70, 139-155 and 175-185.
110 Buckley, A Short History, p. 237.
111 Buckley also appears to have authored two scholarly articles engaging with theosophy 
(ie. the possibility of re-incarnation) from an evolutionary perspective. See [Buckley, 
A.B.] 'Darwinism and Religion', Macmillan's Magazine 24 (1871), pp. 45-51 and 
[Buckley, A.B.] 'The Soul, and the Theory of Evolution', University Magazine 93 (1879), 
pp. 1-10.
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god in nature (in this case natural selection), but the acknowledgement that the true 
nature of creation is not and (critically) cannot ever be completely known.
For those seeking to articulate a form of narrative in which the narrator is 
not - and cannot be - all-knowing, the supposition that any mode of practice might 
act  as  an  infallible  guarantor  of  perception  becomes  problematic.  This  was 
certainly the case as far as technical modes of objectivity are concerned. Going 
along  with  Buckley's  articulation  of  an inherently  unknowing subjectivity  is  a 
portrayal of investigative tools not as sources of observational authority, but as 
literal  'narrative  devices.'  A  Short  History describes  the  seventeenth-century 
microscopist Anton von Leeuwenhoek as someone who made the microscope tell a 
'wonderful tale' of a world of invisible animalcules and  the tiny offspring of larger 
creatures.112 Her  later  Through  Magic  Glasses (1890)  narrates  the  story  of  an 
illusion-producing  'magician'  science  teacher  who  introduces  his  class  to  the 
wonders of nature by speaking to them through the 'magic glasses' of telescopes, 
microscopes  and  spectroscopes.113 Such  strategies  are  strongly  reminiscent  of 
Elliot’s use of microscopic metaphors in Middlemarch (1871-1872), in which the 
microscope figures as a narrative means of contrasting the technical confidence of 
a professional scientific observer with the perceptual difficulties experienced and 
acknowledged by the amateur of the tale.114 The publications of Elliot’s partner, the 
physiological psychological author and self-defined amateur microscopist George 
Henry Lewes, also relate a sense of microscopy as connected to self-examination 
as much as interrogation of an external world.115 For Buckley, Elliot and Lewes, 
microscopic manipulation is not only a means of knowing the world, but also of 
narrating a sense of self as unable to know in any complete sense at all.
Though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the specific beliefs 
of  Buckley,  Elliot  or  Lewes regarding the nature of the knowing subject,  it  is 
nevertheless important to note that these figure's notions of scientific subjectivity 
were both entirely compatible with embodied notions of cognition,  and sharply 
divergent  from the  technical  tropes  of  scientific  observation  outlined  above  in 
112 Buckley, A Short History, p. 139.
113 Buckley, A.B. Through Magic Glasses, and Other Lectures (London, 1890). See 
Gates, 'Revisioning Darwin'.
114 Wormald, M. 'Microscopy and Semiotic in Middlemarch', Nineteenth-Century Literature 
50 (1996), pp. 501-524.
115 Ibid, esp. pp. 512-517; Armstrong, 'The Microscope', pp. 40-43. See Lewes, G.H. Sea-
Side Studies at Ilfracombe, Tenby, The Scilly Isles, & Jersey (Edinburgh and London, 
1858), esp. pp. 36-38 and 53-55.
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connection  with  it.  These  figures'  comments  on  the  narrative  potential  of 
investigative tools  can be understood as  indicating the presence of  a strand of 
scientific  culture  that  sought  to  constitute  alternatives  to  the  tool-centred, 
professional ways of seeing associated with technical conceptions of objectivity.  
Through its privileging of technical means of knowing the world, the nerve-centric 
culture of late nineteenth-century Britain emphasised technical competence as the 
means of - and thereby also the barrier to - participating in scientific discourse. As 
epistemic  tools  and  techniques  became  ever  more  complex,  esoteric,  and 
expensive,  the ability to be recognised as a scientific authority came to rest on 
access  to  institutions  able  to  afford  such  equipment.  For  writers  seeking  to 
articulate  wider  narrative  conceptions  of  nature,  this  mode  of  participation 
constituted a problem in and of itself, rather than a means of overcoming bodily 
barriers to rational contemplation. The figuring of tools as narrative devices in this  
sense becomes a means of resisting technique-centred notions of natural perception 
without necessarily bringing the observer's worldly presence into question (indeed, 
often by insisting on it all the more).
Conclusion
The  articulation  of  diverse  forms  of  embodied  subjectivity  during  this 
period thereby marks a disjuncture in  the conditions of possibility that  women 
experienced regarding their participation in discourses relating to nature. Where a 
regime of disembodied subjectivity held up the possession of rationality as the pre-
eminent  key  to  the  production  of  natural  truth,  the  articulation  of  a  notion  of 
rationality  as  inherently  embodied  brought  the  means  of  its  production  into 
question.  Within  the  regime  of  cognitive  disembodiment,  the  organic  body 
presents the sovereign medium through which perception of the material  world 
might  be effected.  In  contrast,  the  regime of  bodily  cognition  is  marked by  a 
tension  between  the  perceptive  capacities  of  two  kinds  of  body  -  the  organic 
experiencing subject, and the technical means by which that subject's perceptual 
capacity is presumed to be extended.116
For middle-class women seeking to resist late-nineteenth-century efforts to 
confine professional participation to historically authoritative (ie. European, male) 
bodies, at least two possibilities presented themselves. On the one hand, they could 
116 Ketabgian, 'The Human Prosthesis.'
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seek access to those organisations that sought (increasingly effectively) to gain a 
monopoly over the production of natural truth. To this end, many women sought 
recognition  as  technical  innovators.  By  emphasising  the  originality  of  their 
techniques rather than of their organic bodily experiences, they were able to elide 
the  corporeal  barriers  to  rationality  that  their  organic  bodies  were  thought  to 
present.  On  the  other  hand,  they  could  -  in  conjunction  with  other  'non-
professional' sympathisers - seek to deny the scientific legitimacy of  professional 
knowledge  itself.  For  those  to  whom  scientific  professionalism  constituted  a 
problem  as  much  as  a  solution,  the  tool-centred  epistemology  of  professional 
science itself begins to figure as an object of resistance. 
The  divergence  of  these  two  forms  of  resistance  appears  to  rest  on  a 
differentiation  between  two  modes  of  scientific  activity  that  accompanied  the 
articulation of embodied notions of self. Where disembodied culture consistently 
elevates  'representation'  above  'practice'  -  science pre-eminently  consists  in  the 
rational sensation and interpretation of the material world by an immaterial soul -  
the nerve-centred culture of embodiment is marked by a tension between the two.  
Within this latter culture, attitudes towards tools and techniques constitute a point 
of  departure  regarding  political  action.  For  those  seeking  escape  from  the 
definition of their selves in terms of a determining, organic nature, a ‘practical’  
engagement  with  epistemic  tools  and  techniques  could  constitute  a  means  of 
personal emancipation. Alternately, for those who saw the determination of culture 
in  terms  of  nature  as  inevitable,  it  could  only  be  through  the  articulation  of  
alternative forms of ‘representation’  (ie.  the re-constitution of narrative science) 
that  any  of  those  aspects  of  scientific  culture  then-increasingly  coming  to  be 
perceived as excessive (vivisection, for example) might be curbed. 
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Chapter 5:
Technical  Life:  vivisection  and  the  critique  of 
nervous subjectivity (c.1870-1890)
Introduction
This chapter characterises the constitution during the 1870s and 1880s of 
what I term a 'post-physiological'  dynamic regarding the place of the human in 
Western  culture.  This  dynamic,  I  believe,  both  depends  on,  and  seeks  to 
differentiate itself from, the physiological psychological context out of which it  
begins  to  crystallize  during  the  late  nineteenth  century.  Where  physiological 
conceptions of mind take as their central problematic the relation of matter to spirit, 
and  human  beings’  place  in  this  relation,  the  post-physiological  tendencies 
addressed in this chapter are principally concerned with defining ways in which 
technicity and humanity, and humanity and life, relate to one another. Put another 
way,  although  the  exclusively  material  presence  of  human  being  remains  the 
principal explicit point of contention in physiological psychological culture during 
the nineteenth century, another discourse can be discerned that emerges alongside 
it.  Within  this  discourse,  the  principal  tension  brings  the  very  'humanness'  of 
individuals' bodies into question. Psychologically-concerned texts begin to emerge 
during  the  1870s  and  1880s  that  do  not  principally  address  the  materiality  or 
otherwise of mind, but rather the extent to which bodily presence can be thought as 
interaction between human animals and ‘animal’ others, and to which bodily organs 
can be thought in relation to non-organic 'tools'. Such texts thereby prefigure the 
‘cybernetic’  and ‘posthuman’ subjectivities pointed to in the introduction to this 
thesis.
It  should  be emphasised  that  neither  the re-thinking  of  humanity  as  an 
attempt  to  become  more  animal-like,  nor  belief  that  it  might  gradually  being 
displaced by a potentially self-generating, 'technical' form of existence, can be seen 
as  central  to  most  nineteenth-century  culture.  Nevertheless,  by  focusing  on the 
notion of tools as ‘prosthetics’ that could be attached to human bodies (and, indeed, 
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of humans as prosthetics that could be attached to tools), Tamara Ketabgian and 
Erin O’Connor have begun to chart  the emergence during the latter  half  of  the  
century of a culture in which it became harder to conceive of humans and machines 
as  distinct, constitutionally unrelated categories. These writers privilege such sites  
as factories and such tools as artificial limbs as objects of concern. As such, their  
analyses address a re-constitution of humanity in relation to an unproblematically 
‘mechanical’ set of tools and techniques.1 
In  contrast  to  O’Connor  and  Ketabgian’s  focus  on  human-machine 
interactions,  this  chapter  takes  as  its  focus  the  constitution  of  subjectivity  in 
relation  to  an  assemblage  that  itself embodied  a  relation  between  body  and 
mechanism: the vivisected animal. In Britain, vivisected animals constituted the 
principal,  most  explicitly  problematized  figure  of  organic-technical  interaction 
during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Through a consideration of two 
late-nineteenth-century  critics  of  nervous  subjectivity  that  engaged  with  these 
entities - Edward Carpenter (1844-1929) and Samuel Butler (1835-1902) - a post-
physiological  subjectivity  is  seen to  emerge.  Within this  notion of  the self,  the 
principal  points  of  contention concern  the  extent  and  ways  in  which humanity 
might indeed come to reconcile itself to living nature, and the possibility that to be 
human might indeed also be to accommodate oneself to a self-generating, technical 
form of life.
The previous chapter indicated that nervous psychology constituted a key 
condition by which tools became important for the re-negotiation of gender roles 
during the second half  of the nineteenth century.  Extending this analysis to the 
notion of ‘masculinity,’ this chapter emphasises again that the technical discourse 
of  physiology  did  not  simply  offer  a  means  by  which  historically  objectified 
‘subjects’ could seek to participate in an unchanging, enlightened culture of rational 
empiricism.2 On the contrary, the increasingly prevalent figure of the technically-
1 Ketabgian, 'The Human Prosthesis’; O’Connor, Raw Material, pp. 102-147. See also 
Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines.
2 On masculinity nineteenth-century in Britain see eg. Adams, J.E. Dandies and Desert  
Saints: styles of Victorian masculinity (Cornell; University Press, 1995); Sussman, H. 
Victorian Masculinities: manhood and masculine poetics in early Victorian literature and 
art (Cambridge; University Press, 1995); Tosh, J. A Man's Place: masculinity and the 
middle-class home in Victorian England (Yale; University Press, 1999); Tosh, J.A. 
Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth-Century Britain: essays on gender, family and 
empire (Harlow, 2005).
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manipulated  organism  struck  at  the  heart  of  eighteenth-century  conceptions  of 
‘man’ as a singular and observationally privileged whole. Kay Anderson has noted 
that the latter decades of the nineteenth century can be read as being marked by a 
‘crisis’  within  ‘classical’  (ie.  enlightenment)  notions  of  the  human.  Anderson 
emphasises  the  agency  of  colonial  sites  and  peoples  in  this  crisis.3 I  wish  to 
complement her account by pointing to the place of organic-technical entities in  
this break-down of the human subject.
Vivisected  animals  participated  in  the  break-down  of  conceptions  of 
humanity that had come to the fore during the eighteenth century in at least two 
respects.  Firstly,  the  performativity  of  vivisectional  practice  dramatised  the 
already-detailed contention that human life could not be conceived except in terms 
of an epistemologically prior, or more fundamental, living 'element.' The medical 
rationale for study of non-human nervous systems took as its basic premise the  
contention that all nervous systems were fundamentally similar. Re-thinking ‘man’ 
in terms of 'elemental' or 'animal' drives and desires, late nineteenth century texts 
concerning  relations  between  animality  and  humanity  contributed  to  a  much 
longer-term  undermining  of  the  presumption  that  men  are  pre-eminently 
intellectual,  'rational'  beings.4 Secondly,  and  more  specifically  to  the  technical 
emphasis  that  accompanied physiological  psychological  thinking,  the vivisected 
animal is made in and of itself a figure in relation to which humans begin to be re-
constituted as inherently 'habitual'  entities.  Human bodies come to be linked to  
machines and animals simultaneously; or rather, human subjectivity is integrated 
into a representational world in which tools are conceived of as counterparts of the 
‘living,’ and animals are portrayed as fundamentally reliant on the ‘technical’.
The  spreading  of  vivisectional  practice  played  a  significant  role  in  the 
fracturing  of  many  of  the  certainties  of  nineteenth-century  culture.5 As  an 
3 Anderson, Race and the Crisis of Humanism, esp. pp. 109-145.
4 See the previous chapters of this thesis and Dror, O.E. 'The Affect of Experiment: the 
turn to emotions in Anglo-American physiology, 1900-1940,' Isis 90 (1999), pp. 205-237; 
Dror, O.E. 'Techniques of the Brain and the Paradox of Emotions, 1880-1930,' in 
Science in Context 14 (2001), pp. 643-660; White, P. 'The Face of Physiology,' 
Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century 7 (2008), pp. 
[http://www.19.bbk.ac.uk/index.php/19/article/view/487/0 accessed 01/02/11]; White, 
'Darwin's Emotions’.
5 There is now an extensive literature on nineteenth-century vivisectional practices. See 
French, R.D. Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society (Princeton and 
London; Princeton University Press, 1975); Lansbury, C. The Old Brown Dog: women, 
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investigative  technique,  it  both  promised  answers  to  long-held  questions 
concerning the 'nature'  of  the human, and required as raw material  elements of 
nature (animals)  conventionally defined within Western culture as placed under 
man's  care  by  God.  Hitherto  largely  unquestioned  assumptions  regarding  the 
inevitability of scientific progress, as well as the unquestionablility of man's place 
at the head of creation, become subject to doubt in Britain around the same time 
that  vivisection  becomes  a  focus  of  debate.  The  newly-constructed  academic 
laboratories devoted to the technical revealing of the physiology of life witness the 
emergence of a newly-persuasive object of scientific concern during the 1870s and 
1880s. Held up as 'the' technique by which the physiological relations of nerves 
and bodies to minds might be discovered, the results of interventions in animals'  
nervous  systems are  employed to  support  those  psychologies  that  insist  on the 
identity of matter  and spirit.  Yet,  simultaneously,  such practices also become a 
broader focus for concern. For many, the practice of vivisection heralded a cultural 
elevation of physical science, was motivated by a desire to reduce metaphysics to 
matter, and symbolized a descent into a state of moral degradation at odds with the  
teachings of the Christian church.6
Vivisection remains a focus of concern even amongst those texts that do 
not object to the proposition that mind is inherently material. Indeed, attempts to 
workers , and vivisection in Edwardian England (University of Wisconsin Press; Madison, 
1985); Rupke, N.A. (ed.) Vivisection in Historical Perspective (London and New York, 
1990); Kean, H. 'The 'Smooth Cool Men of Science': the feminist reaction and socialist 
response to vivisection' History Workshop Journal 40 (1995), pp. 16-38; Menke, R. 
'Fiction as Vivisection: G.H. Lewes and George Eliot,' ELH 67 (2000), pp. 617-653; 
Preece, R. 'Darwinism, Christianity, and the Great Vivisection Debate', Journal of the 
history of Ideas 64 (2003), pp. 399-419; Bittel, C. 'Science, Suffrage, and 
Experimentation: Mary Putnam Jacobi and the controversy over vivisection in late 
nineteenth-century America,' Bulletin of the History of Medicine 79 (2005), pp. 664-694; 
Pollock, M.S. 'Ouida's Rhetoric of Empathy: a case study of Victorian anti-vivisection 
narrative', in Pollock, M.S. and Rainwater, C. (eds.) Figuring animals: essays on animal  
images in art, literature, philosophy and popular culture (New York and Basingstoke, 
2005), pp. 135-159; Degeling, C. 'Canines, Cosanguinity, and One-Medicine: all the 
qualities of a dog except loyalty', Health and History 10 (2008), pp. 23-47; Mayer, J. The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Laboratory Animals’, Victorian Studies 50 
(2008), pp. 399-417; Miller, I. 'Necessary Torture? Vivisection, suffragette force-feeding, 
and responses to scientific medicine in Britain c. 1870-1920,' Journal of the History of  
Medicine and Allied Sciences 64 (2009), pp. 333-372; Mayer, J. 'The vivisection of the 
Snark,' Victorian Poetry 47 (2009), pp. 429-448; Chakrabarti, P. 'Beasts of Burden: 
animals and laboratory research in colonial India,' History of Science 48 (2010), pp. 125-
151. For an historiographic overview see Mayer, J. 'Ways of Reading Animals in 
Victorian Literature, Culture and Science', Literature Compass 7 (2010), pp. 347-357.
6 Preece, 'Darwinism, Christianity, and the Great Vivisection Debate'.
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re-think an embodied psychology in more holistic terms than those adhered to by 
physiological psychologists are frequently accompanied by doubts regarding the 
appropriateness,  efficacy,  and  plausibility  of  vivisection  as  a  means  of 
psychological  investigation.  One  response  to  this  concern  was  to  regulate  the 
practice  of  vivisection,  enclosing  it  as  the  exclusive  right  of  a  ‘professional’  
scientific  community.  But  even  though vivisectional  practice  itself  came  to  be 
regulated out of the sight of a citizenry no longer judged competent to evaluate its'  
effects,  the  representational figure  of  the  vivisected  animal  proliferated.7 This 
figure became a means by which the very historically differentiated categories that  
physiological psychologists had sought indelibly to fuse within the human body - 
matter and spirit - would be re-thought in relation to and at the conjunction of two 
rather  different  figures  -  that  of  the  animal  and the  machine.  It  is  thereby the  
purpose  of  this  chapter  to  emphasise  the  active  role  that  the  representation  of 
vivisectional assemblages played in reconstitution of 'man,' and the breakdown of 
historically-established  attitudes  and  beliefs  during  the  latter  decades  of  the 
century.  Animals  combined  with  physiologically-intrusive  tools  -  and,  by 
implication, bio-technical entities more generally - can, I believe, be understood as 
participatory actors in the deconstruction of the nerve-centred discourse that has 
played (and still does play) a critical role in the constitution and maintenance of 
liberal individualist forms of subjectivity.8
7 Burt, J. 'The Illumination of the Animal Kingdom: the role of light and electricity in animal 
representation,' Society & Animals 9 (2001), pp. 203-228; Lawrence, C. 'Cinema Vérité? 
The Image of William Harvey's Experiments in 1928', in Rupke, Vivisection, pp. 295-313.
8 In this respect this chapter draws its theme from studies of the place of the 'cyborg' in 
contemporary culture (see the notes to the introduction of this thesis). It also draws on a 
burgeoning literature addressing the representation of animals. See eg. Rothfels, N. (ed.) 
Representing Animals (Indiana University Press; Bloomington, 2002), esp. Fudge, E. 'A 
Left-handed Blow: writing the history of animals', in idem, pp. 3-18; Pollock, M.S. and 
Rainwater, C. (eds.) Figuring Animals: essays on animal images in art, literature,  
philosophy and popular culture (New York and Basingstoke, 2005); Kete, K. (ed.) A 
Cultural History of Animals in the Age of Empire (Oxford and New York, 2007), esp. 
Magnum, T. 'Narrative Dominion or The Animals Write Back? Animal genres in literature 
and the arts', in idem, pp. 153-173; Ritvo, The Animal Estate.
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Vivisection and the 'man of science'
Firstly,  it  should  be  noted  that,  as  'the'  characteristic  form  of 
experimentation  with  life  during  the  late  nineteenth  century,  vivisection  was 
intimately associated with the constitution of physiology as the scientific equal of 
other experimental disciplines such as physics and chemistry.
A perceived need for laboratory settings in which to conduct vivisection 
helped constitute new spaces in which scientific identities could be formed. The 
widespread adoption of vivisection, and of the notion of the British physiologist as 
a scientific man who works exclusively as a researcher, emerge at around the same 
time.9 Vivisection's bloody nature, and the need for specialist equipment to conduct 
it, meant that it was largely practised in the laboratory or laboratory-like settings 
associated with the emerging identity  of  the 'professional'  scientific  or  medical 
researcher.  Conversely,  as  texts  place  increasing  emphasis  on  laboratory 
experimentation  as  'the'  principal  characteristic  of  scientific  practice,  inquiry 
regarding the nature of physiological life comes to be identified closely with sites 
designed  specifically  for  experimentation  with  animals.  Like  the  chemical 
laboratories  of  Thomas  Thomson  or  Lord  Kelvin's  rooms  devoted  to  physical 
experimentation  at  Glasgow  University  earlier  in  the  century,  physiological 
laboratories  such as  those founded by Michael  Foster  at  Cambridge during the 
early 1870s10 had become emblematic of an enhancement of cultural status for their  
associated field of study. 
Animal experimentation also took place in museological or even (as anti-
vivisectionists frequently emphasised) domestic settings.11 Nevertheless, it is only 
along  with  the  dedication  of  rooms and buildings  (and particularly  rooms  and 
buildings  within  established  academic  settings)  to  such  practices  that  British 
writers begin to identify them as critical to the conduct of investigation within the  
field as a whole.12 The need for personnel that went along with the construction of 
9 French, Antivivisection and Medical Science, pp. 42-44. Rupke, N. 'Pro-Vivisection in 
England in the Early 1880s: arguments and motives', in Rupke, Vivisection, pp. 188-208.
10 Geison, Michael Foster, pp. 162-163.
11 Kraft, and Alberti, ‘’Equal though Different'’.
12French, R.D. Antivivisection and Medical Science, pp. 33-46. Rupke, 'Pro-Vivisection in 
England'.
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physiological laboratories both swelled the numbers of physiologists employed by 
institutions devoted to experimental research and pedagogy, and helped create a 
perception that experimental physiology was attaining increasing influence within 
those institutions themselves.
The  widespread  adoption  of  vivisection  also  accompanied  efforts  by 
laboratory-trained physiologists to claim exclusivity regarding the ability to define 
physiological life.  As well  as being perceived as the principal means by which 
physiology could be made into a 'laboratory' science like chemistry and physics,  
the proliferation of laboratory-based vivisection is accompanied by an expansion in 
the  use  of  technical  terms  relating  to  it.  As  noted  in  previous  chapters, 
physiologists  employed  in  laboratories  and  museums  at  this  time  begin  to 
demarcate  their  activities  from what  are  increasingly  characterised  as  'amateur' 
investigations into the nature of  life.  One important  means of  achieving this  is 
through  the  use  of  esoteric  terminology.  The  Handbook  for  the  Physiological  
Laboratory (1873)  -  a text  considered critical  to  the formation of  experimental 
physiology as a discipline - insisted in its introductory statement that it belonged 'in 
the laboratory rather than the study', and spared its readers none of the technical 
terms  associated  with  the  academic  study  of  medicine.13 The  perception  that 
vivisectional investigation could be unreliable if conducted without due care and 
attention contributed to a wider feeling that  hands and heads that  had not been 
trained in  the language of  physiology were not  capable  of  pronouncing on the 
significance  of  experimental  phenomena.  Whilst  entirely  capable  of  observing 
apparently unadorned 'facts' in the field, amateurs were not generally considered 
masters of the tools and language that were becoming requisite for the admission of  
physiological articles into respected, specialist scientific publications. 
These two tendencies regarding the justification of allocation of resources 
to physiological investigation, and the increasing exclusivity of the community that 
benefited from such resource allocation, indicate ways in which vivisection came 
to be associated with the formation of the identity of the 'professional' physiologist  
rather than that of the 'man of science.'14 As one means by which the exclusive 
13Sanderson, J.B. 'Editor's Preface', in Sanderson, Handbook for the Physiological  
Laboratory, p. vii.
14On the gendering of the emerging identity of the 'scientist' during the late nineteenth 
century see Barton, ''Men of Science'’; White, Thomas Huxley; Mussell, 'Private 
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spaces and rhetoric now associated with a professionalizing scientific discourse  
could be constructed, vivisection might be said to have constituted a set of tools 
and techniques by which a community seeking to define the nature of life was able 
to exclude others (such as untrained laypeople, and spokespeople for faith-based 
institutions).15 However, I wish to point here to another assumption associated with 
the spread of laboratory vivisection that is perhaps more specific to the practice  
itself  (rather  than  held  in  common  with  other  experimental  assemblages);  the 
consideration  of  intervention  in  animals'  nervous  systems  as  a  pre-eminently 
'manly' activity.
That  nineteenth-century  commentators  on vivisection understand it  as  a 
practice  particularly  unsuited  to  women  is  well  recognised.  Historians  such  as 
Coral Lansbury and Mary Anne Elston, as well as highlighting the for-the-time 
unusual prominence of women in campaigns against animal experimentation, have 
also  noted  a  concurrent  tendency to  portray  those  women who did  vivisect  as 
particularly  immoral  or  dangerous.16 To  many,  women's  participation  in  such 
practices directly contravened their responsibility of upholding a stringent ideal of  
domestic virtue and innocence.  'Sensibility'  (discussed below) towards those on 
whom pain might be inflicted constituted an unquestionable feminine duty. Women 
who  experimented  with  animals  (dogs  presented  a  key  example)  that  might 
constitute  objects  of  affection  in  other  contexts  seemed to  have  abandoned all  
notion of feminine responsibility, whether towards God the father or the father of 
the home.17 Such assumptions held, despite protestations from women practitioners 
that  vivisection  was  critical  to  the  attainment  of  professional  competency  in 
medicine  (a  significant  object  of  feminist  agitation  at  the  time).18 As  a  set  of 
techniques  the mastery of  which  could be taken to  indicate  both  observational 
competency and the infliction of  pain  on  'innocent'  life,  vivisection  attracted  a 
Practices’.
15 On the teleology of 'profession' as object of explanation see Burnham, 'How the Idea of 
Profession’.
16 Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog; Elston, M.A. 'Women and Anti-Vivisection in Victorian 
England', in Rupke, Vivisection, pp. 259-294.
17 On the status of dogs as both companion animals and experimental subjects see 
Degeling, 'Canines, Cosanguinity, and One-Medicine’. 
18 Bittel, 'Science, Suffrage, and Experimentation’.
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particularly  contentious  discourse  regarding  women's  status  and  notions  of 
femininity.19 Less well understood however are the specific conceptions and re-
formulations of manliness that accompanied and paralleled these debates.
In asserting the cultural  value of experimental  physiology,  advocates of 
vivisection also articulate a conception of such physiology as a manly pursuit. In 
his study of Thomas Henry Huxley (one of the key advocates of the practice during 
the second half  of  the nineteenth century),  Paul  White describes a tension that  
characterises many late-nineteenth-century scientific men's attempts to define their  
activities  as  crucial  to  British  culture.  Early  in  his  career,  Huxley  strove  to 
construct a scientific persona that was autonomous from and authoritative over the 
domestic  aspects  of  his  life.  For  example,  when discussing  his  suitability  as  a 
partner in his private correspondence, Huxley appealed to his self-sacrifice and the 
nobility of his cause, rather than the material prospects that a zoological career 
might bring. Becoming a 'man of science' was in one sense a means of legitimising 
his choice of career in the face of doubts regarding his ability to support a family  
(or even bring his future wife Henrietta Heathorn to England from Australia, where 
she had been born). Huxley's articulation of his scientific ideal was thus also an 
assertion of a masculinity in which self-sacrifice for a ‘greater cause’, rather than 
the cultivation of material  wealth,  was critical.20 Later  in his career,  during the 
1880s, Huxley sought to re-define science in relation to what he portrayed as more 
literary,  less  'useful'  pursuits.  Here,  the  nobility  or  idealism  of  the  practical 
experimentalist  was  understood  as  comparable  to  that  of  gentlemen  of  letters.  
Scientific practitioners deserved an at least equal role to classicists in elite culture  
because of their highly trained organic senses, and their elevation of the authority 
of 'nature' over that of any individual.21 Yet at the same time, it was by workers in a 
laboratory  -  rather  than  by  disinterested  gentlemen  at  home  -  that  Huxley 
envisioned most science would be conducted.22 In establishing buildings intended 
for  the  training  of  scientific  workers,  Huxley  implicitly  acknowledged that  the 
19 Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog; Elston, 'Women and Anti-Vivisection'.
20 White, Thomas Huxley, pp. 6-31.
21 White, Thomas Huxley, pp. 67-99. See also White, P. 'Ministers of Culture: Arnold, 
Huxley and liberal Anglican reform of learning', History of Science 43 (2005), pp. 113-
138.
22 Forgan, and Gooday, 'Constructing South Kensington’.
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inclusion  of  natural  philosophic  concerns  within  an  elite  culture  entailed  a 
profound shift in what it meant to be a scientific ‘man’. Scientific culture would 
become something that was generated outside of the home - and hence largely in 
conjunction of the earning of a living by a ‘professional’ man of the household. 
The  construction  of  a  laboratory  culture  in  Britain  at  this  time  is 
accompanied by the emergence of new ideals of gender relations, as well as of 
manliness. In the new scientific ideal, a gentlemanly, 'leisurely' notion of detached 
observation  of  a  distinct,  feminized  ‘nature’  begins  to  be  combined  with  a 
'worklike' notion of reactive experimentation with nature that typifies the emerging 
ethos of professionalism. This re-formation of notions of gendered experience is 
evident in perhaps the most widely read text dealing with the proper conduct of the 
experimentalist,  Claude Bernard's  An Introduction to the Study of Experimental  
Medicine (1865).  Discussing the need for the good experimentalists to alternate 
between distinct modes of observation and experimentation, Bernard insists on the 
desirability of both active and passive stances towards their objects of concern:
I may say that our experimenter puts questions to nature; but that, as 
soon as she speaks, he must hold his peace, must note her answer, hear 
her out and in every case accept her decision. It has been said that the 
experimenter  must  force  nature  to  unveil  herself.  Yes,  the 
experimenter doubtless forces nature to unveil herself by attacking her 
with all manner of questions; [but] he must never answer for her nor 
listen  partially  to  her  answers  by  taking,  from  the  result  of  an 
experiment, only those that confirm his hypothesis... he must submit 
his idea to nature and be ready to abandon, to alter or supplant it, in 
accordance with what he learns from observing the phenomena which 
he has induced.23
The  good  experimentalist  will  approach  nature  as  he  would  a  potential  wife:  
politely,  sensitively,  but  nevertheless  with  the  ultimate  goal  of  forcing  or 
persuading  her  to  'reveal'  herself.  In  contrast  to  previously-articulated,  
'gentlemanly' codes of scientific conduct, this is not to be achieved by a penetrative 
23 Bernard, C. (trans. Greene, H.C.) An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine 
(New York, 1929 [1865]), pp. 22-23.
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observation and representation of ‘passive’ objects of concern alone. It is also a 
matter of inducing nature to act, and of passively submitting  oneself to whatever 
actions one induces.24 Moreover, such activities are to be conducted in specially-
constructed  (predominantly  masculine)  spaces  of  work,  and  hence  appear  to 
constitute  both  a  vantage  point  over,  and  a  refuge  from,  the  (increasingly 
feminized) gaze of the home.25
As  the  epitome  of  late-nineteenth-century  physiological  practice, 
vivisection played a  critical  role  in  experimentalists'  attempts  to  define what  it 
meant  to  be  a  scientific  man.  Well-known practitioners  of  vivisection  such  as 
Huxley and Bernard were also key figures in the articulation of an experimental  
manliness. The new scientific man was to be both an active, penetrating builder  
and operator of experimental apparatus, and a passive, submissive observer of the 
phenomena that they thereby induced. In so doing, they were to combine qualities 
of  both  elite  gentlemanly  and  middle-class  professional  masculinity. Yet 
experimentalists' concern regarding such matters did not spring from their attempts 
to introduce new epistemic practices alone.  Manliness in general  was being re-
negotiated in many different parts of British life during the latter decades of the  
nineteenth century.26 A reputation as a talented experimentalist did not confer an 
unquestionable right to define gender norms. Indeed, the 'experimental' notion of 
masculinity  evident  in  Bernard's  text  emerges  in  conjunction  with  claims 
articulated  in  the  context  of  explicit  opposition  to  vivisectional  practice  -  as  a 
negotiation  between  a  small  but  coherent  community  of  gentlemen  and 
'professionals',  and  a  larger  and  more  diffuse  group  seeking  to  critique  their 
activities. 
24 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, pp. 115-190.
25 Bernard's comments regarding the necessity of passing through a 'costly, ghastly 
kitchen' also seem relevant here. See Dror, O.E. 'Creating the Emotional Body: 
confusion, possibilities, and knowledge', in Stearns, P.N. and Lewis, J. (eds.) An 
Emotional History of the United States (New York and London; New York University 
Press, 1998), pp. 173-194, and Dror, 'The Affect of Experiment'.
26See the literature cited in note [2] above, esp. Tosh, A Man's Place.
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Questioning the manliness of vivisection
Many  of  the  concerns  regarding  masculine  conduct  evident  in 
vivisectionists'  writings  are  equally  apparent  in  texts  opposing  technical 
intervention  in  animals'  bodies.  For  example,  a  similar  tension  between 
gentlemanly  and  occupational  concerns  can  be  discerned  in  anti-vivisectionist  
literature. However, whereas the experimentalists’ texts are principally engaged in 
defining  a  positive  vision  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  student  of  nature,  their 
opponents  chiefly  occupy  themselves  with  stating  ways  in  which  experimental 
physiology exemplifies or produces undesirable, negative forms of masculinity. 
I  here  highlight  two connected tendencies  regarding the accusation that 
practising  vivisection  is  not  an  appropriate  activity  for  a  man;  firstly  that  
vivisection is not compatible with a gentlemanly code of conduct; and secondly, 
that those that do engage with it expose themselves and others to the possibility of  
moral degradation.
Many  of  the  texts  opposing  vivisection  emphasise  that  in  subjecting 
animals to what they characterise as painful experiments, physiologists display a 
lack of the 'sensibility,' or sympathetic feeling considered critical to the conduct of 
a  gentleman.  Sensibility  had  formed  an  indispensable  element  of  gentlemanly 
identity  since  at  least  the  eighteenth  century.  A  term  initially  denoting  both 
perceptual sensitivity and a more general susceptibility to one's environment, it had 
by the  middle  of  the nineteenth  century  come to refer  primarily  to  empathetic 
emotional  experience.27 Sensibility  to  the feelings  of  others  -  and especially  to 
those placed under one's care - was a key duty for a gentleman. Properly controlled 
by  a  superintending  rationality,  the  expression  of  one's  emotional  life  was 
considered crucial  to the maintenance of fruitful relationships,  especially within 
marriage.28 Whilst  during the nineteenth century the public display of affect came 
increasingly to be frowned upon in the light of revolutionary 'excesses',  private 
expressions of feeling nevertheless remained critical to gentlemanly identity.29 To 
27 Barker-Benfield, G.J. The Culture of Sensibility: sex and society in eighteenth-century 
Britain (Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. pp. 65-77 and 
382-395.
28Barker-Benfield, G.J. The Culture of Sensibility, pp. 247-250.
29 On the post-revolutionary reaction to overt expressions of emotion see Kete, K. 
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lack sensibility, then, was to indicate one's lack of awareness of social convention.  
If,  as  its  opponent  claimed,  vivisection  could  only  be  undertaken  in  good 
conscience  by  those  with  little  emotional  awareness,  its  status  as  a  legitimate 
practice for a scientific gentleman would be open to question.
Anti-vivisectionist  texts  deny the  possibility  that  the  practice  of  animal 
experimentation is compatible with the possession of gentlemanly sensibility by 
emphasising  what  they  represent  as  a  need  for  animals  to  be  ‘protected’  from 
‘painful’  experimentation.  In her essay  The Scientific Spirit  of  the Age,  Frances 
Power Cobbe -  perhaps the most  active,  and certainly one of the most  famous 
agitators against experimental physiology during the 1870's and 1880's - articulates 
a notion of gentlemanliness that  places  particular emphasis on its  'sympathetic,' 
protective character. Cobbe bridles at a suggestion of Sir James Paget (a defender 
of vivisection) that a 'scientific' education offers an appropriate means of training 
men in the skills requisite for living a civilized life:
To train a MAN it is surely indispensable to develop in him a superior 
order  of  powers  from these?  His  mind  must  be  enriched with  the 
culture of his own age and country, and of other lands and ages... a 
human education making claim to completeness should cultivate the 
imagination and poetic sentiment; should 'soften manners'... widen the 
sympathies,  dignify  the  character,  inspire  enthusiasm  for  noble 
actions, and chivalrous tenderness towards women and all who need 
defence; and thus send for the accomplished student a  gentleman in 
the true sense of the word.30
'Introduction: Animals and Human Empire', in Kete, A Cultural History of Animals, p. 7. 
The centrality of sensibility to nineteenth-century conceptions of gentlemanliness is now 
well recognised. See for example Wagner, T.S. '"Overpowering Vitality": nostalgia and 
men of sensibility in the fiction of Wilkie Collins', Modern Language Quarterly 63 (2002), 
pp. 471-500; Endersby, J. 'Sympathetic Science: Charles Darwin, Joseph Hooker, and 
the passions of Victorian naturalists,' Victorian Studies 51 (2009), pp. 299-320. On 
sensibility in psychological discourse, see Lanzoni, S. 'Sympathy in Mind (1876-1900),' 
Journal of the History of Ideas 70 (2009), pp. 265-287.
30 Cobbe, F.P. 'The Scientific Spirit of the Age', in Cobbe, F.P. The Scientific Spirit of the 
Age and Other Pleas and Discussions (London, 1888),  pp. 10-11. Cobbe's emphases. 
see also eg. Kingsford, A. 'The Uselessness of Vivisection', Nineteenth Century 11 
(1882), p. 181.
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Key to Cobbe's argument is the 'chivalrous tenderness' that she expects gentlemen 
to display towards those under their care - a trope also prevalent in the growing 
number of novels and poems addressing the issue of vivisection from this time. 31 
To inflict pain on animals, it seems, constitutes a clear breach of this code, posing 
severe problems for those physiologists seeking to defend animal experimentation 
as a gentlemanly practice.
A  second  line  of  attack  concerned  an  anxiety  that  even  if  those  that 
experimented came to the laboratory with the best  of  intentions,  the degrading 
nature of the practice would leave them incapable of appreciating the distress of  
others. The articulation of this concern owes more to the emerging middle-class 
physiological psychological culture than to any elite notion of masculine identity. 
Specifically, it draws on the notion that 'habit', or the repetition of the actions of 
experimenters'  muscles and nerves, might result in the gradual and unconscious 
adoption of potentially undesirable kinds of behaviour. A pure-hearted innocent 
entering  a  physiological  laboratory  could,  given  long  enough  to  habituate 
themselves to the cruel practices undertaken there, leave with little or no ability to 
recognise  signs  of  pain  or  discomfort  in  the  animals  or  human  beings  they 
encounter in their day-to-day lives. 
The  'habitual'  critique  of  vivisection  emphasises  a  possibility  that 
involvement in experimental physiological training might be a cause, rather than 
(as was the case in discussions of the relative gentlemanliness of the practice) an 
indication, of a wider debasement of morality. In this respect it strikes at a key 
means by which experimental physiologists' sought to justify the construction of 
physiological laboratories for the instruction of university students and teachers. 
George Hoggan relates that
my own personal  experience  has  taught  me,  and  on  the  continent 
especially,  that  amongst  physiologists  you  have  the  kindest,  most 
gentlemanly, and amiable people, but that the glaring fault that was to 
be  noticed  was  an  entire  want  of  feeling,  that  their  feelings  were 
entirely  blunted;  they  seemed  to  be  unconscious  that  they  were 
31 Coral Lansbury addresses vivisection in nineteenth-century fiction at some length in 
Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog, pp. 63-129. See also Menke, 'Fiction as Vivisection’and 
Mayer, 'The vivisection of the Snark’.
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inflicting the greatest pain; they did not do it intentionally.32
For many opponents of vivisection, it is the sensibility of the nation's youth as well  
that of its gentlemen that experimental physiology threatens to undermine. George 
Richard  Jesse,  secretary  for  Cobbe's  Society  for  the  Abolition  of  Vivisection,  
asserts  in his evidence to the Commission for example that  'these practices are  
becoming a moral ulcer... they tend to demoralise mankind, and are by education 
vitiating the minds of the young.'33
Vivisection, by habituating the nation's youth into the acceptance of the 
infliction  of  pain  on  animals,  could  be  identified  as  a  source  of  many  of  the  
problems  that  we  now  associate  with  industrial  culture  more  generally.  This 
tendency to associate experimental or 'scientific' education with wider concerns is  
articulated most emphatically by the novelist ‘Ouida’.34 In an 1886 article opposing 
vivisection published in  the  North American Review (much of  which was later 
incorporated into a subsequent, more general critique of scientific culture entitled 
The New Priesthood (1893)), Ouida connects the spread of laboratory training in 
Germany with an insidious autocratic mindset:
[Lyon] Playfair [also a defender of vivisection] speaks much of the 
superior  wisdom,  the  superior  education,  the  superior  devotion  to 
science, of Germany as contrasted with those of any other nation... but 
the only  result  of  all  this  expenditure  and instruction  is  a  military 
despotism  so  colossal  that,  whilst  it  overawes  and  paralyses  both 
German liberty and European peace, it may yet fall over from its own 
weight any day.35
32 Report of the Royal Commission, p. 211.
33 Report of the Royal Commission, p. 219. See also eg. Macauley, J. 'Vivisection: is it 
scientifically useful or morally justifiable?', in Grant, B. and Wall, A. Vivisection,  
Scientifically and Ethically Considered in Prize Essays (London, 1881), pp. 82-83, Wall, 
A. 'Painful Experiments on Living Animals', idem, pp. 293-295, and Sarel, E.A. 'Letter to 
The Zoophilist, April 2nd 1883,' The Zoophilist 3 (1883-1884), p. 62.
34 Ouida is the pseudonym of Maria Louise Ramée. See Pollock, 'Ouida's Rhetoric of 
Empathy’.
35 Ouida, 'Some Fallacies of Science', North American Review 142 (1886), pp. 139-152. 
See also Ouida, The New Priesthood (London, 1893), esp. pp. 14-18 and 59-60.
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For some, the habit of vivisection threatened to escape from the laboratories where  
it was practised and engulf the liberal values that had become such a mainstay of  
late-nineteenth-century  Anglophone  culture.  It  typified  a  cultural  malaise  into 
which it seemed industrial Britain was plunging, along with a growing concern that  
the nation's empire might fall into decline.
Anti-vivisectionists  thereby  brought  to  the  fore  the  possibility  that 
physiological  experimentation  might  be  playing  a  role  in  corrupting  boys  who 
would be better  off  trained in more sympathy-inducing topics.  Understood as a 
critical tool for the formation of future rulers of the Empire's attitudes and beliefs, 
education of the nation's male youth constituted a significant point of debate during 
the latter  decades  of  the nineteenth century.36 Concern regarding the morals  of 
children combined readily with the insistence of authors such as Henry Maudsley 
or  Francis  Galton  that  organic  inheritance  might  be  degenerative  as  well  as  
progressive.37 Although experimentation with animals' nervous systems was critical 
to the establishment of notions that this could occur at psychological (nervous) as 
well  as  generative  (non-nervous  bodily)  levels,  the  rhetoric  of  'unconscious 
cerebration' was also easily adapted to critique of experimental epistemology in the 
study of life.38 In adapting physiological psychological rhetoric in this way, critics 
of vivisection separated faith in the notion that mind and nerve are congruous from 
the  epistemic  conditions  under  which  such  notions  were  initially  articulated. 
Despite many of those sceptical of the scientific value of vivisection agreeing that 
mind and nerve were congruous, they nevertheless began to employ the concept of  
habituation  against  the  experimental  practices  that  had  helped  legitimate  the 
concept in the first place.
36 See chapter three of this thesis. On the close relation between British attitudes towards 
colonial peoples and non-human animals towards the end of the nineteenth century, see 
Chakrabarti, 'Beasts of Burden’.
37On education, degeneration and childhood see Shuttleworth, S. The Mind of the Child:  
child development in literature, science, and medicine, 1840-1900 (Oxford University 
Press; Oxford and New York, 2010), esp. pp. 181-206, 233-244, and 353-354. On 
degeneration more generally see Pick, D. Faces of Degeneration: a European disorder,  
c.1848-1918 (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne; Cambridge University Press, 1993).
38Eg. 'Editorial', The Zoophilist 4 (1884-1885), p. 230. The notion that heredity could only 
occur via the organic production of offspring (ie. by natural selection), on the other hand, 
came to be understood as offering powerful support to vivisectionists' activities. See for 
example Cobbe, F.P. 'The New Morality', The Zoophilist 4 (1884-1885), pp. 167-169.
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Both those committed to physiological experiment and those who opposed 
such  practices  adopt  remarkably  similar  positions  regarding  the  desirability  of 
certain kinds of masculinity. Though different antagonists place differing emphases 
on  such  categories  as  gentlemanliness  and  professionality,  proponents  on  both 
sides of the debate are agreed on the importance of both. At different times, either 
the  private  expression  of  sentimentality,  or  the  need  for  men  to  earn  a  living 
outside of the home, remains the pre-eminent concern. The vivisection debates that 
occur  during  the  late  nineteenth  century  might  then  be  characterised  as 
accompanying a more general re-positioning of gender norms of masculinity. In 
this debate, the character-ideal of the 'man of science' is articulated in terms of a 
figure  residing  along  a  continuum  that  runs  from  the  personal  integrity  (or 
otherwise)  of  the  reputable  gentleman  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  self-regulating 
capacity (or otherwise) of a group of working professionals on the other.39 
Animal-machine hybrids and the constitution of self
Historians have pointed to the relevance of questions of class and professional 
exclusivity  in  the  vivisection  debates.40 Their  conclusions  indicate  that  the 
questioning of experimental physiology by practitioners and non-practitioners alike 
are not motivated by concerns regarding gender politics alone. Nevertheless, what I 
wish to indicate here is that vivisected animals - and by implication bio-technical  
entities  more  generally  -  have  historically  constituted  representational  loci  by 
which gender norms - along with other aspects of subjectivity - have been brought 
into  question.  Another  way  of  saying  this  is  that  cultures  centred  on  nervous 
psychology have tended to produce certain kinds of artefact (such as vivisected 
animals)  and  certain  kinds  of  debate  (such  as  whether  or  not  it  is  'manly'  to 
vivisect)  that  have  tended  to  undermine  established  norms  regarding  the 
constitution of the self.  If  nothing else, the late-nineteenth-century debates over 
vivisection signify the introduction of a symbol of organism-machine interaction 
39 White, Thomas Huxley. See also White, 'Darwin's Emotions.'
40Harrison, B. Peaceable Kingdom: stability and change in modern Britain (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 82-122; French, Antivivisection and Medical Science, eg. 
pp. 27-30; Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog, esp. pp. 26-62; Kean, 'The 'Smooth Cool Men 
of Science'.
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into  a  much  broader  cultural  arena  than  had  hitherto  been  the  case.  This 
proliferation should, I believe, be accorded more prominence in explanations of the 
emergence during the final decades of the nineteenth century of a critical literature 
that targets the liberal individualist assumptions of its time.
The  rest  of  this  chapter  expands  on  these  claims  by  pointing  to  the 
publications of two late-nineteenth-century figures who articulate - and to a certain 
extent embody - a then-nascent effort to critique conventional science as a whole, 
rather than just experimental physiology. Firstly, a series of lectures by Edward 
Carpenter  -  a  late-nineteenth  century  opponent  of  capitalism  and  advocate  of 
'natural' living - exemplifies a more general attempt amongst those opposing liberal 
individualism to re-constitute  science on an emotional  rather  than a  rational  or 
systematically objective basis. The second figure I address here - Samuel Butler - 
takes a very different view of physiological experimentation. Rather than oppose 
the practice per se, he articulates a radical re-interpretation of the significance of 
such  investigations  (at  least  as  far  as  they  relate  to  psychology).  Publications 
attributed  to  both  of  these  figures  have  been  recognised  as  influential  in  the 
breaking-down  of  nineteenth-century  assumptions  regarding  the  inherent 
desirability  of  outward  expressions  of  piety,  and  the  undesirability  of  overtly 
emotional - and especially sexual - display by men.
What I want to emphasise here is the connection of such critiques to the 
vivisectional techniques that were increasingly being held up as symbolic of the 
dangers of moving towards an exclusively ‘scientific’ culture. Carpenter and Butler  
set out their critiques of nerve-centred subjectivity in contrasting ways, as detailed 
below.  
In Carpenter's texts, discovering ways in which we might empathise and 
communicate  as  human  animals  will  enable  humanity  as  a  whole  to  begin  to 
participate in, rather than dominate, ‘nature’. In developing this position, these texts 
draw heavily on 'romantic' tropes such as the need to acknowledge the observer's  
presence in observation, and the desirability of 'transcending' the assumptions of 
the present.  But  texts  identified with the romantic movement  almost  invariably 
focus  on  contending  the  rationalist  insistence  that  existence  can  be  understood 
entirely in terms of the interaction of material entities – that 'spirit' has no causal  
effect in day-to-day life.41 Carpenter's texts, in contrast, identify not the reduction 
41 On romanticism and the constitution of 'life' as an object of study see Richards, R.J. The 
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of  existence  to  matter,  but  the  belief  that  'technology'  offers  an  unproblematic 
means by which humans can control nature, as their target. They aim to render  
obsolete any attempt to subsume non-human elements of the world to the human 
via  the  introduction  of  tool-centred modes  of  investigation  such  as  vivisection. 
They thereby, through critique of vivisection, begin to bring the 'non-humanness' of 
the built world to the fore.
In  contrast  to  Carpenter's  writings,  those  of  Samuel  Butler  target 
physiologists' assumption that the provocation of phenomena through intervention 
in animals' nervous systems (ie. vivisection) will produce knowledge relating to an 
unadorned 'nature'. They insist that one of the foundational categories relating to 
physiological psychology - 'habit' - is as applicable to the tools used to intervene in 
animals' bodies as it is to the psychology of the animal itself. In this way, they 
promote the notion that self-perpetuation is a phenomenon characteristic of non-
organic  entities  hitherto  generally  considered  to  have  been  the  construction  of  
‘human’ subjects just as much as it is of 'natural', organic ones. In these critiques of 
nerve-centred subjectivity, the notion of individual humans as unitary, independent 
actors on a world stage comes to appear as an illusion brought about by our own 
elevated sense of self-worth. 
Both Carpenter and Butler thereby draw on the figure of the vivisected 
animal to articulate radically different notions of self, both of which serve to call  
conceptions of humans as beings independent from and able to define the nature of 
the non-human into question.
Taken  together,  such  notions  as  these,  I  suggest,  are  indicative  of  the 
emergence  of  a  'post-physiological'  dynamic.  I  am  not  claiming  here  that 
contemporaries  understood  Carpenter  and  Butler  as  working  together  to  go 
'beyond' liberal individualist assumptions regarding the capacities of human life. I 
am however suggesting that, as modes of thought that have historically associated 
themselves  with  (whether  through  their  direct  opposition  to,  or  radical  re-
interpretation  of)  figures  of  organism-machine  interaction,  their  publications 
indicate  an  intimate  link  between  the  articulation  of  critical  perspectives  on 
conventionally ‘scientific’ subjectivity, and such hybrid entities.
Romantic Conception of Life: science and philosophy in the age of Goethe (Chicago; 
University Press, 2002).
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Edward Carpenter: human animality
Edward Carpenter is best known for his work articulating and identifying 
with the notion of an 'intermediate sex' - a sexual identity that does not adhere to  
nineteenth-century culture's hetero-normative ideals of emotional fulfilment. In his 
Love's Coming of Age (1896), Carpenter characterises femininity as an identity that 
has  historically  been  made  subject  to  masculinity.  He  positions  his  own 
'intermediate' or 'Uranian' identity as a mixture between the two gender extremes, 
able  to  mediate  between  them.  Positing  sexual  desire  fundamental  to  human 
psychology, Carpenter develops his 'intermediate sex' in terms of a critique of the 
taboos regarding the expression of sexuality that he portrays as permeating the late 
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, sex for Carpenter is not the end of life. Men and 
women, he suggests, should seek to develop their emotional capacities as a means 
of  transcending  their  natural  sexual  desire  into  a  higher  form,  achievement  of 
which is denoted by the attainment of worldly love.42 Carpenter can thereby be 
understood as a champion of a masculinity that seeks to reconcile itself with a 
feminine  nature  via  assimilation.  By  apprehending  and  accepting  the  natural, 
feminine  aspects  of  themselves,  men might  participate  in  the  constitution  of  a 
world in which sexual expression is constituted in terms of loving emotion rather  
than simply (as he suggests had previously been the case) procreation.43 
Carpenter  is  also recognised as influential  in  the codification of  radical 
ideals  and practices  as  they come to be established in  Britain during the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century. Though particularly attracted to anarchism as a  
political doctrine, his speeches and essays have since been noted by socialists and 
anarchists  alike.  Carpenter  (who  hailed  from  a  conventional,  well-respected 
family), sought not only to develop a critique of liberal capitalist culture, but also 
42 Carpenter, E. Love's Coming-of-Age (Manchester, 1896).
43 Thiele, B. 'Coming-of-Age: Edward Carpenter on Sex and Reproduction,' in Brown, T. 
(ed.) Edward Carpenter and Late-Victorian Radicalism (London and Portland, Oregon, 
1990), pp. 100-125. Carla Hustak points to this aspect of Carpenter's activities in her 
recently-completed doctoral thesis on early twentieth-century trans-Atlantic radicals' 
notions of love, intimacy and bodily emotion. See Hustak, C.C. 'Radical Intimacies: 
affective potential and the politics of love in the transatlantic sex-reform movement, 
1900-1930' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 2011), esp. pp. 379-402. On 
Carpenter more generally see Rowbotham, S. Edward Carpenter: a life of liberty and 
love (London and Brooklyn, 2008); Tsuzuki, C. Edward Carpenter 1844-1929: prophet of  
human fellowship (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge and New York, 1980).
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insisted on a need to put such ideological convictions into practice. He played an 
important  part  in  the  foundation  of  the  Labour  Party  and  Fabian  Society,  and 
corresponded with  many of  the  leading radicals  of  his  day including (amongst 
many others) Havelock Ellis, William Morris, Marie Stopes, Mahatma Ghandi, and 
Annie Besant.44 By living in a manner at odds with the assumption of capitalism - 
specifically,  by  seeking  a  return  to  nature  via  the  attainment  of  personal  self-
sufficiency - Carpenter hoped to inspire in others the idea that profit maximization 
and  the  expression  of  personal  self-interest  were  not  inevitable  conditions  of 
human life.
Both of these well-known aspects of Carpenter's work come together in his 
efforts to articulate an explicitly anti-vivisectional, yet nevertheless 'organic' notion 
of  person-hood.45 Carpenter's  early,  formative commitment  to  the opposition of 
vivisection is demonstrated by his for-the-time substantial subscription of £20 to 
the Victoria Street Society in 1882, before he came to be widely recognised as a 
cultural commentator and critic of liberal capitalism.46 He may well also have been, 
along with  his  friend  Edward  Maitland,  and Anna  Kingsford,  an author  of  the 
radical  anti-vivisectionist  tract  "The  Woman"  and  the  Age (London,  1881). 
Maitland  claimed  in  the  anti-vivisection  journal  The  Zoophilist,  objecting  to 
censorship of the document, that it had multiple authors (although he later claimed 
it as his own).47 It is certain that Carpenter and Maitland later published a joint 
work attacking vivisection,48 and that anti-vivisectional rhetoric infused Carpenter’s 
comments on science.
44On this aspect of his life see also Goodway, D. Anarchists Seeds Beneath the Snow: 
left-libertarian thought and British writers from William Morris to Colin Ward (Liverpool 
University Press, 2006), pp. 35-61; Brown, T. ‘Figuring in History: the reputation of 
Edward Carpenter, 1883-1987 Annotated Secondary Bibliography, I,' English Literature 
in Transition, 1880-1920 32 (1989), pp. 35-64. See also ‘Fabian Economic and Social 
Thought: Series One: the papers of Edward Carpenter, 1844-1929, from Sheffield 
Archives’ (Adam Mathew Publications: http://www.ampltd.co.uk/collections_az/Fab-Carp-
1/description.aspx accessed 08/04/2011).
45 Shaw, C.E. 'Identified with the One: Edward Carpenter, Henry Salt and the Ethical 
Socialist Philosophy of Science,' in Brown, Edward Carpenter, pp. 33-57.
46 The Zoophilist 3 (1883-1884), p. 19.
47 See The Zoophilist 1 (1881), pp. 58 and 71, and Maitland, E. Anna Kingsford: her life,  
letters, diary and work [Vol. II]  (London, 1986), p. 8.
48Carpenter, E. and Maitland, E. Vivisection (London, 1893).
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Carpenter's statements on organic identity can be characterised in terms of 
an attempt to resolve the tension already discussed in relation to both anti- and pro-
vivisectional  literature  -  that  between  the  personal  integrity  of  (gentlemanly) 
individuals, and the self-regulating ability of (professional) groups of workers. On 
the one hand, Carpenter the individual became a vehement critic of the notion of  
gentlemanliness  and  what  he  saw  as  its  perniciously  stifling  influence  on  the 
abilities of Britons to express themselves emotionally.49 On the other, Carpenter the 
activist built a reputation as a commentator on and theorist of social democracy 
through his insistence that communal forms of identity could best be established 
through the combined efforts of groups of mutually committed individuals.50 Both 
themes address the related notions of the possibility of group interaction between 
individuals, and the potential impact that groups of politically-directed individuals 
striving towards communal forms of consciousness might have on liberal, capitalist 
culture.
Carpenter's conception of natural science, expressed in a series of articles 
published under the title Civilisation: its cause and cure in 1889, is articulated in 
terms  of  a  need  to  oppose  what  is  portrayed  as  the  overly  'selfish'  or 
anthropocentric  tendency  of  conventional,  individualistic  experimental  culture. 
This  tendency  is  characterised  as  springing  from  scientists'  unwillingness  to 
recognise themselves as active participants in the constitution of conceptions of 
nature. Science, as practised conventionally, has come to deny its inevitably human 
origins. It has sought to:
enounce  facts  independent  of  Man,  the  observer.  Seeing  that  the 
ordinary statements of daily life are obviously inexact and relative to 
the observer - charged with human sensation in fact - Science [sic] has 
naturally  tried  to  produce  something  which  should  be  exact  and 
independent of human sensation; but here it has of course condemned 
itself beforehand to failure; for no statement of isolated phenomena or 
49 As expressed in such essays as Carpenter, E. 'England's Ideal,' in Carpenter, E. 
England's Ideal, and Other Papers on Social Subjects (London, 1887), pp. 1-19 and 'The 
Enchanted Thicket: an appeal to the well-to-do', in idem, pp. 166-177.
50 See eg. Carpenter, E. 'Social Progress and Individual Effort', in Carpenter, England's  
Ideal, pp. 45-61, and 'Does it Pay, in idem, pp. 100-105.
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groups of phenomena can be exact... and no statement obviously can 
be really independent of human sensation.51
It is the undeniably of fallible, individual humans' involvement in the constitution 
of facts relating to nature - and thereby the certainty that human inaccuracy will 
creep  into  observation  -  that  undermines  the  project  of  defining  a  single,  true 
conception  of  nature.  This  denial  of  the  role  of  human  subjectivity  in  the 
constitution of fact  is  also a denial  of  the unity of nature -  an assumption that  
humanity, as the entity able to comprehend nature absolutely, is not itself a part of  
it.52 The project of constituting a value-free notion of science has reached its limit  
in  the  physiological  constitution  of  a  'primitive  consciousness  of  muscular 
contraction and its abstraction "mass" or "matter".'53 Indeed, 'in truth Science has 
never left the great world, or cosmos, of Man.'54 It is thereby only by starting with a 
conception  of  science  as  a  human construct  that  it  is  possible  to  consider  the 
articulation of different interpretations of life.
For  Carpenter,  the  assumption  that  conventional,  individualistic 
conceptions  of  scientific  practice  are  correct  is  a  specific  case of  what  he had  
previously portrayed as a tendency to assume that competition between individuals 
and  adherence  to  the  profit  motive  constitute  immutable,  fundamental  laws  of 
social order. In many of his essays, Carpenter insists on the seeming inalienability,  
but  actual  mutability,  of  social  order  as  described in  liberal  political  economic 
texts.55 ‘Society’  seems  to  be  governed  by  laws  beyond  human  control,  yet 
(Carpenter insists) such laws might be transcended by the expression of humanity's 
natural agency. This belief is perhaps most clearly expressed in a lecture given in 
Sheffield  in  1885  and  reprinted  in  the  collection  England's  Ideal  (1887). 
Discussing the notion that ‘natural selection’ presents a confirmation of the doctrine 
51 Carpenter, E. 'Modern Science: a criticism', in Carpenter, E. Civilisation: its cause and 
cure (London, 1889), p. 74. Carpenter's emphasis.
52 Carpenter, 'Modern Science,' pp. 52-53, 69.
53 Carpenter, 'Modern Science,' p. 81.
54 Carpenter, 'Modern Science', p. 80.
55 See for example the essays in England's Ideal, especially 'England's Ideal', pp. 1-19, 
'Social Progress and Individual Effort', pp. 45-61 and 'Does it Pay?', pp. 100-105. 
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of freedom of competition, Carpenter demurs: 
It is often pointed out that this law of competition [natural selection] 
rules  throughout  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms  as  well  as 
through  the  region  of  human  society...  granting  [this],  I  say  that 
competition  has  hitherto  been  the  universal  law,  the  last  word,  of 
Nature, still if only one man should stand up and say "It shall be no 
more," if he should say "It is not the last word of my nature, and my 
acts and life declare that it is not," - then that so-called law would be 
at an end.56
Activism by individuals could potentially undermine the presumed ‘natural’ state of 
competition between individuals. Nevertheless, individuals find themselves largely 
determined by the effects of a ’society’ that maintains a presence more powerful  
than their own:
The  more  I  think  of  it,  the  more  I  am  persuaded  that  the  true 
explanations,  theories,  of  the  social  changes  which  we  see  around 
us…  lie  deep,  deep  down  unsuspected…  individuals,  institutions, 
nations [seem] more or less like puppets or pieces in a game;-  the 
hand that moves them altogether unseen.57
This bind presents Carpenter with the problem of defining which kinds of actions 
are worth undertaking in the face of the impersonal forces of society - a problem 
addressed in terms of the epistemology of science and life in Civilization: its cause  
and cure.
Nature versus the technical
The limits of a science produced by humanity alone have (according to 
56 Carpenter, 'Social Progress,' p. 46.
57 Carpenter, 'Social Progress', p. 45.
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Carpenter)  been  reached.  It  is  only  through the  adoption  of  a  subjectivity  that 
embraces non-human organic entities that this now-stale, 'objective' science might 
be superseded. An activist, non-capitalist science will differentiate itself from the 
exceptionalist,  domineering  attempt  to  establish  eternally  valid  objective 
knowledge via its fulfilment of the goal of reconciling human with non-human life.  
The  comparative  anatomical  proposition  that  all  parts  of  all  bodies  can  be 
considered  expressions  of  a  single  natural  unity,  Carpenter  claims,  brings  the 
humanity of organic identity into question:
The only conceivable answer to the question, "What is that which is 
now a mollusc and now a man and now an inorganic atom?" is given 
by man himself - and his answer is, I fear, not scientific. It is "I Am." 
"I am that which varies." And the force of his answer depends on what 
he means by the word "I." And so the only conceivable answer to the 
absolute  datum question  [ie.  the  question  of  what  the  single  thing 
called 'nature' in fact is]  is to be found in the meaning of the word "I" 
- in the deepening back of consciousness itself.58
Invoking (albeit vaguely) a form of consciousness that 'deepens back', and thereby 
uncovers,  a  more  profound state  of  being,  Carpenter  hints  at  a  possibility  that 
humanity does not necessarily hold exclusive possession of the ability to apprehend 
itself. Nature as a whole is posited as the probable source of this extra-human form 
of cognition: 
That there is in every man a local consciousness connected with his 
quite  external  body;  that  we  know.  Are  there  not  also in  man the 
makings of a universal consciousness?...  may there not  be then the 
makings of a perception and knowledge which is here and now, but 
which shall be good for all time and everywhere?59
In the connection of humanity with a deity-like consciousness embodied by nature,  
58 Carpenter, 'The Science of the Future,' p. 95.
59 Carpenter, 'The Science of the Future,' pp. 97-98.
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the elucidation of true knowledge can begin again on a new footing.
As  part  of  the  old  order  in  Carpenter's  projected  non-capitalist  culture, 
vivisection would be an anathema to the man of science,  who would aspire  to 
commune with, rather than analyse, nature:
Is it not a strange kind of science that which wakes the mind to pursue 
the shadows of things, but dulls the senses to the reality of them... 
[which  allows  a  man]  to  vivisect  a  dog,  unconscious  that  he  is 
blaspheming the pure and holy relation between men and animals in 
doing  so?  Surely  the  man of  Science  (in  its  higher  sense,  that  is) 
should be lynx-eyed as an Indian, keen scented as a hound - with all 
senses and feelings trained by constant use and a pure and healthy life 
in close contact with Nature, and with a heart beating in sympathy 
with every creature.60
But whether or not this vision is realised will depend on the will of the social body 
as a whole. As Carpenter had commented in his above-mentioned Sheffield lecture: 
It is a common notion... that science may as it were take Society by 
the hand and become its high priest and guide to a glorious kingdom... 
but whither it leads society will depend entirely on whither Society 
desires to be led. If Society worships a god of selfish curiosity, the 
holy rites and priesthood of science will consist in vivisection and the 
torture of the loving animals; if Society believes above all things in 
material results, science will before long provide those things.61
What Carpenter offers is the statement that another social order is possible, and 
himself as an exemplar regarding the kinds of practice that will bring such an order  
about. His radical notion of science constitutes an effort to reconcile his vision of 
human  social  life  as  law-defined,  and  his  affirmation  of  the  effectiveness  of  
activism on an individual level.
60 Carpenter, 'The Science of the Future,' p. 87.
61Carpenter, 'Social Progress', p. 55.
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This  re-constitution  subjectivity  in  terms  of  a  human-nature  interaction 
appears here to be above all a representational one. It is in the act of enunciating  
dissent from the established order that its demise is to be  brought about. Yet as 
noted  above,  Carpenter  also  sought  to  persuade  his  fellow  activists  to  adopt 
different kinds of economic  practice - different ways of living - that would not 
appear to follow the logic of individualist political  economy. This call to change 
the way we live - as well as what we say about life - is for Carpenter as applicable 
to the life of the man of science as it is to any other.
Carpenter's  emphasis  on  inter-personal  and  inter-species  relationality  is 
indicative  of  the  emergence  of  concerted  efforts  to  reconsider  and  develop 
alternatives to individualist notions of the organic self during the latter decades of 
the nineteenth century. Others, such as the psychologist and aesthetic Vernon Lee, 
and the political and gender activist Edith Simcox, similarly sought to privilege a 
communality grounded in mutual emotional expression above the identification of 
self with nerve and body.62 Thomas Dixon has pointed to the emergence of the 
concept of 'altruism' in the works of such figures as George Henry Lewes, Herbert 
Spencer  and  Arabella  Buckley,  and  the  centrality  of  notions  of  sentiment  to 
mutually  assistant  conceptions  of  natural  human  life.63 Edward  Carpenter's 
publications highlight many of the dilemmas faced by such thinkers - for example 
the extent to which it is possible to differentiate absolutely between an 'internal'  
and an 'external' nature, and the difficulties associated with representing 'animal'  
subjectivities  in  'human'  linguistic  forms.  Perhaps  the  most  expressive  of 
Carpenter's attempts to constitute non-liberal, non-capitalist forms of life are those 
which he says relatively little about in his essays on science - the hope that he  
could institute political change through his adoption of self-sufficiency as a means 
of communing with nature. What is certain is that Carpenter seeks to develop a 
notion of scientific practice that would constitute a holistic guide to conduct in  
human life - the production of food and construction of shelter,  the conduct of  
62 Lanzoni, S. ‘Practising Psychology in the Art Gallery: Vernon Lee's Aesthetics of 
Empathy,' Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 45 (2009), pp. 330-354. 
Beer, G. 'Passion, Politics, Philosophy: the work of Edith Simcox', Women: a cultural  
review 6 (1995), pp. 166-179 and Beer, G. 'Knowing a Life: Edith Simcox - sat est 
vixisse?' in Anger, S. (ed) Knowing the Past: Victorian literature and culture (Cornell; 
University Press, 2001), pp. 252-266.
63Dixon, T. The Invention of Altruism: making moral meanings in Victorian Britain (Oxford 
and New York; Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 10, 41-61, 151-158 and 181-221.
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relations with humans and other animals, the expression of desire, and so on. In 
this  respect,  his  thinking  offers  an  intriguing  response  to  the  physiological 
emphasis  (related in previous chapters)  on and elevation of  a  notion of  a non-
representational  experimental  practice  as  a  means  of  producing  economically 
useful citizens.
Yet  despite  Carpenter’s  conviction  regarding  the  ‘selfishness’   of 
experimental  science,  what  is  most  notable  by its  absence from his  texts  more 
generally is any sustained attempt to engage positively with the technical entities 
that had become so prominent in the industrial culture in which he writes. This is 
even more surprising given that he resided for much of his life near Sheffield, one 
of the longest-established industrialised towns in England. To continue the above-
quoted  declaration  that  vivisection  is  the  inevitable  accompaniment  of  'selfish 
curiosity', 
if  Society believes above all  things in material results,  science will  
before  long  provide  those  things,  -  it  will  surround  men  with 
machinery  and  machine-made  products,  it  will  whirl  them  about 
(behind steam-kettles as Mr. Ruskin says) from one end of the world 
to  the  other...  but  through  all  the  whistling  of  the  kettles  and  the 
rattling of toys it  will  not make the still  small voice of God sound 
nearer.64
Indeed,  it  is  in  opposition  to  technical  intervention  in  the  human  body  that 
Carpenter  grounds  his  most  extensive  critique  of  vivisection.  Fully  admitting 
experimental  physiologists'  claims  that  vivisection  presents  humanity  with  the 
possibility of curing illnesses that  have hitherto been incurable,  he nevertheless 
argues that the practice has a pernicious influence on culture precisely because of  
its apparent utility. The ability to cure some diseases through the administration of  
vaccines, Carpenter claims, threatens to lead to a culture in which all medicine is  
assumed to be interventionist. People will neglect to care for their own and others’ 
healthy bodies, and hence no longer seek to prevent disease, merely to cure it.65 
64Carpenter, 'Social Progress', pp. 55-56.
65Carpenter, E. 'Medical Science: the true method and the false', in Carpenter, E. and 
Maitland, E. Vivisection (London, 1893), pp. 3-17.
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This hostility to industrial aspects of life (also evident in the publications of other  
anti-vivisectionists such as Ouida)66 points to an unwillingness to engage with one 
of the central problems of urban existence during the nineteenth century - how to 
live  in  an  environment  in  which  technical  entities  (not  an  unadorned  nature) 
constitute  the  principal  conditions  under  which  human  relations  take  place.  
Carpenter,  along  with  many  opponents  of  vivisection,  might  be  said  to  have 
responded to the economic (and indeed physiological) demands of urban existence 
by rejecting them outright.67
Samuel Butler: technical organicism
If Edward Carpenter's publications can be understood in terms of an effort 
to constitute a natural ideal shorn of technology, those of his contemporary, the 
evolutionary critic,  photographer, painter, novelist and composer Samuel Butler, 
portray  relations  between  organisms  and  machines  as  fundamental  to  the 
understanding of life. Where Carpenter seeks to constitute a form of subjectivity  
that  would  provide  an  explicitly  organic  alternative  to  liberal  individualism, 
Butler's publications articulate a need to take the organically-determined aspects of 
individuals' lives themselves less seriously. Where Carpenter advocates a deistic 
subjectivity  in  which  the  unity  of  one's  emotional  expression  constitutes  a 
foundation for the affirmation of an alternative individuality, Butler brings the very 
possibility of the unity of the organic self into question. Butler develops a critique 
of conventional, liberal individualistic manliness that centres on a re-evaluation of 
the  constitution  of  knowledge  and  ignorance.  He  not  only  engages  with  the 
66 Ouida, 'Some Fallacies of Science.' A parallel scepticism appears to have existed 
amongst the medical profession regarding technical intervention in human bodies. See 
Miller, 'Necessary Torture?’. On the critique of technical culture more generally at this 
time, see MacLeod, R. 'The 'Bankruptcy of Science' Debate: the 'creed of science' and 
its critics', Science Technology and Human Values 41 (1982), pp. 2-15 (reprinted in 
MacLeod, R.M. The 'Creed of Science' in Victorian England (Aldershot, Burlington and 
Sydney, 2000).
67 On connections between urban culture and laboratory spaces see Dierig, S. 'Engines for 
Experiment: laboratory revolution and industrial labour in the nineteenth-century city', 
Osiris 18 (2003), pp. 116-134.
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technical aspects of experimental life,  but places machinery at the centre of his  
critique of it. The effect of all of this is to elaborate a form of self-hood in which  
humanity is no longer able to define its own existence without the assistance of  
extra-human, technical means. This raises the prospect of a future in which human 
self-interest comes to be accommodated to a form of power embodied by active yet  
non-organic entities (ie. self-sustaining technical entities).
The  text  that  Butler  is  most  generally  understood  as  establishing  his 
reputation as a serious writer with - an autobiographical novel entitled The Way of  
All Flesh (1903) - has been accorded a crucial role in the early-twentieth-century 
reaction  against  what  early-twentieth-century  writers  were  beginning  to 
characterise negatively as 'Victorian' attitudes and values.68 As an inspiration for 
the works of such twentieth-century figures as Edward Morgan Forster, Bernard 
Shaw,  Robert  Graves  and  Aldous  Huxley,  Butler  has  been  understood  as 
developing (like Edward Carpenter) a critique of nineteenth-century culture that 
has  had  a  particularly  lasting  influence  on  twentieth-century  conceptions  of 
manliness (and subjectivity more generally).69 Nevertheless, Butler himself did not 
allow  The  Way  of  All  Flesh,  the  work  now  emphasised  as  playing  the  most 
significant part in this critique, to be published during his own lifetime. What is of  
particular interest for this chapter then is the context in which such a critique of 
nineteenth-century manliness came to be articulated.
During Butler's own lifetime, he was known primarily as a critic not of a 
‘Victorian’  repression of sexual expression and individuality,  but  of  ‘Darwinian’ 
ideas  regarding inheritance and natural  selection,  and as  a  speculative novelist. 
Specifically, he was (and is) recognized as one of the earliest and most persuasive 
British advocates of a 'neo-Lamarckian' conception of development.70 In this final 
68Eg. Ganz, M. 'Samuel Butler: ironic abdication and the way to the unconscious,' English 
Literature in Transition, 1880-1920 28 (1985), pp. 366-394. On Butler more generally see 
the essays in Paradis, J.G. (ed.) Samuel Butler, Victorian Against the Grain: a critical  
overview (University of Toronto Press; Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2007), and Raby, P. 
Samuel Butler: a biography (London, 1991).
69Ganz, 'Samuel Butler'. See also Sussman, H. 'Samuel Butler as Late-Victorian Bachelor: 
regulating and representing the homoerotic,' in Paradis, Samuel Butler, pp. 170-194.
70 Pauly, P.J. 'Samuel Butler and His Darwinian Critics,' Victorian Studies 25 (1982), pp. 
161-180; Bowler, P. The Eclipse of Darwinism: anti-Darwinian evolution theories in the 
decades around 1900 (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 72-75; 
Morton, P. The Vital Science: biology and the literary imagination, 1860-1900 (London, 
Boston and Sydney, 1984), pp. 174-193; Otis, L. Organic Memory: history and the body 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Lincoln and London; University of 
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section  I  point  to  Butler's  engagement  with  physiological  psychological 
conceptions  of  life  and mind.  I  highlight  ways in  which the notion of  habit  is 
adopted and deployed in his work as an especially effective means of casting doubt 
on  the  notion  that  mind (like  other  aspects  of  bodily  existence)  is  determined 
exclusively by one’s organic lineage. Above all, I emphasise ways in which Butler 
was able to use the notion of habit to pose the question of technical development as 
a  problem  for,  rather  than  a  corollary  of,  organism-centred  explanations  of 
consciousness.71
Most  nineteenth-century conceptions of  relations  between evolution and 
technology  -  for  example  those  of  Herbert  Spencer  -  tend  to  treat  technical 
development  as  entirely  analogical  with  organic  development.  The  laws  of 
evolution of 'society' could be drawn from already-established insights regarding 
the development of non-human life.72 In emphasising that technical entities might 
not  necessary accord  with such  laws -  or  rather  that  organic  entities  might  be 
subject to forces made manifest by technical entities - Butler elevates the notion of 
habit  to  the  status  of  a  general  well-spring  of  development,  rather  than  a 
psychological category only applicable to entities with nervous systems. 
A technical critique of physiological authority
Butler's early publications on life and mind pose the possibility of a form 
of reproduction and development that is not specific to 'life' - or, indeed, 'nature.'  
As a means of escaping the expectations of his own family, Butler had left England 
Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. 18-27; Lightman, B. ''A Conspiracy of One': Butler, Natural 
Theology, and Victorian Popularization,' in Paradis, Samuel Butler, pp. 113-142; 
Shuttleworth, S. Evolutionary Psychology and The Way of All Flesh,' in idem, pp. 143-
169; See also Forsdyke, D.R. 'Heredity as Transmission of Information: Butlerian 
'Intelligent Design'’, Centaurus 48 (2006), pp. 133-148.
71 Butler's engagement with technology is addressed in Sussman, H.L. Victorians and the 
Machine: the literary response to technology (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 
1968), pp. 135-161; Edwards, E. 'Samuel Butler's Photography: observation and the 
dynamic past', in Paradis, Samuel Butler, pp. 251-286. 
72Compare eg. Spencer's treatment of scientific tools in The Principles of Psychology 
(London, 1855), p. 484 with the below-cited quote from Butler's Erewhon (1872) 
addressing men of science's use of 'seeing-engines.'
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for New Zealand in 1859, in the hope that he could make a living and achieve 
financial independence from his father.73 It was in this largely pastoral setting that 
he first encountered Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859), and published 
his first (satirical) comment on the book, suggesting that eventually humans could 
be superseded by machines in the race of existence.74 His first  novel,  Erewhon 
(1872), develops this concept into a full-blown satire on nineteenth-century Britons 
confidence in the capacities of man, positing in the Antipodean colony a lost tribe 
of  humanity  that  has,  following  the  guidance  of  a  great  analyst  of  technical  
evolution, abandoned all  technical accoutrements in order to preserve their own 
species'  dominance.75 The  inversion  of  nineteenth-century  values  that  Butler 
portrays as accompanying this Luddite existence was sufficiently shocking to his 
father for him to claim that it had hastened his mother's death (which occurred in 
1873).76 The Way of All Flesh,  and his first  serious commentary on nineteenth-
century organicism, Life and Habit (1877) (started in 1873 and 1874 respectively) 
develop the technical and personal themes of this earlier work.
Butler  begins  Life  and Habit by  drawing on  his  own experiences  as  a 
pianist and composer. He poses a problem regarding the explanation of why, after 
musicians  have  learnt  to  play  a  piece,  they  no  longer  think  of  the  specific 
physiological  actions that  their  bodies undertake to produce it.  Butler  describes 
how, if we ask a competent (implicitly male)77 pianist to play a piece that they 
know well, but insist that he attends to the performance of each of the notes rather 
than the piece as a whole,
73 Robinson, R. 'From Canterbury Settlement to Erewhon: Butler and Antipodean 
counterpoint', in Paradis, Samuel Butler, pp. 21-44.
74 Butler, S. 'Darwin among the Machines', Press [Christchurch, New Zealand], 13th June 
1863.
75 Butler, S. Erewhon: or over the range (London, 1947 [1872]).
76 Raby, Samuel Butler, pp. 20, 119-122.
77On gender and musicianship in this period see Weliver, P. Women Musicians in  
Victorian Fiction, 1860-1900: representations of music, science and gender in the 
leisured home (Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2000) and Law, J. 'The 'Perniciously 
Homosexual Art': music and homoerotic desire in The Picture of Dorian Grey and other 
fin-de-siècle fiction', in Fuller, S. and Lossef, N. The Idea of Music in Victorian Fiction 
(Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2004), pp. 173-196. On the piano in nineteenth-century 
culture see also Lustig, J. 'The Piano's Progress: the piano in play in the Victorian novel', 
in Fuller, and Lossef, The Idea of Music, pp. 83-104.
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we shall  observe that  he finds it  hardly less difficult  to compass a 
voluntary consciousness of what he has once learnt so thoroughly that 
it has passed, so to speak, into the domain of unconsciousness, than he 
found it to learn the note in the first instance. The effort after a second 
consciousness of detail baffles him - compels him to turn to his music 
or play slowly.78
It should go without saying that this passage is highly reminiscent of physiological 
psychologists' comments on 'unconscious cerebration.' Butler explains the learning 
of music - and extends his example to address learning more generally - as an  
accumulation of habit, or the repetition of certain actions until they are no longer  
dependent  on conscious effort.79 What  is  of  particular  interest,  however,  is  the 
context  in  which  Butler  articulates  the  notion of  habitual  learning -  that  of  an 
individual’s engagement with an aspect of the technical environment (the piano) 
which he encounters in every-day experience.
The notion of habit articulated by Butler can be differentiated from that 
utilised  by  contemporaries  by  reference  to  the  particularly  pervasive  and 
fundamental role that it plays in his thought. For Butler, 'habit' consists in nothing 
more than repeated action - in this respect it is not specific to human psychology,  
or  even  to  organic  life.80 If  organic  bodies  cannot  originate  energy,  and  the 
acquisition of new forms of behaviour can only be explained by reference to the 
repetition of actions (Butler claims), machines might develop and assimilate habits 
in  the same way as living entities.  The only quote of  contemporary science in 
Erewhon  - given by the English narrator who has fortuitously re-discovered the 
anti-technical 'Erewhonians' - is of William Benjamin Carpenter's claim that energy 
cannot  be created or destroyed by life,  but  is  merely a  transformation of other  
forms of it (such as heat and electricity). 'I do not know how he has found this out,'  
the narrator pointedly comments, 'but he is a man of science - how then can it be  
78Butler, S. Life and Habit (London, 1877), p. 4.
79On the more general use of music and piano-playing as a metaphor in nineteenth-
century philosophy of mind see Weliver, Women Musicians. pp. 59-97.
80 In contrast with this reading, Laura Otis addresses Butler's texts as concerned above all 
with the assertion that memory is organic. See Otis, Organic Memory, pp. 18-27.
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objected  against  the  future  vitality  of  machines  that  they  are,  in  their  present  
infancy, at the beck and call of beings [ie. humans] who are themselves incapable  
of  originating  mechanical  energy?'81 However  seemingly  incapable  of  self-
development (what we might now call) technological assemblages may seem from 
a human perspective, their use of energy and repetition of actions indicate that they 
have the potential to become conscious.82 It is in this potential to develop functions 
generally associated with nervous psychology that machines retain a capacity to 
render humanity obsolete.
Acknowledging the universality of habit entails - as with the recognition of 
the  humanness  of  science  in  Edward  Carpenter's  publications  -  a  radical  re-
orientation  of  humanity's  awareness  of  its  own  place  in  the  world.  Reason  or 
intelligence is manifest where bodies of any sort are unable to reconcile themselves 
to  their  present  situation without  the habitual  accumulation of  new behaviours.  
Consciousness  is  the  development  of  new forms of  action  which  subsequently 
recede into unconsciousness:
For the embryo of the chicken... we claim exactly the same kind of 
reasoning power and contrivance which we claim for the amœba, or 
for our own intelligent performances in later life. We do not claim for 
it much, if any, perception of its own forethought, for we know very 
well that among the most prominent features of intellectual activity 
that, after a number of repetitions, it ceases to be perceived, and that it 
does not, in ordinary cases, cease to be perceived till [sic] after a very 
great number of repetitions.83
As  fundamentally  repetitive  creatures,  humans  possess  no  superiority  over 
amoebae  or  embryos  regarding  their  capacity  for  self-awareness.  Rather,  all  
struggle through the repetition of particular actions to reconcile themselves to the 
environments in which they find themselves. Habit is a constant generative force 
that acts throughout existence, and is not something possessed by some entities  
81 Butler, Erewhon, pp. 242 and 248.
82 Butler, Erewhon, p. 238 and Butler, 'Darwin amongst the machines'.
83Butler, Life and Habit, p. 73.
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more than others.
The  universality  and  fecundity  of  habit  also  implies  for  Butler  that 
conceptions of existence that rely on the perceptions of an unadorned humanity are 
inadequate. Again, in Erewhon, an ancient, great philosopher of ‘machines’, writing 
against  the  then-still-technically-enthusiastic  culture  of  his  now-Luddite  tribe, 
attempts to point out the extent to which even the most respected intellectuals of 
his society remain at the mercy of their built environment:
Is it man's eyes, or is it the big seeing-engine which has revealed to us 
the existence of worlds beyond worlds into infinity? What has made 
man familiar with the scenery of the moon, the spots on the sun, or the 
geography of the planets? He is at the mercy of the seeing-engine for 
these things, and is powerless unless he tack it on to his own identity, 
and make it part and parcel of himself. Or again, is it the eye, or the 
little  see-engine,  which  has  shown  us  the  existence  of  infinitely 
minute organisms which swarm unsuspected around us?84
Perception in this account is not dependent on man's senses alone (as would be the  
case  in  Edward  Carpenter's  critique),  but  on  an  interaction  between,  or 
amalgamation of, the organic and the technical. Men of science do not speak from 
a vantage point primarily attained through the disciplined training of their bodily 
senses, but are rather privileged in their access to certain forms of apparatus. 
The  notion  that  technical  entities  might  develop  habits  -  and  thereby 
intentions - alien to already-established, human modes of thought constitutes for 
Butler a powerful source of critique of exclusive and esoteric forms of rhetoric. 
Claims such as those of William Benjamin Carpenter regarding the constitution of  
a  'professional'  community,  or  of  Huxley  concerning  the  need  to  develop  a 
'scientific  priesthood'  are,  from  this  vantage  point,  clearly  misguided.85 Butler 
introduces what might be termed his 'techno-physiological' psychology in Life and  
Habit in terms of a critique of specialist scientific authority, and of an appeal to  
84 Butler, Erewhon, p. 242
85 For a consideration of the morality of vivisection in relation to an explicitly 'professional' 
ethos, see Carpenter, W.B. 'The Ethics of Vivisection', Fortnightly Review 31 (1882), pp. 
237-246, esp. on pp. 238-239 and 243.
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what he terms the 'unconscious' knowledge of his lay audience. 
For Butler,  the ability to express a truth-claim is not,  as had (he claims) 
hitherto been assumed, an indication of its likelihood, but rather an expression of  
its uncertainty.  Indeed, only those forms of knowledge that have been repeated 
until they are unconscious can be considered as 'perfectly' known: 'on becoming 
intense, knowledge seems also to become unaware of the grounds on which it rests,  
or that it has or requires grounds at all, or indeed even exists.'86 This implies that 
scientific  authors,  whilst  they  may  be  understood  as  'pioneers'  of  knowledge, 
cannot claim to be certain regarding the knowledge that they express. Certainty can 
however be attained by those who do not articulate claims about the world:
we  should  recognise  more  than  we  do,  that  there  are  two distinct 
classes of scientific people... The one class is deeply versed in those 
sciences  which  have  already  become  the  common  property  of 
mankind...  whilst  the  other  class  is  chiefly  intent  upon  pushing 
forward the boundaries of science... pioneers, as important to an army 
as  they  are,  are  still  not  the  army  itself,  which  can  get  on  better 
without the pioneers than the pioneers without the army. Surely the 
class  which  knows  thoroughly  well  what  it  knows,  and  which 
adjudicates on the value of discoveries made by the pioneers - surely 
this class has as good a right or better to be called scientific than the 
pioneers themselves.87
This advocacy of what would later be called 'folk' psychology over that of the (also 
later) 'specialist' scientist is informed and supported by a critique of physiological  
psychology  as  a  pioneering,  'conscious,'  and  therefore  not  certain,  form  of 
knowing.
Life  and  Habit deploys  this  inversion  of  the  distinction  between  an 
authoritative consciousness and a subordinate unconsciousness to undermine  the 
authority  of  those  seeking  exclusivity  in  the  interpretation  of  physiological 
experimental  practices.  The  principal  object  of  concern  in  this  respect  are  the 
86 Butler, Life and Habit, p. 34.
87 Butler, Life and Habit, pp. 30-31.
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claims  of  William Benjamin  Carpenter  in  his  Principles  of  Mental  Physiology 
(1877 edition). As Butler's  text comments (in relation to Carpenter's critique of 
mesmerism), the
only issue between myself and Dr. Carpenter would appear to be, that 
Dr. Carpenter, himself an acknowledged leader in the scientific world, 
restricts the term "scientific" to the people who know that they know... 
while I say that the term "scientific" should be applied (only that they 
would not like it) to the nice sensible people who know what's what 
rather than to the discovering class.88
By  re-defining  science  in  terms  of  what  is  commonly  known  rather  than  a 
community of  'men of  science',  Butler  casts  doubt  on any authority  that  being 
recognised as a 'man of science' might confer on the former.
Central  to  Butler's  critique  of  William  Benjamin  Carpenter  is  that  an 
explanation of non-human animals' construction of technical (ie. non-biological)  
entities can only be achieved by replacing the latter's notion of 'instinct' with an 
elevation of the concept of 'habit' to that of a universal generative force. In Mental  
Physiology,  Carpenter  had pointed to  a  particularly  intractable  problem for  the 
notion that simpler animals could be considered 'lower' on a scale of intellectual 
development than more complex. Small amoeba-like organisms, named  Gromia, 
had  been  observed  to  construct  dome-like  ‘tests’  or  casings  as  they  reached 
maturity. These seemingly indisputably ‘lower’ animals appeared to be completely 
conscious  of  the  requirements  for  building  such  highly  efficient  architectural  
forms, 'selecting' tiny pieces of grit and fitting them together to do so. But they did 
not  appear to possess the extent of nervous development that would (Carpenter 
believed) indicate a capacity for consciousness. If Gromia were not conscious, how 
was it that they were able to act as designers of their own habitats, like humans? 
The explanation given in Carpenter's text had been that such formations could only 
be explicable in terms of an these animals' possession of an 'internuncial,' instinct-
like impulse to build them.89 Having related Carpenter’s comments, Butler chooses 
88 Butler, Life and Habit, p. 34.
89 Carpenter, W.B. Principles of Mental Physiology: with their applications to the training of  
the mind, and the study of its morbid conditions [4th edition] (London, 1877), pp. 41-45.
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this  point  in  his  narrative  to  assert  the  primacy  and  universality  of  his  own 
preferred explanation; that such structures could only be constituted by the gradual 
accumulation of conscious habits possessed jointly by the organism and its built  
environment  simultaneously.  To  Carpenter's  insistence  that  'we  can  scarcely 
conceive  that  a  creature  of  such  simplicity  should  possess  any  distinct 
consciousness  of  its'  needs',  Butler  replies:  'why  not?'90 From  this  simple 
contradiction, Butler quickly extends his insistence on the habitual constitution of 
organism-tool relations to include the sand tube-like houses of the slightly more 
complex  terebella worms, birds and their nests, and, by implication, the humans 
and their constructed environments.91 The heritability of habit, not instinct (or of 
any other exclusively organic force), is conceived as the only plausible means of 
accounting for the presence of technical entities of any sort.
Butler's emphasis on relations between technical and organic entities leads 
him to a profoundly different interpretation of the experimental assemblages that  
were being created by physiologists in laboratories. For example, discussing the 
fact  that  frogs'  legs  can  still  be  induced  to  move  after  the  animals  had  been 
decapitated,  he arrives  at  conclusions  almost  diametrically  opposed to  standard 
interpretations. William Benjamin Carpenter had suggested that the independence 
of such movements from the brain must indicate that certain forms of muscular  
movement  are  'instinctive'  -  ie.  that  movement  in  frogs'  legs  is  not  necessarily 
accompanied by conscious awareness. Butler objects to this interpretation on the 
grounds that Carpenter arbitrarily associates the head of the animal with the totality 
of the animal itself - that for Carpenter, having severed the source of the animal’s  
will  from  its  body,  the  continued  existence  of  movement  must  indicate  that 
movement can occur 'automatically,' without willed intervention.92 Butler, on the 
other hand, attributes the movement of decapitated frogs' legs to the independent 
will of the legs (and remaining parts of the body) themselves:
One can see the absurdity of maintaining that we can make one frog 
90 Butler, Life and Habit, p. 67.
91 Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology, pp. 43-44. Butler, Life and Habit, pp. 67-74.
92 Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology, pp. 68-70.
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into  two  frogs  by  cutting  a  frog  into  two  pieces,  but  there  is  no 
absurdity  in  believing  that  the  two  pieces  have  minor  centres  of 
sensation and intelligence within themselves, which, when the animal 
is entire, act in such concert with the brain, and with each other, that it 
is not easy to detect their originally autonomous character.93
For  Butler  (like  Darwin),  organic  individuality  is  an  ultimately  arbitrary 
classificatory denotation. This contention serves him as a literal tool with which he 
is able to undermine any attempt to define the physiological nature of naturally-
occurring species, as the entity being analysed in such experimental set-ups will 
inevitably be technically constituted by the experimentalist.
The disunity of technical beings
Butler's re-orientation of subjectivity in terms of technical entities and a 
universally  generative  'habit'  is  accompanied  by  severe  doubts  regarding  the 
unitary existence of any real entity which might be identified as constituting the 
human individual:
We regard our personality as a simple and definite whole; as a plain, 
palpable  individual  thing...  But  in  truth  this  "we,"  which  looks  so 
simple and definite, is a nebulous aggregate of many component parts 
which  war  not  a  little  among  themselves,  our  perception  of  our 
existence at all being perhaps due to this very clash of warfare, as our  
sense of sound and light is due to the jarring of vibrations.94
A few pages later, the relation of this confusion to technical entities is articulated 
more clearly:
we find that we are rooted into outside things, and melt  away into 
93 Butler, Life and Habit, pp. 113-123, on p. 119.
94 Butler, Life and Habit, p. 78.
250
them, nor can any man say that he consists absolutely in this or that,  
nor define himself so certainly as to include neither more nor less than 
himself...
A man's clothes, for example, as they lie on a chair at night are no 
part of him, but when he wears them they would appear to be so, as 
being a kind of food which warms him and hatches him, and the loss 
of which may kill him cold.95
As well as not constituting a unitary whole in and of itself, the human body is an 
arbitrary category dependent on a wide-ranging panoply of 'external' aids for its 
survival.
Butler does not specifically critique the practice of vivisection. He does 
imply in  a  later  lecture  on 'Thought  and Language'  (presented  to  the  Working 
Men's  College  in  Great  Ormond  Street  in  1894)  that  he  considers  technical  
intervention in physiology of the nervous system to be futile as far  as nervous 
psychology  is  concerned.96 An  indication  that  Butler  did  not  conceive  of 
vivisection  as  problematic  on  moral  grounds  is  indicated  by  Erewhon,  which 
(through another  fictional  'great  philosopher')  articulates  a  lengthy  reductio  ad  
absurdum of the notion of 'animal rights'.97 
Butler's chief concern is with what vivisectional experiments might mean, 
rather than their relative legitimacy. His radical re-interpretation of physiological 
phenomena is accompanied by an equally radical sense of doubt regarding many of 
the certainties of nineteenth-century British culture - especially those concerning 
the primacy of humanity's place in the world.
Butler's  engagement  with  and  critique  of  physiological  individuality  is 
directly related to his portrayal of masculinity in The Way of All Flesh. Above all, 
the  novel  emphasises  that,  despite  our  ambitions,  we  are  not  able  to  maintain 
ourselves  as  unitary beings with the capacity to  regulate  our  goals  and desires 
accordingly. Its central character, Ernest Pontifex (who most critics identify with 
95 Butler, Life and Habit, pp. 80-81. See also p. 110, and Butler, Erewhon, pp. 266-269.
96 Butler, S. 'Thought and Language', in Butler, S. (Streatfield, R.A. ed.) Essays on Life, Art  
and Science (New York and London, 1970 [1908]), p. 179.
97 Butler, Erewhon, pp. 273-292.
251
Butler) takes on a series of identities - intellectual, preacher, shopkeeper - which, 
despite his full belief in them at the time, are overthrown by desires and aspects of 
his self of which he is not conscious. Faith in self-discipline, the Anglican church,  
and  biblical  literalism  is,  through  a  series  of  mistakes  and  misdemeanours, 
gradually supplanted in Ernest by his irrepressible need to express sexual desire 
and the stifling influence of his respectably religious family. Indeed, his transition 
between these identities is marked by the involuntary expression of parts of himself 
which he had sought to repress. When, as a preacher, he visits a prostitute, his  
initial intention to convert her becomes mingled with a (hitherto unacknowledged) 
feeling of sexual  attraction.  Having been interrupted in his conversion,  he then 
transfers his sexual desire onto another, more ‘reputable’ woman, resulting in his 
arrest and departure from the priesthood.98 Later, as a shopkeeper, his intention to 
build a business with the woman he has married is subverted by a combination of 
her alcoholism, and his own blindness to it.99 Critically, these 'falls' also constitutes 
a form of emancipation for Ernest, who gradually gains independence from and 
power over his domineering father.100 The Way of All Flesh and Life and Habit both 
call  established norms of  nineteenth-century masculinity  into question via  their  
representation of subjectivity as contradictory, habit-defined, and ultimately unable 
to be characterised in terms of any singular will or consciousness.
Butler's  texts  indicate  ways  in  which  an  intense  interest  in  relations 
between life and technicity might accompany a breakdown of organism-centred 
notions of subjectivity. Re-considering subjectivity in relation to organic-technical 
assemblages threatens - as had the reconsideration of subjectivity in relation to  
human-animal relations in Edward Carpenter's work - to dissolve the category of  
the  human  observer  as  an  independent  entity.  The  representative  power  of 
physiological experimental phenomena, and their importance in the definition of 
late-nineteenth-century notions  of  self,  meant  that  they retained the capacity to  
subvert the medical and scientific goals of the vast majority of the physiologists  
who set such experiments up in the first place.
98Butler, S. The Way of All Flesh (New York, 1965 [1903]), pp. 259-261
99 Butler, The Way of All Flesh, pp. 323-333.
100 Butler, The Way of All Flesh.
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Conclusion
The  emergence  of  vivisection  as  a  practice  central  to  the  discipline  of 
physiology was dependent on a physiological psychological conception of learning 
as practice. Physiological psychologists stressed that it  was in the interaction of  
hand and head that habit could best be formed, and their rhetoric was effectively  
taken  up  by  advocates  of  laboratories  as  places  of  learning.  One  cultural  
phenomenon associated with this proliferation of experimental practice was an re-
evaluation  by  experimental  physiologists  of  the  status  of  'men  of  science'  in  
nineteenth-century society. Physiological researchers such as Huxley and Bernard 
sought to redefine masculinity in relation to their experimental activities, thereby 
creating a discourse in which the man of science was to be upheld as at least as (if 
not more) 'cultured' than any gentleman of letters.
Nevertheless, within British society, the perception of humanity as owing a 
moral duty of care to non-human animals meant that the very animal-tool hybrids 
which physiological psychologists used to support their conclusions - vivisected 
animals - became a focus for debate. Though (or perhaps more accurately because)  
anti-vivisectionists  frequently  arrived  at  diametrically  opposed  conclusions  to 
physiologists  regarding the appropriateness of experimentation on animals,  they 
adopted  remarkably  similar  attitudes  regarding  the  desirability  or  otherwise  of 
'masculine'  characteristics.  Both  experimental  physiologists  and  their  opponents 
articulated a notion of scientific manliness that sought to reconcile a middle-class 
notion of 'professional' community with a longer-standing ideal that upheld the un-
impeachability of gentlemanly virtue. It is this proliferation of representations of  
vivisection - rather than any specific judgement regarding its validity - that can be 
identified  as  playing  an  active  part  in  the  deconstruction  of  nineteenth-century 
assumptions regarding the nature of 'man'  more generally.  This representational 
field constituted a condition of possibility for the articulation of post-physiological 
conceptions  of  subjectivity  such  as  those  expressed  in  the  works  of  Edward 
Carpenter and Samuel Butler.
Taken  in  isolation,  neither  Samuel  Butler's  nor  Edward  Carpenter's 
reactions against the ideals and assumptions of their time can be understood as 
offering a fundamental re-alignment of subjectivity away from that that had been 
constituted by physiological psychological culture. Edward Carpenter's faith in the 
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unity  of  nature  was  ultimately  grounded  in  an  assumption  regarding  the 
undesirability of technical change - an assumption which few of his contemporaries  
were willing to go along with. Butler, despite adopting a radically different attitude 
regarding  technical  entities,  and  even  appealing  to  them in  his  critique  of  the 
organically-focused culture of his time, did not develop an alternative to this latter  
culture. Where he did seek to articulate a positive vision of action within a world 
constituted by technical as well as organic entities - in Erewhon and to a certain 
extent in Life and Habit - he did so tentatively, always deploying irony as a means 
of mitigating any sense of certainty in his readership.
Neither Edward Carpenter nor Butler appear to have known of each others 
work. Yet together the texts of these figures can be understood as representing two 
poles of a nascent, 'post-physiological' tension as it begins to emerge during the 
latter decades of the century. The principal concerns of this subjective dynamic can 
be conceived as, on the one hand, a tendency to appeal to nature not as an object to 
be known, but as a being that one might learn to commune with. On the other hand, 
an insistence on the independence and ultimate unknowability of technical entities 
in relation to humanity begins to appear that threatens to efface the human as an  
object  of  intellectual  concern.  The  relevance  of  Carpenter's  appeals  to  the 
environmental movements that have come to the fore during the twentieth century 
should  be obvious.  Similarly,  his  critique  of  science will  be familiar  to  many, 
especially  those who have engaged with the history of  science as  a  discipline.  
Perhaps  less  familiar  to  some historians  (though not  cultural  theorists)  will  be 
Butler's appeal to technical self-development, and his deconstruction of humans' 
belief in their own unitary selves. This technical emphasis points to the ever-more-
critical place that tools have come to hold in life and thought over the last hundred  
and fifty or so years.
Conclusion
Like many studies before it, this thesis has articulated a conception of the 
nineteenth  century  as  a  period  marked  by  the  re-figuring  of  humanity  as  a 
zoological  organism.  The  concerns  of  eighteenth  and  early-nineteenth-century 
authors with relations between matter and spirit, it has shown, came together in  
contentions regarding the nature of the living and experiencing body. As spirit and 
matter were thought together, a notion of the self as an amalgamation of both came 
to the fore. 
Debates regarding the relative explanatory powers of natural law and spirit 
were conducted in relation to a range of epistemic tools. As far as living bodies 
were concerned, microscopes and museums constituted two of the most important 
of such tools during the first half of the century. The relative merits of each as  
means of perceiving the nature of life were evaluated in relation to an epistemology 
of gentlemanly witnessing and agreement. In this conception of perceptual activity,  
museum specimens were valued because they could be made were visible to many 
witnesses at once, as well as because they constituted symbols of imperial power.
The  relative  status  of  such  tools  as  microscopes  and museums became 
directly relevant to the articulation of embodied notions of human psychology at 
this  time.  Because  of  the  increasing  status  of  zoology  within  the  academy, 
intellectuals hoping to instantiate psychology as a ‘discipline’ began to appeal to 
the  very  tools  and  techniques  that  zoologists  were  holding  up  as  able  to 
demonstrate  the  nature  of  both  human  and  animal  bodies.  In  positioning 
psychology as  a science of  the nervous system,  these authors  placed particular  
emphasis on the ability of epistemic tools to reveal humanity’s internal as well as 
its external nature.
Though much of the above has been articulated in some way before, the 
importance  of  tools  in  nineteenth-century  zoological  endeavour  is  not  so  well 
recognised.1 In addition, most histories of nineteenth-century organicism concern 
themselves almost exclusively with interrogating means by which the category of  
1 Though see Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, and Hopwood et. al,. ‘Seriality and Scientific 
Objects’.
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’life  itself’2 came  to  be  defined  and  understood.  In  contrast,  this  thesis  has 
characterised the notion of organic subjectivity as a participant in the construction 
of alternative subjective modes.
The second half of this thesis shows ways in which the articulation and 
instantiation of embodied notions of cognition not only constituted the human as a 
zoological object, but also became critical to the emergence of notions of self that 
did not take the individual organic body as their primary object of explanation. In 
the first instance, the emergence of microscopes as epistemologically significant  
tools was accompanied by the articulation of energy-centred, movement-oriented 
notions  of  cognition.  Physiological  psychology  rhetoric,  in  merging  with  the 
broader science of energy that came to the fore in Britain during the 1860s and 
1870s,  was  critical  to  the  instantiation  of  science  as  a  practice-  as  well  as 
representation-oriented activity. In this instantiation, an epistemic field came to the 
fore  in  which  human-tool  interaction,  as  well  as  bodily  perception,  became 
paramount. Finding themselves in a position in which their bodies were deemed to 
incapacitate  their  ability  to  perceive  the  nature  of  things,  middle-class  women 
seeking to participate in the culture of medical and scientific professionalism began 
to appeal to their technical competency rather than their sensory capacities in the 
constitution of themselves as authorial observers.
By the late nineteenth century, modes of subjectivity were coming to be 
articulated that sought to escape from the bodily confines of physiological ways of 
conceiving  of  the self.  In  the writings  of  George Eliot,  Arabella  Buckley,  and 
Samuel Butler - all of which committed to embodied conceptions of self -  tools 
begin to take on a ‘life’ of their own. They appear as narrators of tales, as well as 
self-generating  entities.  Butler’s  texts,  especially,  begin  to  position  life  as 
something that cannot be thought except in conjunction with the tools by which it  
is perceived and enabled to continue. As an entity reliant on a highly technical,  
constructed environment, the human subject begins to appear as unstable in relation 
to  its  surroundings.  In  addition,  and  as  significantly,  those  who  perceived  in 
industrial culture a threat to their own ideals and ways of life (such as Edward  
Carpenter) began to adopt and articulate modes of conduct that might reconcile 
humanity  with  an  imagined  nature.  Where  much  nineteenth-century  natural 
2 On the notion of ‘life itself’, see Rose, N. The Politics of Life Itself: biomedicine, power,  
and subjectivity in the twenty-first century (Princeton; University Press, 2007).
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philosophy had been pre-occupied with the relation of matter to spirit, twentieth-
century thought would be equally pre-occupied with relations between animality 
and machinery.
The texts of Edward Carpenter and Samuel Butler analysed in chapter five 
foreshadow the technical and cybernetic anxieties of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries referred to at the beginning of this thesis. On the one hand, 
Butler’s appeal to ‘habit’ as a means by which machines might be understood as 
entities as potentially capable of self-generation as any animal point to one means 
by which bodies and tools might be thought together more rigorously. On the other, 
Carpenter’s concerns regarding the tendency of scientific machinery to dominate 
and thereby efface prior ‘natural’ modes of being brings the risks inherent to such 
endeavour to the fore. Stretched  between  a  nostalgia  for  an  imagined,  non-
technical  ‘past’,  and  fear  of  a  projected,  technically-determined  future,  the 
constitution of the self as both technical and organic seems to be accompanied by a 
considerable measure of uncertainty regarding its positioning in time and place. 
Indeed, though they purport to be describing a real world that exists ‘out there’,  
even Butler’s texts acknowledge the impossibility of defining a conception of self 
and world that can hold good for all time and all places. Life and Habit represents 
enunciation as an expression of uncertainty rather than of belief. Butler presents 
himself as unwilling to determine his reader’s notions of self: ‘Above all things, let  
no unwary reader do the injustice of believing in me. In that I write at all I am 
amongst the damned.’3 Such a comment is pertinent to the contention mooted here 
that the technical or ’cybernetic’ conception of self is itself historically contingent. 
To conclude this thesis, I wish to offer a few speculations regarding what it might  
mean to practice history in our cybernetically-constituted present.
As  touched  upon  in  the  introduction  to  this  thesis,  Geoffroy  Bowker's 
recent text  Memory Practices in the Sciences indicates that whether we position 
ourselves as fact-gatherers seeking to construct a 'more complete' representation of 
'the' past, or (as has been the case in this thesis) as certain kinds of subjects offering  
a 'reading' of a nominally stable 'archive', we participate fully in the concerns that 
emerged in conjunction with the historical sciences and industrial environments of 
the nineteenth century. Acknowledging the contingency of historical explanation 
3 Butler, Life and Habit, p. 41.
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does not present an escape from the notion that what it is we are interpreting - the 
'archive' - participates in and constitutes a critical condition of possibility for our 
narration.  By  considering  bodies  and  texts  as  entities  co-constituted  by 
'developmental' life and 'mediating' tools, we can begin to move away from debates 
regarding the indeterminacy or otherwise of objective, scientific observation that 
were already becoming stale by the end of the nineteenth century.4 To do so would 
be to participate in the constitution of a  different  set  of  concerns to those that  
animate the vast majority of historical accounts of nineteenth century Britain, if not 
history as a discipline more generally.
One way those concerned with the constitution of historical narrative might 
help disarm the seemingly pervasive trap of having to choose between subjective  
and  objective  commitments  might  be  to  emphasise  more  vehemently  the 
participation of a broader range of participants than the 'interpreting'  author (or 
authors) and the set of archival 'information' that they are able to access. As this  
thesis has shown, the assertion that ‘we’ can comprehend our own ‘nature’ (and 
with it, as Bowker shows, our own history) in any absolute sense is fraught with  
questions relating to who or what is to do the comprehending in the first place. The 
way we experience or remember the past is contingent who or what we believe 
ourselves to be.
Since  we  now  find  ourselves  in  a  situation  in  which  we  are  able  to 
acknowledge that we are co-constituted by both tools and living bodies, historians’ 
own  texts  might  henceforth  be  thought  more  carefully  as,  inescapably, 
'assemblages',  built  or  emergent  from networks  of  interactions.  They  might  be 
understood as the sedimentation of sets of experiences or contingencies present at 
certain locations (e.g. London, University College, The British Library) at certain 
times (c. 2007-2011) and for certain entities (that of a white, middle class twenty-
something  from  the  British  midlands,  along  with  the  co-workers,  friends, 
companion animals, communication networks and word-processing machines they 
engaged  with).  Such  conceptions  would  entail  a  re-working  of  the  notion  of 
historical  authorship  and  archivization,  away  from  the  assumption  of  'active'  
authorship in relation to a 'passive' set of archival information or 'data'. 'Archives'  
have recently begun to be re-thought as entities that emerge in conjunction with the 
4 Kittler, Discourse Networks; chapter five of this thesis.
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narratives and concerns of those that engage them: as tools created by as much as 
constitutive  of  specific  forms  of  subjectivity.5 The  continued  theorizing  of 
posthuman notions of self will, this thesis implies, further this process.
To acknowledge such a broad range of contingencies as those referred to 
above in the constitution of historical narrative would be to position recent work 
interrogating linkages between embodiment and technical subjectivity as critical 
matters of  concern.  The introduction to this thesis pointed to Friedrich Kittler's 
interrogation of the years around 1900 as marked by a sense of narrative and bodily 
disintegration and doubt. This was, he suggests, brought on by a de-centering of the 
human as an ‘authorial’ subject. With the mediation of texts, speech and sight via 
mechanical  typewriters,  gramophones  and  film  equipment,  reading  could  (he 
claims)  no longer  be conceived  as  an 'internal',  'imaginative'  projection,  or  the 
written  word  be  thought  as  an  interpretative  medium  for  a  passive,  feminine 
'nature'.6 As Kittler implies, in continuing to cast ourselves as sovereign ‘authors’ 
offering  either objective  or  subjective  accounts  of  history,  we  abandon  our 
narratives in  the face of  ever-more-sophisticated and persuasive modes of  non-
linear and/or non-textual narration.
Kittler's implication that it is only such ‘mediating’ tools as typewriters, 
gramophones and film projectors that effectively efface the authority of the printed 
word (and with it the human authorial subject) begins to appear somewhat over-
stated  once  the  centrality  of  notions  of  life  in  the  constitution  of  technical 
subjectivities are brought to the fore. As this thesis contends, the thinking of the 
human as a developing, organic 'animal' has been a critical condition of possibility 
for  the technicalization  of  power.  The  constitution and proliferation of  techno-
organic  bodies  such  as  the  vivisected  animals  constructed  in  physiological 
laboratories during the nineteenth century should be accorded at least as central a  
role in the cultivation of posthuman subjectivities as Kittler accords such tools as 
the typewriter. A more intense interest in similar sites of techno-organic interaction 
5 Waterton, C. ‘Experimenting with the Archive: STS-ers as analysts and co-constructers 
of databases and other archival forms’, Science, Technology, and Human Values 35 
(2010), pp. 645-676. Bowker, Memory Practices; Derrida, J. (trans. Prenowitz, E.) 
Archive Fever: a Freudian impression (Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 
1995).
6 Kittler, Discourse Networks. See also Kittler, F.A. (trans. Winthrop-Young, G. and Wutz, 
M.) Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Stanford; University Press, 1999).
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would further this claim. The zoological gardens that sprung up throughout Europe 
and North America during the nineteenth century would be one site of interest in 
this regard.7 As would the intensive cultivation techniques that became increasingly 
pervasive in agriculture from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A 
privileging of  such sites  and techniques  as  matters  of  historical  concern would 
further  emphasise  that  'animal'  -  and  more  generally  'natural',  'developmental', 
'narrative' - bodies have been implicated in the constitution of technical subjectivity 
from its very beginning.
The  figuring  of  technical  modes  of  subjectivity  entails  a  projection  of 
certain kinds of future as much as it does a narration of particular conceptions of 
past.8 This thesis has emphasised the latter at the expense of the former. It has done 
so not out of a desire that our posthuman future be foreclosed. Rather, it has been 
motivated by a hope that we might begin to construct tools with which we are able 
to re-work 'nature' in ways that do not preclude the survival of aspects of our planet  
presently under threat from human over-population and its concomitant technical 
excesses. To me, it suggests that to seek a return to a world-imaginary in which 
'culture' or 'technology' figure as entities super-added to an a-priori (and therefore 
more 'fundamental') 'nature' would be to idealise nature as something that could be 
unproblematically  differentiated  from  humans  and/or  tools.  Yet,  equally,  to 
abandon certain forms of 'nature' to the to-them existence-threatening conditions 
that technical 'progress'  has constituted seems also to risk the dissolution of the 
very conditions upon which the technical has come to be recognised as constituting 
subjectivity in the first place.
To return to the initial question of this thesis: at stake in the identification 
of  ourselves  as  technical  beings  is,  precisely,  'life’  itself.  Forms  of  life  are 
continually being (re)constructed to  feed,  clothe,  and otherwise administer  to  a 
rapidly  expanding  world  population.  In  such  a  context,  the  technicalization  of 
living appears to some as a threatening spectre in which humanity organises the 
planet around itself via its project of technical 'progress'. Life, it appears, is  being 
7 Ritvo, The Animal Estate and Rothfels, N Savages and Beasts: the birth of the modern 
zoo (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 2002) implicitly address the emergence 
of zoological gardens as sites of animal-technical interaction.
8 See eg. Fuchs, C.J. ‘”Death is Irrelevant”: cyborgs, reproduction, and the future of male 
hysteria’, in Gray, The Cyborg Handbook, pp. 281-300.
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articulated, through technique, to the human. Humanity is figured as life's superior  
and beneficiary rather than its offspring and collaborator. Rather than recommend 
reclaiming or returning to a 'natural' state that has never existed, this thesis figures 
'life' as something that cannot be so subordinated. To the extent that it insists on the 
animality as well  as the technicality of human being,  it  implies that  continued,  
uncritical  belief  in  technical  'development'  also,  paradoxically,  constitutes  a 
subordination of the human animal to its own technical ideals.
I believe that to raise such spectres as the technical determination of non-
human nature is to neglect the capacity of technical entities to exceed the purposes 
intended  for  them  by  humans.  I  have  sought  to  emphasise  the  capacities  of  
technical entities to cultivate certain forms of (both human and non-human) life, as  
much as the ability of living entities to determine technical operations. It is not  
through the elevation of one or another of these categories that a viable technical 
future is to be found, I suggest, but through their mutually constitutive articulation. 
The kinds of activities by which we might seek to constitute sustainable 
forms of life will  entail  the  construction of new tools and the learning of  new 
techniques,  and  not  just  those  related  to  the  production  of  electricity  or  the 
cultivation of crops. For those without leverage in either the highly inert, slow-
moving politics of industrial nations, or the technically-exclusive and -excluding 
'global' economy of electronic investment and share trading, such learning and such 
construction  must,  I  believe,  begin  with  those  entities  that  are  most  readily 
available,  and  which  are  thereby  most  readily  brought  to  bear:  narratives, 
languages, and living bodies. As N. Katherine Hayles has convincingly shown, the 
effective  mobilization  of  such  entities  will,  increasingly,  also  involve  an 
unprecedentedly  intense  engagement  with  digital  software,  computational 
hardware, and their associated communication networks.9 The imperative of this 
thesis is that we must learn to interact with and deploy this latter set of entities in 
ways  that  do  not  efface  the  fleshy,  expressive,  story-telling  elements  of  our 
biotechnical selves.
9 Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer.
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